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SÍNTESIS 
 
La doctrina del interés público puede ayudar a justificar restricciones, incluyendo 
la expropiación o nacionalización de inversiones extranjeras.  Sin embargo, la 
propia configuración de la doctrina proporciona a los Estados una discreción 
ilimitada equivalente a una licencia para ejercitar la doctrina en detrimento de sus 
obligaciones de proteger a las inversiones extranjeras.  
 
El estándar subjetivo y la falta de contenido de la doctrina, en tanto derecho 
internacional convencional como consuetudinario, además de fomentar el abuso 
de algunos Estados contra los inversores, ha conllevado a concluir que la doctrina 
debe de ser ignorada en virtud a sus vulnerabilidades para servir por si misma a la 
aplicación de parte de los Estados. 
 
En tal sentido, uno de los propósitos es enfatizar, aun cuando ello parezca 
implícito, que sólo la compensación, el debido proceso y el trato no 
discriminatorio realmente importan en situaciones de expropiación, 
nacionalización, o de toma de propiedad por parte de los Estados. 
 
A pesar de esta falta de definición, la doctrina es utilizada indiscriminadamente.  
En lo que respecta a derechos humanos la doctrina desempeña un rol importante, 
pero aun se encuentra carente de definición.  Por ejemplo, las tres convenciones 
de derechos humanos aquí analizadas (la Convención Europea, la Convención 
Interamericana, y la Carta Africana) se aprovechan de la doctrina con la finalidad 
de elaborar cualificaciones aplicables a varios, pero no todos, los derechos 
humanos enunciados (tal como el derecho de propiedad).  Conciencia sobre el 
interés público, sea en el contexto de convenciones de derechos humanos, 
acuerdos de comercio regionales, tratados bilaterales de protección de inversiones 
(“BIT”), o convenciones de derecho comercial, es necesaria si la doctrina espera 
ser considerada como un talismán para justificar la intervención del Estado, 
proporcionándoles a ellos con prerrogativas para desconocer el derecho de otros. 
 
En tal sentido, nosotros proponemos once proposiciones para modificar la 
doctrina que ciertamente no tienen la pretensión de agotar el estudio de la 
doctrina, pero se configuran como centrales para la rehabilitación concienzuda de 
la doctrina. 
 
Primero, el interés público no puede ser desarrollado como una proposición auto 
evidente, debe de ser construido y entendido de acuerdo a un razonamiento 
lógico.  
 
Segundo, no todo aquello que tenga un imprimátur público se encuentra dentro 
del ámbito de la doctrina. 
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Tercero, la percepción subjetiva, los orígenes, o la justificación de un acto no lo 
hace legal o viable de acuerdo a la doctrina.  El acto por sí mismo debe responder 
a objetivos de interés público. 
 
Cuarto, la globalización comanda a que los Estados se comprometan y que 
conjuntamente identifiquen preocupaciones dentro del marco de un paradigma 
que no tolere resultados de “suma cero”.  El “test de efectos” encontrado en las 
decisiones y normas de NAFTA deben conllevar a que el test sea aplicado en el 
contexto de una doctrina de interés público moderada que pueda conllevar a un 
resultado razonable y proporcionado.  
 
Quinto, un esfuerzo concertado por la comunidad internacional es necesario para 
forjar una nueva doctrina que sea utilizada como base normativa para justificar 
incumplimientos con obligaciones vinculantes que subyacen sobre los Estados.  
 
Sexto, una jerarquía de intereses públicos, todos dentro del ámbito de una doctrina 
única, necesita ser identificada.  Asuntos que afectan la aplicación de principios 
de jus cogens, o que conciernen al derecho a la vida, deben de tener preminencia.  
 
Sétimo, el interés público no puede ser confundido con la acción del Estado con la 
finalidad de perpetuar al régimen de turno o con la “obligación histórica” de 
diseminación ideológica.  Aquí, el “test de utilidad” puede servir como un 
estándar relevante. 
 
Octavo, armonizar el interés público en normas de protección de inversiones 
extranjeras (“FIPS”) y en BITs, de manera que la cantidad y calidad de 
obligaciones de protección al inversor vinculantes a los Estados pueda conllevar 
al cumplimiento y no a la frustración de las expectativas entre el Estado de origen 
y el Estado receptor de la inversión, es neurálgico para la rehabilitación de la 
doctrina con la finalidad de evitar arbitrariedades, falta de transparencia, así como 
irregularidades y corrupción.  
 
Noveno, una solución parcialmente práctica puede ser la inmediata 
implementación a través de la incorporación de una definición de interés público 
en los instrumentos internacionales.  
 
Décimo, los Estados que aplican el interés público en cumplimiento del ejercicio 
de la soberanía regulatoria deben tener la carga de la prueba mediante un estándar 
similar a lo “claro y convincente”, para demostrar los objetivos fundacionales y 
comparables que subyacen en la aplicación de la doctrina. 
 
Undécimo, debe haber un reconocimiento de que las ONGs y los legisladores 
nacionales representan vehículos pragmáticos para transformar y definir una 
nueva doctrina de interés público que pueda servir a los intereses de la totalidad 
de la comunidad de naciones consonante con las demandas de la globalización 
económica.  
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El desarrollo e implementación de éstas once proposiciones es intimidante.  Sin 
embargo, algún confort puede ser encontrado en entender que el conocimiento del 
problema en sí y por sí mismo puede servir como un factor mitigador. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The doctrine of public purpose may help to justify restrictions, including the 
expropriation or nationalization of foreign investment.  However, the self-judging 
configuration of the doctrine provides States with unbridled discretion tantamount 
to a license to exercise it to the detriment of its obligations to protect foreign 
investment. 
 
The subjective standard and the lack of content of the doctrine, in both 
conventional and customary international law, in addition to fostering abuse of 
some States against investors, have led to conclude that it may be ignored because 
of the doctrine’s vulnerabilities to self-serving application on the part of States.   
 
Therefore, one of the purposes is to emphasize, even though they may seem 
implicit, that only compensation, due process, and non-discriminatory treatment 
actually matter in instances of expropriation, nationalization, or the taking of 
property on the part of States.   
 
Notwithstanding this lack of definition, the doctrine is used indiscriminately.  In 
human rights, the doctrine serves an important role, but it is still undefined.  For 
instance, the three human rights conventions here analyzed (the European 
Convention, the Inter-American Convention, and the African Charter), avail 
themselves of the doctrine in order to craft qualifications applicable to many, but 
not all, human rights enunciated (such as the right to property).  Consciousness of 
public purpose, be it in the context of human rights conventions, regional trade 
agreements, BITs, or commercial law conventions, is necessary if the doctrine is 
to be relied on as a talisman for exceptions to State intervention providing them 
with the right to disavow the rights of others. 
 
 
In that order, we proposed eleven propositions to modify the doctrine that 
certainly have no pretense of exhausting the subject, but appear to be central to 
the meaningful rehabilitation of the doctrine.  
 
First, public purpose cannot be construed as a self-evident proposition, it should 
be construed and understood subject to discursive reasoning. 
 
Second, not everything that has a public imprimatur falls within the ambit of the 
doctrine.  
 
Third, the subjective perception, origins, or justification of an act does not render 
it legal or viable according to the doctrine. The act itself must respond to public 
purposes’ objectives.  
 
Fourth, globalization commands that States compromise and jointly address 
concerns within the framework of a paradigm that does not tolerate “zero-sum 
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game” results.  The “effects test,” found in the NAFTA “decisional law” must 
yield to a test to be applied in the context of a tempered public purpose doctrine 
that may lead to a reasonable and proportionality driven result.  
 
Fifth, a concerted effort by the international community is needed to fashion a 
new doctrine when used as a normative foundation for the disavowance of 
binding obligations on States.   
 
Sixth, a hierarchy of public purposes, all falling within the ambit of a single 
doctrine, needs to be identified.  Matters affecting the application of principles of 
jus cogens, or that concern human life, must be accorded preeminence.   
 
Seventh, public purpose cannot be confused with State action in furtherance of 
regime perpetuation or the “historical obligation” of ideological dissemination. 
Here the “futility test” can serve as an important standard.  
 
Eighth, harmonizing public purpose in FIPS and BITs so that the quantum and 
quality of investor protection obligations binding on States can lead to the 
fulfillment and not the frustration of expectations between home and Host States 
is central to the doctrine’s rehabilitation, in order to avoid arbitrariness, lack of 
transparency, as well as irregularities and corruption. 
 
Ninth, one practical partial solution that may be immediately implemented is 
through the incorporation of a definition of public purpose in international 
instruments.  
 
Tenth, States applying public purpose in furtherance of the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty should bear the burden by a standard akin to “clear and convincing” 
of demonstrating the objective foundations and commensurable underpinnings of 
the doctrine’s application.  
 
Eleventh, there must be a recognition that NGOs and national policymaking 
represent pragmatic vehicles for transforming, and defining a new public purpose 
doctrine that may serve the interests of the entire community of nations consonant 
with the demands of economic globalization. 
 
The development and implementation of these eleven propositions is daunting.  
Some comfort, nonetheless, perhaps can be found in realizing that consciousness 
of the problem in and of itself may serve as a mitigating factor.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of the present work is to comply with the requirement 
necessary to obtain the PhD degree.  This work has been developed 
pursuant to Article 31 of the University Reform Act (Ley de Reforma 
Universitaria) and its development legislation, upon which it was 
delimited the characteristics for the PhD programs as well as the Doctorate 
Thesis.  The Thesis then it is defined as an original work research-project 
about a topic related to the scientific, technical or artistic field of the PhD 
that is carried out by the PhD applicant.  Its purpose is the specialization 
of the PhD applicants in such specific field and their formation in research 
techniques.  In the following pages, the PhD applicant will explore the 
concept of the doctrine of Public Purpose and its application and 
development in the international law.   
Economic globalization and non-territorially based understandings of 
sovereignty have underscored a need to revisit, or perhaps just simply 
visit, the role of the public purpose doctrine in customary and 
conventional international law. The tension between a State’s legitimate 
right to regulate, and its equally genuine and binding obligations 
concerning foreign investment protection often rest on the scope and 
application of this doctrine. Unlike the orthodox territorially grounded 
principle of sovereignty, the public purpose doctrine has commanded little 
attention from jurists and scholars. Therefore, it has not developed to meet 
the multiple demands of capital-exporting and capital-importing countries 
in a Global environment. The legacy public purpose doctrine reflects a 
substantively bankrupt doctrine that is nearly eviscerating itself. Economic 
globalization has called for a qualification of public purpose in 
international law. This text seeks to contribute the mere suggestion of a 
first modest step towards this now quite necessary undertaking.  
In order to contextualize the nature of the relevant issues that place in 
high relief the inadequacies of the legacy-orthodox application of the 
public purpose doctrine in an era of economic globalization and of an 
attendant conceptualization of sovereignty that prioritizes the needs of the 
international community over the perceived national interests of particular 
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States, the origins of the public purpose doctrine in international law, 
which the author identify as resting in Classical Greece, need to be 
summarily reviewed. 
As previously mentioned, the doctrine of public purpose in international 
law is not a self-evident truth. Its rich origins in Homeric, and later 
Classical Greece, however, have contributed to a modern understanding of 
the doctrine as a concept that is intuitive, self-evident, and, therefore, one 
that would only be obscured by discursive reasoning seeking to reduce to 
syllogistic form its normative foundation. To explain a self-evident truth 
in order to submit to the light of reason its underpinnings, so the argument 
suggests, is to obscure the very object sought to be explained. The 
incomplete conception of the public purpose doctrine developed in 
Classical Greece as a principle of international law and justice provided 
very limited conceptual space for the consideration of “foreign” interests 
while championing the polity’s public purpose objectives often to the 
detriment of the rights of foreigners.  
The Greece of Homer, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the great playwrights, 
and the elegant analytics of euclidian geometry that gave birth to the 
founding tenets of Western philosophy, literature, and mathematics, 
simply did not recognize a common public purpose doctrine that 
enveloped multiple city-States, expanding beyond the geopolitical 
subdivisions of a single πολισ (“polis”). The original and legacy origins of 
public purpose as a principle of international law were sufficiently 
circumscribed to the political boundaries of the πολισ and to language so 
as to justify slavery, and the taking of a slave’s property for the public 
purpose of serving the common good. It provided for two takings, the first 
of which was the very act of enslaving, i.e., the taking of a slave as 
property, as further discussed below in the analysis of terms. Thus, the 
mere crossing of a political/territorial boundary of one πολισ to the next 
would transform a free citizen into a slave. The perceived public purpose 
and benefit to the πολισ was deemed sufficient to justify a dehumanized 
status of captives from person to commodity. This slave status is most 
eloquently explained by the actual words used for slaves first appearing in 
Homer (δμὤσ f. or δμοσ m.), and later in Attic-Classical Greek 
(ανδραπωδων), both of which not too loosely may be translated as 
“plunder with feet.”1 It thus follows that under this rubric the act of 
                                                 
1 Even Greece’s keenest philosopher argued in favor of the commodification of human 
beings when concerning slave status. In Politics, Aristotle argues: 
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enslavement was considered to be little more than the taking of property, 
of plunder or chattel with feet. 
Pursuant to application of international public purpose strictures, 
Classical Greece understood public purpose as a normative doctrine of 
international law that enshrined the inwardness of the parochial world of 
the πολισ. In this context it makes sense that the Attic Greek word for 
foreigner, βἄρβαροσ, originally meant “all who were not Greeks,” 
especially the Medes and Persians. More indicative still of the inwardness 
that constituted the basis for public purpose and justified sacrificing the 
rights of “foreigners” is the verb βαρβαριζειν, meaning to speak gibberish, 
or at best, to enunciate broken Greek; an onomatopoeic word that to the 
ears of Ancient Greeks resembled the guttural babble of languages other 
than their own.2 The root of the English word barbarian certainly is 
related to a conceptual disdain for peoples not Greek but this 
conceptualization by itself cannot stand as sufficient to explain public 
                                                                                                                         
Just as the phrase ‘an article of property’ is used akin to the word ‘part,’ 
anything that is a part not only forms by definition part of something 
else, but also must necessarily belong to such other thing. It is no 
different as concerns an item of property. Therefore, while it is clear 
that a master is only the slave’s master and cannot belong to the slave, a 
slave is not just the slave of the master, but also belongs to the master 
in its entirety. 
 
These propositions clearly establish the nature of slaves and of their 
fundamental quality. A slave is a human being that by nature is not 
autonomous and cannot be said to belong to himself, but rather belongs 
to another human being by dint of the very nature of a slave. Now a 
human being who belongs to another despite being a person also must 
be considered an article of property. In turn, an article of property is a 
chattel, item or instrument that is susceptible to being separated or 
severed from its owner.  
 
Politics I. II. 6-8. 
 
A person is by nature a slave when that person is such that he can 
belong to another person, and indeed it is because of this capacity to 
belong to another person that he so belongs, and such a person is 
rational enough to understand belonging to another person but not 
being himself but a slave; for other than man animals are not 
subservient, animals do not follow reason, but instead are guided by 
feelings. 
 
Politics, I. II. 13-14. (Translation from the original Greek by the authors)  
 
2 See, e.g., AN INTERMEDIATE GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON: FOUNDED UPON THE SEVENTH 
EDITION OF LIDDELL AND SCOTT’S GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON, 146 (Oxford University 
Press, 7th ed., Dec. 31, 1945) [hereinafter Liddell & Scotts Greek-English Lexicon]. 
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purpose in international law at the time.3 It is also inextricably connected 
to an inward-looking public purpose that is understood as serving the 
common good of the πολισ.  
Significantly, while the intuitive nature of public purpose justified 
the commodification of free citizens now turned slave when wandering 
into a foreign jurisdiction, “and even the philosopher, who visited foreign 
countries to enrich his native land with the merchandise of science and art 
was exposed to be captured and sold as a slave to some barbarian 
master,”4 the taking of “property” in the form of a slave based upon a 
public purpose exercised for the common good of the πολισ was not 
absolute. A solitary but quite significant and now relevant exception was 
recognized in the form of a treaty that ostensibly bestowed non-foreigner 
status on peoples who otherwise would be deemed “barbarians.” These 
original and embryonic precursors to the contemporary concept of 
national treatment protection contained in conventional international law 
were called σπονδαι in the plural. Even though the original source 
literature that would explain the normative foundation of an agreement 
preempting public purpose justification for the taking of property is scant, 
its meaning is settled. It is connected to “the wine poured out to the gods 
before drinking.”5 There is consensus, however, that the term for treaty, 
alliance, truce, or agreement is one and the same with libations first 
offered to the gods because upon concluding a truce or treaty “solemn 
drink-offerings were made on concluding them.”6 
                                                 
3 Plato in his work, The Statesman, suggests that the origins of the word are not based on 
a theory premised on onomatopoeia. He specifically States: 
 
It appears as if in classifying peoples (citizens of other States) this 
classification were to have nearly two parts, a practice that is shared by 
popular culture among Greeks. On the one hand, one half of all peoples 
are Greek and the other half, which includes many other peoples 
unrelated to each other by blood or language, are all classified under 
the single name of ‘barbarian,’ under the thinking that they have 
identified a single and particular race.”  
 
The Statesman, Lines 262 D-E. (Translation by the authors). 
 
According to Plato’s account, the origin is based on an “otherness” that is unrelated to a 
perception of languages other than Greek. 
 
4 See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH A SKETCH OF THE 
HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE 1 (Originally published 1836 by Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 
reprinted 3d ed. 2002. 
 
5 Liddell & Scotts Greek-English Lexicon, supra note 4, at 740. 
 
6 Id. 
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Parties to the treaties were called εν-σπονδοσ, meaning a party to 
the treaty, or more literally, “included in a truce or treaty.”7 Similarly, 
persons or peoples outside of the treaty’s ambit, i.e., non-parties or non-
signatories to the convention, were referred to as εκ-σπονδοσ (singular), 
more literally translated as “out of the treaty, [or] excluded from it.”8 
Conceptually it appears reasonable then that any exception to a 
public purpose-based taking or confiscation in furtherance of the common 
interests of the πολισ would be qualified by the “sanctity” of a treaty or 
convention and in this sense somewhat partaking in an underlying 
normative premise connected to the divine. 
 
Except for a treaty or convention blessed by the gods, public 
purpose-based confiscations or takings for the benefit of the πολισ 
constituted a settled doctrine of international law well-established in 
Classical Greece. But for this qualification, public purpose was supreme, 
preempting all considerations and justifying disregard for foreigners for 
the benefit of the πολισ. Wheaton in his venerable chestnut published in 
1836, Elements of International Law: With a Sketch of the History of the 
Science9 observed that:  
Thucydides has correctly Stated the leading political 
maxim of his countrymen, --’that to a king or 
commonwealth, nothing is unjust which is useful.’ The 
same idea is openly avowed by the Athenians, in their reply 
to the people of Melos. Aristides distinguished in this 
respect between public and private morality, holding that 
the rules of justice were to be sacredly observed between 
individuals, but as to public and political affairs, a very 
different conduct was to be followed. He accordingly 
scrupled not to invoke upon his own head the guilt and 
punishment of a breach of faith, which he advised the 
people to commit in order to promote their national 
interests.10 
The self-evident and nearly absolute character of the public 
purpose doctrine as a protagonist in public international law keeps close to 
its origins and has persisted unchanged into the twenty-first century, as to 
(i) attribution of the self-evident status and (ii) virtually unqualified 
                                                 
7 Id. at 265. 
 
8 Id. at 244. 
 
9 See WHEATON, supra note 6. 
 
10 Id. 
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standing and preempted only by jus cogens. Consequently, the public 
purpose doctrine when invoked as part of the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty by a State in furtherance of its national interests is generally 
accepted as application of an intuitive, self-evident truth no different from, 
for example, fundamental human rights that are not subject to mitigation, 
exception, or qualification such as the right to humane treatment,11 
freedom from slavery,12 the right to name,13 and the right to not to be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.14 
The public purpose doctrine is practically ubiquitous in the form of 
a material doctrinal and conceptual principle in both customary and 
conventional international law. It is foremost present in tempering and 
regulating a State’s legitimate right to regulate and its equally genuine and 
binding obligation to protect foreign investors and investments. Illustrative 
in this regard is the conventional and customary international law on 
expropriation and the taking of property. As a general principle it is 
universally accepted that a State has a right to expropriate or to nationalize 
directly or indirectly, or to undertake acts tantamount or equivalent to an 
expropriation or nationalization of property pertaining to a non-citizen so 
long as such a measure is taken (i) for a public purpose, (ii) in a non-
discriminatory manner, (iii) in accordance with due process of law, and 
(iv) on payment of compensation. In addition to being central to any 
analysis concerning the protection of foreign investor rights, defining the 
scope of a sovereign’s regulatory space, and harmonizing conflicts 
between international trade law and domestic regulations, the doctrine is 
pivotal to the application of international human rights and to the 
workings of such public international law doctrines as permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, and numerous iterations of sustainable 
development (i.e., health, safety, & environment, labor, and economic 
regulation).  
Despite the public purpose doctrine’s preeminence in public 
international law and its time-honored historical prominence, public 
purpose remains an elusive concept. It is not rigorously defined anywhere 
in customary or conventional law. What sparse pronouncements exist on 
“the jurisprudence of public purpose in international law” is mostly 
inconclusive and merely suggest that, although not without limits, States 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123 (entered into force on July 18, 1978) [Hereinafter American Convention] . 
 
12 Id. at art. 6.  
 
13 Id. at art. 18. 
 
14 See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 & 14, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 
[hereinafter European Convention]. 
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enjoy wide discretion in determining what constitutes public purpose. 
Such pronouncements are of little utility for use of the doctrine in the 
present, and inspire little hope for greater understanding in the future. 15 
Moreover, the treatment of the doctrine as encompassing “all things 
public” based upon a subjective content that is self-judging on the part of 
States and, therefore, not susceptible to challenge, may have been viable in 
an international law framework based upon orthodox understandings of 
sovereignty in turn premised on territoriality in an environment of pre-
economic globalization. Such “practical or functional success” was 
possible where States asserted “international-independence” within a 
rubric where national interests were perceived to be segregated from the 
common concerns of the international community of States. This paradigm 
no longer exists. 
The advent of economic globalization has introduced a paradigm 
of interdependence. Traditional notions of territorially based Westphalian 
sovereignty are no longer responsive to the common needs of nations. 
International human rights law serves as a model of a new sovereignty that 
is neither absolute nor any longer resting on geopolitical borders. In this 
                                                 
15 Commenting on this issue Schrijver observes: 
 
In most relevant arbitral decisions, the view has been taken that a 
lawful nationalization or expropriation must serve a public purpose 
[citation omitted] but sometimes with qualifications. For example, in 
the Liamco case it was held: 
 
‘As to the contention that the said measures were 
politically motivated and not in pursuance of a 
legitimate public purpose, it is the general opinion in 
international theory that public utility is not a 
necessary requirement for the legality of a 
nationalisation’ [citation omitted] 
 
….While many conclude that the demand of a ‘public interest’ or 
‘public purpose’ should be maintained, there is recognition of the fact 
that ultimately it is the taking government which determines the public 
purpose or utility of a particular expropriation, and that in many cases, 
it can be taken as impossible that an international court or organization 
can form a reasonable judgment on the accuracy of a claim by a State 
that an action served a public purpose. [citation omitted] 
 
In Summary, a State is not completely free to determine the 
justification and conditions for a nationalization but is bound by certain 
international law requirements. In practice, however, it has wide 
margins of discretion. 
 
NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES, (Cambridge University Press, 1997) at pp. 291-292. 
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new space and era that economic globalization delineates, a legacy public 
purpose doctrine that is self-judging (subjective), based upon models of 
dependence, and conducive to “all or nothing” results, will frustrate the 
expectations of both capital-exporting and capital-importing States, as 
well as the answers to fundamental questions of process legitimacy in the 
adjudication of investor-state disputes. Can this legacy public purpose 
doctrine be re-defined so as to comport with paradigms of 
interdependence, the exigencies of economic globalization, and the 
expectations of home and Host States? Are there NGOs appropriately 
positioned and sufficiently credentialed to lead this effort? Is the legacy 
public purpose doctrine susceptible to substantive reconfiguration so as to 
account for international principles of proportionality and bilateralism? 
What would be the mechanics pursuant to which the content, scope, and 
application of the doctrine may be conditioned in order to satisfy an 
objective standard? Is the prevailing paradigm of Global interdependence 
sufficiently developed so as to cause the international community of 
nations to set aside competing interests and reach a consensus on a neutral 
and objective-based understanding of public purpose in customary and 
conventional international law?  
More fundamentally still, are the various iterations of public 
purpose such as environmental concerns, human, animal and plant life, 
national security, and exercise of police powers susceptible to being 
classified under the overarching umbrella nomenclature of “public 
purpose”? Is the doctrine of public purpose susceptible to hierarchical 
categorization if indeed there are multiple subject-matter public purposes? 
Can a government by decree transform a governmental initiative and 
objective, such as the “institutionalization” and perpetuation of a political 
revolutionary agenda, into a public purpose within the purview of the 
public purpose doctrine? This latter inquiry is particularly applicable in the 
context of nationalizations or expropriations undertaken in furtherance of 
the alleged public purpose of promoting alleged revolutionary and 
political ideological principles. 
While not purporting to provide exhaustive and conclusive answers 
to these inquiries, and other equally relevant queries, this contribution 
does aspire to address these concerns. 
 
II. CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE METHODOLOGY USED 
In addition to the methodological requirements, a PhD thesis should 
comply with the essential requirements related to originallity, novelty, and 
topicality of the subject matter of the research, its scientific basis and the 
probability to be pragmatically applied.  The selection of the research 
method is subject to the purpose aimed to be reached and the nature of the 
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field of research, in this present case the international public law, 
specifically speaking the concept of public purpose.   
If law is considered as a complex field with multiple areas, it is 
understood that it should be studied from different perspectives.  The 
method is, then, the way of the critical thinking in order to find the truth, 
therefore it complies with the formulation of ideas, the organization of the 
reasoning in a theoretical system; and finally, its rational exposition of 
certain idea or topic to the public audience.  In consequence, the validity 
given to one or another method will be subject to the framework of the 
specific field of study.   
As it is generally known, international public law is a field that is 
evolving through the time, the historical factas and the multiple 
international relations that are continually happenning among States 
compels the conduct of individuals and countries to certain standards.  
Therefore an historical approach is demanded.  Today, the law, in general 
terms, is evolving, in other words, transforming itself.  There are several 
rules, laws, and regulations, as well as sources of law that continuously 
change, however the tenets of the international consuetudinary and 
convencional law still prevail.  The general principles of law, the norms of 
ius cogens, have a universal recognition.  The States in their own 
development create norms, rules and regulation.  This power to 
unilaterally create new rules is part of the characteristic of novelty that 
attaches to the power of States, which in no way is empty of juridical 
content.  The mere existence of rules whose purpose is to protect higher 
values, which the international community considers indispensable to the 
community, determines a necessity to understand these higher principles.  
Therefore a inductive and deductive approach have to be applied.  
In that regard, it is a common approach to affirm that the public purpose 
is present in all the political actions of a state/government, however, there 
is no, in our personal perspective, an specific and narrow identification 
about its scope and limits.  Given the broad meaning of this concept, 
influence by political issues, it is important to establish certain boundaries 
based on the historical and pragmatic perspective.  To do that it is 
necessary to do a brief hystorical research about the doctrine of public 
purpose, in order to find out its roots and necessary meaning.  As it is 
generally understood, Public International law is an independent system of 
law existing outside the legal orders of particular states. It differs from 
domestic legal systems in a number of respects. For instance, there is no 
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system of courts with comprehensive jurisdiction in international law.  
There is no international police force or comprehensive system of law 
enforcement, and there also is no supreme executive authority.  
Additionally, public international law is a distinctive part of the general 
structure of international relations.  In contemplating responses to a 
particular international situation, states usually consider relevant 
international laws. Although considerable attention is invariably focused 
on violations of international law, states generally are careful to ensure 
that their actions conform to the rules and principles of international law, 
such as public purpose, because acting otherwise would be regarded 
negatively by the international community. The rules of international law 
are rarely enforced by military means or even by the use of economic 
sanctions. Instead, the system is sustained by reciprocity or a sense of 
enlightened self-interest. States that breach international rules suffer a 
decline in credibility that may prejudice them in future relations with other 
states or investors. Thus, a violation of a treaty by one state to its 
advantage may induce other states to breach other treaties and thereby 
cause harm to the original violator. Furthermore, it is generally realized 
that consistent rule violations would jeopardize the value that the system 
brings to the community of states, international organizations, and other 
actors. This value consists in the certainty, predictability, and sense of 
common purpose in international affairs that derives from the existence of 
a set of rules accepted by all international actors. International law also 
provides a framework and a set of procedures for international interaction, 
as well as a common set of concepts for understanding it.  
Under that framework is upon which the concept of public purpose also 
evolve and need to be understood through an historical, inductive and 
deductive approach, but more importantly through a pragmatic view that 
most of the tribunals –international ones- have given to the content of its 
meaning. 
III. CONTENT, PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
While not purporting to provide exhaustive and conclusive answers, this 
contribution does aspire to address several concerns within the framework 
of six chapters, each of which contains multiple subparts.  
The first chapter uses the framework of the NAFTA as a microcosm of 
customary and conventional international law to explore the public 
purpose doctrine as an exception, more precisely a reservation, to treaty 
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obligations addressing investment protection provided to the NAFTA 
parties. Thus, emphasis is placed on Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA 
(Investment Services and Related Matters). As to methodology, the 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven first is analyzed strictly within the Chapter’s 
context and then more generally in select chapters where public purpose 
serves a foundational role in defining the scope, content and, application 
of specific provisions. The treatment of the public purpose doctrine in the 
NAFTA’s text, beyond the Chapter Eleven framework is used as a 
predicate to tracing the doctrine’s contours in conventional international 
law. Foundational NAFTA arbitral opinions, i.e., the NAFTA’s 
“decisional law” also is used as a tool for penetrating the orthodox view of 
the public purpose doctrine in customary international law. Thus, as 
Chapter Eleven is to the remainder of the NAFTA framework, so is the 
entirety of the NAFTA to conventional international law. It also draws a 
distinction between treaty-based reservation exceptions and public 
purpose exceptions. 
This first chapter sets forth the analytical methodology used in 
subsequent chapters to identify the workings of the doctrine within the 
parameters of specific subject-matter treaties, such human rights 
conventions, but also within international law instruments concerning 
macroeconomics that have contributed to the formation and transformation 
of the public purpose doctrine in customary international law. Finally, 
chapter one aspires to understand whether the cross-fertilization between 
public purpose-based exceptions imported from international trade law 
into international investment protection law may affect the relationship 
among the delicate and competing interests of capital-exporting States and 
their capital-importing counterparts. The chapter concludes with 
reflections on conventional international law’s use of public purpose. 
Chapter two aspires to identify both the role and status of the public 
purpose doctrine in customary international law. It does so, however, first 
by testing the quantity and content of the public purpose doctrine in 
customary international law and rejecting an a priori judgment even as to 
the doctrine’s very existence. This chapter posits that common elements of 
public purpose compellingly argue in favor of a single public purpose 
doctrine that even when embedded in instruments that limit a State’s 
domestic regulatory space, the doctrine despite its multiple iterations 
broadens the regulatory authority of States. The chapter further advances 
the proposition that meaningful contributions to the content and scope of 
the public purpose doctrine arose from the tension between capital-
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exporting and capital-importing countries. Here careful consideration is 
accorded to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (1994), the WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (1994), and the WTO DOHA Ministerial Declaration: Nov. 14, 
2001, all of which are used as analytical and synthetic instruments that 
help explain the existing shortcomings of the legacy public purpose 
doctrine, and also are suggestive of detailed ways in which the doctrine 
can be developed to meet the demands of economic globalization, the 
interests of both industrialized and under-developed countries, and the 
often conflicting requirements of a paradigm of transnational political and 
economic interdependence. The recurring motif of the right to regulate and 
this right’s relationship to a State’s international obligations is viewed in 
the context of the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012, and the 
Principle of Sustainable Development.  
The public purpose doctrine’s role in the law of international human 
rights is examined through the lenses of (i) the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights, (ii) the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
(iii) the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights in chapter three. 
These three conventions are used to analyze the extent to which the public 
purpose doctrine has been influenced by regional historical developments 
as to scope and content. In this context, historicity is understood as a 
temporal and constraining element that need not form part of the public 
purpose doctrine of the twenty-first century. Chapter three also asserts that 
delineating the public purpose doctrine as it appears in international 
human rights law serves as a tenet that is fundamental in identifying a 
hierarchy of human rights precepts that enjoy a status akin to that of jus 
cogens. The analysis advanced in this chapter helps to facilitate an 
understanding of public purpose in international law as a doctrine that 
must be subjected to discursive reasoning and, therefore, cannot be treated 
as a self-evident truth the normative foundations of which are intuitively 
known. 
Chapter four chronicles the effect of bilateral investment treaties on the 
public purpose doctrine, as well as the doctrine’s distortion of symmetry 
and bilateralism in the conventional international law of investment 
protection. Specifically, the virtually ad hoc and decentralized framework 
of bilateral investment treaties is considered from the perspective of the 
manner in which structural framework issues attendant to BITs have 
contributed to the contemporary understanding of the legacy public 
purpose doctrine.  
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Chapter five primarily advances the proposition that the principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR) constitutes an 
expression of the legacy public purpose doctrine. This chapter also 
attempts to identify formal and substantive connections between PSNR 
and the Principle of Sustainable Development, the latter also is treated as 
an important iteration of the legacy public purpose doctrine. The status of 
the public purpose doctrine in customary international law is critically 
revisited in this chapter. The conceptual effects of PSNR on regulatory 
sovereignty, and host-State investor protection obligations are also 
reviewed. 
Finally, chapter six addresses domestic legislation purporting to protect 
foreign investors in order to attract FDI. This chapter compares and 
contrasts FIPS (Foreign Investment Protection Statutes) to BITs, focusing 
on structure, content, and the role of the public purpose doctrine. In 
addition it is suggested that the FIPS’s structural configuration may serve 
as a practical and effective instrument of reform that may contribute to the 
much necessary remedial work that is required to redeem the public 
purpose doctrine’s promise to harmonize the right to engage in regulatory 
sovereignty with the obligation to enforce juridically binding foreign 
investor protection obligations. This final chapter aspires to demonstrate 
the subtle and more immediate relationships between the preceding five 
chapters and eight very particular suggestions of ways in which FIPS may 
be used in concert among interested members of the international 
community to render the public purpose doctrine relevant to the needs of 
nations and to the struggle for transparency in the quest for process 
legitimacy..   
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c Purpose in NAFTA 
	EAST\64724221.3 15 
The North American Free Trade Agreement16 constitutes an ideal 
Petri dish for any inquiry as to the status of the public purpose doctrine in 
public international law. Featuring a comprehensive self-contained treaty 
structure comprising eight parts, 22 chapters, and seven annexes, the 
NAFTA can serve as a microcosm of public international law, particularly 
as to trade and investment. In addition, this treaty framework, most 
notably because of Chapter Eleven (Investment), has spawned its own 
“jurisprudence” arising from contracting party arbitrations. This 
“decisional-law” at least theoretically, in part serves to help define 
fundamental principles of international trade and investment law that are 
endemic to the NAFTA. 
The seemingly all-encompassing breath of the NAFTA-treaty 
framework ranging from national treatment and market access for goods to 
temporary entry for business persons, together with ambitious but practical 
objectives concerning (i) the elimination of barriers to trade, (ii) the 
promotion of conditions for fair competition in a free trade area, (iii) a 
commitment to increasing investment opportunities, (iv) the protection of 
intellectual property rights, (v) the provision of procedures for dispute 
resolution, and (vi) the establishment of a framework for further trilateral, 
regional, and multilateral cooperation to maximize the benefits of the 
treaty, provide an ideal configuration for understanding the role of the 
public purpose doctrine more broadly in customary and conventional 
international law beyond the scope of just a single treaty. Put simply, the 
NAFTA, with the benefit of the investor-state decisional law that it has 
spawned, much like Leibniz’s monads, each said to have been 
imperceptibly small but reflecting the entire universe, can be said to 
embody in some sense the fundamental precepts of the public international 
law of trade and investment protection. Equally relevant for purposes of 
this analysis is the NAFTA’s application of the public purpose doctrine 
broadly throughout the whole of its treaty framework, but more 
particularly in its Chapter Eleven rubric. The NAFTA references and 
relies on the public purpose doctrine directly in the most pristine form of 
its nomenclature as “public purpose,” and less explicitly pursuant to the 
doctrine’s multiple iterations, such as “public order,” “public morals,” 
“social welfare.” It develops a “public purpose standard” while also 
relying doctrinally on public purpose as a substantive principle explicitly 
having specific categorical or subject matter content, and thus presents the 
compelling case of a principle that is more than a “boiler plate catchall” 
conceivably concerning a sovereign’s exercise of sovereignty under the 
banner of the public good. The NAFTA, is ideally tailored to an 
exploration of the role, scope, and content of public purpose in 
conventional and customary international law. Accordingly, this first 
                                                 
16 North American Free Trade Agreement, US-Can-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.639 
(1993) (hereinafter NAFTA). 
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chapter shall serve to identify the fundamental workings of the public 
purpose doctrine in a treaty framework, which includes analyses of the 
doctrine’s iterations, subject matter content, application, and scope. In 
tracing the edges of public purpose within the NAFTA framework, an 
analytical “blueprint” will be developed that in turn shall be applied more 
comprehensively in identifying the relationship between public purpose 
and the sphere of regulatory sovereignty in the context of divergent 
international law instruments forming part of customary international law. 
The challenge of identifying and understanding public purpose within the 
doctrine is one and the same from a purely analytical perspective as 
identifying and studying the doctrine’s role and effect in customary 
international law. Challenges common to a single treaty analysis and 
consideration of numerous international law instruments pertaining to 
different fields of law and regions of the world promise to facilitate the 
exercise while preserving its virtually infinite and inviting challenges.  
The NAFTA rubric has carved a meaningful and substantive space 
for public purpose. Throughout the NAFTA Chapter Eleven scheme,17 
                                                 
17 Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement forms part of PART 5 
entitled: INVESTMENT SERVICES AND RELATED MATTERS, Chapter 11, 
Investment. This chapter of the NAFTA is most unique because it comprises both 
international trade law and international investment law, at times indiscriminately 
intermingling both concepts. Id. 
For example, Chapter 11 incorporates the orthodox standards found in customary and 
conventional international investment law aimed at protecting foreign investors that also 
represent substantive claims for affirmative relief: Article 1102 (National Treatment), 
Article 1103 (Most-Favored Nation Treatment), Article 1104 (Standard of Treatment), 
Article 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment), and Article 1106 (Waver of 
Performance Requirements). Id.  
Significantly, however, paragraph 6 of Article 1106 engages in the wholesale importation 
of recognized principles of international trade law that comprise the fundamental general 
exceptions found in Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
relating to the protection of human, animal or plant life and health, providing:  
Provided that such measures are not applied in any arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade or investment, nothing in paragraphs 1(b) or (c) or 
3(a) or (b) shall be construed to prevent any Party from adopting or 
maintaining measures, including environmental measures: 
(a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations 
that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement;  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
or  
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources. 
Id. art. 1106 ¶ 6; cf. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 20, 1947, 55 
U.N.T.S. 188, 262 [hereinafter GATT]. The challenges that the co-mingling of 
international trade law and international investment law principles raise are significant 
with respect to the development of a public purpose doctrine that seeks legitimacy based 
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public purpose is explicitly referenced only once.18 The doctrine of public 
purpose, however, is conceptually addressed without the identifying 
“public purpose” nomenclature on ten distinct occasions.19 The most 
significant reference is found in Article 1101(4). This provision reflects 
well conceived temperance on the part of the NAFTA parties in their 
treatment of public purpose. The article merits citation in its entirety: 
1. This Chapter applies to measures adopted or 
maintained by a Party relating to: 
investors of another Party; 
investments of investors of another Party in 
the territory of the Party; and 
with respect to Articles 1106 and 1114, all 
investments in the territory of the Party. 
2. A Party has the right to perform exclusively the 
economic activities set out in Annex III and to 
refuse to permit the establishment of investment in 
such activities. 
                                                                                                                         
upon an objective standard, uniform application, and a configuration that comports with 
the effects of economic globalization on the concept of sovereignty in the 21st century, as 
more fully discussed in this text. 
 
18 NAFTA Article 1110, entitled “Expropriation and Compensation,” directly references 
“public purpose” as one of four (4) predicates to a lawful nationalization or expropriation 
under international law. Article 1110 reads: 
Expropriation and Compensation 
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a 
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an 
investment (“expropriation”), except:  
(a) for a public purpose;  
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and  
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 
through 6.  
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110 ¶ 1(a)-(d) (emphasis supplied). 
 
19 See, e.g., id. art. 1101 ¶ 4; art. 1105 ¶ 3; art. 1106 ¶¶ 2, 4, 6(a)-(c); art. 1108 ¶¶ 1, 3; art. 
1110 ¶ 8; art. 1114 ¶¶ 1, 2. 
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3. This Chapter does not apply to measures adopted or 
maintained by a Party to the extent that they are 
covered by Chapter Fourteen (Financial Services). 
4. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to 
prevent a Party from providing a service or 
performing a function such as law enforcement, 
correctional services, income security or insurance, 
social security or insurance, social welfare, public 
education, public training, health, and childcare, in 
a manner that is not inconsistent with this Chapter.20  
The term “such as” in paragraph four suggests that the NAFTA parties 
were aware that reducing the public purpose doctrine to a definition was 
not possible.21 The eleven disciplines identified in paragraph four, ranging 
from law enforcement to childcare, are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. 
Instead, they are categorical but thematically consistent with each other 
based upon having a “public character” as a common denominator.22  
                                                 
20 Id. art. 1101 (emphasis supplied). 
 
21 See, e.g., Alberto R. Salazar V., Ph.D., NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, 
and Domestic Counter-Advertising Law, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 44-45 (2010) 
(identifying Art. 1101(4) as one of the provisions in Chapter 11 that operates to “shed 
important light on a possible definition of public purpose,” but noting that “while this 
NAFTA provision permits governments to provide essential public services, it largely 
limits or negates the public purpose exception to trade rules due to its NAFTA 
compatibility requirement.”); Benjamin W. Jenkins, The Next Generation of Chilling 
Uncertainty: Indirect Expropriation Under CAFTA and Its Potential Impact on 
Environmental Protection, 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 269, 294 (2007) (arguing that Art. 
1101(4) “highlights the uncertainty surrounding when a legitimate public policy goal 
might be considered an expropriation” and that in some circumstances the services 
alluded to in the provision “could be provided in a way that is inconsistent with chapter 
11.”); L. Kinvin Wroth, Lingle and Kelo: The Accidental Tourist in Canada and NAFTA-
Land, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 62 (2006) (noting that Art. 1101(4) recognizes “a Party’s right 
to take domestic measures for certain police power purposes, expressly including 
environmental measures, though these measures must be consistent with Chapter 11.”). 
 
22 In the June 15, 1992 draft of article 1101(4), Mexico sought to broaden the scope of 
this paragraph, by including all branches of government, a public purpose category 
entitled “Public Retirement Plans,” and welfare services. Additionally, “services” 
identified in statutes pertaining to specific public purpose categories were included: 
 
4. MEX[Nothing in this Chapter prevents a Party through its executive, 
legislative and judicial bodies, from providing services or functions 
such as public welfare services and services forming part of a statutory 
system of social security, public health care, public education, and 
public retirement plans to its citizens.] 
 
Draft of June 15, 1992, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
NAFTA CH. 11 TRILATERAL NEGOTIATING DRAFT TEXTS [Hereinafter NAFTA 
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Article 1101(4) adjusts for the elusive status of public purpose in 
international law by fashioning a criterion or standard rather than a 
definition for the doctrine.23 The final subordinate clause of the paragraph, 
“that is not inconsistent with this Chapter,” is consonant with both a 
“proportionality” and an “effects test,” as the plain language itself invites 
policy comparison and contrast. 
Paragraph four of Article 1101 of the NAFTA, when construed as 
a standard, represents a meaningful contribution towards vesting the 
public purpose doctrine with uniformity while tacitly acknowledging the 
conceptual difficulties endemic to an international law doctrine 
                                                                                                                         
Negotiating Drafts]. All NAFTA negotiating documents are available for download at the 
Office of United States Trade Representative, 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/NAFTA_Chapt
er_11_Trilateral_Negotiating_Draft_Texts/. 
 
23 The United States, in the August 4, 1992 draft pertaining to this paragraph, sought to 
place limits on “public purpose” and to limit its subjective content but in so doing 
emphasized the circular reasoning that is so common to this undertaking. Specifically, the 
U.S. proposed that “[t]he term  ‘public purpose’ does not include the deliberate 
disadvantaging of investors of another Party or country.” Id. (Draft of Aug. 4, 1992) 
(emphasis supplied). Pursuant to this stricture, the proscribed conduct would entail an 
inquiry into the subjective motive (“deliberate”) of the State in characterizing an act as 
within the ambit of public purpose. Consequently, the effort does not bring us closer to a 
narrowly defined public purpose construct that would limit overreaching by sovereigns. 
This proposed language formed part of a broader proposal qualifying a sovereign’s ability 
to act through State enterprises: 
USA[1. This Chapter, and in particular the obligation to accord 
nondiscriminatory treatment to investments in the territory of a Party of 
investors of another Party, shall apply to the State enterprises of a 
Party. (n. 16: Mexico can agree to this provision if placed outside the 
Investment Chapter and only in respect of non-discriminatory treatment 
when buying and selling goods or services.) 
2. Where a Party owns and controls, at the federal level, State 
enterprises that are not monopolies, it shall not by provision of 
subsidies or otherwise, take measures to support such State enterprises 
in conduct that results in serious prejudice to investors of another Party, 
contrary to such investors’ reasonable expectations. This provision 
shall not apply where such conduct is authorized by law to fulfill a 
public purpose and is reasonably related thereto. The term “public 
purpose” does not include the deliberate disadvantaging of investors of 
another Party or country.] 
Id. (emphasis in original). This proposed provision sought to narrow the scope of State 
action that may adversely compromise foreign investments on the part of the NAFTA 
Parties. Because the United States and Canada are representative of capital exporting 
countries, it is consonant with this status that a narrowing of sovereign action vis-à-vis 
foreign investment would be welcomed. Here, the U.S. sought to protect prospective 
investments in Mexico, it stands to reason primarily but not exclusively, from adverse 
effects in connection with State-owned entities at the federal level. 
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characterized by uncertainty and want of predictability because of its 
subjective content and application. Moreover, the configuration of a 
standard inviting policy analysis as a predicate to application comports 
with the shifting legal landscape that economic globalization has spawned; 
a landscape demanding of a public purpose doctrine characterized by 
greater flexibility and certainty. The “NAFTA approach” to public 
purpose contributes to moving the doctrine further towards an objective 
space and in this narrow sense limits or more literally defines the doctrine 
by circumscribing it to the categories comprising Article 1101(4) or other 
categories that conform to these elements.24 
After carefully engaging in a succinct etymological and 
discriminating survey of the meaning of standard in international law, in 
the context of consistency of fair and equitable treatment as a standard,25 
                                                 
24 The Canadian Statement on Implementation supports a flexible, “standard-like” 
construction of Article 1101(4). Helpful language from that text reflects the “such as” 
approach to public purpose categories: 
 
The section does not apply to any measure to the extent it is covered by 
chapter fourteen relating to financial services. Article 1101 affirms the 
right of a Party to perform functions (such as law enforcement) and to 
provide services (such as social welfare and health). The article also 
affirms the right of Mexico to perform exclusively the economic 
activities set out in annex III, which lists those sectors reserved to the 
State in the Mexican Constitution. To the extent that Mexico permits 
foreign investment in these sectors (e.g., in the form of a service 
contract or joint production arrangement), the protections of the 
investment chapter apply to that investment. 
 
Government of Canada, Statement on Implementation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, CANADA GAZ. PART 1C(1) 147 (Jan. 1, 1994)  [Hereinafter Canadian 
Statement on Implementation]. 
 
25 Ioana Tudor identifies various definitions of standard in international law that 
A. Sanhoury, S. Rials, and P. Julliard advance. Sanhoury asserts that a mutation occurs at 
the apogee of a specific developmental stage of a legal system pursuant to which rules 
and principles are no longer viable because of their inability to embrace the legal 
system’s own “evolutionary development.” He observes that at this stage the standard 
appears as “a more elaborated concept that leaves space for adaptation and evolving 
situations [which] is embraced in order to make the system function properly. This new 
concept is the standard. Its nature is more adapted because it is more general and more 
flexible than rules and principles, and therefore leaves space for interpretation while it 
can be applied to a broader number of situations.” IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS at 112,113 (Oxford University Press 2008) 
(citing A. SANHOURY, LES RESTRICTIONS CONTRACTUELLES À LA LIBERTÉ INDIVIDUELLE 
DETRAVAIL DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE ANGLAISE, CONTRIBUTIONS À L’ÉTUDE 
COMPARATIVE DE LA RÈGLE DE DROIT ET DU STANDARD JURIDIQUE (1925)). 
 
Rials defines standard as an indefinite concept which refers to the fundamental values of 
society and that analyzes the behaviors of the legal actors by reference to an average 
conduct.” Id. at 114 (citing S. RIALS, LE JUGE ADMINISTRATIF FRANÇAIS ET LA 
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Tudor provides a composite picture of what is commonly understood by 
standard, reduced to five precepts: 
(i) the broad behavioral direction or an indeterminate 
concept; 
(ii) a large margin of maneuver left to the 
arbitrator/judge and a very flexible character, which 
allows the decision maker to adapt to a variety of 
circumstances; 
(iii)a link between law and society; 
(iv) the reference point constituting an average social 
conduct; and  
(v) a reference to the conformity between national and 
international law.26 
A construction of Article 1101(4) as a standard for public purpose 
together with the title of the article (“scope and coverage”), compels an 
interpretation of the paragraph as one vesting the term “public purpose” 
within Article 1110(1)(a) with a standard that removes the doctrine from 
the realm of subjectivity and relativism as to expropriation and 
compensation. By ascribing to public purpose an objective definitional 
criteria in both theory and practice, the relationship between the 
competing interests: (i) protecting foreign investments, (ii) safeguarding 
the right to regulate (regulatory sovereignty), and (iii) promoting the 
objectives of international trade law, is best harmonized. The importance 
of this latter concern is multiplied even further because of the 
commingling of public purpose categories of international trade law with 
public purpose concerns underlying fundamental precepts of international 
investment law. The seven “conceptual references” to public purpose in 
Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA, particularly in Article 1108,27 best 
                                                                                                                         
TECHNIQUE DU STANDARD, ESSAI SUR LE TRAITEMENT  JURIDICTIONNEL DE L’IDEE DE 
NORMALITE 3-4 (1980)). 
 
26 Id. at 115.   
 
27 Article 1108 reads: 
 
Reservations and Exceptions 
 
1. Articles 1102 [National Treatment Standard], 1103 [Most-Favored 
Nation], 1106 [Performance Requirements], and 1107 [Senior 
Management and Boards of Directors] do not apply to: 
 
(a)  any existing non- conforming measure that is maintained by  
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illustrate the cross-contamination of public purpose elements having their 
origins in international trade law and international investment law but 
contained within a single chapter of a statutory rubric that must account 
for the protection of foreign investments while preserving a State’s 
exercise of regulatory sovereignty. The public purpose doctrine 
theoretically serves as a principle that reconciles these two competing 
rights and obligations. 
Article 1105(3)28 identifies a public purpose in the form of 
“subsidies or grants” that amply comports with the NAFTA public 
                                                                                                                         
(i)  a Party at the Federal level, as set out in its Schedule to 
Annex I or III,  
 
(ii)  a State or province for two (2) years after the date of entry 
into force of this Agreement, and thereafter as set out by a 
Party in its Schedule to Annex I in accordance with 2 or, 
 
(iii)  a local government; 
 
(b) the continuation or prompt renewal of any non-conforming 
measure referred to in subparagraph (a); or 
 
(c)  an amendment to any non-conforming  measure referred to in 
subparagraph (a) to the extent that the amendment does not 
decrease the conformity of the measure, as it existed 
immediately before the amendment, with Articles 1102 
[National Treatment Standard], 1103 [Most-Favored Nation], 
1106 [Performance Requirements], and 1107 [Senior 
Management, Boards of Directors]. 
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1108 ¶ 1(a)-(c). 
 
28 Article 1105 in its entirety provides: 
 
Article 1105: Minimum Standard of Treatment 
 
1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another 
Party treatment in accordance with international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security.  
 
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and notwithstanding Article 
1108(7)(b), each Party shall accord to investors of another 
Party, and to investments of investors of another Party, non-
discriminatory treatment with respect to measures it adopts or 
maintains relating to losses suffered by investments in its 
territory owing to armed conflict or civil strife.  
 
3. Paragraph 2 does not apply to existing measures relating to 
subsidies or grants that would be inconsistent with Article 
1102 but for Article 1108(7)(b).  
Id. art. 1105. 
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purpose standard.29 This paragraph establishes the preeminence of public 
purpose in the form of subsidies or grants pertaining to armed conflict or 
civil strife, over the public purpose of protecting foreign investments or 
investors by according such investors or investments treatment no less 
favorable than that provided to citizens of the Host State. This 
pronouncement is quite significant, particularly within the narrow 
framework of Article 1105, because this article encompasses virtually all 
of the international investment law standards that, if satisfied, give rise to 
an affirmative claim for relief on the part of an investor in an international 
arbitration against a NAFTA Party.30 Thus, even though Article 1105 at 
first would appear to be an eminently international investment law 
provision providing for foreign investor protection, it in fact highlights 
subsidies and grants, albeit within the confines of armed conflict or civil 
strife, as a legitimate public purpose that overrides equitable and non-
discriminatory practices on the part of the State with respect to foreign 
investors and investments. The generic nature of the terms “armed 
conflict” and “civil strife” bespeaks an intent to provide a Host State with 
considerable latitude and its “entitlement” to discriminate on this basis. It 
also demonstrates a manifestly identifiable penchant favoring a public 
purpose that furthers no regulatory State interests over investment or 
investor protection.31 
The public purpose categories that are enunciated in Article 
1106(2), (4), and (6)(a)-(c), certainly meet the NAFTA public purpose 
standard.32 The health, safety, or environmental exceptions contained in 
                                                 
29 The “NAFTA public purpose standard” refers to Article 1101(4). See id. art. 1101 ¶ 4. 
 
30 Article 1105(1)-(2) includes, without limitation, (i) fair and equitable treatment, (ii) full 
protection and security, (iii) non-discriminatory treatment in keeping with international 
minimum standard, and (iv) non-discriminatory treatment concerning losses suffered by 
investments in the Host State owing to armed conflict or civil strife. Accordingly, 
expropriation and denial of justice are the only standards absent from those included in 
Article 1105.  See id. art. 1105. 
 
31The inclusion of non-qualified or ear-marked “subsidies” or “grants” in subsection 3 
also suggests a heightened sense of priority favoring non-regulatory State-sanctioned 
discrimination over foreign investment or investor protection. See id. art. 1105 ¶ 3. 
 
32 Article 1106 subsections 2, 4, and 6(a)-(c) State: 
 
Article 1106: Performance Requirements 
 
2.  A measure that requires an investment to use a technology to 
meet generally applicable health, safety or environmental 
requirements shall not be construed to be inconsistent with 
paragraph 1(f). For greater certainty, Articles 1102 [National 
Treatment] and 1103 [Minimum Standard of Treatment] apply 
to the measure.  
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Article 1106(2) are indicative of the standard fare of international trade 
law exceptions that (i) meet the NAFTA public purpose standard and (ii) 
are derived from international trade law but now find themselves forming 
part of the NAFTA Chapter Eleven investment regime.33 In contrast with 
                                                                                                                         
4.  Nothing in paragraph 3 shall be construed to prevent a Party 
from conditioning the receipt or continued receipt of an 
advantage, in connection with an investment in its territory of 
an investor of a Party or of a non-Party, on compliance with a 
requirement to locate production, provide a service, train or 
employ workers, construct or expand particular facilities, or 
carry out research and development, in its territory.  
 … 
 
6.  Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade or investment, nothing in 
paragraph 1(b) or (c) or 3(a) or (b) shall be construed to 
prevent any Party from adopting or maintaining measures, 
including environmental measures:  
 
(a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and 
regulations that are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement;  
 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; or 
  
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources. 
 
Id. art. 1106 ¶¶ 2, 4, 6(a)-(c). 
 
33 The “health, safety or environmental” public purpose exceptions that legitimately 
empower the State to exercise its authority in ways that may be inconsistent with a 
foreign investor’s business or investment, although in some circumstances compensable, 
finds their genesis in international trade law. These exceptions, which shall be 
demonstrated in greater detail in this text, arise from the general exceptions contained in 
the GATT Article XX, which provides States with a normative foundation for 
encroaching on agreed trade principles where an exception may be deemed applicable. 
These exceptions have been incorporated into the NAFTA Chapter 11 without 
qualification. The more relevant GATT Article XX exceptions include protection for 
acts: 
 
(a)  necessary to protect public morals;  
 
(b)  necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health;  
 
 … 
 
(d)  necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, including those relating 
to customs enforcement, the enforcement of 
 EAST\64724221. 325 
Article 1105, the Article 1106(2) Public Purpose Exceptions do not 
preempt the investment law tenets of national treatment and most favored 
nation treatment designed to protect foreign investors and investments. 
The paragraph, in an effort to underscore uniformity and predictability, 
States that “[f]or greater certainty, Articles 1102 [National Treatment 
Standard] and  1103 [Most-Favored Nation] apply to the measure.”34 
Therefore, pursuant to an Article 1106(2) analysis, the State’s 
exercise of its regulatory fiat prescribing a measure requiring an 
investment to adopt specific technology so as to meet health, safety, or 
environmental requirements, must be equally enforced among foreign 
investors and host-State citizens. The State’s use of its regulatory authority 
in this context is limited by investment law principles of non-
discriminatory practice and not left unbridled on the basis of regulatory 
subject matter. As with Article 1105(3), Article 1106(2) stands in sharp 
relief with the overriding standing of the public purpose categories 
provided in Article 1106(4) pertaining to the (i) location of production, (ii) 
provision of services, (iii) training of personnel, (iv) employment of 
workers (v) construction or expansion of particular facilities, and (vi) 
research and development, within the national territory.35 
The Article 1106(4) public purpose categories are consistent with 
the NAFTA public purposes standard. This paragraph, however, vests the 
State with absolute authority to act in furtherance of the enumerated 
                                                                                                                         
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II 
and Article XVII, the protection of patents, 
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of 
deceptive practices; 
 …  
(g)  relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption. 
 
GATT, supra note 19, art. XX ¶¶ (a)-(b), (d), (g).  
 
34 See NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1106 ¶ 2 (emphasis supplied). 
 
35 Article 1106(4) States: 
 
Nothing in paragraph 3 shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
conditioning the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, in 
connection with an investment in its territory of an investor of a Party 
or of a non-Party, on compliance with a requirement to locate 
production, provide a service, train or employ workers, construct or 
expand particular facilities, or carry out research and development, in 
its territory. 
 
Id. art. 1106 ¶ 4. 
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exceptions irrespective of the consequences of these actions on foreign 
investment protection or international trade either at a practical or a policy 
level.36 
Article 1106(6)(a)-(c) in addition to meeting the NAFTA standard, 
exemplifies a direct and verbatim incorporation of the GATT Article XX 
“General Exceptions”37 that materially amplify the State’s regulatory 
space.38 Paragraph six tempers the “international trade law exceptions” 
that favor the interest of traditional State sovereignty over investor 
protection by stating that any such measure is not to be applied “in an 
arbitrary or unjustifiable manner.” It does, albeit tepidly, arguably 
incorporate international law providing that foreign investments and 
investors are not to be arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminated against 
and, therefore, are entitled to national treatment and international 
minimum standard protection. This reading is bolstered by the use of the 
disjunctive “or,” which in the second subordinate clause explicitly adds 
that any such measure must “not constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade or investment.”39 The first subordinate clause 
                                                 
36 The consequences of the exercise of the State’s regulatory and non-regulatory authority 
on foreign investment represents the most significant deficit in the NAFTA’s public 
purpose treaty construct. As discussed in considerable detail, see infra at Chapter 1.H(2). 
The “proportionality,” “effects,” and “sole effects,” tests that the NAFTA 
“jurisprudence” has fashioned in determining the extent to which a particular measure 
that a State prescribes may give rise to detrimental consequences that far exceed the 
remedial or public benefit stemming from the measure in question in order to pass on its 
propriety are rife with conceptual and practical shortcomings that militate against 
uniformity, predictability, and transparency of standard. 
 
37 Compare NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1106 ¶¶ 6(a)-(c) with GATT, supra note 19, art. 
XX. 
 
38 Article 1106(6)(a)-(c) provides: 
 
Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade or investment, nothing in paragraph 1(b) or (c) or 
3(a) or (b) shall be construed to prevent any Party from adopting or 
maintaining measures, including environmental measures:  
 
(a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement;  
 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or  
 
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources.  
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1106 ¶¶ 6(a)-(c) (emphasis supplied). 
 
39 Id. art. 1106 ¶ 6 (emphasis supplied). 
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addresses the application of measures, i.e., actions by the State in the 
implementation and execution of its regulatory sovereignty, while the 
second subordinate clause concerns “restriction[s]” on international trade 
or investment, i.e., the effects of the subject measures.40 
Paragraph six further broadens the State’s regulatory sovereignty 
for purposes of adopting “environmental measures,” a broad and 
unqualified term far exceeding the scope of the term “environmental” 
within the meaning of paragraph two of the same article.41 Paragraph six, 
subsection (b) explicitly references measures, “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health,” which is identical language to the 
GATT Article XX(b).42 Similarly, paragraph six, subsection (c), pertaining 
to measures “necessary for the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources,” also draws heavily on the GATT General 
Exceptions.43 
The categories of public purpose enunciated in paragraph six, 
perhaps with the notable exception of “non-living exhaustible natural 
resources,” fall into five (5) quite distinct categories: (i) human life or 
health; (ii) animal, plant or health; (iii) plant life or health; (iv) living 
exhaustible natural resources; and (v) environmental measures. These five 
categories, having as their subject matter life, health, environment, and 
exhaustible natural resources, likely represent a higher categorical status in 
the hierarchy of a State’s priorities than the public purposes categories 
                                                 
40 The absence of any plain language referencing “international law” certainly detracts 
from the proposition that the first part of this subsection aims at protecting foreign 
investors and investments. Yet, the use of the words “arbitrary” and “unjustifiable,” 
together with the overall construction of that subsection, certainly do not render the 
proposition at all implausible. The NAFTA Chapter 11 drafters achieved the extremely 
challenging objective of simultaneously addressing international trade and investment 
law concepts and spheres of protection that are premised on different and often 
competing underlying principles that in turn are expressed in disparate terms of art. 
 
41 Article 1106(2) limits the scope of “environmental” to measures requiring investments 
to use specific environmentally sensitive technologies: 
 
A measure that requires an investment to use a technology to meet 
generally applicable health, safety or environmental requirements shall 
not be construed to be inconsistent with paragraph 1(f). For greater 
certainty, Articles 1102 and 1103 apply to the measure. 
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1106 ¶ 2. 
 
42 See GATT, supra note 19, art. XX ¶ (b). 
 
43 See id. art. XX ¶ (g) (“[R]elating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption.”). 
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identified in Article 1105(3),44 or in Article 1106(4).45 The five categories 
contained in Article 1106(6), however, are treated no differently, i.e., in 
pari materia with such public purpose categories such as subsidies, grants, 
the procurement of services or the training of workers, as set forth in 
Articles 1105(3) and 1106(4), respectively.  
All of these categories, indiscriminately, at least prima facie 
provide a NAFTA Party with a normative foundation for exercising its 
authority in ways that may be detrimental to investors or investments. This 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven structural feature represents a policy that adopts a 
broad understanding of public purpose, one that does not categorically 
discern among public purpose constructs in connection with the extent 
regulatory sovereignty based upon such a public purpose category must be 
qualified. The general treatment of public purpose categories as equal in 
every regard, without a need to qualify a State’s exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty based upon any public purpose category, constitutes a material 
deficit in the NAFTA Chapter’s rubric with respect to investor/investment 
protection.46  
Article 1108, entitled “Reservations and Exceptions,” perhaps best 
exemplifies the multifarious nature of public purpose within a single 
chapter of one treaty alone.47 It is also illustrative of the indiscriminate 
                                                 
44 Article 1105(3), read together with Article 1108(7)(b), exempts existing measures 
relating to subsidies or grants by a Party or State enterprise from the Article 1105(2) 
requirement of non-discriminatory treatment during armed conflict and civil strife. 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1105 ¶¶ 2-3; art. 1108 ¶ 7(b). 
 
45 Article 1106(4) provides that the prohibition on conditioned advantages in Article 
1106(3) “shall not be construed to prevent a Party from conditioning the receipt or 
continued receipt of an advantage...on compliance with a requirement to locate 
production, provide a service, train or employ workers, construct or expand particular 
facilities, or carry out research and development, in its territory.” Id. art. 1106 ¶¶  3-4. 
 
46 This shortcoming, together with the uncertainty that the NAFTA “jurisprudence” has 
spawned, comprise the most significant public purpose deficits within the NAFTA 
investor protection system. 
 
47 Article 1108 reads: 
 
Article 1108: Reservations and Exceptions 
 
(i) Articles 1102 [National Treatment Standard], 1103[Most-
Favored Nation], 1106 [Performance Requirements] and 1107 
[Senior Management, Boards of Directors] do not apply to:  
 
(a) any existing non-conforming measure that is maintained 
by  
 
(i) a Party at the federal level, as set out in its 
Schedule to Annex I or III,  
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(ii) a State or province, for two years after the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement, 
and thereafter as set out by a Party in its 
Schedule to Annex I in accordance with 
paragraph 2, or  
 
(iii) a local government;  
 
(b) the continuation or prompt renewal of any non-
conforming measure referred to in subparagraph (a); or  
 
(c) an amendment to any non-conforming measure referred to 
in subparagraph (a) to the extent that the amendment does 
not decrease the conformity of the measure, as it existed 
immediately before the amendment, Articles 1102 
[National Treatment Standard], 1103[Most-Favored 
Nation], 1106 [Performance Requirements],and 1107 
[Senior Management, Board of Directors].  
 
(ii) Each Party may set out in its Schedule to Annex I, within two 
years of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, any 
existing nonconforming measure maintained by a State or 
province, not including a local government.  
 
(iii) Articles 1102 [National Treatment Standard], 1103[Most-
Favored Nation], 1106 [Performance Requirements],and 1107 
[Senior Management, Board of Directors] do not apply to any 
measure that a Party adopts or maintains with respect to 
sectors, subsectors or activities, as set out in its Schedule to 
Annex II.  
 
(iv) No Party may, under any measure adopted after the date of 
entry into force of this Agreement and covered by its Schedule 
to Annex II, require an investor of another Party, by reason of 
its nationality, to sell or otherwise dispose of an investment 
existing at the time the measure becomes effective.  
 
(v) Articles 1102 [National Treatment Standard] and 1103[Most-
Favored Nation] do not apply to any measure that is an 
exception to, or derogation from, the obligations under Article 
1703 (Intellectual Property-National Treatment) as specifically 
provided for in that Article.  
 
(vi) Article 1103[Most-Favored Nation] does not apply to 
treatment accorded by a Party pursuant to agreements, or with 
respect to sectors, set out in its Schedule to Annex IV.  
 
(vii) Articles 1102 [National Treatment Standard], 1103[Most-
Favored Nation] and 1107 [Senior Management, Board of 
Directors] do not apply to:  
 
(a) procurement by a Party or a State enterprise; or  
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cross-pollination between international investment law and international 
trade law. All but three of the paragraphs comprising this Article explicitly 
reference either national treatment standard and most-favored nation 
treatment or one of these two treatment standards.48 Because Article 1108 
addresses both reservations and exceptions, it is the most complex of the 
Chapter Eleven NAFTA Articles. 
A. Public Purpose in the Context of Reservations 
Reservations and exceptions represent two normatively related but 
distinct sets of public purpose precepts that often encompass overlapping 
categories. Reservations fall within the ambit of public purpose, at least 
within the context of this contribution, because by definition they are the 
product of the State’s exercise of regulatory sovereignty. Their normative 
standing, and therefore their propriety as a juridically cognizable public 
purpose, is founded on the procedural adherence to a legitimate 
negotiation of a treaty forming part of international conventional law. 
Consequently, the structure of a treaty reservation has an objective 
grounding based upon process and in this sense it is universal and 
commonly shared by all members of the community of nations. The 
content of treaty reservations, however, is subjective. In contrast with its 
formal process-driven structure, its substantive subject matter is particular 
and hence, subjective. The subject matter arises from the unique needs of 
States and is determined within a framework of orthodox Westphalian 
                                                                                                                         
(b) subsidies or grants provided by a Party or a State 
enterprise, including government-supported loans, 
guarantees and insurance. 
 
(viii)  The provisions of:  
 
(a) Article 1106[Performance Requirements](1)(a), (b) 
and(c), and (3)(a) and (b) do not apply to qualification 
requirements for goods or services with respect to export 
promotion and foreign aid programs;  
 
(b) Article 1106[Performance Requirements](1)(b), (c), (f) 
and (g), and (3)(a) and (b) do not apply to procurement by 
a Party or a State enterprise; and  
 
(c) Article 1106[Performance Requirements](3)(a) and (b) do 
not apply to requirements imposed by an importing Party 
relating to the content of goods necessary to qualify for 
preferential tariffs or preferential quotas. 
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1108 (emphasis supplied). 
 
48 See, e.g., id. art. 1108 ¶¶ 2, 4, 8. 
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notions of sovereignty.49  Because of this duality, “treaty reservation 
public purpose” cannot be analyzed together with public purpose 
categories such as those constituting the NAFTA standard.50 
Most of Article 1108 addresses the inapplicability of the national 
treatment and most-favored nation standards to reservations.51 Paragraph 
seven does carve out public purpose exceptions consonant with the 
NAFTA public purpose standard that are not contained in the annexes to 
the agreement and thus fall beyond the ambit of reservations.52 This 
paragraph renders inapplicable national treatment and most-favored nation 
standards to State-sponsored (i) subsidies, (ii) grants, (iii) loans, (iv) 
guarantees, and (v) insurance. State procurement is also sanctioned as an 
exception.53 
                                                 
49 Westphalian sovereignty refers to the Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor 
and the King of France and their respective allies, October 24, 1648 (the “Treaty of 
Westphalia”). While the Treaty of Westphalia indeed brought an end to the Thirty-Year 
War, its most enduring legacy has been the treaty’s general discussion on the nature of 
sovereignty, which provided the foundations for a territorially based conception that 
accorded a virtual monopoly in international law to sovereign States. The writings of 
Grotius and Leibniz together with the treaty’s text provided a framework for a rigid and 
dogmatic conception of sovereignty that prevailed through the 20th century and is still 
accepted in some quarters today. Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, Juridical Convergence in 
International Dispute Resolution: Developing A Substantive Principle of Transparency 
and Transnational Evidence Gathering, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 37, 38 n.3 (2012) 
(citing J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-14 (9th ed. 1984)). 
 
50 What here has been identified as “treaty reservation public purpose” represents a right 
to State action that may infringe upon fundamental rights of a foreign investor or 
investment, which is substantively spawned by a State’s perceived needs. The “public 
purpose” component of this right to act on the part of a State can be divorced completely 
from such public purpose categories as health, education, orthodox regulatory State 
prerogatives, childcare or income-security,  and still enjoy binding juridical legitimacy. 
Its subjective content derives from the exercise of the State’s political will which may or 
may not coincide with the public purpose categories found in and suggested by the 
NAFTA standard. 
 
51 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1108 ¶¶ 1-6. 
52 For example, Article 1108(7) provides: 
 
7. Articles 1102, 1103 and 1107 do not apply to: 
 
(a) procurement by a Party or a State enterprise; or  
 
(b) subsidies or grants provided by a Party or a State 
enterprise, including government-supported loans, 
guarantees and insurance. 
 
Id. art. 1108 ¶ 7. 
 
53 The procurement exception is a common public purpose category traceable to the 
GATT Article XX, subsections (i) and (j): 
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The Article 1108 exceptions, construing paragraphs (a) and (b) 
together, are more akin to public purpose exceptions deriving from the 
State’s police powers, as their direct relationship to a common good of the 
State is less clear than their parity with an activity of the State. The public 
purpose found in the exercise of orthodox administrative authority 
forming part of a State’s police powers are distinct from the public 
purpose categories enunciated in Article 1106 paragraphs four (concerning 
the training or employment of workers, construction or expansion of 
facilities, and research and development) and six (pertaining to human, 
animal, and plant life and health, and exhaustible natural resources). The 
difference between the public purpose categories contained in Article 
1108(7)(a)(b) and those mentioned in Article 1106(4), does not necessarily 
suggest a hierarchical difference between the two sets of categories. Yet 
both sets of exceptions (those of Article 1106(4) and Article 1108(7)), 
would appear to be subordinated to the public purpose category of Article 
1106(6) concerning life, health, and the conservation of exhaustible 
resources. On the other hand, the Article 1108(7)(b) public purpose 
categories conceptually comport best with the limited and qualified public 
purpose categories of Article 1105(2).  
                                                                                                                         
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
 
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials 
necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials 
to a domestic processing industry during periods when the 
domestic price of such materials is held below the world 
price as part of a governmental stabilization plan; 
Provided that such restrictions shall not operate to 
increase the exports of or the protection afforded to such 
domestic industry, and shall not depart from the 
provisions of this Agreement relating to non-
discrimination; 
 
(j)  essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in 
general or local short supply; Provided that any such 
measures shall be consistent with the principle that all 
contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of 
the international supply of such products, and that any 
such measures, which are inconsistent with the other 
provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon 
as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to 
exist…. 
 
GATT, supra note 19, art. XX ¶ (i), (j).(emphasis supplied). 
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The tension between exceptions and reservations that is present in 
any effort that aspires to analyze public purpose in international law finds 
fertile ground in Article 1108. The drafts of this article suggest that the 
NAFTA Parties initially sought to categorize as “general exceptions” 
many of the international trade law categories of exceptions that are 
contained in the GATT’s Article XX.54 Most notably, Canada assumed a 
protagonistic role in promoting these general exceptions that ultimately 
were incorporated into the various annexes memorializing the 
reservations.55 The proposed GATT-derived general exceptions amply 
meet the NAFTA public purpose standard yet their expansive scope, 
ranging from measures “necessary to protect public order, safety or public 
morals” to decrees “imposed for the protection of national treasures of 
artistic, historic, or archaeological,” would overwhelm the public purpose 
doctrine rendering it all too general and encompassing for practical and 
even analytical application. Here, the distinction between the public 
                                                 
54 For example, in the January 16, 1992, NAFTA Chapter 11 Draft, Canada proposed: 
 
CDA [Article 111: General Exceptions 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Party of measures: 
 
(i)  necessary to protect public order, safety or public morals; 
 
(ii)  necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health or 
the environment in its territory, or to enforce generally agreed 
international environmental or conservation rules or standards; 
 
(iii)  relating to the products or services of prison labor; 
 
(iv)  imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, 
historic or archaeological value; 
 
(v)  necessary for fiduciary or consumer protection reasons; 
 
(vi)  necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, 
including those relating to the avoidance of fraudulent or deceptive 
practices; 
 
Provided that such measure is: 
 
(vii)  consistent with Article 106; and 
 
(viii) is the least trade-restrictive necessary for securing the protection 
required.] 
 
NAFTA Negotiating Drafts, supra note 24, Draft of Jan. 16, 1992. 
 
55 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 18, annex II (“Schedule of Canada”). 
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purpose categories consonant with the NAFTA standard and “treaty 
reservation public purpose” indeed is helpful in obtaining a more 
comprehensive understanding of the public purpose doctrine and of its 
functional application in international law, particularly with respect to 
tempering foreign investor expectations, a State’s exercise of its regulatory 
authority, meeting the aspirations of international investment law, and 
maximizing international trade law efficacy. 
Because treaty reservation public purpose is too subjective in 
content and too general in scope, it serves the de facto function of limiting 
the conceptual universe of the NAFTA public purpose standard 
exceptions. This categorical segregation in turn renders plausible 
meaningful analysis concerning possible public purpose exceptions 
without creating an unworkable criteria that is weak on discriminating 
among practices falling within the public purpose doctrine. Despite 
Canada’s laudable intent to have broad and all-encompassing public 
purpose exceptions pervade Chapter Eleven, the final iteration of Article 
1108—limiting public purpose to (i) procurement, (ii) subsidies, (iii) 
grants, (iv) government supported loans, (v) government supported 
guarantees, and (vi) government supported insurance—actually furthers 
the plight of public purpose. In addition, narrowing the scope of public 
purpose exceptions helps serve the conceptual interests of international 
investment law without drawing on a doctrinal reservoir of public purpose 
constituted by terms and categories of both international trade and 
international investment law.56 
The single reference to the nomenclature “public purpose” in 
Chapter Eleven is found in  Article 1110(1)(a).57 The term appears as one 
of four elements that give rise to a legal expropriation where all four tenets 
                                                 
56 The Article 111: General Exceptions draft is illustrative on this point.  Supra note 56. 
That draft article included such public purpose categories as “the products or services of 
prison labor,” and measures “necessary for fiduciary or consumer protection reasons.” 
Even though the public purpose component to these categories is eminently clear, the 
categories do not have their origins in, nor do they form part of, international investment 
law. To the contrary, they are categories consistently associated with international trade 
law. Because their origin is disassociated from the law and principles governing the 
protection of aliens, the doctrinal development and application of these concepts suggest 
that their highest and best use is within a framework that pertains to macroeconomic 
regulation over significant time frames and not the short to medium term microeconomic 
issues more common to international investment law and treaty based arbitrations. See 
generally, Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and 
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 A.J.I.L. 48 
(January 2008).  
 
 
57 NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110 ¶ 1(a). 
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are met.58 While the NAFTA standard engrafts conceptual and practical 
meaning to the term public purpose, Article 1110 nowhere defines it. 
Moreover, the drafts of Chapter Eleven suggest that the NAFTA Parties 
expressed no concern over defining public purpose within the confines of 
this article. Instead, the drafts reflect that the NAFTA Parties at the time 
had divergent views on the issue of compensation with the United States 
and Canada agreeing on a specific and discernible standard consonant with 
established principles of compensation found in public international law, 
and Mexico expressing a penchant for a domestic criteria.59 The 
                                                 
58 The Article, which identifies public purpose as the first of four tenets that if 
collectively met, legalize direct or indirect nationalization or expropriation, provides no 
guidance as to the meaning of public purpose or its hierarchical relationship as to the 
three remaining tenets comprising subsections (b) through (d). Id.  art. 1110 ¶ 1.  
 
59 By way of example, the February 13, 1992 draft of  Article 1110 concerning 
expropriation and compensation States: 
 
1. No Party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take 
any measure or series of measures tantamount to expropriation 
USA, CDA [or nationalization] or such an investment USA  CDA 
[(“expropriation”)], except: 
 
(a) for a public purpose; 
 
(b) on a nondiscriminatory basis; 
 
(c) in accordance with due process of law USA 
[and the general principles of treatment 
provided for in Article ----]; and 
 
(d) upon payment of USA, CDA [prompt, adequate 
and effective] compensation. 
 
2. Compensation shall be MEX [paid within a reasonable period of 
time] USA  CDA [equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory 
action was taken or became known, whichever is earlier; be paid 
without delay; include interest at a commercially reasonable 
rate from the date of expropriation; be fully realizable; and be 
freely transferable at the prevailing market rate of exchange on 
the date of USA [expropriation]. CDA [transfer.] ] 
 
NAFTA Negotiating Drafts, supra note 24, Draft of Feb. 13, 1992 (emphasis in 
original).The differences between the Parties on this issue become all the more stark, 
with Mexico underscoring its rejection of the U.S. and Canada’s adherence to public 
international law principles with respect to compensation for indirect or direct 
nationalizations or expropriations of another Party’s investment: 
 
EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION 
 
1. No Party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate 
an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or 
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discrepancy among the NAFTA Parties on the question of compensation 
perhaps finds foundation in Mexico’s status as the NAFTA Party most 
likely to be classified as a “capital-importing State.”  
The extent to which the public purpose doctrine in its legacy form 
affects compensation in the context of direct or indirect expropriations or 
nationalizations should not be altogether severed from the often disparate 
treatment of public purpose between capital-exporting and capital-
importing States.60 Understandably, in the context of Chapter Eleven, the 
                                                                                                                         
take any measure or series of measures tantamount to 
expropriation or nationalization of such an investment 
(“expropriation”), except: 
 
(a) for a public purpose; 
 
(b) on a nondiscriminatory basis; 
 
(c) in accordance with due process of law USA [and the 
general principles of treatment provided for in 
Article ----]; and 
 
(d)  upon payment of USA CDA [prompt, adequate and 
effective] compensation. 
 
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of 
the expropriated investment immediately before the 
expropriatory action was taken or became known, whichever 
is earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, 
asset value (including declared tax value of tangible property), 
and other criteria, as appropriate to determine fair market 
value. Compensation shall be paid without delay; include 
interest at a commercially reasonable rate from the date of 
expropriation; be fully realizable; and be freely transferable at 
the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of USA 
[expropriation.] MEX  CDA [transfer]. 
 
Mexican Note 2 – Mexico considers that the concerns expressed by 
the U.S. and Canada delegations on compensation are covered by 
the new draft proposal on paragraph 2. On that basis Mexico will 
only accept this paragraph if the U.S. and Canada delegations drop 
the actual bracketed text in paragraph 1(c) and (d). 
 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
60 See, e.g., Professor Alan C. Swan, NAFTA Chapter 11-”Direct Effect” and Interpretive 
Method: Lessons from Methanex v. United States, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 85 (2009) 
(“[C]apital-exporting countries promoted a strong legal tradition, both international and 
domestic, of requiring the government to pay full compensation to the owner. While the 
international version of that requirement was challenged particularly by the 
underdeveloped countries in the United Nations General Assembly, it nevertheless 
seemed to retain its vitality among the various tribunals that were from time to time 
called to pass on the issue. It was against this background that the underdeveloped 
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NAFTA Parties elected to negotiate aggressively and comprehensively the 
question of compensation within the framework of Article 1110 instead of 
engaging in the more challenging and, from a pragmatic treaty negotiation 
perspective, less viable endeavor of “defining” (literally crafting limits on) 
the public purpose doctrine, which already received considerable attention, 
albeit without being overtly saddled with the “public purpose” 
nomenclature, in Article 1101(4).61 
Article 1114 addressing “environmental concerns” comports with 
the NAFTA standard.62 While at first glance this public purpose 
“environmental exception” may appear to be, from a public purpose 
categorical classification perspective, duplicative of the general reference 
to “environmental measures” in Article 1106(6), the phrase “sensitive to 
environmental concerns” appears to suggest an even broader scope.  This 
amplified categorical construction is further bolstered by the participles 
“adopting, maintaining or enforcing” any measure presumably deemed to 
be “sensitive to environmental concerns.”63 This observation 
notwithstanding, paragraph two of Article 1114 does suggest a new 
environmental public purpose different from the general category 
contained in Article 1106(6). 
                                                                                                                         
countries increasingly found it in their interests to use regulatory intervention, rather than 
an outright “taking,” to achieve their purposes.”). 
 
61 The Article 1101 drafts do not contain any permutations of the term “public purpose,” 
nor do they even mention public purpose. 
 
62 This Article reads: 
 
1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise 
consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure 
that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental concerns. 
2.  The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental 
measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise 
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such 
measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an 
investor. If a Party considers that another Party has offered such an 
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party 
and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such 
encouragement. 
 
Id. art. 1114. 
 
63 Id. art. 1114 ¶ 1. 
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Paragraph two of Article 1114 proscribes conduct that encourages 
investment “by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental 
measures.”64 This provision constitutes a measure directed at foreclosing 
pollution havens. The Canadian Statement of Implementation of Chapter 
Eleven corroborates this interpretation of the public purpose category 
enunciated in Article 1114.65  
The NAFTA Chapter Eleven contribution to public purpose is 
significant. In addition to fashioning what is here regarded as a public 
purpose standard,66 it also categorically enriched the public purpose 
doctrine by listing fifteen (15) identifiable public purpose categories 
pursuant to which State action may adversely compromise a foreign 
investor or an investment without incurring liability: 
(i) human life and health; 67 
(ii) animal life and health;68 
                                                 
64 Id. art. 1114 ¶ 2.  
 
65 For example, the Canadian Statement on Implementation in part provides: 
 
The first paragraph of article 1114 affirms each Party’s right to adopt 
and enforce environmental measures, consistent with the chapter (e.g., 
environmental measures must be applied on a national treatment basis). 
The second paragraph, which addresses the pollution haven issue, 
requires that the Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental 
measures, and that Parties should not waive or derogate from such 
environmental measures to attract investment. If one Party considers 
that another has done so, it may request consultations. 
 
Canadian Statement on Implementation, supra note 26, at 152. 
 
66 The Article 1101(4) construct that has been identified as a “public purpose standard,” 
lists ten (10) public purpose categories that are not exhaustive but rather to be used as a 
paradigm against which actions on the part of the State that purport to be of a public 
purpose nature may be challenged and/or identified: 
 
(i) law enforcement, 
(ii) correctional services, 
(iii) income security, 
(iv) insurance,  
(v) social security, 
(vi) social welfare, 
(vii) public education, 
(viii) public training, 
(ix) healthcare, 
(x) childcare. 
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1101 ¶ 4. 
 
67 See, e.g., id. art. 1106 ¶ 6(b). 
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(iii) plant life and health;69 
(iv) living and non-living exhaustible resources;70 
(v) general environmental;71 
(vi) modification to technology to meet health requirements;72 
(vii) modification to technology to meet safety requirements;73 
(viii) modification to technology to meet environmental 
requirements;74 
(ix) subsidies directed at investments affected by civil strife or 
armed conflict;75 
(x) grants directed to investments affected by armed conflict;76 
(xi) government supported loans;77 
(xii) government supported guarantees;78 
(xiii) government supported insurance;79 
(xiv) government grants generally; and80 
(xv) measures to proscribe the creation of future pollution 
havens.81 
This contribution to the public purpose doctrine demonstrates a serious 
and sustained effort aspiring to develop a functioning public purpose 
standard. The NAFTA Chapter Eleven public purpose experiment is a 
successful one. The chapter studiously balances public purpose categories 
within the ambit of the NAFTA standard and public purpose treaty 
                                                                                                                         
68 Id. 
 
69 Id. 
 
70 Id. art. 1106 ¶ 6(c). 
 
71 Id. art. 1106 ¶ 6. 
 
72 Id. art. 1106 ¶ 2. 
 
73 Id. 
 
74 Id. 
 
75 Id. art. 1103 ¶ 2. 
 
76 Id. 
 
77 Id. art. 1108 ¶ 7(b). 
 
78 Id. 
 
79 Id. 
 
80 Id. 
 
81 Id. art. 1114. 
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reservations. Even more significantly, Article 1101(4) sets a tone that 
seeks to impose limits on the public purpose doctrine so that it may serve a 
practical function. This effort, however, hardly brings us closer to 
understanding the doctrine of public purpose in international law beyond 
merely a “catch-all” phrase attaching to all matters reasonably related to a 
sovereign’s exercise of sovereignty, i.e., to all things public in a State. 
B. Chapter Eleven of The NAFTA Does Not Develop an Objective 
Test 
The orthodox conception and treatment of public purpose is not 
workable in large measure because it is grounded on a subjective 
normative framework.82 This subjective configuration necessarily leads to 
uncertainty, lack of uniformity, and lends itself to “justifiable abuse.” The 
relative nature of the legacy public purpose doctrine in international law is 
particularly dysfunctional and conceptually at odds in the context of 
economic globalization and shifting paradigms concerning the related 
doctrine of sovereignty. Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA vests the doctrine 
with the requisite objective foundation. To be sure, while what here has 
been identified as the “NAFTA Standard” does not remove public purpose 
from the realm of absolute subjectivity and relativism, it does set forth 
subject matter based categories that serve as a first step towards limiting 
the doctrine from a substantive content perspective. Still, however, when 
addressing complex issues, primarily in the regulatory sphere, the 
objective deficit and lack of doctrinal development necessarily surface. 
This difficulty is compounded by the unique status that the public purpose 
doctrine holds in determining the legality of expropriations and even 
nationalizations under public international law.83 The challenge is equally 
                                                 
82 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 cmt. e (1987) (“The 
requirement that a taking be for a public purpose is reiterated in most formulations of the 
rules of international law on expropriation of foreign property. That limitation, however, 
has not figured prominently in international claims practice, perhaps because the concept 
of public purpose is broad and not subject to effective reexamination by other States.”); 
see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 458 (1964) (“Of course, 
there are many unsettled areas of international law, as there are of domestic law, and 
these areas present sensitive problems of accommodating the interests of nations that 
subscribe to divergent economic and political systems. It may be that certain 
nationalizations of property for a public purpose fall within this area.”). 
 
83 A functional public purpose doctrine should and must account for differences between 
expropriation and nationalization. The policies underlying expropriations are less 
dependent on “matters of State” and closer to identifiable concerns having a public 
character than those policies framing sector based nationalizations. See, e.g., United 
Nations Conference on Trade & Development, Expropriation: UNCTAD Series on Issues 
in International Investment Agreements II, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, U.N. 
Sales No. E.12.II.D.7 (2011) (“Nationalization usually refers to massive or large-scale 
takings of private property in all economic sectors or on an industry – or sector-specific 
basis. Outright nationalizations in all economic sectors are generally motivated by policy 
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exacerbated in the effort to harmonize the public purpose doctrine’s 
regulatory sovereignty enhancing features with the sovereignty restricting 
effects of international human rights. 
The drafts and working papers pertaining to Chapter Eleven are 
unavailing in the effort to develop a public purpose doctrine having an 
objectively discernable content. The NAFTA Parties, while concerned 
with public purpose, soon realized that the proliferation of public purpose 
categories in the treaty’s actual text would further dilute the protection to 
be accorded to investors and investments. A proliferation of public 
purpose categories, in addition to treaty reservations, would emphasize the 
lack of investor protection policies underlying the chapter and completely 
distort the measured temperance that is to characterize the relationship 
between investment protection and the State’s regulatory authority or 
regulatory sovereignty.84 Despite the development of the NAFTA 
Standard, Chapter Eleven does not remedy the subjective content ill that 
plagues the orthodox public purpose doctrine. It also fails to cure the ills 
arising from the accepted practice of according deference in defining what 
is public purpose to the invoking State. 
C. Public Purpose in the NAFTA Lacks Hierarchical Structure 
The NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven framework is rich with emphasis on 
the fifteen public purpose categories identified. Assuming a “rule of 
reason” approach—the extent to which a State’s regulatory measure is 
akin to or may derive from any of these categories—the evaluation of 
whether a particular measure constitutes a public purpose category within 
the NAFTA Standard would be considerably facilitated. This approach, 
however, assumes that the universe of public purpose categories that 
reasonably relate to the NAFTA Standard share an equal status or 
hierarchy for purposes of furthering the common good. This assumption is 
unreliable. Concerns pertaining to public health and safety likely outweigh 
administrative public purpose categories such as government supported 
guarantees. Similarly, as discussed in the context of international human 
rights, not all rights are, or can be considered to be equal from a regulatory 
perspective.85 By way of example, can the human right to be free from 
                                                                                                                         
considerations; the measures are intended to achieve complete State control of the 
economy and involve the takeover of all privately owned means of production.”) 
 
84 The Chapter 11 drafts do not overtly State the reasons why public purpose categories 
first identified as general exceptions were later regarded as reservations contained in the 
annexes. Close scrutiny of the texts (drafts), particularly between December 1, 1991 and 
March 23, 1993, does support the proposition that the NAFTA policy seeking to 
maximize the effect of international trade law while providing for a comprehensive 
investor protection rubric was best furthered by the exceptions methodology that typifies 
Article 1101(4) and that avails itself of broad but limited public purpose categories. 
 
85 See infra at Chapter 3. 
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slavery be considered the same from a regulatory perspective as the right 
to freedom of assembly?86 Similarly, the human right to humane treatment 
or the rights of children cannot be deemed susceptible to the same degree, 
if any, of regulatory sovereignty as freedom of movement nationally and 
internationally. The presence of a hierarchy in international human rights 
principles and norms is evident and established. The same cannot be said 
for the multiple iterations of the public purpose doctrine.  
Chapter Eleven does not at all emphasize some public purpose 
categories over others. A system that relies on a public purpose doctrine to 
determine the juridical standing of an expropriation or a nationalization 
cannot rest on a conception of public purpose that lacks objective content 
and categorical hierarchy. 
D. The Chapter Eleven Framework Indiscriminately Incorporates 
and Comingles Terms of Art from the GATT: An Unwanted 
Cross-Pollenization 
Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA fashions public purpose categories 
drawn from international trade law, even though this chapter 
fundamentally applies to “investment, services and related matters.”87 In 
broad strokes, the chapter’s architecture speaks to three objectives. 
First, it identifies treatment standards for investor and investment 
protection.88 Second, exceptions in the form of public purpose categories 
and public purpose treaty reservations earmarked to protect regulatory 
sovereignty are carved out.89 Third, Chapter Eleven sets forth an 
international dispute resolution methodology.90 Accordingly, the chapter 
aspires to harmonize investment law with the underlying policies and 
objectives of international trade law, even though it nowhere explicitly 
States so. In so doing, general exceptions pertaining to international trade 
law are introduced into Chapter Eleven and provided with “public purpose 
category status.” As noted, verbatim subparagraphs from the GATT’s 
Article XX general exceptions are transposed into Chapter Eleven and 
                                                                                                                         
 
86 See id. 
 
87 NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1101 ¶ 1 (emphasis supplied). 
 
88 Id. art. 1102 (National Treatment); art. 1103 (Most-Favored Nation Treatment); art. 
1104 (Standard of Treatment); art. 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment); and art. 1110 
¶ 1 (Expropriation & Compensation). 
 
89 Id. art. 1101 ¶ 4; art. 1106 ¶¶ 2, 4, 6(a)-(c); art. 1108; art. 1114. 
 
90 See, e.g., id. art. 1117-38. 
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presented as exceptions and not reservations.91 This cross-fertilization 
does more than comingle terms of art that have different origins and seek 
disparate objectives that are often in conflict. 
The introduction of international trade law terms into investment 
protection instruments is not unique to the NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven. A 
number of second-generation bilateral investment treaties, particularly 
those in which Canada is a party and generally acting as the capital 
exporting country to the treaty, have incorporated international trade law 
terms of art, mostly from the GATT’s Article XX General Exceptions.92 
                                                 
91 See supra note 35 & accompanying text. 
 
92 Among the Canadian bilateral investment treaties (called “Foreign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreements” or “FIPAs”) that include such protections are 
those entered into with the following:  
 
(i) Armenia (signed May 8, 1997) (protection for “human, animal 
or plant life or health,” “environmental” measures, and “the 
conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”); 
 
(ii) Barbados (signed May 29, 1997) (including “environmental 
protection,” the protection of “human, animal or plant life or 
health,” and “the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources.”); 
 
(iii) Costa Rica (signed May 18, 1998) (including the protection of 
“human, animal or plant life or health,” the “conservation of 
living or non-living exhaustible natural resources, if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption,” “the protection of 
investors, depositors, financial market participants, policy 
holders, policy claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary is 
owed by a financial institution,” and the “maintenance of the 
safety, soundness, integrity or financial responsibility or 
financial institutions.”); 
 
(iv) Croatia (signed January 30, 2001) (including “any current or 
future foreign aid program to promote economic development, 
whether under a bilateral agreement or pursuant to a 
multilateral arrangement or agreement, such as the OECD 
Agreement on Export Credits,” the protection of “human, 
animal or plant life or health,” “the conservation of living or 
non-living exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption,” “the production, distribution, sale 
or exhibition of film or video recordings.”); 
 
(v) Czech Republic (entered into force January 22, 2012) 
(including the protection of “human, animal or plant life or 
health,” “the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources,” “the protection of investors, depositors, 
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Several other States have also incorporated such provisions into their 
investment protection regimes.93  
                                                                                                                         
financial market participants, policy holders, policy claimants, 
or persons to whom a fiduciary is owed by a financial 
institution,” and “ensuring the integrity and stability of a 
Contracting Party’s financial system.”); 
 
(vi) Ecuador (signed April 29, 1996) (including the protection of 
“human, animal or plant life or health,” and measures 
concerning “the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources.”); and 
 
(vii) Egypt (signed November 13, 1996) (including measures 
necessary to protect “human, animal or plant life or health,” 
and acts “relating to “the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.”). 
 
93 The role of the public purpose doctrine in BITs is explored in Chapter 4. For non-
Canadian bilateral investment treaties including these protections, see the following non-
exhaustive listing:  
 
1. Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia 
and the Government of the Republic of China, Colom.-Chi, Nov. 
22, 2008, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/colombia_china.pdf 
(including the preservation of “public order”) [hereinafter 
Colombia-China BIT];  
 
2. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
Between the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of India, 
Colom.-Ind., Nov. 10, 2009, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/colombia_india.pdf 
(including “public order,” “human, animal, plant life or health,” 
“the protection of the environment or the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources,” and “pursuance of obligations 
under the United Nations Charter for the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security.”) [hereinafter Colombia-India 
BIT].  
 
3. United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, Chapter 10 
(Investment), Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text 
(including “environmental measures,” the protection of “human, 
animal, or plant life or health,” and “conservation of living or non-
living exhaustible natural resources.”) [hereinafter US-Colombia 
TPA]; 
 
4. Republic of Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 
11 (Investment), Jun. 30, 2007, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text (including 
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the protection of “human, animal, or plant life or health,” and “the 
conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural 
resources.”) [hereinafter US-South Korea FTA]; 
 
5. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and 
the Government of Japan for the Liberalisation, Promotion and 
Protection of Investment, Kor.-Jap., entered into force Jan. 1, 2003, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_japan.pdf 
(including the protection of “essential security interests,” 
“pursuance of  its obligations under the United Nations Charter for 
the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,” the 
protection of “human, animal or plant life or health,” and “the 
maintenance of public order.”) [hereinafter South Korea-Japan 
BIT]; 
 
6. Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Peru, Nov. 14, 
2006, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_peru.pdf 
(including the protection of “human, animal or plant life or health,” 
the protection of “public morals or to maintain public order,” “the 
prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the 
effects of a default on contract,” “the protection of the privacy of 
the individual in relation to the processing and dissemination of 
personal data and the protection of confidentiality of personal 
records and accounts,” the protection of “national treasures of 
artistic, historic or archaeological value,” and the “pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the Maintenance 
of International Peace and Security.”) [hereinafter Canada-Peru 
BIT]; 
 
7. Panama-United States Trade Promotion Agreement, June 28, 2007, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/panama-tpa/final-text (including the protection of 
“environmental measures,” the protection of “human, animal or 
plant life or health,” and the conservation of “living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources.”); 
 
8. Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of China (“Taiwan”) 
and the Republic of Panama, Tai.-Pan., Mar. 26, 1992, 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/PAN_T
W_s.pdf (including the protection of “environmental measures,” 
the protection of “human, animal or plant life or health,” and the 
conservation of “living or non-living exhaustible natural 
resources.”); 
 
9. Australia-Thailand Free Trade Agreement, Aus.-Tha., entered into 
force Jan. 1, 2005, http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tafta/aus-
thai_FTA_text.pdf (including the following language: “1. For the 
purposes of Chapters 2 – 7, Article XX of GATT 1994 is 
incorporated into and made part of this Agreement, mutatis 
mutandis. 2. For purposes of Chapters 8 – 10, Article XIV of 
GATS is incorporated into and made part of this Agreement, 
mutatis mutandis. 3. Article XX (e) – (g) of GATT 1994 is 
incorporated into and made part of Chapter 9, mutatis mutandis.”); 
and 
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The effect of this doctrinal confluence has more than just 
theoretical consequences. Conditioning what at first may appear to be 
orthodox public policy categories on trade law principles, such as 
“restrictions on domestic production or consumption” or “ensuring the 
integrity and soundness of financial institutions,” which are far removed 
from the objectives of international investment protection law, 
unconditionally and unjustifiably amplifies the State’s regulatory 
authority. To the extent that this broadening of the scope of the State’s 
regulatory sovereignty takes place, investor and investment protection is 
significantly diminished. Furthermore, because of the quite tenuous 
connection between international trade law precepts and the fundamental 
protection principles of investment law, uncertainty, lack of predictive 
value, and considerable want of uniformity ensue. The consequence is to 
provide Host States with a virtually unbridled license to regulate foreign 
investments in ways that could not have been reasonably foreseeable.94 
Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA is distinct from other chapters of 
the treaty in that its purpose is to attract “foreign investment” among the 
NAFTA Parties primarily by ensuring the twin goals of (i) providing 
foreign investors with a super-national arbitral forum in which to resolve 
disputes, and (ii) protecting “foreign investment” among the NAFTA 
Parties. The challenge in executing these objectives within the matrix of a 
trade agreement is to fashion a public purpose rubric that harmonizes 
different and even inimical principles and objectives of international 
investment and trade law. This theoretical and functional aspiration is 
frustrated where States are granted, under the guise of a legitimate public 
purpose, a license to regulate and compromise foreign investment 
protection in ways that are detrimental both to the investments and 
investors.95 Indeed, in the event of any inconsistency between Chapter 
                                                                                                                         
 
10. Australia-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Aus.-Sin., Feb. 17, 
2003, http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/safta/index.html (including the 
protection of “public morals” and “public order,” as well as 
“human, animal or plant life or health,” “the prevention of 
deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects of a 
default on a contract,” “the protection of the privacy of individuals 
in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and 
the protection of confidentiality of individual records and 
accounts.”). 
 
94 See, e.g., Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in 
International Law, 20:1 ICSID REV. 1, 23 (2005) (“Moreover, arbitral tribunals also share 
this view and have held that parties are ‘not liable for economic injury that is the 
consequence of bona fide regulation within the accepted police powers of the State.’ 
While this abstract principle is said to be ‘indisputable’ its application is anything but 
clear.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 
95 Without purporting to draw a necessary and apodictic connection between this 
distortion of public purpose caused by the indiscriminate wholesale importation of 
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Eleven of the NAFTA—the single investment and investor protection 
chapter in the treaty that also provides for international dispute 
resolution—and any other NAFTA chapter, it is the latter (the trade and 
not the investment chapter) that is to prevail.96 The NAFTA Parties were 
acutely aware that Chapter Eleven and its investment protection rubric was 
to be subordinated to all other NAFTA trade related articles.97 In this 
sense, investment law policies are but a stepchild to the overarching trade 
policies permeating the treaty’s architecture. 
E. The NAFTA Standard Public Purpose Exceptions and the 
Treaty Reservation Public Purpose Category: Harmonizing a 
Dichotomy 
Even though public purpose reservations in international treaties 
are rightfully construed as singular or particular categories that result as a 
process of diplomatic negotiations,98 the question lingers as to whether 
and the extent to which they inevitably may constitute general categories 
of customary international law.99 Often, conventional international law 
results from the codification of principles found in customary international 
law. The less common but still viable methodology of fashioning 
customary international law based upon principles of international 
                                                                                                                         
international trade law principles into the positive law and consequently the 
“jurisprudence” of investment law, it still remains paramount to underscore that as of this 
writing a NAFTA Chapter 11 claimant only has prevailed once in a NAFTA treaty-based 
arbitration. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002) [Hereinafter Metalclad]. 
 
96 See Article 1112(1): Relation to Other Chapters, which provides: “In the event of any 
inconsistency between this Chapter and another Chapter, the other Chapter shall prevail 
to the extent of the inconsistency.” NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1112 ¶ 1. 
 
97 See, e.g., Canadian Statement on Implementation, supra note 26, at 152 (“In the case of 
any inconsistency between the investment chapter and other chapters, article 1112 
provides that the latter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency. This article ensures 
that the specific provisions of other chapters are not superseded by the general provisions 
of this chapter.”) 
 
98 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 313 cmt. d (1987) (“A 
reservation, an express acceptance of a reservation, or an objection to a reservation, must 
be formulated in writing and communicated to the contracting States and other States 
entitled to become parties to the agreement.”) 
 
99 General reservations may result from a sovereign’s explicit adoption of customary 
international law principles. This proposition, however, does not preclude the negotiation 
of reservations precisely because they do not appear in international customary law. It is 
this latter universe of general reservations that are disconcerting with respect to the 
likelihood of having such reservations eventually populate the realm of customary 
international law. 
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conventional law is a phenomenon that has been amply chronicled.100 The 
customary practice of interpreting reservations as having an objective 
structure but a subjective content arising from the particular needs of 
States and the treaty negotiation process simply cannot be relied upon to 
ensure that recurring reservations, often hidden under the banner of 
“public safety and protection,” will not form part of a collective 
international law consciousness.101 
While the elements of customary international law102 certainly do 
bestow normative legitimacy on the principles that constitute it, and to this 
extent serve to enhance substantive and process legitimacy, the 
consequence necessarily leads to still a broader conception of public 
policy exceptions that distorts the workings of international investment 
law. Moreover, the orthodox legacy conceptualization of the public 
purpose doctrine is based upon a subjective analysis rendered legitimate 
by dint of State pronouncement enjoying minimum process.103 Legitimacy 
                                                 
100 See Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of 
Customary International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 71, 72 (1996) (Arguing that 
“those parts of multilateral treaties which are generalizable beyond the particulars of the 
treaty can serve as a source of customary international law provided three basic 
conditions are met:  1) The treaty is accepted by a sufficient number of States in the 
international system. 2) Among the parties to the treaty there are a significant number of 
those States whose interests are most affected by the treaty. 3) The treaty provisions are 
not subject to reservations by the accepting parties.”); see also Lt. Colonel Vincent A. 
Jordan, Creation of Customary International Law By Way of Treaty, 9 A.F. L. REV. 38 
(1967).  
 
101 For example, in Annexes I-III, each of the three NAFTA Parties provided a Schedule 
pertaining to “Reservations for Existing Measures and Liberalization Commitments.” 
NAFTA, supra note 18, annexes I-III. In these annexes, each Party delineated certain 
domestic legislation to be deemed inapplicable in evaluating the treatment to be accorded 
to investors of another NAFTA Party, including the duties placed upon a Host State 
under Article 1102’s National Treatment Standard. Notably, one of the reservation 
chapters, Annex III “Activities Reserved to the State,” only includes a Schedule of 
Reservations for Mexico, in which Mexico specified certain industries—Petroleum, 
Electricity, Nuclear Power, etc.—that it reserved the right to perform exclusively and “to 
refuse to permit the establishment of investments.” Id. annex III. 
 
102 Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 6 (1988) (“The fact which one must constantly keep in mind 
with respect to rules of customary international law is that proving the existence of such 
rules requires proof of two elements: first, the general practice of States must reflect the 
rule (the generality requirement); and second, States must follow the rule in the belief 
that such a course is legally required (the opinio juris sive necessitatis requirement).”) 
(citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-9 (3d ed. 1979)). 
 
103 Reservation exceptions constitute binding conventional law. They do not, however, 
arise from a political process akin to the enactment of domestic legislation. See, e.g., 
Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 319 (2006) (“[I]f a non-reserving 
State accepts another State’s reservation, it modifies the relevant treaty provisions for 
them both. If, on the other hand, a non-reserving State objects—without specifically 
denying the reserving party’s status as a party—’the provisions to which the reservation 
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is solely grounded on the authority of the State to negotiate a space for its 
political will to express itself irrespective of the effects that it may have on 
foreign investments. The ratification of the treaty provides for the requisite 
consent that engrafts the final imprimatur of juridical legitimacy and 
normative standing.104 Transitioning from a treaty reservation public 
purpose to a commonly recognized general principle of public purpose is 
both plausible and virtually inevitable.105 Content scrutiny would then be 
minimal because the validating normative predicate—in the first instance 
a State pronouncement, and in the second a common State pronouncement 
that is recurring and consonant with customary international law process 
legitimacy—would prevail particularly in connection with a doctrine that 
is almost exclusively based upon a subjective content. 
The transposition of general reservations contained in international 
conventional law to principles of international customary law likely to be 
categorized as public purpose precepts indiscriminately applicable to 
international trade and investment law is more than a theoretical construct. 
                                                                                                                         
relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.’”) (citing 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 21, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
[hereinafter VCLT]).   
 
104 See VCLT, supra note 105, art. 14 ¶ 1 (“The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty 
is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such consent to be expressed 
by means of ratification; (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were 
agreed that ratification should be required; (c) the representative of the State has signed 
the treaty subject to ratification; or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject 
to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative or was expressed during 
the negotiation.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 312 
cmt. d (1987) (“A State can be bound upon signature, but that has now become unusual 
as regards important formal agreements. For such agreements, signature is normally ad 
referendum, i.e., subject to later ratification, and has no binding effect but is deemed to 
represent political approval and at least a moral obligation to seek ratification.”). 
 
105 An example of this process can be found in the development of the Hull Rule:  
 
Consider, for example, customary rules governing compensation for 
expropriation. In 1938, in response to Mexico’s nationalization of oil 
and agrarian assets, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull articulated the 
Hull Rule, which requires prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation in the event of expropriation. The United States, as well 
as many developed countries, has long considered it to be the 
customary rule on compensation for expropriation. In the 1970s, 
underdeveloped countries sought to weaken the Hull Rule (along with 
the broader international investment regime) through a series of U.N. 
General Assembly resolutions. In response, developed countries, led by 
the United States, began employing BITs to shore up the existing 
regime. 
 
Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1025-26 (2012) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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It is an inevitable historical mandate. This cross-fertilization simply cannot 
be properly managed with reliance based solely upon the legacy public 
purpose doctrine. The consequence of expanding the scope of the existing 
public purpose doctrine, in addition to amplifying the regulatory sphere of 
States to the detriment of investment protection, also destabilizes the 
preferred equipoise in the economic relationship between capital-
exporting and capital-importing countries. The widening of this chasm in 
turn destabilizes public international law policies as well as the juridical 
principles that are fundamental to international trade and investment law, 
such as the seminal question of whether a finding of public purpose 
discharges a State’s obligation to compensate a foreign investor as a result 
of a direct or indirect expropriation or nationalization, or conduct 
tantamount to a taking. This central concern has been obscured and 
polarized by competing interpretations that are directly related to the status 
of a State as capital-exporting or capital-importing.106 
A corollary to the question of compensation107 from a sovereign’s 
perspective needs to be raised as well. Should the public purpose doctrine 
play any role, let alone a dispositive one, in determining whether a 
sovereign’s tender of compensation in an indirect expropriation, where the 
legacy public purpose doctrine is applied, constitutes the imposition of a 
penalty on a State for merely exercising its obligations as a sovereign? In 
this connection, should the legacy public purpose doctrine constitute a 
material test, standard or predicate consideration for determining whether 
a nationalization represents a justifiable expression of regulatory 
sovereignty in a specific economic sector or an abuse of that authority 
under the mantle of public purpose? These concerns relate not only to the 
workings of the existing legacy public purpose doctrine, but in particular 
can be quite meaningfully traced to consequences derived from the 
amplification of the public purpose doctrine because of its subjective 
content.108  
                                                 
106 See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or A Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals 
and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 505 (1991) (“[I]t was 
argued that the Hull formula could not continue to be valid law in the face of the 
opposition of a majority of States. At the same time, since the development of customary 
international law requires the consent of all significant interest groups of States, the 
persistent opposition of one group, i.e., the capital-exporting States, prevented the 
development of any alternative formula into new law.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 
107 A detailed consideration of the extent to which the public purpose doctrine effects 
compensation within the framework of direct or indirect expropriations or 
nationalizations is referenced in the context of Bilateral Investment Treaties, infra 
Chapter 4, and Foreign Investment Protection Statutes, infra Chapter 6.  
 
108 The September 2, 1992 draft iteration of Article 1101(4), at Canada’s initiative, sought 
to include “ monetary policy” as a public purpose category. This inclusion would have 
been tantamount to infusing into the public purpose subjective content national policies 
deemed to be necessary, and, therefore, also would have had the effect of suggesting that 
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In addition to subordinating the investment chapter to all other 
chapters of the NAFTA “to the extent of [any] inconsistency” pursuant to 
Article 1112, Chapter Eleven’s cornerstone investment protection 
provision109 (Article 1110 entitled “Expropriation and Compensation”) is 
                                                                                                                         
“necessity, without more” (i.e., lacking the predicate principles constituting the State 
Necessity Defense) would suffice as a public purpose. The text of this draft, however, 
suggests that Mexico opposed  it: 
 
4. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
providing functions or services such as law enforcement, correctional 
services, [monetary policy,] [n.3 ‘Canada is considering  this bracket. 
Mexico does not agree to subject the Mexican monetary policy to the 
dispositions on the Investment Chapter.’] income security or insurance, 
social security or insurance, social welfare, public education, public 
training, public health and childcare, in a manner that is inconsistent 
with this Chapter. 
  
NAFTA Negotiating Drafts, supra note 24, Draft of Sept. 2, 1992. 
 
109 The proscription against direct or indirect nationalization or expropriation of an 
investment of another NAFTA Party was first framed using the permissive “may,” where 
the final version adopts the mandatory “shall.” The paragraph in part reads: 
 
Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation 
 
1. No Party [may] directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a 
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an 
investment….   
 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 
One commentator has argued that the NAFTA has the effect of weakening the 
sovereign’s exercise of sovereignty in the regulatory sphere. Marisa Yee, The Future of 
Environmental Regulation after Article 1110 of NAFTA: A Look at the Methanex and 
Metalclad Cases, 9 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 85 (Fall 2002). Like Jackson, 
infra note 132, she generally points to the NAFTA’s international dispute resolution 
mechanism. More specifically, she contends that because the term “expropriation” within 
Article 1110 of the NAFTA “remains unclear,” Host States are left “vulnerable to law 
suits by foreign companies that conduct business in the host country whenever the host 
country’s action reduces the company’s profits. This may jeopardize national regulations, 
including efforts to protect the environment.” Id.  
 
In a similar vein, it has been asserted that “[n]on-discriminatory, non-arbitrary 
regulations that are legitimate exercises of the police power should be exempted from 
Article 1110’s scrutiny. That exclusion should include not only those police-power 
regulations exempted from arbitration under GATT, Article XX, but also human rights 
and labor standards, which are not covered by GATT Article XX due to their 
impermissible focus on production process methods rather than on criteria of products.” 
Jessica C. Lawrence, Chicken Little Revisited: NAFTA Regulatory Expropriations After 
Methanex, 41 GA. L. REV. 261, 305 (2006). The author further asserts that “[b]ecause the 
burden of proof will remain on the claimants under the ‘presumptions that respondent 
States act lawfully’ such an alteration or interpretation of the NAFTA text would provide 
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made applicable to “taxation measures,” but arguably qualified by the 
jurisdictional predicate of submitting a claim to arbitration pursuant to 
Article 1120 (Submission of a Claim to Arbitration).110 To the extent that 
the public purpose category of taxation111 requires a prospective claimant 
first to submit the issue of whether a particular taxation measure 
constitutes an expropriation “to the appropriate competent authorities,”112 
                                                                                                                         
a significant check on the ability of investors to interfere with a State’s right to enact 
regulations for the benefit of its citizens.” Id. at 305-306. 
 
Although helpful in contextualizing the disparate tensions between investors generally 
arising from income-exporting countries and Host States (typically income-importing 
sovereigns), Lawrence elects not to comment on the overbroad scope that is engrafted on 
the public purpose doctrine (in the form of “police powers”) and its effect on FDI 
incentives. Under her formulation, an expansive construction of the public purpose 
doctrine is amply checked by the international dispute resolution burden of proof that a 
prevailing claimant first must meet. 
 
110 Article 2103 (“Taxation”) paragraph 6 States: 
 
Article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation ) shall apply to taxation 
measures except that no investor may invoke that Article as the basis 
for a claim under Article 1116 (Claim by an Investor of a Party on its 
Own Behalf) or 1117 (Claim by an Investor of a Party on Behalf of an 
Enterprise), where it has been determined pursuant to this paragraph 
that the measure is not an expropriation. The investor shall refer the 
issue of whether the measure is not an expropriation for a determination 
to the appropriate confident authorities set out in Annex 2103.6 at the 
time that it gives notice under Article 1119 (Notice of Intent to Submit 
a Claim to Arbitration). If the competent authorities do not agree to 
consider the issue or, having agreed to consider it, fail to agree that the 
measure is not an expropriation with a period of six months  of such 
referral, the investor may submit its claim to arbitration under Article 
1120 (Submission of a Claim to Arbitration). 
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 2103 ¶ 6. 
 
111 Taxation is not mentioned Article 1101(4), but amply meets the NAFTA Standard as 
defined in this text.  
 
112 Annex 2103.6 defines competent authorities for purposes of Article 2103: Taxation as 
follows: 
 
For purposes of this Chapter: competent authority means: 
 
a. in the case of Canada, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Tax 
Policy, Department of Finance; 
 
b. in the case of Mexico, the Deputy Minister of Revenue of the 
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (“Secretaría de 
Hacienda y Crédito Público”); 
 
c. in the case of the United States, the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury. 
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as a condition precedent to perfecting an arbitration claim alleging 
expropriation, the NAFTA rubric accords expropriation a distinct status 
from that of other public purpose categories.113 
F. Beyond the NAFTA Chapter Eleven Framework: The 
NAFTA’s Anatomy Provides for an Expansive Construction of 
the Public Purpose Doctrine and the “Legitimate Objective” 
Standard 
The term “public purpose” does not appear in the NAFTA beyond 
Chapter Eleven.114 A permutation of the term, mostly in the form of 
“public interest,” appears eight times.115 The term appears once in the 
“public welfare” iteration.116 Throughout the NAFTA the public purpose 
doctrine serves as an organizing principle. The doctrine is fundamental in 
structuring, defining, and harmonizing the allocation of affirmative 
obligations and proscriptions concerning a substantively diverse gamut of 
public purpose categories.117 From a macro point of view, the entire 
NAFTA significantly mirrors the public purpose doctrine structural 
organization of Chapter Eleven. 
                                                                                                                         
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, annex 2103.6. 
 
113 The requirement to submit for a determination the question of whether a taxation 
measure constitutes an expropriation, competent authorities in the context of a six-month 
waiting period or determination period, whichever comes first, likely constitutes a 
jurisdictional condition precedent that can only be obviated either (i) upon penalty of 
triggering lack of consent in the event that an arbitral claimant’s filing would provide a 
Host State with a jurisdictional defense to the claim, or (ii) in situations where the 
competent authority structurally or politically is incapable of or unlikely to process the 
claim within the applicable time frame. Just as a provision calling for recourse to a 
competent authority of the Host State or a limited time frame at the expiration of which 
claimant may initiate an arbitral proceeding imposes an obligation on the claimant, such 
obligation is bilateral and also places on the Host State the duty to make available 
competent authorities or tribunals within the meaning of the treaty that can meet the 
treaty obligation. Such provision are bilateral and, therefore, equally applied to investors-
claimants and Host State respondents. See, e.g., Daimler Financial Services AG v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award ¶¶ 179-204 (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1082.pdf. 
 
114 Supra note 63 & accompanying text 
 
115 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 721 ¶ 2(b); art. 912 ¶ (b); art. 1015 ¶¶ 4(c), 8(a), 
8(i); art. 1017 ¶ 1(j); art. 1019 ¶ 6; art. 1411 ¶ 5(b); art. 1804 ¶ (b). 
 
116 Id. preamble (stating, in relevant part, the parties’ aim to “PRESERVE their flexibility 
to safeguard the public welfare.”) (emphasis in original). 
 
117 See e.g., id. art. 1015. 
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Central to the NAFTA’s development and application of the public 
purpose doctrine are Articles 904, 915, and 1201, which are conceptually 
interrelated with respect to the public purpose doctrine and should be 
analyzed together.118 Article 904, entitled “Basic Rights and Obligations,” 
relies on the GATT Article XX’s public purpose categories primarily 
grounded on (i) safety, (ii) the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, (iii) environmental concerns, and (iv) consumer protection.119 The 
                                                 
118Even though these three Articles are not sequentially in immediate order, they are 
conceptually inextricable when viewed in a public purpose doctrinal context. 
 
119 This Article provides: 
 
Article 904: Basic Rights and Obligations 
 
Right to Take Standards—Related Measures 
 
Each Party may, in accordance with this Agreement, adopt, maintain or 
apply any standards related measure, including any such measures 
relating to safety, the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, the environment or consumers, and any measure to ensure its 
enforcement or implementation. Such measures include those to 
prohibit the importation of a good or another Party, or the provision of 
a service by a service provider of another Party that fails to comply 
with the applicable requirements of those measures or to complete the 
Party’s approval procedures.  
 
Right to Establish Level of Protection 
 
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, each 
Party may, in pursuing its legitimate objectives of safety or the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or 
consumers, establish the levels of protection that it considers 
appropriate in accordance with Article 907 (2).  
 
Non-Discriminatory Treatment  
 
3. Each Party shall, in respect of its standards-related measures, 
accord to goods and service providers of another Party: 
(a) national treatment in accordance with Article 301 (Market 
Access) or Article 1202 (Cross-Border Trade in Service); 
and 
 
(b) treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like 
goods, or in the circumstances to service providers, of any 
other country.  
 
Unnecessary Obstacles 
 
4. No Party may prepare, adopt, maintain or apply any standards-
related measure with a view or with the effect of creating an 
unnecessary obstacle to trade between the Parties. An unnecessary 
obstacle to trade shall not be deemed to be created where: 
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international law trade exceptions contained in Article 904 comport with 
fundamental principles governing cross-border trade in goods and 
services; as noted, a subject matter that is materially distinct from 
investment or investor protection in international law. Therefore, but for 
the hierarchy established in Article 1112120, subordinating the Chapter 
Eleven investor-investment protection strictures to all other chapters of the 
NAFTA, the unqualified GATT-based public purpose categories appear to 
be in keeping with furthering cross-border trade in goods and services. 
The Article 1112 mandate, however, contributes to a distortion of the 
tempered ratio that must be present between the trade and investor-
investment protection objectives of the NAFTA. 
Paragraph four of Article 904 does purport to limit party-autonomy 
as to measures implemented in furtherance of the public purpose 
categories contained in this Article to the extent that any such measure 
may have “the effect of creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade between 
the Parties.”121 This qualification in turn is itself subject to a “legitimate 
objective” test that first appears in paragraph two of Article 904 and is 
repeated in paragraph four subsections (a) and (b). The “legitimate 
objective” standard serves to broaden the scope of the Host State’s 
regulatory sovereignty.122 Article 904 on three occasions relies upon the 
“legitimate objective” standard, but nowhere in this article is the standard 
defined. The standard oddly is not defined until eleven articles later in 
                                                                                                                         
(a) the demonstrable purpose of the measure is to achieve a 
legitimate objective; 
 
(b) the measure does not operate to exclude goods of another 
Party that meet that legitimate objective. (emphasis 
supplied). 
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 904 (emphasis supplied). 
 
120 Id. art. 1112. 
 
121 Id. art. 904 ¶ 4. 
 
122 This effect of the Host State’s or host Parties’ regulatory-legislative space is 
corroborated by the language contained in paragraph 3 of Article 905, which provides: 
 
Nothing in paragraph 1 [relating to the NAFTA Party’s use of relevant 
international standards or international standards] shall be construed to 
prevent a Party, in pursuing its legitimate objective from adopting, 
maintaining or applying any standards-related measure that results in a 
higher level of protection than would be achieved if the measure were 
based on the relevant international standard. 
 
Id. art. 905 ¶ 3 (emphasis supplied). 
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Article 915 entitled: “Definitions.”123 Because “legitimate objective” 
within the meaning of Chapter 9 (“Standards-Related Measures”) of the 
NAFTA are defined as a standard and not as a “term,” it is vested with 
latitude and flexibility in keeping with the use of standards in international 
law and as described in this text.124 Consequently, the Article 904(4) 
“check” on the extent to which a NAFTA Party may infringe on another 
Party’s goods or service providers is further broadened by the treatment of 
“legitimate objective” as a “standard” and not a “term.” 
Even though strictly the term “public purpose” does not appear 
beyond its solitary reference in Chapter Eleven, (Article 1110(1)(a)), 
Article 1201(3)(b) is identical to the NAFTA Standard as set forth in 
Article 1101(4).125 The unqualified incorporation of the NAFTA Standard 
                                                 
123 Article 915: Definitions, in pertinent part reads: 
 
1. For purposes of this Chapter:  
 
Legitimate objective includes an objective such as: 
 
(a) safety, 
 
(b) protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, the environment or consumers, including 
matters relating to quality and identifiability of 
goods or services, and  
 
(c) sustainable development, 
 
considering, among other things, where appropriate, 
fundamental climactic or other geographical factors, 
technological or infrastructural factors, or scientific 
justification but does not include the protection of domestic 
production. 
 
Id. art. 915 ¶ 1. 
 
124 Accordingly, Article 915, while seeming to define the words “legitimate objective” 
taken together, instead reconfigures it with the matrix of a standard, as evinced by the 
words “such as” and the subordinate clause “considering, among other things, where 
appropriate,…” Id. 
 
125 In governing the scope of and coverage of cross-border trade in services within the 
Chapter 12 framework in paragraphs, Article 1201, paragraphs 1 and 3 provide: 
 
1. This Chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained by 
Party relating to cross-border trade in services by service 
providers of another Party, including measures respecting:  
 
(a) the production, distribution, marketing, sale, and delivery 
of a service; 
 
(b) the purchase or use of, or payment for, a service; 
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in the Chapter regulating cross-border trade to limit a Host State’s exercise 
of regulatory sovereignty in ways that may be detrimental to another 
Party’s investment or trade interests, further demonstrates a doctrinal 
conception of public purpose that commands refinement. Investment-
investor protection and cross-border trade interests have different 
objectives and underlying policies.126 The microeconomic model incident 
to international investment law generally consists of (i) a single-sector 
investment, (ii) by a private entity or natural person, (iii) for a limited time 
frame, and (iv) of an amount unlikely to affect materially a State’s 
                                                                                                                         
 
(c)  the access to and use of distribution and transportation 
systems in connection with the provision of a service; 
 
(d)  the presence in its territory of a service provider of 
another Party; and 
 
(e) the provision of a bond or other form of financial security 
as a condition for the provision of a service. 
... 
 
3. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to:  
 … 
(b) prevent a Party from providing a service or performing a 
function such as law enforcement, correctional services, 
income security, or insurance, social security or insurance, 
social welfare, public education, public training, health, and 
childcare, in a manner that is not inconsistent with this 
Chapter. 
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1201 ¶¶ 1,3.  
 
126 “[I]nternational investment law is designed to support economic development by 
protecting the interests of foreign investors.” Elizabeth A. Martinez, Understanding the 
Debate over Necessity: Unanswered Questions and Future Implications of Annulments in 
the Argentine Gas Cases, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 149, 175 (2012); see also 
Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual 
and Methodological Foundations of A New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 
59 (2011) (“The public function of international investment law consists of establishing 
principles of investment protection under international law that provide for the protection 
of property and endorse rule of law standards for the treatment of foreign investors by 
States. These principles have the purpose of reducing the so-called “political risk” 
inherent in any foreign investment situation.”). 
 
By contrast, the “chief purpose” of international trade law is to promote free trade. 
Stephen McCaffrey, Biotechnology: Some Issues of General International Law, 14 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 91 (2001). See also O.A. Odiase-Alegimenlen, globalization, the 
World Trade Organization and Developing States; A View from the “South’, CURRENTS: 
INT’L TRADE L.J., Winter 2003, at 24 (“The purpose of International trade as espoused 
today is the ultimate prosperity of the generality of humankind. This is supposed to occur 
through the increase in the volume of trade amongst countries of the world, which will 
stimulate demand and therefore production, thus opening up jobs and expanding 
opportunities in all spheres.”). 
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economy.127 In high relief, the subject matter of international trade law 
generally consists of a (i) full sector or multiple sector economic event, (ii) 
taking place over an extended time frame and after a very measured 
contractual period of time, (iii) with revenue that materially affects a 
State’s economy, and (iv) concerning treaties between nations or 
geopolitical subdivisions, but not private entities or natural persons.128 The 
objectives and underlying economic policies pertaining to international 
trade law are grounded in a macroeconomic framework that generally 
seeks to remove or mitigate the effects of trade barriers and other forms of 
protectionism.129  
Similarly, the international dispute resolution configuration for 
controversies arising from alleged non-compliance with investment 
protection, and violations pertaining to international trade law also differ. 
A breach of international investment law consists of an arbitration 
configuration having a private entity or natural person as a claimant and a 
State as a respondent.130 Treaty-based investment arbitrations concern 
claims for damages. These damages principally are calculated based upon 
analysis of past events giving rise to the alleged investment protection 
violation.131 In contrast, the relief sought arising from alleged violations of 
                                                 
127 Generally, the harm to the investor stemming from a violation of international 
investment law “would be derived primarily from the conduct of the State, which has 
actively utilized its sovereign power to place the investor in a worse position than it had 
enjoyed before the State’s action.” Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive 
Obligations in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 
419 (2006). 
 
128 For example, it has been argued that “the WTO system prioritizes, in terms of 
remedies, consistency and conformity with the WTO rules over compensation whose 
concept is deeply associated with such elements as injury, damages and nullification or 
impairment.” Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 763, 771 (2004). 
 
129 See Sara Dillon, A Farewell to “Linkage”: International Trade Law and Global 
Sustainability Indicators, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 87, 97 (2002) (“[T]he operation of the 
current global trading system, complete with its legal rules and dispute resolution 
mechanisms, must be examined for evidence of its larger effects.”). 
 
130 See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 129, at 415 (“The modern investor-State dispute 
resolution system takes a dramatically different approach. Virtually every BIT contains a 
section allowing investors who feel their treaty-based rights have been violated to 
institute arbitration against the Host State. Such arbitrations are frequently to be 
administered by the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), an institution within the World Bank Group formed in 1966 to conduct and 
promote investor-State dispute resolution.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 
131 Christopher M. Ryan, Discerning the Compliance Calculus: Why States Comply with 
International Investment Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 63, 83 (2009) (“International 
investment law permits investors to bring claims directly against States. As such, a 
breach of international investment law carries with it the prospect of significant financial 
liability. A recent study shows that, as of 2006, the amount of quantified damages 
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international trade law does not contemplate an award of pecuniary 
damages based on past violations, but rather issuance of appropriate 
modifications to trade regulations that would eviscerate the allegedly 
wrongful conduct on a prospective basis.132 The affirmative relief sought 
in treaty-based investment arbitrations is premised on alleged violations of 
international investment law standards such as the fair and equitable 
treatment standard,133 national treatment standard,134 and international 
minimum standards.135 Claims predicated on alleged violations of 
international trade law commonly concern principles that international 
investment law and international trade law have in common, such as most-
favored nation clauses (MFN), but contextualized within a radically 
different framework governing trade and tariffs.136  
                                                                                                                         
claimed in investment treaty arbitrations ranged from $155,314 to $9.4 billion, with an 
average claim of approximately $345 million.”) (citing Susan D. Franck, Empirically 
Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 54-58 
(2007)). 
 
132 See, e.g., Cho, supra note 130, at 771.   
 
133 See generally, ROLAND KLÄGER, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Cambridge University Press 2011).   
 
134 A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of Non-
Discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview, 8 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 57, 71 (1998) (“[N]ational treatment is the commitment by a 
country to treat enterprises operating on its territory, but controlled by the nationals of 
another country, no less favorably than domestic enterprises in like situations.”) 
 
135 One NAFTA tribunal has described the Minimum Standard as follows:  
  
The minimum standard of treatment provision of the NAFTA is similar 
to clauses contained in BITs. The inclusion of a “minimum standard” 
provision is necessary to avoid what might otherwise be a gap. A 
government might treat an investor in a harsh, injurious and unjust 
manner, but do so in a way that is no different than the treatment 
inflicted on its own nationals. The “minimum standard” is a floor 
below which treatment of foreign investors must not fall, even if a 
government were not acting in a discriminatory manner. 
 
S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, First Partial Award on Liability ¶ 259 (Nov. 
13, 2000), 8 ICSID Rep. 18 (2005) [hereinafter S.D. Myers First Partial Award]. 
 
136 In the international trade context the national treatment standard, by way of example, 
has applied to the GATT, only concerns trade in goods, and, therefore, is not applicable 
to trade and services or technology. Similarly, the MFN clause, which pervades the 
GATT, seeks to affect economic categories that are wholly unrelated to investment law 
policies. The most notable MFN clause in GATT, contained in Article I, paragraph 1, is 
illustrative of this point: 
 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or 
in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the 
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It soon becomes clear that the economics, subject matter, 
objectives, underlying policies, and even international dispute resolution 
configuration of international investment law and international trade law 
are disparate. The NAFTA’s use of a single overarching public purpose 
standard in Chapter Eleven and with respect to the remaining NAFTA 
chapters on trade is as incongruous as the wholesale importation of GATT 
Article XX (“Exceptions”) into Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA or into 
bilateral investment treaties.137 A less malleable public purpose doctrine 
with objective content is necessary if the goals of both international trade 
and investment law are to be maximized and reconciled with the interests 
of all parties, i.e., foreign investors, capital-exporting, and capital-
importing countries. The public purpose doctrine in the guise of “public 
interest” in the NAFTA chapters beyond Chapter Eleven plays a distinct 
role in relation to disclosure or access to information. Pursuant to Article 
912 (b), the NAFTA Parties are not obligated to disclose any information 
deemed to be “contrary to the public interest.”138 Linking limitations on 
the provision of information to so general a standard as “contrary to the 
public interest,” even where the NAFTA Standard vests “public interest” 
with substantive import, is not different than according the NAFTA 
                                                                                                                         
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, with respect 
to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to 
all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 
and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties. 
 
GATT, supra note 19, art. I ¶ 1. It is worth underscoring that the MFN clause in Article I, 
paragraph 1 of the GATT only applies to the importation and exportation of products. It 
is also of an unconditional nature in that it proscribes that any concession granted by a 
contracting party to a product of another country “shall by accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.” 
 
137 See infra Chapter 4. 
 
138 Article 912: Limitations on the Provision of Information, reads: 
 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to require a Party to:  
 
(a)  communicate, publish texts, or provide particulars or copies of 
documents other than in an official language of the Party; or  
(b) furnish any information the disclosure of which would impede 
law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to public interest, 
or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of 
particular enterprises.  
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 912 (emphasis supplied). 
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Parties unbridled discretion to limit the provision of information.139 A 
similar stricture is found in Articles 1019 of Chapter Ten (“Government 
Procurement”)140 and Article 1411 of Chapter Fourteen (“Financial 
Services”).141 “Public interest” in the NAFTA may determine whether to: 
                                                 
139 Considerable ink has been spilled on the issue of transparency in the NAFTA. See, 
e.g., Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in Investor-State Disputes—Adoption, Adaption, and 
NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1379-80 (2006) (addressing a new 
generation of texts “consolidating, clarifying and promoting transparency practice.”); 
Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L 
L.  213 (2001); see generally, Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Transparency in Analysis of an 
Evolving Fundamental Principle of International Economic Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
579, 580-581 (2006); Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, Juridical Convergence in International 
Dispute Resolution: Developing A Substantive Principle of Transparency and 
Transnational Evidence Gathering, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 37 (2012). 
 
Furthermore, the NAFTA Parties have interpreted the agreement as follows: 
 
Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality under 
disputing Parties to a Chapter 11 Arbitration [or] precludes the Parties 
from providing public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, a 
Chapter 11 Tribunal. 
… 
 
Each Party agrees to make available to the public in a timely manner all 
documents submitted to, or issued by a Chapter 11 Tribunal, subject to 
redaction of:  
 
(a)  confidential business information;  
(b)  information which is privileged or is otherwise protected from 
disclosure under the Party’s domestic law; and 
(c)  information which the Party must withhold pursuant to the 
relevant arbitral rules, as applied. 
 
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter Eleven Provisions of the NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission (July 31, 2001), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang=eng&view=d.  
 
140 Article 1019 in part reads: 
 
1. Further, to Article 1802(1) (Publication), each Party shall 
promptly publish any law, regulation, precedential judicial decision, 
administrative ruling of general application in any procedure, including 
standard contract clauses, regarding government procurement covered 
by this Chapter in the appropriate publications referred to in Annex 
1010.1. 
… 
6.  Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as requiring any 
Party to disclose confidential information the disclosure of which 
would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public 
interest. 
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1019 ¶ 1,6. 
 
141 Article 1411: Transparency, in relevant part States: 
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award a procurement contract, withhold information pertaining to such an 
instrument, or withhold information in connection with the procurement of 
consulting services.142 
Finally, a reviewing authority investigating a BIT challenge “may 
delay the awarding of the proposed contract pending resolution of the 
challenge, except in cases of emergency or where the delay would be 
                                                                                                                         
 
5.  Nothing in this Chapter requires a Party to furnish or allow 
access to:  
 
(b) any confidential information, the disclosure of which 
would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the 
public interest or prejudice legitimate commercial interests of 
particular enterprises. 
 
Id. art. 1411 ¶ 5(b). 
 
142  Article 1015: Submission Receipt and Opening of Tenders and Awarding of 
Contracts States, in relevant part: 
 
4. An entity shall award contracts in accordance with the 
following: 
 
(c) unless the entity decides in the public interest not to award 
the contract, the entity shall make the award to the supplier 
that has been determined to be fully capable of undertaking 
the contract and whose tender is either the lowest-priced 
tender or the tender determined to be the most advantageous in 
terms of the specific evaluation criteria set out in the notices or 
tender documentation; 
 
8. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1-7, an entity may withhold 
certain information on the award of a contract where disclosure of the 
information: 
 
(a) would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to 
public interest. 
 
Id.  art. 1015 ¶¶ 4(c), 8(a). 
 
Additionally, Article 1016: Limited Tendering Procedures, in pertinent part provides: 
 
2. An entity may use limited tendering procedures in the 
following circumstances and subject to the following 
conditions, as applicable: 
 
(i) where an entity needs to procure consulting services 
regarding matters of a confidential nature, the disclosure of 
which could reasonably be expected to compromise 
government confidences, cause economic disruption or 
similarly be contrary to the public interest.  
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contrary to public interest.”143 Beyond Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA, the 
NAFTA rubric conceptually and structurally follows the organizational 
principles found in Chapter Eleven. The public purpose doctrine finds 
identical expression and is not at all modified. The doctrine’s scope and 
content remained identical but for the seemingly expansive recourse to 
“public interest” principally in the context of disclosures.144 The entire 
framework fundamentally adheres to the NAFTA Standard and, therefore, 
mirrors the virtues incident to Chapter Eleven, particularly as a result of 
the Article 1101(4) effort to fashion a public purpose standard. The 
NAFTA regime beyond Chapter Eleven does not contribute to a doctrinal 
context or content for the public purpose doctrine other than setting forth a 
more detailed iteration of the orthodox-legacy public purpose scheme. Put 
simply, the NAFTA chapters beyond Chapter Eleven do not contribute a 
satisfactory answer to the underlying inquiries: to what extent are 
governmental measures exercised for genuine and legitimate domestic 
objectives “legal” despite their detrimental effect on foreign investors or 
investments? Is there a limited and identifiable universe of substantive 
categories that, from a Global legal perspective, rightfully fall under the 
umbrella of public purpose and, therefore, supersede obligations owed to 
foreign investor/investments despite the adverse consequences of their 
application? Is the public purpose doctrine as embedded in the NAFTA 
regime determinative in parceling legitimate State action from the 
discriminatory issuance of regulatory decrees? This dynamic upsets the 
very principles of bilateralism and symmetry between home and Host 
States that, when present, give rise to the requisite transparency, 
uniformity, and predictability that purport to be the hallmarks of BITs, as 
well as treaty-based arbitral proceedings. International investment law and 
treaty-based international arbitration deserve more from the public 
purpose doctrine. 
G. Conclusions and Observations 
The NAFTA regime ably crafts what may be construed as a public 
purpose doctrine standard in Article 1101(4), which is later replicated in 
Article 1106(6).145 Certainly this effort represents a notable landmark in 
seeking to bestow meaning to the doctrine, at least within the NAFTA 
framework. The broad and all-encompassing scope of the categories 
comprising what in this writing has been identified as the NAFTA 
Standard is problematic. The NAFTA describes the content of its version 
of public purpose but does not define it with any rigor in the classical 
etymological sense of that word, i.e., definire as in rendering distinct 
                                                 
143 Id. art. 1016 ¶ 2(i). 
 
144 See supra notes 141-44 & accompanying text.  
 
145 NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1104 ¶ 4; 1106 ¶ 6. 
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because of its very limits or boundaries. Instead, the limitless and 
unqualified public purpose categories forming part of the NAFTA 
Standard by itself, let alone when coupled with the use of the term “public 
interest” throughout the NAFTA chapters beyond Chapter Eleven, divests 
the doctrine of all objective content. The doctrine is thus accorded an 
intuitive, self-evident status. Consequently, instead of serving as a 
standard capable of harmonizing the policies incident to investment 
protection with regulatory sovereignty, the public purpose doctrine of the 
NAFTA disproportionately favors the State’s regulatory authority to the 
likely detriment of investment protection.146 The practical result has 
problematic consequences that extend to investor-state arbitration well 
beyond the confines of the NAFTA. 
The indiscriminate commingling of international trade law with 
international investment law exceptions under the public purpose banner is 
not conducive to yielding a functional public purpose doctrine beyond the 
legacy-orthodox paradigm. The wholesale importation into investment law 
of general exceptions from the GATT147 is not conducive to yielding a 
public purpose doctrine capable of harmonizing the interests of “foreign 
investors” and “Host States.” The general exceptions endemic to 
international trade law in theory and practice seek to further underlying 
policies that are radically distinct from those pertaining to international 
investment law. The Article XX General Exceptions of the GATT 
enjoying robust standing in the NAFTA framework, including Chapter 
Eleven, should be tepidly applied148 in furtherance of the objectives of 
                                                 
146 The proposition that the public purpose doctrine within the NAFTA more favorably 
bolsters the regulatory authority of sovereigns, is contrary to the orthodox understanding 
of the effects of trade agreements generally and of the NAFTA in particular. By way of 
example, Jackson has observed that, “[t]he North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in some respects went very far in its measures seeking national government 
changes arguably necessary to fulfill the NAFTA international obligations. This was true 
for the NAFTA investor protection rules, and also in relation to environment and labor 
standards.” JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS 
ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1, 5 (Cambridge University Press 2000). 
 
147 Compare NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1106 ¶¶ 6(a)-(c) with GATT, supra note 19, art. 
XX. 
 
148 The GATT Article XX, General Exceptions, are to be applied only if “necessary.” 
Accordingly, the matter of treaty construction, the exceptions are not to apply where their 
objectives can be served by a less restrictive alternative. This principle, however, is not 
triggered in the context of protection of foreign investments and investors under 
international investment law. To the contrary, because the “jurisprudence” that treaty-
based international arbitral tribunals generate simply to not constitute binding legal 
precedent, the application and construction of General Exceptions are not governed by a 
set of binding principles capable of having predictive value. In addition, with respect to 
the international law of investment protection, there is no universally accepted or 
consistently applied “proportionality” or “effects” tests capable of mitigating the policy 
consequences arising from a lack of checks and balances in the application of General 
Exceptions. GATT, supra note 19, art. XX. 
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international investment law. The subject matter of international trade law 
principally concerns: (i) the protection of the value of tariff concessions;149 
(ii) distortions of trade flow; (iii) the effects of non-tariff measures, 
including subsidies and countervailing duties; anti-dumping obligations, 
technical barriers to trade, government procurement;150 (iv) trade 
regulation pertaining to agricultural goods so as to preserve its advantage 
in underdeveloped countries, primarily with respect to trade agreement 
clauses that distinguish between “industrialized” and “primary” goods;151 
(v) restrictions on imports that may injure domestic producers through 
“safeguards” techniques;152 and (vi) rules seeking to minimize government 
intervention, and also to enhance domestic government intervention in 
trade law both with respect to type and amount of trade.153 The general 
exceptions found in international trade law are meant to comport with 
these (above-referenced) macroeconomic issues. Hence, such public 
purpose categories as “prison labor” are staples of the GATT General 
                                                                                                                         
 
For example, “tariffs are the ‘preferred trade policy instrument’ under GATT because the 
most-favored-nation and national treatment requirements reinforce negotiated tariff 
concessions; because tariffs are relatively open, predictable, pro-competitive, and 
domestically acceptable trade policy instruments; and because alternative trade policy 
instruments are restricted or prohibited.” Robert J. Girouard, Water Export Restrictions: 
A Case Study of WTO Dispute Settlement Strategies and Outcomes, 15 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 247, 254 (2003). 
 
150 See, e.g., David G. Forgue, An Overview of an International Trade and Customs 
Practice, CBA REC., FEBRUARY/MARCH 2002, at 28 (“International Trade law issues 
include representing parties in antidumping duty cases involving foreign producers that 
allegedly sell their goods at unfairly low price in the U.S., countervailing duty cases 
involving subsidies to foreign companies by their governments, matters brought under 
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, and similar matters.”). 
 
151 See, e.g., Ari Afilalo, Not in My Backyard: Power and Protectionism in U.S. Trade 
Policy, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 749, 782 (2002) (“The Uruguay Round of 
negotiations resulted in the reduction of protectionist policies in developed countries. The 
Agriculture Agreement that issued from these negotiations required the developed 
countries to convert nontariff barriers into tariffs, while preserving equivalent market-
access opportunities.”). 
 
152 See Frank J. Garcia, Three Takes on Global Justice, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 323, 
332-33 (2010) (“The core commitment of contemporary trade law is that of free trade: 
international economic relations are to be free, or as free as possible, from governmental 
restrictions in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and nondiscriminatory with 
respect to country of origin (the most-favored-nation rule) and domestic origin (the 
national treatment rule).”) (citation omitted). 
 
153 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO 1, 38-40 (Cambridge 
University Press 2000) (citing  Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate 
Committee on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., MTN Studies: MTN and the Legal 
Institutions of International Trade (Committee Print, 1979) Vol. IV.4-5 (report prepared 
by J. Jackson at the request of the Subcommittee on International Trade)). 
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Exceptions, but conceptually remain far afield from the issues pervading 
international investment law.154 The precepts of international trade law 
used to enhance trade flow patterns simply are ill-suited to constitute the 
substantive content of a public purpose doctrine seeking to preserve this 
objective while protecting foreign investor/investments, and attracting 
foreign direct investment (“FDI”).  
The development of the Public Purpose Standard and the 
legitimate effort to engraft a subject-matter “definitive” to the doctrine 
must be recognized as more than a tepid first step towards developing 
public purpose beyond a self-evident truth pertaining to all things public, 
and must remain self-judging by the invoking State. This contribution 
notwithstanding, the importance of public purpose as both an organizing 
principle and a source for legitimacy in the process of exercising 
regulatory sovereignty commands objective content and application. The 
public purpose doctrine within the NAFTA is accorded great weight but 
little specificity. The role of the doctrine within customary international 
law as simplified by the NAFTA is significant, but its workings all too 
often resemble a license granted to the Host States to engage in regulatory 
sovereignty at the expense of investor/investment protection. 
H. The Jurisprudence of Public Purpose in the NAFTA 
Structurally, the jurisprudence of any statutory framework would 
serve to define principles and terms. One of the rudimentary promises that 
decisional-law aspires to redeem is the development of statutory 
frameworks vested with predictive value, uniformity of standard, and 
transparency,155 notwithstanding the lack of stare decisis of such 
awards.156 The “jurisprudence” of public purpose within the NAFTA does 
not meet this objective. To the contrary, the “decisional-law” that the 
NAFTA has spawned emphasizes the shortcomings of the public purpose 
doctrine generally and within the NAFTA in particular. 
The failings of the “NAFTA common law” in part arise from the 
very nature of treaty-based international arbitration.157 The Chapter Eleven 
dispute resolution framework provides for ad hoc arbitration tribunals. 
                                                 
154 GATT, supra note 19, art. XX ¶ (e). 
 
155 See generally BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
 
156 See, e.g., Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga & Harout Jack Samra, The Role of Precedent in 
Defining Res Judicata in Investor-State Arbitration, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 419, 449 
(2012) (noting “[t]he uncertain nature and application of the doctrine of precedent—stare 
decisis—in international arbitration.”). 
 
157 It would be a mistake to represent that an arbitration based on consent arising from a 
treaty and concerning issues in dispute of great public importance. 
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The arbitrators are empaneled for the exclusive purpose of processing the 
single case over which they preside. Unlike judicial courts, investor-state 
arbitrations are not altogether part of a sovereign’s exercise of sovereignty 
through the judicial branch of government. Treaty-based international 
arbitration formally takes place beyond the realm of a sovereign’s exercise 
of sovereignty. Even though investor-state international arbitrations 
address issues of public policy and public international law, arbitral 
awards do not generate second-instance jurisprudence because they are not 
appealable.158 Moreover, because of their ad hoc configuration and want 
of judicial status (a non-State administration of justice) arbitral awards do 
not constitute binding precedent.159 These awards at most are deemed to 
cosnstitute persuasive authority. Treaty-based arbitration proceedings, and 
particularly Chapter Eleven arbitrations, in contrast with judicial 
proceedings, have been widely criticized by commentators as suffering 
from a “transparency deficit.”160 In fact, both the party-appointed 
arbitrator system and the practice of dissent writing in treaty-based 
international arbitration have been identified as problematic features that 
tend to delegitimize the entire treaty-arbitral process because they are 
emblematic of lack of arbitrator impartiality and in some instances, 
independence.161 The lack of a mature NAFTA jurisprudence providing 
for a systematic development and refinement of the public purpose 
doctrine in part can be explained as the consequence of an overarching 
systemic debility arising from the very nature of decisional-law in treaty-
based international arbitration.  
A second contributing factor that helps explain the impoverished 
and often conceptually contradictory status of the jurisprudence addressing 
the public purpose doctrine within the NAFTA must be attributed to the 
unduly broad scope and subjective content (State-oriented) of the legacy 
public purpose doctrine. The orthodox conception of the public purpose 
doctrine is based on the unworkable proposition that a State’s subjective 
intent to use the property that has been the subject of a direct or indirect 
expropriation or nationalization for a public purpose renders the taking a 
                                                 
158 See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 53, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
 
159 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055 (providing that a “decision of the Court has no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular case.”) 
 
160 As noted in prior writing, the “arbitral decision-making remains an impenetrable 
‘black box’ process. Despite ably chronicled significant gains for transparency, 
deliberations remain obscured by design and practice in order to minimize the scope of 
judicial intervention at the enforcement stage.” Martinez-Fraga, supra note 51, at 46. 
 
161 NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110 (“Expropriation and Compensation”). 
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legal act of State.162 In fact, the proposition has been advanced that where 
the public purpose standard has been met, a State is exempt from the 
payment of any compensation  because the failure to exempt a State would 
result in imposing a fine on a sovereign for merely undertaking its 
regulatory obligations.163 After all, a sovereign has an obligation to 
regulate. Pursuant to this standard, however, virtually every act of State 
constitutes a public purpose. Hence, a very simple and legitimate question 
remains. What constitutes a public purpose? Three related but distinct 
inquiries also need to be raised. How is public purpose defined? When is 
public purpose met? What type of tribunals should sit in judgment of a 
public purpose issue? 
The NAFTA jurisprudence of public purpose does not bring us any 
closer to answering these questions. In contrast, the conceptual categories 
discernible from the complex mosaic of ad hoc tribunals struggling with 
public purpose—either as a determinative standard by itself or as one of 
four elements to be considered in determining the legality of an 
expropriation or nationalization—are patently inconsistent in harmonizing 
the policies of international investment law with the underpinnings of 
international trade law.164 
As shall be discussed, efforts to devise tests and standards for 
calibrating the delicate balance between the protection of foreign 
investment/investor and the lawful exercise of sovereignty in furtherance 
of a public purpose only have served to obscure even further the public 
purpose doctrine. Much like the Ptolomaic effort directed at “saving the 
appearances” of the movement of celestial bodies by repeatedly engrafting 
                                                 
162 Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation, of the NAFTA is illustrative of the 
standard. It provides that a direct or indirect nationalization or expropriation of an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory constitutes a legal taking where 
“(a) [the property is used] for a public purpose; (b) [and has been taken] on a non-hyphen 
discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraph 2  through 6.” Id. art. 1110 
¶¶ 1(a)-(d).  
 
163 See, e.g., Matthew C. Porterfield, State Practice and the (Purported) Obligation 
Under Customary International Law to Provide Compensation for Regulatory 
Expropriations, 37 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 159, 164 (2011) (noting that there 
appears to be “some support for the position that there is a police power exception to the 
compensation requirement--i.e., that a nondiscriminatory regulatory measure cannot 
constitute an act of expropriation regardless of its adverse economic impact,” but that 
only a minority of cases have found this to be so). 
 
164 As suggested in Article 1110 1(a)-(d), as part of both conventional and customary 
international law expropriation/nationalization analysis, public purpose often is 
considered together on equal footing with (i) non-discriminatory basis, (ii) the presence 
of due process of law, and (iii) payment of compensation. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 
1110 (“Expropriation and Compensation”). 
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an epicycle upon an epicycle in a near infinite effort to devise a theory that 
would bestow uniformity and predictive value on the movement of the 
heavenly bodies, “legal epicycles” began to appear in the firmaments of 
treaty-based arbitration awards. Legal gyrations such as the 
“proportionality test” first identified by the tribunal in the Fireman’s Fund 
case165 sought to discern the appropriate proportionality between the 
means employed by a State and the aim sought to be achieved, together 
with the good faith nature of the measure. The Fireman’s Fund tribunal 
was silent with respect to any theoretical or practical definition of the 
proportionality principle that it created. Similarly, it failed to explain the 
principle’s foundation in international law and also did not detail the 
application of proportionality to any fact pattern.  
Other tribunals, such as in TecMed,166 which was decided three 
years before Fireman’s Fund, observed the need to use “proportionality” 
as a principle of public international law that would serve as a litmus test 
in harmonizing a State’s exercise of its regulatory authority appropriately 
with investment/investor protection. The use of a concept such as 
“proportionality” bespeaks objectivity and compromise. TecMed mentions 
the proportionality principle, but, as with the tribunal in Fireman’s Fund, 
did not voice any theoretical or practical definition of the proportionality 
principle or the important role that the public purpose doctrine may enjoy 
if infused with greater substantive content and applied within the context 
of a proportionality rubric.  
A proportionality standard addresses the State’s objective in any 
alleged expropriation or nationalization against the effects that such a 
taking would have on the subject foreign investment/investor. These two 
elements—effects and a State’s objective in exercising its authority—
invariably led to a “sole effects” standard under which only the 
purportedly detrimental effects that a measure may have on an 
investment/investor need to be considered in assessing the viability of a 
claim arising from a direct or indirect nationalization or expropriation.167 
                                                 
165 Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/02/01, Award (July 17, 2006), 16 ICSID Rep. 523 (2012) [hereinafter Fireman’s 
Fund]. 
 
166 See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 134 (2006) [hereinafter 
TecMed].  
 
167 See, e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/07, Award ¶ 133 (Jun. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Saipem S.p.A.] (“[A]ccording to 
the so-called ‘sole effects doctrine’, the most significant criterion to determine whether 
the dispute actions amount to indirect expropriation or are tantamount to expropriation is 
the impact of the measure.”). 
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This gamut ranging from proportionality, effects, and sole effects, 
all presumably aspiring to limit a State’s use of its regulatory authority in 
the context of expropriations or nationalizations, only fosters greater 
confusion, inconsistency, and lack of uniformity.  
The divergent positions that theoretically would vastly contribute 
to the definition of the public purpose doctrine within the NAFTA 
framework, reaches its apogee in the competing views expounded by the 
tribunal in Metalclad168 and Methanex.169  
1. The Metalclad Legacy: One Extreme 
Metalclad, decided five years before the issuance of the final 
award on jurisdiction and merits in Methanex, was one of the pioneer 
cases in the NAFTA jurisprudence addressing environmental regulations 
and, therefore, directly falling within the ambit of the GATT’s Article XX 
General Exceptions that were incorporated into the NAFTA’s Chapter 
Eleven framework as well as the treaty’s general structure.170 The case 
presents a wealth of issues and a rich factual narrative ranging from (i) 
State responsibility, (ii) the failure to meet conditions precedent to 
contractual obligations, (iii) conflicting State/federal representations 
communicated to a foreign investor by the Host State, (iv) the closure of a 
hazardous waste transfer station by the federal government of Mexico 
prior to its acquisition, (v) a municipality’s challenge to an operation 
agreement (“Convenio”) entered into by the federal government of 
Mexico and the foreign investor, (vi) estoppel and ratification defenses 
arising from the continuous, open, and notorious construction of a 
hazardous land waste facility, and (vii) to the effect of an ecological 
decree banning operation of a hazardous land waste facility for the public 
purpose of protecting a species of cacti. The case also serves as an ideal 
case-study for analysis of the public purpose doctrine within the NAFTA 
because it enjoys the added benefit of an opinion issued by the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia arising from the Host State’s effort to vacate 
the award.171  
                                                 
168 Metalclad, supra note 97.   
 
169 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA Ch. 11/UNCITRAL, Final 
Award on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), 16 ICSID Rep. 40 (2012) [hereinafter 
Methanex]. 
 
170 Metalclad was decided in August 2000, and while the Methanex tribunal issued a 
partial award on jurisdiction and evidence-gathering in 2002, the final award on 
jurisdiction and merits was not entered until August, 2005. 
 
171 See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664 (2001). This opinion 
is helpful because, among other considerations, it premises its analysis exclusively on 
uncontroverted facts. 
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The Metalclad tribunal virtually dispensed with any sustained 
analysis of the role of the public purpose doctrine in any of its 
permutations, i.e., public interest, police powers, or even in the form of a 
State’s regulatory authority. It also refrained from any “proportionality” 
scrutiny pursuant to which the public purpose or benefit of the regulatory 
measure at issue would be weighed against its effect on the operative 
investment/investor. Instead, the tribunal selected as its organizing 
conceptual principle—ratio decidendi—three factors:  the detrimental 
effects that the regulatory measure had on the investment;172 what the 
tribunal characterized as “lack of transparency” concerning the workings 
of the Mexican government;173 and the thwarted investor expectations 
stemming from representations made by Mexican government officials.174 
The emphasis placed on this triad wrests all predictive value from 
the public purpose doctrine or even the NAFTA Public Purpose Standard 
articulated in Article 1101(4). Revisiting the tribunal’s analysis through 
the particular prism of the public purpose doctrine, however, is necessary 
if in fact its reasoning and decision are to be rescued from the “catch-all” 
quagmire of basing its analysis on the “particular nature” or “unique facts” 
underlying the case.175  
The Metalclad case concerned a property site (“the site”) in La 
Pedrera, a valley located within the municipality of Gualdalcazar (“the 
Municipality”), in the State of San Luis Potosi (“the State of SLP”), 
Mexico.176 The site was owned by Confinamiento Técnico De Residuos 
Industriales, S.A. de C.V. (“COTERIN”), a Mexican corporation. Both the 
site and COTERIN were first owned by Mexican nationals.177 In 1993, 
Metalclad Corporation (“Metalclad”), a United States corporation 
incorporated under the laws of Delaware, through its subsidiary, 
purchased COTERIN. Simultaneously with that transaction the ownership 
of the site was transferred to COTERIN.178 
                                                                                                                         
 
172 Metalclad, supra note 97, at ¶ 104. 
 
173 Id. at ¶ 99 
 
174 Id. at ¶¶ 107-108. 
 
175 Because of the nature of the decisional-law that treaty-based arbitration generates, 
specifically its ad hoc character, the danger of ascribing selective consideration of 
international law principles to “a unique set of facts” (an observation applicable to 
virtually every dispute) looms large and must be obviated. 
 
176 Metalclad, supra note 97, at ¶ 28. 
 
177 Id. at ¶ 29. 
 
178 Id. at ¶ 30. 
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Prior to Metalclad’s acquisition of COTERIN, the federal 
government of Mexico ordered the closure of a hazardous waste transfer 
station that was located at the site and operated by COTERIN on the 
ground that 20,000 tons of waste were not transferred from the site after 
having been deposited on the site without treatment or separation. 
Moreover, the Municipality of Guadalcazar, (“the Municipality”) in 1991, 
prior to Metalclad’s acquisition of COTERIN, had denied COTERIN an 
application for a permit to construct a hazardous waste landfill at the 
site.179  
What follows are uncontroverted but conflicting Statements of fact 
between federal and municipal authorities. Specifically, in January 1995, 
COTERIN received a third construction permit from federal authorities 
authorizing the construction of the final phases of the facility.180 By that 
time COTERIN already had commenced construction of the hazardous 
waste landfill facility.181 The Municipality, however, never authorized the 
construction and in fact issued a stop order to the activity on the site based 
upon the absence of a municipal permit.182 Notwithstanding the 
Municipality’s stop-work order, COTERIN continued with the 
construction of the hazardous waste landfill facility at the site for 
approximately five months until completion.183 
The tribunal’s award suggests that the conflicting dispositions 
between municipal and federal authorities were such that while the 
                                                                                                                         
 
179 In 1993 COTERIN did receive three permits concerning the hazardous waste landfill 
at the site. These permits, however, were not issued by the Municipality. Two of the 
permits were issued by the National Institute of Ecology and Agency of Mexico’s 
Secretariat of the Environment, National Resources and Fishing. These permits 
authorized the construction and operation of the landfill. The third permit was issued by 
the State of SLP and concerned land use. The receipt of these three permits and the non-
issuance of a permit by the Municipality were material to the tribunal’s analysis, because 
Metalclad’s agreement to purchase COTERIN provided that the payment of the purchase 
price was subject to, inter alia, the condition that either (i) a municipal permit was issued 
to COTERIN or (ii) COTERIN had received a final non-appealable judgment from 
Mexican tribunals that a municipal permit was not required for the construction of the 
landfill. Id. at ¶¶ 50-56, 77-87. 
 
Factually, Metalclad closed its acquisition of COTERIN without either of these 
conditions having been met. Id. at ¶ 43 
 
180 Id. at ¶ 39 
 
181 Id. at ¶ 40. 
 
182 Id. at ¶ 50. Indeed, approximately two years after Metalclad applied for a municipal 
construction permit the Municipality denied it. 
 
183 Id. at ¶¶ 41-45. 
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Municipality had issued a stop order and denied Metalclad’s application 
for a construction permit for the facility on the site, the federal authorities 
negotiated with Metalclad and reached an agreement called the Convenio. 
Pursuant to this instrument, Metalclad would be allowed to operate the 
landfill facility for a five-year term, and during the first three years of this 
term to remediate the previous contamination on the site.184 
The Municipality unsuccessfully challenged the Convenio by 
pursuing an administrative complaint with the Secretariat of the 
Environment and simultaneously pursued an injunction in federal court in 
Mexico seeking to enjoin the Convenio’s execution. Injunctive relief 
initially issued but was subsequently dismissed.185 After engaging in 
multiple appeals to a Mexican Federal Court and the Mexican Supreme 
Court, COTERIN decided to abandon the pursuit of judicial remedies as a 
gesture of good faith to the Municipality and as a predicate to 
negotiations. Upon reaching an impasse in the negotiations with the 
Municipality, Metalclad commenced arbitration under Article 1119 of the 
NAFTA. 
Remarkably, the tribunal’s award does not mention, let alone 
elaborate on, the environmental/ecological harm that the Municipality 
sought to mitigate or prevent. This aspect of the case is salient because of 
its omission. In addition to the obvious subject matter of the dispute, i.e., 
the operation of a hazardous waste landfill, a threat to the environment 
can be inferred from two factual assertions that are fleetingly Stated and 
virtually lost in the body of the award comprising 131 paragraphs. First, in 
October, 1991, prior to Metalclad’s acquisition of COTERIN, the 
Municipality had denied COTERIN its application for the construction of 
the facility.186 Second, the award reflects that demonstrators impeded the 
                                                 
184 Id. at ¶¶ 47-48.Subsequent to the execution of the Convenio federal authorities 
provided COTERIN with a permit allowing it to increase by ten-fold the annual permitted 
capacity of the facility from 36,000 tons to 360,000 tons. Id. at ¶ 58. 
 
185 Id. at ¶ 56. 
 
186 The reasons underlying this initial denial of the application are not continued in the 
award. In fact, that there was a denial at all prior to Metalclad’s acquisition of COTERIN 
is scarcely referenced as part of a subordinate clause of a two-sentence paragraph. 
Accordingly, no weight was accorded to this fact and the environmental considerations 
attendant to it cannot be gleaned with any degree of specificity: 
 
On December 5, 1995, thirteen months after Metalclad’s application for 
the municipal construction permit was filed, the application was denied. 
In doing this, the Municipality recalled its decision to deny a 
construction permit to COTERIN in October, 1991 and January 1992 
and noted the ‘impropriety’ of Metalclad’s construction of the landfill 
prior to receiving a municipal construction permit.  
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“open house” or “inauguration” of the facility by blocking major access 
arteries and thus preventing access to the facility to workers and guests, 
i.e., invited dignitaries from the United States and from Mexico’s local, 
State, and federal governments.187 This heightened level of concern 
bespeaks fear for health and safety, even though the award is bereft of any 
such suggestion.188 Other than these two scant suggestions, the 
environmental effect that the landfill could have had and its consequences 
to health, safety, and fauna simply is not discussed.189 
The substance of what otherwise likely would have been a deeper 
inquiry into the public safety, health, and environmental issues 
surrounding the landfill were ironically marred by the tribunal’s 
discussion of transparency/jurisdictional conflicts. Using its understanding 
of the NAFTA’s reference to “transparency” in Article 102(1) to extend to 
the workings of a Host State’s government in relation to a particular 
investment, the tribunal reads the Article 102(1) (“Transparency 
Principle”) “to include the idea that all relevant legal requirements for 
purposes of initiating, completing, and successfully operating investments 
made, or intended to be made, under the Agreement [the NAFTA] should 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at ¶ 50 (emphasis supplied). We also learn from the Tribunal’s recitation of the terms 
of the Convenio that “Metalclad would also provide one day per week of free medical 
advice for the inhabitants of Guadalcazar through Metalclad’s qualified medical 
personnel, employ manual labor from within Guadalcazar, and give preference to the 
inhabitants of Guadalcazar for technical training.” Id. at ¶ 48. It is not clear, however, the 
extent to which Metalclad’s provision of medical advice to the inhabitants of Guadalcazar 
is related to the possible effects of the hazardous waste facility. 
  
187 Id. at ¶¶ 45-46. 
 
188 In fact, as to this point, the award limits itself to restating Metalclad’s position “that 
the demonstration was organized at least in part by the Mexican State and local 
governments, and that State troopers assisted in blocking traffic into and out of the site. 
Metalclad was thenceforth effectively prevented from opening the landfill.” Id. at ¶ 46. 
 
189 There is minor discussion on whether the landfill site was geographically suitable or a 
hazardous waste landfill facility. This issue, however, was limited to a single paragraph 
reference because the concern appeared to have been allayed: 
 
In February 1995, the Autonomous University of SLP issued a study 
confirming earlier findings that, although the landfill site raised some 
concerns, with proper engineering, it was geographically suitable for a 
hazardous waste landfill. In March 1995, the Mexican Federal 
Attorney’s Office for the Protection of the Environment [citation 
omitted], and independent sub-agency of SEMARNAP [Secretariat of 
the Mexican Environment, Natural Resources and Fishing], conducted 
an audit of the site and also concluded that, with proper engineering 
and operation, the landfill site was geographically suitable for 
hazardous waste landfill. 
 
Id. at ¶ 44. 
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be capable of being readily known to all affected investors of another 
Party. There should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such 
matters.”190 Mexico, the tribunal found, “failed to ensure a transparent and 
predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and 
investment.”191  
This want of transparency, in the tribunal’s analysis, stemmed 
from diametrically conflicting jurisdictional Statements and strictures 
concerning the extent to which the Municipality’s permit for the 
construction of the landfill facility was a requirement in circumstances 
where such construction already had received federal approval.192  
The conflicts between Mexico’s federal government and the 
Municipality was stark. Federal officials allegedly told Metalclad that if it 
submitted an application for a municipal construction permit that “the 
Municipality would have no legal basis for denying the permit and that it 
would be issued as a matter of course.”193 The question of whether 
Metalclad as an investor rightfully harbored expectations that it was 
entitled to construct a facility and acted reasonably in reliance of federal 
officials manifestly diverted the analysis away from consideration of the 
health, safety, and environmental issues associated with the landfill and 
the manner in which such issues in turn would be affected by the 
Municipality’s denial of a construction permit. Consequently, whether 
wittingly or by happenstance, the tribunal fashioned part of the test as a 
subjective inquiry premised on investor expectations. This conceptual 
approach placed considerable emphasis on the (i) licensing jurisdictional 
conflict between Mexico’s federal government and the Municipality, and 
(ii) the extent to which an investor may legitimately rely on the 
representations advanced by government officials, instead of formulating a 
                                                 
190 Id. at ¶ 76. 
 
191 Id. at ¶ 99. 
 
192 The Tribunal observed that “[e]ven if Mexico is correct that a municipal construction 
permit was required, the evidence also shows that, as to hazardous waste evaluations and 
assessments, the federal authority’s jurisdiction was controlling and the authority of the 
Municipality only extended to appropriate construction considerations. Consequently, the 
denial of the permit by the Municipality by reference to environmental impact 
considerations in the case of what was basically a hazardous waste disposal landfill, was 
improper, as was the Municipality’s denial of the permit for any reason other than those 
related to the physical construction or defects in the site.” Id. at ¶ 86. The Municipality 
never alleged that there were physical construction or engineering defects in the site. 
 
193 Id. at ¶ 88. In fact, “[t]he absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a 
municipal construction permit, as well as the absence of any established practice or 
procedure as to the manner of handling applications for a municipal construction permit, 
amounts to a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by 
NAFTA.” Id. 
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more broad-based approach that would not fail to consider the 
Municipality’s environmental concerns and how these issues could be 
addressed by denial of a construction permit.194 Moreover, in addition to 
finding that the Municipality’s jurisdiction was limited to denying 
construction permits only with respect to “construction aspects or flaws of 
the physical facility,” the tribunal also underscored that pursuant to 
Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
compliance with domestic law does not justify non-performance of a 
treaty violation.195 The local government’s lack of authority for denying 
the construction permit and its connection to a finding of violation of fair 
and equitable treatment on Mexico’s behalf, was not at any time 
juxtaposed to its logical countervailing consideration. If the investor has 
been denied fair and equitable treatment, is the State being penalized for 
lawfully exercising its sovereignty in the form of a permit denial and 
issuance of an Ecological Decree?196 
                                                 
194 The award is rife with references to the issue of representations advanced by officials 
of Mexico’s federal government to Metalclad: 
 
85. Metalclad was led to believe, and did believe, that the federal and 
State permits allowed for the construction and operation of the 
landfill. Metalclad argues that in all hazardous waste matters, the 
Municipality has no authority. However, Mexico argues that 
constitutionally and lawfully the Municipality has the authority to 
issue construction permits. 
 
87. Relying on the representations of the federal government, Metalclad 
started constructing the landfill, and did this openly and 
continuously, and with the full knowledge of the federal, State and 
municipal governments, until municipal “Stop Work Order” on 
October 26, 1994. The basis of this order was said to have been 
Metalclad’s failure to obtain a Municipal construction permit. 
 
88. In addition, Metalclad asserted that federal officials told it that if it 
submitted an application for a municipal construction permit, the 
Municipality would have no legal basis for denying the permit in 
that it would be issued as a matter of course… 
 
89. Metalclad was entitled to rely on the representations of federal 
officials and believes that it was entitled to continue its construction 
of the landfill…. 
 
Id. at ¶¶ 85-89. 
 
195 Id. at ¶ 100; see also VCLT, supra note 105, arts. 26-27. 
  
196 The Governor of SLP issued an Ecological Decree declaring a Natural Area for the 
protection of rare cactus. The area of the landfill is encompassed by the Decree’s Natural 
Area. 
 
Even though Metalclad also relied on this Ecological Decree as an additional ground in 
furtherance of its claim of expropriation, inter alia, asserting that the Decree effectively 
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Having concluded that the Municipality lacked authority to deny 
the permit, and that investor’s expectations had been wrongfully and 
unjustifiably undermined, the tribunal fashioned an “effects test” that 
appears to have been crafted in a vacuum and not within the framework of 
a system that in great measure rests on the public purpose doctrine. 
2. An “Effects Test” Beyond the Purview of Public 
Purpose 
The Metalclad tribunal’s “effects test” appears to derive from 
Article 1110 of the NAFTA.197 The tribunal observed that: 
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, 
deliberate, and acknowledged takings of property, such as 
outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in 
favour of the Host State, but also covert or incidental 
interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the 
use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of 
the Host State.198  
This subordinate clause “or take a measure tantamount to… 
expropriation,” the Metalclad tribunal construed as appropriately having 
the corresponding standard of having “the effect of depriving” an owner of 
the use or economic benefit of property. The elements of the Article 1110 
nationalization or expropriation exception ((i) public purpose, (ii) on a 
non-discriminatory basis, (iii) in accordance with due process of law, and 
(iv) non-payment of compensation consonant with Article 1110) are not 
ostensibly incorporated into the test, except perhaps for the obscure 
phrase, “even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the Host 
State.”199    
The second source that the tribunal relied upon in fashioning its 
“effects test” was the arbitral award issued in the Biloune, et al v. Ghana 
                                                                                                                         
and permanently precluded the operation of the  landfill, Metalclad, supra note 97, at ¶¶ 
59, 96, the Tribunal did not rely on the Ecological Decree in its finding in favor of 
Metalclad on the expropriation claim. It did, however, add that “the implementation of 
the Ecological Decree would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to 
expropriation.” Id. at ¶ 111. 
 
197 Nowhere, however, in Article 1110 does the word “effect” or any permutation of the 
term appear. See NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110. 
  
198 Metalclad, supra note 97, at ¶ 103 (emphasis supplied). 
 
199 Id. 
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Investment Centre, et al.200 This authority is the only decisional law cited 
in the award as part of the tribunal’s ratio decidendi. It is also significant 
to note that the tribunal opined that Biloune materially resembled the case 
before it.201 Consonant with its analysis of Article 1110, which strictly 
focused on the language pertaining to an indirect expropriation of an 
investment and completely excluded any public purpose consideration, the 
tribunal’s treatment of Biloune centered on the connection between the 
denial of a permit and the effect of that the denial on the investment. Other 
factors, including the investor’s “justified reliance on these government 
representations regarding the permit,” were also considered.202 A closer 
reading of Biloune, however, suggests that an “effects test” without 
consideration of a public purpose doctrine justifiably finds credible 
resonance in that dispute because the underlying facts simply did not give 
rise to a public purpose countervailing analysis. Only very superficially 
does Biloune resemble the competing interests configuring Metalclad.203 
Quite significantly, poles apart from the construction and operation 
of a hazardous waste landfill facility, the investment in Biloune concerned 
“renovating, expanding, and operating [a] restaurant/resort complex at 
Palm Court.”204 Public safety, health, and risk to the environment were not 
at issue. The “effects test” that the tribunal applied in Biloune correctly 
                                                 
200 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the 
Government of Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (27 October 1989), 95 I.L.R. 
183 (1993) [hereinafter Biloune]. 
 
201 The Tribunal placed considerable weight on what it understood to be meaningful and 
material factual parallels between the two cases. It noted the following points in common:  
 
The present case resembles in a number of pertinent respects that of 
Biloune, et al v Ghana Investment Centre, et al [citation omitted]. In 
that case, a private investor was renovating and expanding a resort 
restaurant in Ghana. As with Metalclad, the investor, basing itself on 
the representations of a government affiliated entity, began construction 
before applying for a building permit. As with Metalclad, a Stop Work 
Order was issued after a substantial amount of work had been 
completed. The order was based on the absence of a building permit. 
An application was submitted, but although it was not expressly denied, 
a permit was never issued.  
 
Metalclad, supra note 97, at ¶ 108. 
 
202 Id. 
 
203 The only public purpose doctrine that would be relevant in Biloune would be along the 
lines of a State’s legitimate and justifiable exercise of its police powers. Regulatory 
considerations touching upon health, safety and public welfare were not at issue in that 
proceeding. 
 
204 Biloune, supra note 202, at 207. 
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was limited to determining the extent to which Ghanaian governmental 
authorities exercised measures preventing the investor from pursuing the 
hospitality renovation effort.205 The Biloune factual configuration, 
together with the tribunal’s actual analysis, suggests that the dispute was 
framed as a contractual dispute only having at issue whether the 
expropriation clause in the operative concession contract applied to an 
indirect expropriation.206 This narrow framing of the issues meaningfully 
invited an “effects test” analysis that only warranted examination of two 
sets of issues. First, whether as a matter of international law a distinction 
may be drawn where a government may indirectly expropriate the subject 
matter of a contract with a foreign investor that cannot be directly 
expropriated pursuant to positive law.207 Second, whether, when analyzed 
together, the Stop Work Order, the investor’s reliance on 
representations,208 the arrest, the detention, and the deportation of the 
                                                 
205 The Biloune Tribunal found that “[g]iven the central role of Mr. Biloune in promoting, 
financing and managing MDCL, his expulsion from the country effectively prevented 
MDCL from further pursuing the project. In the view of the Tribunal, such prevention of 
MDCL from pursuing its approved project would constitute constructive expropriation of 
MDCL’s contractual rights in the project and, accordingly, the expropriation of the value 
of Mr. Biloune’s interest in MDCL unless the Respondents can establish by persuasive 
evidence sufficient justification for these events.” Id. at 210. 
 
The Tribunal did not find the government’s evidence concerning the arrest and 
deportation of Mr. Biloune to be credible. More importantly, the Biloune award does 
reflect that the issue of the extent to which a State may legitimately and justifiably 
exercise its police powers to the detriment of a foreign investment-investor was ever 
raised or even considered. The term “a State’s police power” does not appear anywhere 
in the Biloune award. 
 
206 Id. at 206. 
 
207 Id. 
 
208 In contrast with the representations upon which the investor in Metalclad relied, in 
Biloune, the investor relied on representations of a “long-term leaseholder of the 
premises” as well as those advanced by “an experienced government-affiliated entity.” 
Consequently, the much-vaunted estoppel argument that the Tribunal underscores in 
Metalclad is not comparable to the factual configuration of the representations 
constituting the estoppel argument applied in Biloune. Id. at 208. 
 
Also distinguishable from Metalclad is the legal status of the permit denial. In Metalclad, 
the denial was deemed to be of no moment because the Municipality had limited 
jurisdiction as to the content of a construction permit as it could only pass on physical 
defects or engineering flaws, neither of which were at issue. The Biloune Tribunal in 
contrast, acknowledged that “[w]hile the letter of the law, as pleaded by the Respondents, 
supports the contention that extension works of the character contemplated cannot go 
forward without a permit—or, if they did, would be subject to fine or demolition—
nevertheless, the practice with regard to this site indicates an exception to the rule.” Id.  
 
Biloune is distinguishable from Metalclad  even on fundamental technical issues 
concerning estoppel and the legal status of the permit at issue. 
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primary investor without possibility of reentry constitutes an indirect or 
regulatory expropriation.  
A salient distinction between Biloune and Metalclad that directly 
influenced the tribunal’s analysis concerns the absence of any underlying 
bilateral investment treaty.209 The Metalclad tribunal’s failure to consider 
this rudimentary issue will remain enigmatic.  
While Article 15 of the GIC Agreement that claimant signed was 
broad in providing for arbitration of “[a]ny dispute between the foreign 
investor and the government in respect of an approved enterprise,” and 
contained language protecting against expropriation, the Biloune tribunal 
observed that its “competence is limited to commercial disputes arising 
under a contract entered into in the context of Ghana’s Investment 
Code.”210 Indeed, unlike Metalclad—where public international law 
applied—in Biloune the rights and obligations of the Parties were 
governed by the laws of Ghana.211 Moreover, the dispute was configured 
strictly within the framework of a private international law contract 
dispute. To the extent that the tribunal applied principles of customary 
international law, (i) these precepts were limited to a claim for 
expropriation only, and (ii) the tribunal studiously observed that “there is 
no indication that Ghanaian law diverges on the central issue of 
expropriation from customary principles of international law.”212 
The Metalclad tribunal’s construction of the NAFTA’s Article 
1110 indirect expropriation language and its wholesale inclusion of the 
Biloune analysis based upon presumptively “similar pertinent facts” leaves 
much to be desired.213 The analysis of the NAFTA’s Article 1110 failed to 
                                                 
209 The claimant, Antoine Biloune, Syrian national, executed an agreement with the 
Ghana Investments Centre that included an arbitration clause and referred to the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules. Id. at 202. 
 
210 Id. at 203. 
 
211 Article 24 of the GIC Agreement required the Tribunal to “constru[e]” the Agreement 
“according to the laws of Ghana.” The Parties, however, did not draw on the law of 
Ghana as to the construction of the Agreement and the Tribunal relied on principles of 
customary international law in adjudicating the expropriation claim. Id. at 207. 
 
212 Id. 
 
213 The Metalclad Tribunal did not observe that the Biloune analysis was undertaken 
within the context of a commercial contractual dispute pursuant to which the application 
of a “effects test” without more, along with reliance on the contractual defense of 
estoppel were sufficient in order to harmonize competing interests arising between 
foreign investment protection and a Host State’s exercise of its regulatory authority. Its 
unqualified adoption of the Biloune’s tribunal’s “effects test” and estoppel argument 
presents conceptual challenges because of the meaningful distinguishing elements that 
separate the cases, among the most significant of which is the non-application of 
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consider any fact or factual inference that would have triggered a public 
purpose exception as prescribed in paragraph one, subsection (a). By 
omitting even reference to this pivotal element, the tribunal carved out of 
Article 1110(1) an important criteria for any indirect expropriation 
analysis. In so doing it misapprehended the workings of Chapter Eleven 
generally and Article 1110 in particular. Disavowing the public purpose 
doctrine in its entirety in the context of an indirect expropriation analysis 
frustrates the workings of Article 1110 and unduly advantages a 
prospective claimant. Similarly, the failure to apprehend the commercial 
context in which Biloune was decided, with jurisdiction based on an 
Agreement between a private individual and a State and not between two 
sovereigns, and lacking countervailing public purpose considerations 
attendant to the protection of health, life, and the environment, is equally 
disconcerting.214 The exclusion of these considerations is conducive to 
                                                                                                                         
international conventional law. The Metalclad’s tribunal recitation on this point merits 
citation in its entirety: 
 
The Tribunal found that an indirect expropriation had taken place 
because the totality of the circumstances had the effect of causing the 
irreparable cessation of work on the project. The Tribunal paid 
particular regard to the investor’s justified reliance on the government’s 
representations regarding the permit, the fact that the government 
authorities knew of the construction for more than one year before 
issuing the Stop Work Order, the fact that permits had not been 
required for other projects and the fact that no procedure was in place 
for dealing with building permit applications. Although the decision in 
Biloune does not bind this Tribunal, it is a persuasive authority and the 
Tribunal is in agreement with its analysis and its conclusion.  
 
Metalclad, supra note 97, at ¶ 108 (emphasis supplied).  
 
214 In the vacature proceeding that Mexico initiated before the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, the Court found that the Metalclad tribunal had placed undue reliance on 
Biloune. Even though the Supreme Court of British Columbia did not raise the industry 
sector differences (operation of a hazardous waste landfill facility in contrast with 
renovation of a hotel and restaurant) it did note: 
 
There are substantial differences between the situation in the present 
case and the circumstances in Biloune. The main two distinctions are 
that in Biloune (i) the building was partially destroyed and then closed 
by government officials, and (ii) the investor was deported from the 
country and was not allowed to return. Apart from the Ecological 
Decree [which the arbitral tribunal did not rely on and only commented 
hypothetically with respect to it], the circumstances in the present case 
fall considerably short of those in Biloune and it would not logically 
follow that Biloune could be an independent basis for concluding that 
the actions in this case prior to the issuance of the Decree amounted to 
an expropriation. 
 
Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664, at ¶ 80 (2001).The Supreme Court of British 
Columbia additionally Stated that it did not agree with the Metalclad Tribunal’s approach 
of considering the Ecological Decree but not relying on it. Id. at ¶ 81. The Court 
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penalizing States for having legitimately and justifiably exercised their 
sovereignty. It swings the pendulum of symmetry and bilateralism too far 
in favor of capital-exporting States without contributing countervailing 
doctrinal tenets that could justify the occasionally asymmetrical analysis. 
Metalclad’s “effects test” hardly enriches the NAFTA’s decisional 
law concerning direct or indirect nationalization or expropriation. 
Application of an “effects test” without reference to countervailing State 
interests has the effect of rigidly halting a pendulum at an extreme far 
from equipoise. Conceptually the approach fails to account for the 
underlying policies of the NAFTA that, at least aspirationally, seek to 
further the interests of both home and Host States. A consequence of the 
Metalclad analysis is to introduce into the public purpose jurisprudence of 
the NAFTA a narrow and rigid methodology that is indistinguishable—as 
the Tribunal’s reliance on Biloune demonstrates—and impervious to the 
legitimate interests of Host States, while unduly enshrining a subjective 
standard in the form investor expectation. Analysis of an expropriation 
under public international law commands more than the application of 
basic commercial contract principles. 
3. Revisiting Methanex Through the Prism of the Public 
Purpose Doctrine 
Conceptually, decisional law or the jurisprudence of the NAFTA 
with respect to the public purpose doctrine should be conducive to 
certainty, predictability, uniformity and transparency. This expectation, at 
minimum from the point of departure of the NAFTA’s doctrinal 
development, is further encouraged because tribunals are bound by official 
interpretive Statements offered by the NAFTA,215 but are not subject to 
judicial review in the NAFTA Parties’ courts.216  The jurisprudence should 
seek to harmonize likely conflicts between international investment law 
and the public policy trade objectives of the NAFTA. Decisional law 
would serve to reconcile the competing interests attendant to foreign 
                                                                                                                         
specifically concluded that the Metalclad Tribunal “used an incorrect tense in the Award 
when it Stated that it considered that the implementation of the Ecological Decree would, 
in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropriation, it is clear from another 
passage of the Award that the Tribunal considered that the implementation of the Decree 
did constitute expropriation. In the second paragraph preceding the misuse of the future 
tense, the Tribunal Stated that the Decree had the effect of barring forever the operation 
of the landfill.” Id. at ¶ 83 (emphasis in original). 
 
215 See NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1131 ¶ 2. 
 
216 See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s 
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory 
Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30 n.117 (2003) (stating that “the tribunals are not 
bound by stare decisis and are not subject to centralized appellate review.”). 
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investment protection and a sovereign’s rightful use of its regulatory 
space. A re-characterization of this latter tension would be to suggest that 
more generally the decisional law of treaty-based international arbitration 
should serve to ameliorate the conflicting investor-state interests that 
distinctly separate home and Host States. Regrettably, despite the many 
helpful public purpose features of the NAFTA, the NAFTA jurisprudence 
remains plagued by the dysfunctional contributions of a legacy public 
purpose doctrine. This decisional law is lacking in objective criteria, 
properly defined exceptions, applicable burdens of proof, and a holistic 
“proportionality” approach susceptible to consistent and transparent 
application.217 Metalclad also represents the current juridical disarray that 
leads to “all or nothing” results. Effects tests must be applied  in the 
context of a tempered public purpose doctrine that could lead to a 
reasonable and proportionality driven result. 
I. The Methanex Approach and a Swing of the Pendulum 
The Metalclad tribunal at best diminished the role of the public 
purpose doctrine as a defense or a mitigating factor in an indirect 
expropriation or regulatory taking, and at worse stands for a 
pronouncement of the doctrine’s irrelevancy when raised in specific 
factual scenarios. Put simply, the public purpose doctrine in Metalclad 
played no role in determining whether (i) a regulatory expropriation 
occurred and (ii) the issuance and extent of compensation.218 Poles apart 
from an approach minimizing or altogether foreclosing consideration of 
the public purpose doctrine, the tribunal in Methanex219 rejected claims 
premised on violations of Article 1102 (National Treatment)220, Article 
1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment),221 and Article 1110 
                                                 
217 As shall be examined, the current status of the “proportionality test” enunciated in the 
NAFTA jurisprudence is wanting in numerous respects including uniformity in its 
application and rigor as to its most fundamental elements. 
 
218 See Alberto R. Salazar V, NAFTA Chapter Eleven, Regulatory Expropriation, and 
Domestic Counter-Advertising Law, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 31, 67 (2010) 
(observing that Metalclad “remains important in the context of the uncertainties 
associated with the inconsistencies in the current State of Chapter 11 jurisprudence, the 
public purpose was not a determinant factor in establishing a regulatory expropriation and 
the tribunal thus found the government liable for expropriation.”). 
 
219 Methanex, supra note 171. 
 
220 Id. at Part IV-B ¶¶ 29, 38 (asserting that the legislation at issue was not discriminatory 
and therefore legitimately needing a public purpose). 
 
221 Id. at Part IV-C ¶ 27.. 
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(Expropriation and Compensation),222 in considerable measure based upon 
the scope of the legacy public purpose doctrine.  
Understandably the Methanex case has given rise to considerable 
commentary.223 At the time of its filing, the Methanex dispute was viewed 
as a possible landmark case with far-reaching policy implications in the 
realm of public safety, health and environmental regulations.224 For 
present purposes, the Methanex story need not be told anew, nor is a 
detailed recitation of its many procedural reincarnations necessary during 
the course of its protracted life.225 Some background, however, is 
necessary. 
Methanex Corporation (“Methanex”), as a Canadian corporation 
and investor, brought an action against the United States of America (The 
United States or “The U.S.”) pursuant to Article 716(1) of the NAFTA 
with claims fundamentally based on the alleged breach by the U.S. of two 
provisions in Section A of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA: Article 1105(1) 
and Article 1110(1).226 It premised its claims on the production and sale of 
                                                 
222 Id. at Part IV-D ¶ 15. 
 
223 See, e.g., Salazar, supra note 220; Kara Dougherty, Methanex v. United States: The 
Realignment of NAFTA Chapter Eleven with Environmental Regulation, 27 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 735 (2006); Jessica C. Lawrence, Chicken Little Revisited: NAFTA Regulatory 
Expropriations After Methanex, 41 GA. L. REV. 261 (2006); Vicki Been & Joel C. 
Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the 
Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
30 (2003); Marisa Yee,  The Future of Environmental Regulation After Article 1110 of 
NAFTA: A Look After the Methanex and Metalclad Cases, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVT’L 
L. & POL’Y 85 (2002); Lucien J. Dhooge, The Revenge of the Trail Smelter: 
Environmental Regulation As Expropriation Pursuant to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 475 (2001); Frederick M. Abbott, The Political Economy of 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of North American 
Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303 (2000). 
 
224 Methanex rightfully has been distinguished as meaningfully contributing to a 
transparent dispute resolution regime. See, e.g., Howard L. Mann, The Final Decision in 
Methanex v. United States: Some New Wine in Some New Bottles, 3 TRANSNAT’L DISP. 
MGMT. (Dec. 2006). This recognition is well-justified. The manifold richness of the 
opinion in addressing trilateral parties, deftly adjudicating the extent to which domestic 
regulations concerning public health, safety and the environment may affect international 
law protecting foreign investors, exploring the conceptual role of amici curiae,  and 
finally, addressing the privacy/confidentiality dichotomy, is noteworthy. 
 
225 Methanex’s claim was first advanced in its Statement of Claim dated December 3, 
1999. The final award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits issued August 3, 2005. 
Emphasis of its general configuration, however, will help define the workings of the 
public purpose doctrine within the case, and more generally the post-Methanex effect that 
the doctrine has within the NAFTA and its jurisprudence.   
  
226 Methanex, supra note 171, at Part I-Preface ¶ 2. 
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a methanol-based source of octane and oxygenate for gasoline that is 
known as methyl-tertiary-butyl ether (“MTBE”). Specifically, Methanex 
averred that MTBE was a safe, effective, and economical component of 
gasoline, and the oxygenate of choice “in markets where free and fair 
trade is allowed.”227 The claimant also alleged that MTBE generated 
environmental benefits and did not at all pose a risk to human health or the 
environment.228 Methanex further claimed that it neither produced nor sold 
MTBE, but rather only engaged in the limited business of the production, 
transportation, and marketing of methanol,229 a key ingredient for the 
production of MTBE. Central to Methanex’s position was the contention 
that (i) no methanol production plants were located in California, and (ii) 
during the period 1993-2001 only a fraction of the methanol directly 
consumed in California was produced anywhere in the United States (an 
average of 20.2 thousand metric tons out a total consumption figure of 
185.5 thousand metric tons).230 It advanced the contention that the State of 
California’s ban on the sale and use of MTBE caused it to suffer 
significant losses.231  
Because the case was properly viewed as a seminal decision with 
far-reaching policy implications touching upon public safety, health, and 
environmental regulations, the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (“the Institute”) was the first of four NGOs to file a petition 
for amicus curiae status asserting an argument in favor of a Host State’s 
                                                 
227 See id. at Part II-Ch. D ¶ 2. 
 
228 Id. 
 
229 Id. at Part II-Ch. D ¶ 3. 
 
230 Id. at Part II-Ch. D ¶ 4. In the proceeding it was uncontested that Methanol is the 
essential oxygenating element of MTBE. 
 
231 See id. at Part I-Preface ¶ 2. Methanex ultimately challenged three legislative texts: 
 
(i) the 1999 California Executive Order certifying that, “On balance, 
there is significant risk to the environment from using MTBE in 
gasoline in California”;  
(ii) California Code of Regulations Title Thirteen, §§2273 requiring 
gasoline pumps containing MTBE to be labeled in California as 
follows: “contains MTBE. The State of California has determined that 
use of this chemical presents a significant risk to the environment.” 
§§2262.6 provided at sub-section (a)(1) that: starting December 31, 
2002, no person shall sell, offer for sale, supply or offer for supply in 
California gasoline which has been produced with the use of methyl-
tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE)”; and 
(iii) Amended California Regulation of May 2003, expressly banning 
the use of methanol as an oxygenate in California. 
 
Id. at Part II-Ch. D ¶¶ 14-23  
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proper exercise of regulatory sovereignty in furtherance of the public 
welfare with respect to health, safety, and environmental objectives, 
applied on a non-discriminatory basis.232 The NGOs further advanced that 
under no analysis can such regulations be construed as violating 
international law and that they probably pertain to a Host State’s 
prerogative within its regulatory space.233 Two additional precepts on 
which the Institute predicated its petition were (i) that the interpretation of 
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA should reflect legal principles underlying the 
concept of sustainable development,234 and (ii) “that participation of an 
amicus would allay public disquiet as to the closed nature of arbitration 
proceedings under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA.”235 
The Methanex tribunal’s analysis of Claimant’s Article 1110 
(Expropriation and Compensation) claim is most eloquent in underscoring 
the normative and substantive differences between the Metalclad and 
Methanex tribunals with respect to the public purpose doctrine within the 
NAFTA. In sharp relief with Metalclad, the Methanex tribunal observed 
that the regulation at issue did not give rise to a case for a direct or indirect 
nationalization or expropriation within the framework of Article 1110. The 
tribunal specifically observed: 
In this case, there is no expropriation decree or creeping 
expropriation. Nor was there a ‘taking’ in the sense of any 
property of Methanex being seized and transferred in a 
single or a series of actions, to California or its designees. 
Insofar as Methanex can make a claim under Article 
1110(1) it is not a claim for nationalization or 
                                                 
232 Petitions eventually were filed by (i) The International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, (ii) Communities for a Better Environment, (iii) The Bluewater Network 
of Earth Island Institute and, (iv) The Center for International Environmental Law. Id. at 
Part II-Ch. C ¶ 26. 
 
233 See Methanex v. United States of America, Petitioner’s Final Submission Regarding 
the Petition of the International Institute for Sustainable Development to the Arbitral 
Tribunal for Amicus Curiae Status, ¶¶ 10-18 (Oct. 16, 2000) available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/methanex_petition_oct162000.pdf [hereinafter Methanex Amicus 
Curiae Submission]; see also, Methanex v United States, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petition from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶ 5 (Jan. 15, 2001) available 
at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/methanex_tribunal_first_amicus_decision.pdf (The Institute’s 
Petition sought leave “(i) to file an amicus brief preferably after reading the Parties’ 
written pleadings, (ii) to make oral submissions, (iii) to observe status at oral hearings.”). 
 
234 The principle of sustainable development is explored at length infra at Chapter 2 in the 
context of what collectively is referred to as “the UNCTAD documents,” infra Chapter 3 
in connection with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and again infra at 
Chapter 4 in the context of public purpose in BITs. 
 
235 See Methanex Amicus Curiae Submission, supra note 235.  
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expropriation, simpliciter, but for ‘measures tantamount to 
expropriation’. Thus, Methanex must establish that the 
California ban was tantamount to an expropriation within 
the meaning of Article 1110 in NAFTA.236 
The tribunal’s fundamental organizing principles can be found in 
both (i) its demonstration that the California ban was “tantamount to an 
expropriation” within the ambit of Article 1110 of the NAFTA, and (ii) 
the element of public purpose within the operative legal standard.  
Quite predictably, the Methanex claimants sought analytical and 
conceptual support in Metalclad’s definition of expropriation. Claimants 
reiterated that standard in the following terms:  
…expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, 
deliberate, and acknowledged takings of property, such as 
outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in 
favor of the Host State, but also covert or incidental 
interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole, or in significant part, of the 
use of reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the 
Host State.237 
This definition of expropriation within Article 1110 is wholly bereft of the 
words “public purpose.” It is effects-based and mostly invites a narrow 
analysis limited to scrutiny of the relationship between the claimant and 
the property at issue. Similarly, pursuant to the Metalclad tribunal’s 
definition of expropriation within Article 1110, the subject matter of the 
taking, expropriation, or nationalization is not described in terms of 
investment nor was the claimant framed as an investor.238 
Far from embracing whole cloth the Metalclad standard, the 
Methanex tribunal merely reduced the definition to a single element of a 
direct or indirect expropriation or nationalization. In this connection, it 
noted that “Metalclad is correct that an intentionally discriminatory 
                                                 
236 Methanex, supra note 171, at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 6 (emphasis supplied). 
 
237 Id. at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 4 (citing Metalclad, supra note 97, at ¶ 103) (emphasis in 
original). 
 
238 The absence of these terms of art (investment and investor), particularly within the 
context of Chapter 11, an investment chapter, emphasizes an expansive claimant oriented 
approach and incident policy. Investor and investment status are significant jurisdictional 
predicates that must be met upon penalty of the claim’s dismissal. As such a definition of 
expropriation de-emphasizes central jurisdictional defenses suggests a diminished role for 
the Host State. 
 
 EAST\64724221. 388 
regulation against a foreign investor fulfills a key requirement for 
establishing expropriation.”239 The tribunal, however, advanced a 
conceptually different corollary to Metalclad’s definition that is 
doctrinally closer to the NAFTA’s Article 1110 (Expropriation and 
Compensation) and premised on public purpose considerations: 
…as a matter of general international law, a non-
discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is 
enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, 
inter alias, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory and compensable unless specific 
commitments had been given by the regulating government 
to the then putative foreign investor contemplating 
investment that the government would refrain from such 
regulation.240 
The “Methanex corollary” literally tracks the four elements to an 
indirect or direct nationalization or expropriation contained in Article 
1110:241 (i) public purpose; (ii) non-discriminatory treatment; (iii) due 
process of law; and (iv) the payment of compensation. Moreover, the term 
of art “foreign investor or investment” is used to accentuate jurisdictional 
technical requirements.242 
In addition, the Methanex Tribunal further buttressed the standard 
for expropriation under Article 1110 by borrowing from the Feldman v 
Mexico award: 
The regulatory action has not deprived the Claimant of 
control of his company,… interfered directly in the internal 
operations… or displaced the Claimant as the controlling 
shareholder. The claimant is free to pursue other 
continuing lines of business activity…. Of course, he was 
effectively precluded from exporting cigarettes…. However, 
                                                 
239 Methanex, supra note 171, at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 7.  
 
240 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 
241 See NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110. 
 
242 The treaty-based arbitration decisional law finding that a tribunal lacks jurisdiction 
based upon failure to meet the investor or investment predicates. See, e.g. See, e.g. Salini 
Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), 14 ICSID Rep. 306 (2010) (“The doctrine generally 
considers that investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance of the 
contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction...In reading the [ICSID] 
Convention’s preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic development of 
the Host State of the investment as an additional condition.”). 
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this does not amount to Claimant’s deprivation of control 
of its company.243 
Consequently, under the Methanex public purpose rubric, a regulatory 
measure tantamount to an expropriation, let alone a direct or indirect 
expropriation or nationalization, in addition to an absence of (i) due 
process of law, (ii) public purpose, and (iii) non-discriminatory practice, 
also must establish that the investor was deprived of shareholder 
controlling status or control of the investment at issue. This “control” test 
continues to wander the corridors of conceptual development of public 
international law without finding definitive doctrinal repose in any 
quarter.244 
In holding that the California ban did not constitute a measure 
tantamount to an expropriation,245 the public purpose doctrine was 
accorded a preeminent status in the award’s architecture.246 Indeed, 
                                                 
243 Methanex, supra note 171, at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 16 (citing Fireman’s Fund Insurance 
Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/02/01, Award ¶ 152 (July 17, 
2006)). 
 
244 See Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of 
Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 484 (2008) (“The control test is 
notably subject to multiple interpretations. Some have attempted to find the silver bullet 
that will reconcile the cases and serve as a guide for the future, including by emphasizing 
the intent of the State and the distinction between State takeover of property and mere 
regulation of its use. Others have eschewed a simple solution.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 
245 The award as to this point, Article 1110(1), reads: 
 
For the reasons elaborated here and earlier in this Award, the Tribunal 
concludes that the California ban was made for a public purpose, was 
non-discriminatory and was accomplished with due process. Hence, 
Methanex’s central claim under Article 1110(1) of expropriation under 
one of the three forms of action in that provision fails. From the 
standpoint of international law, the California ban was a lawful 
regulation and not an expropriation. 
 
Methanex, supra note 171, at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 15. 
 
246 Methanex framed its cornerstone expropriation claim on four premises that sought to 
meet the Article 1110 exceptions: 
 
317. First, a substantial portion of Methanex’s investments, including 
its share of the California and larger U.S. oxygenate market were taken 
by facially discriminatory measures and handed over to the domestic 
ethanol industry. Such a taking is at minimum “tantamount… to 
expropriation” under the plain language of Article 1110. 
 
318. Second, these measures were not intended to serve a ‘public 
purpose’ as is required by Article 1110(a), but rather were primarily a 
mechanism for seizing Methanex’s U.S.’s and Methanex Fortier’s share 
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although not expressly mentioned in the Article 1110(1) analysis, the 
tribunal’s factual foundations concerning the Host State’s legitimate and 
appropriate exercise of its sovereignty pursuant to the issuance of a 
                                                                                                                         
of the California oxygenate market and handing it directly to the 
domestic ethanol industry. 
 
319. Third, the discriminatory nature of the measures fail to meet the 
requirement of Article 1110(c)that they comply with ‘due process of 
law and Article 1105(1).’ 
 
320. Finally, Methanex has not been compensated for the harms it has 
suffered as a result of these measures. 
  
Id. at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 3 (citing Second Am. Claim, ¶¶ 317-320). The Tribunal fashioned 
five arguments that addressed Methanex’s averments. 
 
First, it asserted that Respondent, the United States, never communicated false 
representations to Methanex  upon which Methanex relied to its detriment. To the 
contrary, the tribunal emphasized that: 
  
Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely known, if 
not notorious, that governmental, environmental and health protection 
institutions at the federal and State level, operating under the vigilant 
eyes of the media, interested corporations, non-governmental 
organizations and a politically active electorate, continuously 
monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds and commonly 
prohibited or restricted the use of some of those compounds for 
environmental and/or health reasons.”  
 
Id. at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 9. Second, because Methanex did not rely on any representations 
purporting to State that a ban would not issue, the tribunal distinguished its case from that 
of Revere Copper & Brass, Incorporated v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), Am. Arb. Ass’n (Aug. 24, 1978), 17 I.L.M. 1321 (1978). See Methanex, supra 
note 171, at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 10.  
 
Third, Methanex’s averments that, the process pursuant to which the California ban was 
enacted was corrupted by contributions to then Lieutenant Governor, later Governor 
Davis, were found devoid of any record evidence. Id. at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 11.  
 
The tribunal noted that California’s governor  “followed the protocol established in 
California Senate Bill 521 [and that] there is no indication in the record that he varied 
from it in any way.” Id. at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 12. Thus, the tribunal reasoned that “[t]he 
terms of Governor Davis’s Executive Order and subsequent action by the State of 
California are inconsistent with Methanex’s contention that the California ban was 
designed to transfer the gasoline oxygenate market to ethanol.” Id.  
 
Fifth and finally, the operative factual timeline before the tribunal led it to conclude that 
Methanex’s factual submissions are inconclusive because they rely, as Methanex 
admitted, on inferences. The tribunal observed that “where the time-line of California 
Senate Legislation, scientific study, public hearing, executive order and initiative to 
secure an oxygenate waiver are all objectively confirmed, the argument for resorting to 
inference as a way of reaching a conclusion inconsistent with the objective evidence is 
untenable.” Id. at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 14. 
 
 EAST\64724221. 391 
legislative enactment was directly related to its adoption of the University 
of California’s Report.247 The award’s emphasis on the scientific evidence 
and detailed factual findings concerning the relationship between this 
evidence and health and the environment, reflects considerable concern for 
the public purpose doctrine generally, and in particular the orthodox 
GATT Article XX international trade law exceptions. The Methanex 
tribunal, however, does not at all frame this penchant in the language of 
public international law principles. It notably does not undertake any 
sustained analysis that sets forth a standard or otherwise suggests the basis 
of the public purpose doctrine’s primacy in relation to the countervailing 
foreign investor investment law protections. In this regard, the analysis 
deftly limits itself merely (i) to rephrasing three of the NAFTA’s Article 
1110 exceptions and (ii) emphasizing the want of representations 
concerning the California ban on which the claimant did not rely. The 
paucity of language on this point is profoundly disconcerting. It leaves the 
parties, future tribunals, and commentators without any sense of standard, 
doctrinal guidepost, or specific policy issues that may serve as either 
instructive precedent or a principle that meaningfully contextualizes 
competing interests, particularly in the wake of the Metalclad award. 
A more subtle but equally eloquent indicator of the considerable 
weight that the tribunal accorded to a State’s traditional police powers or 
public doctrine is found in its very analysis of the NAFTA’s Article 
1101(1),248 which the tribunal indicates “is not assisted by [Methanex’s] 
arguments under Article 1110.”249 The sufficiency of Methanex’s claim 
rested on the extent to which it could demonstrate the requisite legal 
connection between the 1999 California Executive Order, the 2000 
California Regulations, and its investments, evinced California’s intent to 
harm the specific class of foreign methanol producers, including 
Methanex.250  
                                                 
247 As part of California Senate Bill 521, enacting the MTBE Public Health and 
Environment Protection Act of 1997, directed the University of California to conduct 
research on the effects of MTBE. The University of California Report comprised five 
volumes, 600 pages that constituted seventeen separate papers compiled by over sixty 
researchers. Id. at Part III-Ch. A ¶ 3. 
 
Among other findings, the University of California Report recommended “a full 
environmental assessment of any alternatives to MTBE in Ca. RFG2, including the 
components of Ca. RFG2 itself, before any changes are made in California State law.” Id. 
at Part III-Ch. A ¶ 14. 
 
248 NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1101 ¶ (1). 
 
249 Methanex, supra note 171, at Part IV-Ch. D ¶ 18. 
 
250 The Tribunal framed the jurisdictional issue as “whether the two U.S. measures 
‘relate’ to Methanex as an investor or its investments within the meaning of Article 
1101(1)(a) and (b) in NAFTA.” Id. at Part IV-Ch. E ¶ 2. 
 EAST\64724221. 392 
The Methanex tribunal construed the “relating to” predicate in 
Article 1101(1)251 as consisting of an “effects plus” test that “signifies 
something more than the mere effect of a measure on an investor or an 
investment in that it requires a legally significant connection between 
them.”252 This construction of the “relating to” element of Article 1101(1) 
provides a Home State with considerable defenses in establishing that a 
particular regulatory measure could not have “related to” a particular 
investor or investment, without placing the burden on a claimant to 
demonstrate intent or another iteration of scienter. From an evidentiary 
perspective, establishing specificity of this nature with respect to intent is 
just as daunting, if not altogether impossible in most circumstances, as 
demonstrating intent for purposes of establishing that a particular measure 
issued in furtherance of a public purpose. This unremarkable construction 
of “relating to” within the meaning of Article 1101(1) is a negative 
byproduct of the subjective standard incident to the legacy public purpose 
doctrine.253 This stringent standard comports with an expansive view of a 
State’s regulatory space. It is conceptually consistent with the standard to 
conclude that a measure does not relate to an investor or investment where 
its effect on public health or the environment is scientifically sound, as 
was the case in Methanex.254 
The proposition that scientific evidence negates the legal 
requirement for meeting the “relating to” stricture in Article 1101(1) is 
fundamentally flawed. The scientific soundness of a measure cannot have 
the de facto effect of negating effects triggering Article 1101(1)’s “relating 
to” stricture. Consequently, the “effects plus test” that the Methanex 
tribunal affixed to Article 1101(1) gives rise to a corollary suggesting that 
the requisite “relating to” showing is not demonstrable where the measure 
at issue rests on legitimate scientific foundations. The consequence of this 
reading renders the Article 1101(1) standard insurmountable with respect 
to virtually any credible regulatory measure. 
                                                                                                                         
 
251 In relevant part, Article 1101(1) provides that Chapter 11 of NAFTA “applies to 
measures adopted or maintained by a party relating to: (a) investors of another Party; (b) 
investments of investors of another party in the territory of the Party….” NAFTA, supra 
note 18, art. 1101 ¶ (1)(a)-(b). 
  
252 Methanex, supra note 171, at Part II-Ch. E ¶ 3.  
 
253 Indeed, Methanex failed to meet this standard to the tribunal’s satisfaction. Despite the 
proliferation of partial awards and analysis in the final award on jurisdiction and merits 
consisting of 278 pages, this rudimentary tenet for purposes of Chapter 11 initially was 
not even properly averred, and never met. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, 
NAFTA Ch. 11/UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 147 (Aug. 3, 2005), 7 ICSID Rep. 239 
(2012) [Hereinafter Methanex Partial Award]. 
 
254 Methanex, supra note 171, at Part IV-Ch. E ¶ 20. 
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The use of the public purpose doctrine in Methanex is unbridled 
and detached from the more tempered Statement of the doctrine 
throughout the NAFTA treaty framework. Devoid of standard as to 
application and equally lacking as to tempering regulatory sovereignty, the 
award links the public purpose doctrine with uncertainty and the lack of a 
functional standard having predictive value. It becomes clear and more 
than just a coincidence that after the Methanex case—the award that 
stands as the antinomy to the Metalclad “effects test”—that the public 
purpose doctrine appears as the determinative principle that tips the 
pendulum almost absolutely in favor of regulatory host-State sovereignty. 
The “effects test” in all of its iterations has not redeemed the promise of 
tempering regulatory sovereignty. 
J. Beyond Metalclad and Methanex: The NAFTA Jurisprudence 
In addition to being conceptually and doctrinally diametrically 
opposed on the role of the public purpose doctrine, the Metalclad and 
Methanex awards raise many more questions than they could ever aspire 
satisfactorily to address. Metalclad and Methanex do not address the new 
challenge that the public purpose doctrine must meet. The advent of 
economic globalization has given rise to a paradigm of interdependence 
that shuns “winner take all” applications and definitions of the public 
purpose doctrine.255 The paragon of independence of States has passed. 
globalization underscores the shared approach of exploration, exploitation, 
and development of resources among States. Short from even suggesting 
the need to explore new methodologies in the application of the doctrine, 
the Metalclad and Methanex analyses remarkably do not at all reference, 
let alone rely upon, the NAFTA’s public purpose standard contained in 
Article 1101(4).256 The Article 1101(4) effort to fashion a public purpose 
standard or alternatively provide the doctrine with substantive content 
within the Chapter Eleven rubric, simply is ignored. Along this same vein, 
neither tribunal (Metalclad nor Methanex) even purports to draw upon the 
rich and manifold references to public purpose throughout the NAFTA’s 
framework beyond just Chapter Eleven.257 The scant but helpful working 
papers and drafts prepared by the NAFTA Parties relating to the public 
purpose standard or doctrine as well were not referenced in the awards. It 
necessarily follows that neither Metalclad nor Methanex at all enriched, or 
                                                 
255 One of the shortcomings of the NAFTA public purpose jurisprudence are the “all or 
nothing” results that it has generated. This shortcoming is not unique to NAFTA, but in 
fact pervades the entire public purpose doctrine. See infra Conclusion. 
 
256 NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1101 ¶ 4. 
 
257 See id.  art. 721 ¶ 2(b); art. 912 ¶ (b); art. 1015 ¶¶ 4(c), 8(a), 8(i); art. 1017 ¶ 1(j); art. 
1019 ¶ 6; art. 1411 ¶ 5(b); art. 1804 ¶ (b). 
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otherwise assisted in clarifying the totality of the NAFTA’s public purpose 
workings. 
The command in Methanex is both succinct and clear, but equally 
disconcerting. A conservative construction of the award suggests that a 
direct or indirect expropriation nationalization is not compensable where 
the Article 1110 exceptions (the presence of due process, non-
discriminatory, and public purpose) are present so long as the investor did 
not rely on false representations on the part of the Host State. This 
proposition is neither an uncontroverted principle of public international 
law,258 nor conceptually comprehensive in scope. Specifically, it fails to 
address whether such a taking is compensable even where the operative 
bilateral or multilateral treaty, such as the very NAFTA itself, suggests 
otherwise.259 The Article 1110 framework contemplates that a Host State 
                                                 
258 In fact, steps have been taken post-Methanex & Metalclad to make the scope of such 
obligations more clear. For example, the 2004 US Model BIT “clarifies that ‘[e]xcept in 
rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, 
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.’” Karen Halverson Cross, 
Converging Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151, 
191 (2012). Such language should “make it significantly more difficult for investors such 
as Metalclad to convince an arbitral tribunal that a regulatory measure, particularly an 
environmental protection, health or safety measure, is expropriatory.” Id. (internal 
footnotes omitted).  
 
259 Article 1110 in pertinent part provides; 
 
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a 
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an 
investment (“expropriation”), except: 
 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraph 
2 through 6. 
 
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took 
place (“date of expropriation”), and shall not reflect any change in 
value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known 
earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value 
including declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as 
appropriate, to determine fair market value. 
 
3. Compensation shall be paid without delay and be fully realizable.  
 
4. If payment is made in a G7currency, compensation shall include 
interest at a commercially reasonable rate for that currency from the 
date of expropriation until the date of actual payment. 
 
5. If a Party elects to pay in a currency other than a G7 currency, the 
amount paid on the date of payment, if converted into G7 currency at 
the market rate of exchange prevailing on that date, shall be no less 
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has an obligation to compensate a foreign investor, without more, as to 
any of the following six events: (i) a direct expropriation; (ii) an indirect 
expropriation; (iii) a direct nationalization; (iv) an indirect nationalization; 
(v) a measure tantamount to a nationalization; and (vi) a measure 
tantamount to an expropriation. Nowhere does Article 1110, or Chapter 
Eleven of the NAFTA assert that a Host State is relieved from any legal 
obligation to issue compensation for a direct or indirect expropriation or 
nationalization, or a measure tantamount to a nationalization or 
expropriation so long as false misrepresentations with respect to an 
investment relied upon by an investor did not issue. This principle does 
find support in international law beyond the Methanex tribunal’s 
pronouncement.260 The Methanex tribunal, however, hardly explains the 
circumstances pursuant to which application of this general principle 
trumps the clear command in Article 1110(1). The absence of any analysis 
on this issue  from a policy perspective mitigates against a very broad 
construction of the governing precept in Methanex as an illustration of the 
application of the NAFTA Article 1110 for a public purpose.  
Because the Methanex tribunal neither defines what constitutes a 
public purpose nor explains the Article 1110(1)(d) “compensability issue,” 
no conceptual residue remains that would have didactic value for purposes 
of illustrating the workings of the public purpose doctrine within the 
meaning of the NAFTA’s Article 1110(1) subsections (a) through (d).261 
Once the Methanex tribunal accepted the scientific evidence proffered by 
the University of California Report, no attention was accorded to 
consideration of the benefits and detriments on both the 
investor/investment and the public welfare by dint of issuance of a 
legislative ban and the Executive Decree. To the contrary, the acceptance 
of this scientific evidence proved to be dispositive with respect to (i) 
                                                                                                                         
than if the amount of compensation owed on the date of expropriation 
had been converted into that G7 currency at the market rate of 
exchange prevailing on that date, and interest had accrued at a 
commercially reasonable date for that G7 currency from the date of 
expropriation until the date of payment. 
 
6. On payment, compensation shall be freely transferable as provided in 
Article 1109. 
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110. 
 
260 See supra note 260 & accompanying text.  
 
261 See infra Chapter J.1. 
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legitimizing the effects of the measures on the subject investment and (ii) 
proscribing compensation.262 
The inordinate weight that the Methanex tribunal ascribes to public 
purpose generally (not even the public purpose standard)263 has the 
doctrinal and conceptual effect of marginalizing all other factors that merit 
consideration.264 The pragmatic effect of vesting public purpose with 
dispositive status once the scientific legitimacy of the measure at issue has 
been legally established is to vest the Host State’s regulatory sphere with 
juridically unbridled discretion as to foreign investor/investment 
protection. This approach in the context of the NAFTA eviscerates even 
the most rudimentary policy objective underlying Chapter Eleven. More 
universally beyond the NAFTA, this misapprehension of the public 
purpose doctrine: 
(i) wrests foreign investors of any reasonable hope of 
protecting their investments from takings, and even 
from non-compensable 
expropriations/nationalizations;  
(ii) delegitimizes treaty-based arbitrations as a genuine 
international dispute resolution methodology that 
protects investors/investments from the 
parochialism of host-State judiciaries by providing 
for a super-national tribunal where public 
international law applies; 
(iii) frustrates the policy tenets of international 
investment law that seek to foster enhanced foreign 
direct investments; 
(iv) heightens the tensions between capital-exporting 
and capital-importing States by disrupting equipoise 
in favor of developing nations to the detriment of 
industrialized States; 
(v) further deepens an “all or nothing” risk factor in 
treaty-based investment arbitrations that is contrary 
to pervading principles of economic globalization 
and “Globalized sovereignty” that favor viability 
sharing frameworks;  
                                                 
262 From a technical perspective the tribunal did not have to reach either of these issues as 
it ultimately held that the “relating to” jurisdictional predicate of Article 1101(1) was 
never met. 
 
263 See Supra notes 247-48 & accompanying text.  
 
264 Even though it does not so State, the Methanex tribunal, based upon its very analysis, 
does not treat the elements of Article 1110 para.1(a)-(d) (Public Purpose, Non-
Discriminatory Treatment, Due Process of Law, and Payment of Compensation) as 
having to be construed in pari materia. 
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(vi) does not contribute to a rubric that seeks to 
harmonize the disparate and often conflicting policy 
objectives of international investment law and 
international trade law, and;  
(vii) furthers the distorting effects of treating all 
regulatory measures as equal in importance with 
respect to public purpose.265  
1. The Public Purpose Legacy of Metalclad and Methanex 
While Metalclad enshrined the effects on the investment to the 
detriment of the relevant regulatory measure, Methanex embraces the 
measure wholesale without inquiry into its bona fide  nature or its effects 
on the investor/investment. The consequences of government regulations 
on the investor/investment are of little to no moment when viewed through 
the prism of a Methanex analysis.  
Whether read together or separately, Metalclad and Methanex cast 
considerable doubt on the extent to which treaty or contract provisions 
proscribing regulatory expropriations have any practical effect. Neither 
case contributes to the decisional law on the narrow issue of the 
relationship between compensability and public purpose in the context of 
direct or indirect expropriations or nationalizations. Indeed, both 
Metalclad and Methanex cloud these issues.266 Is there a defined standard 
of proof to which investor States, Host States, and arbitral tribunals must 
be sensitive and should apply concerning the assessment of a regulatory 
measure and its effects on foreign investors/investments?267 Despite more 
                                                 
265 As is suggested in considerable detail in this text, see infra Chapter 4, health, life, 
safety, measures as to plant, animal and human life, vary in importance, as well as 
exigency. The same, so the argument here advanced says, holds true for environmental 
measures. Measures that seek to conserve and preserve are materially different as to 
remediation and mitigation issues together with triggering exigency. It is therefore 
unclear why these exceptions would be treated the same and accorded identical normative 
standing.  
 
266 See supra Chapter 1.H & 1.I. 
 
267 While the Methanex tribunal referenced, but did not define, “burden of proof,” 
Methanex, supra note 171, at Part IV-Ch. B ¶ 9, neither the Methanex nor the Metalclad 
tribunals spoke to an applicable standard of proof in evaluating “effects” on investments 
or “the nature of a particular regulatory measure” characterized as an expropriation, 
nationalization, or a measure tantamount to an expropriation or nationalization. Here too, 
a considerable lack of rigor is demonstrated by both the Methanex and Metalclad 
tribunals, and as shall be established, it is a shortcoming that pervades the NAFTA 
jurisprudence and the decisional-law of treaty-based investor-State arbitration. 
 
Read together, Metalclad and Methanex certainly provide a normative foundation for the 
development of a “proportionality test,” but neither tribunal examines the legal space of 
mitigation that suggests that “less intrusive measure” analysis is warranted in managing 
competing investor and Host State interests. The availability of less restricting measures 
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moderate and balanced approaches, the “NAFTA Jurisprudence” does not 
satisfactorily address these issues. They remain witnesses to an 
impoverished legacy public purpose doctrine that has been incorporated 
by ad hoc tribunals into different tests that fail to address the foundational 
queries that the public purpose doctrine comprehensively must be able to 
address if it is to reconcile the competing interests of investor States and 
Host States in an era of economic globalization.  
2. A Broader Examination of The NAFTA’s 
Jurisprudence and Other Investor-state Decisional 
Law: In Search of a Viable Public Purpose Framework. 
The NAFTA’s decisional law addressing the public purpose 
doctrine primarily in the context of a direct or indirect expropriation or 
nationalization or regulatory measures tantamount to an expropriation is 
internally inconsistent and doctrinally in disarray.268 The Metalclad and 
Methanex awards serve as prime examples.269 The “foundational NAFTA 
                                                                                                                         
is not wholly segregated from consideration of the extent to which a measure is bona fide 
or of whether the measure at issue is an effective one. Scrutiny of the efficacy of a 
government measure or of its effectiveness or place on a scale measuring least restrictive 
means, presents considerable challenges. Most of these obstacles concern access to 
government data and premises for decision-making. These obstacles, however, are being 
progressively shed. The confluence of access to scientific data and technology has made 
it possible for NGO’s and other interested private sector participants to evaluate 
regulatory measures purporting to have a scientific foundation and to be able to analyze 
efficacy, cost efficiency, and the availability of less restrictive options. Also, although it 
is still work in progress, transparency with respect to access to government information 
has obtained the unprecedented status of a universal human right. See Case of Claude-
Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 151, ¶¶ 86-87 (Sept. 19, 2006). Even though much of the practical application of 
the principle of transparency as a right remains aspirational and embryonic, on a relative 
scale transparency can point to notable objective accomplishments. 
 
268 See Tecmed, supra note 168, at ¶ 115 & n.26 (citing Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral 
Treaties & Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, in 269 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 255, 383, 385-86 (Académie de Droit International de la Haye ed., 1997)). There 
is a difference to be drawn between a creeping expropriation and a de facto expropriation 
although both typically are classified as within the broader concept of “indirect 
expropriation.” To be sure, both types of expropriations may be undertaken pursuant to a 
variety of acts that compel case by case examination. Id. at ¶ 116 & n. 27 (citing R. 
Dolzer & M. Stevens, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 99-100 (Martinus Nijhoff 
1995)).   
 
269 The two different and contrasting expropriation compensability rules in Methanex and 
Metalclad rightfully deserve to be joined by yet a third paradigm that further contributes 
to obfuscate the dispositive standard. In Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. 
Republic of Costa Rica, the award on this issue provided:  
 
Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and 
beneficial to society as a whole – are, in this respect, similar to any 
other expropriatory measures that a State may take in order to 
implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for 
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cases” and other jurisprudence often analyzed together with NAFTA 
decisional law such as Tecmed,270 struggle to devise a standard that may 
best harmonize the competing investor-state interests, as well as reconcile 
international trade and investment law. These efforts, however, fail 
because the different “effects test” and “proportionality” standards apply a 
fundamentally flawed public purpose doctrine. As shall be examined, it is 
the fundamental use of a legacy public purpose doctrine enjoying an 
embedded subjective standard that generates the inconsistencies. The 
various competing interests and policies pertaining to home and Host 
States cannot be harmonized and reconciled merely as a by-product of 
awards resulting from ad hoc tribunals applying an ill-defined doctrine. 
More is necessary if such awards indeed aspire to yield a jurisprudence 
that is uniform, transparent, and having predictive value. The 
shortcomings of this decisional law can be traced to an approach that 
“places the cart before the horse” by fashioning different tests that lead to 
inconsistent results. The preferred methodology is one that focuses on 
developing the very principles being applied in ways that address the 
competing interests identified. The emphasis on methodology rather than 
principle development inevitably will give rise to issues of process 
legitimacy and foster an unacceptable level of uncertainty.  
The dissonance arising from emphasis on developing a workable 
methodology or standard becomes evident and perhaps reaches a pinnacle 
with the “proportionality test” enunciated in the Tecmed award.271  Often 
analyzed within the framework of the NAFTA even though the claim is 
brought by an investor from a non-NAFTA Party pursuant to the Spain 
and Mexico BIT,272 the facts underlying Tecmed somewhat resemble 
Metalclad273 but without the municipal, State, and federal dichotomy of 
                                                                                                                         
environmental purposes, whether domestic or international, the State’s 
obligation to pay compensation remains.  
 
Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/96/1, Award ¶ 72 (Feb. 17, 2000), 5 ICSID REV. 169, 192 (2000).  
 
270 See Tecmed, supra note 168. 
 
271 Id. at ¶ 122. 
 
272 Id. at ¶ 4. The Tecmed case is often discussed in conjunction with cases brought 
pursuant to NAFTA. See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
995, 1041 n.177 (2012); Allan Ingelson & Lincoln Mitchell, NAFTA, the Mining Law of 
1872, and Environmental Protection, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 261, 283 (2011); Alberto R. 
Salazar V., Ph.D., NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic 
Counter-Advertising Law, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 48 (2010); Vicki Been, 
NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Division of Authority for Land Use and 
Environmental Controls, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 19, 41 n.135 (2002). 
 
273 See supra Chapter 1.H. 
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positions concerning the need for a municipal permit as a predicate to 
constructing and operating a hazardous waste landfill facility.274 
The Tecmed tribunal’s analysis of the role of public purpose is less 
than lucid. Even though for purposes of determining whether there has 
been a compensable expropriation the tribunal acknowledges “[t]he 
principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers within the 
framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those 
subject to its powers as administrator without entitling them to any 
compensation whatsoever is undisputable,”275 it struggles with the role 
that public purpose defined as “a legitimate aim ‘in the public interest’” 
plays in determining whether there is an expropriation or a compensable 
expropriation.276 At the outset, the tribunal appears to articulate an “effects 
test” approach to determining whether there is an expropriation that is 
                                                 
274 Claimant in Tecmed was the awardee in connection with a public auction held by 
Promotora Inmobiliaria del Ayuntamiento de Hermosillo (“Promotora”) a decentralized 
municipal agency of the Municipality of Hermosillo, located in the State of Sonora, 
Mexico. The auction concerned the sale of real, and improved property in addition to 
facilities and assets concerning a controlled landfill of hazardous industrial waste. The 
facility was known as “Cytrar,” which eventually became the holder of Tecmed’s rights 
and obligations under the tender. Tecmed, supra note 168, at ¶ 35.  
 
While the land on which the landfill was built had been purchased by the Government of 
the State of Sonora, in the locality of Las Víboras, falling within the jurisdiction of the 
Municipality of Hermosillo, in the State of Sonora, the landfill operated pursuant to a 
renewable license issued by the Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology 
(“SEDUE”) of the federal government of Mexico. Initially, Parque Industrial de 
Hermosillo, a public agency of the State of Sonora, operated the facility. Upon a transfer 
of ownership of the landfill to a decentralized agency of the Municipality of Hermosillo, 
Confinamiento Controlado Parque Industrial de Hermosillo O.P.D., this agency was 
provided with authorization to operate for an indefinite period of time. Authorization was 
granted by the Hazardous Materials Waste and Activities Division of the National 
Ecology Institute of Mexico (“INE”) an agency of the federal government of the United 
Mexican States within the Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries 
(“SEMARNAP”), which cancelled the initial authorization that SEDUE had issued. Id. at 
¶¶ 36-37.  
 
Eventually, INE rejected Tecmed’s application for renewal of the authorization to operate 
the landfill and requested Cytrar to submit a program for the closure of the landfill. Id. at 
¶ 39. Tecmed commenced the arbitration alleging, among other things, that the failure to 
grant a new permit renewing authorization to operate the landfill constitutes an 
expropriation of its investments without compensation or justification, in addition to a 
violation of the operative agreement and of Mexican law. In this connection, Tecmed 
further averred that “such refusal would frustrate its justified expectations of the 
continuity and duration of the investment made and would impair recovery of the 
invested amount and the expected rate of return.” Id. at ¶ 41. 
 
275 Id. at ¶ 119. 
 
276 Id. at ¶ 122 (citing Case of James & Others v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) ¶ 50 (Feb. 21, 1986)). 
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completely severed from any meaningful consideration of the connection 
that such effects arising from the government measure at issue may have 
with a State’s police powers or legitimate public purpose.277 It is observed 
that “[t]he government’s intention is less important than the effects of the 
measures on the owner of the assets or on the benefits arising from such 
assets affected by the measures; and the form of the deprivation measure is 
less important than its actual effects.”278 This preliminary “effects test” 
also is segregated from the legal status of the domestic law purporting to 
provide a normative basis for the measure at issue.279 
                                                 
277 The tribunal underscores the “effects test” as a talisman that distinguishes between a 
State’s legitimate exercise of its police powers (which we here construe as public 
purpose) and a de facto expropriation that wrests all value or ownership from the investor 
with respect to the investment. In so doing, however, the tribunal failed to explain, or 
even attempt to elucidate whether a legitimate exercise of a State’s police power 
constitutes a de facto expropriation that is or may not be compensable. The extent to 
which public purpose affects compensability is simply never Stated. The tribunal’s 
reasoning merits citation: 
 
To establish whether the Resolution is a measure equivalent to an 
expropriation under the terms of Section 5(1) of the Agreement, it must 
be first determined if the Claimant, due to the Resolution, was radically 
deprived of such economical use and enjoyment of its investments, as if 
the rights related thereto – such as the income or benefit related to the 
Landfill or its exploitation – had ceased to exist. In other words, if due 
to the actions of the Respondent, the assets involved have lost their 
value or economic use for the holder and the extent of the loss. This 
determination is important because it is one of the main elements to 
distinguish, from the point of view of an international tribunal, between 
a regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of 
the State’s police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a 
de facto expropriation that deprives those assets and rights of any real 
substance. Upon determining the degree to which the investor is 
deprived of its goods or rights, whether such deprivation should be 
compensated and whether it amounts or not to a de facto expropriation 
is also determined. Thus, the effects of the actions or behavior under 
analysis are not irrelevant to determine whether the action or behavior 
is an expropriation.  
 
Id. at ¶ 115 (emphasis supplied).  
  
278 Id. at ¶ 116 (citing Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting 
Engineers of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (1984); Phelps Dodge Corp. et al. 
v. Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121, 130 (1986)). 
 
279 The Tribunal noted, “[t]hat the actions of the Respondent are legitimate or lawful or in 
compliance with the law from the standpoint of the Respondent’s domestic laws does not 
mean that they conform to the Agreement or to international law,” id. at ¶ 120, and 
provided:  
 
An Act of State must be characterized as internationally wrong if it 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation, even if the Act does 
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The objective analytical elegance of an “effects test” is wholly 
undermined by its inability to account for the interests of the Host State. 
The understanding of interests among States within an independent 
framework cannot be abandoned. Metalclad best exemplifies this debility. 
Tecmed’s incorporation of this analytical rubric from cases decided by the 
European Court of Human Rights only exacerbates the need for a 
doctrinally developed public purpose principle without which the 
proportionality test flatly fails.280 The tribunal’s construction of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality test results in a hybrid 
of international investment law and international trade law when 
articulated within the context of the proceeding before it: 
[T]he Arbitral Tribunal should consider whether 
community pressure and its consequences, which 
presumably gave rise to the government action qualified as 
expropriatory by the Claimant, were so great as to lead to a 
serious emergency situation, social crisis or public interest, 
in addition to the economic impact of such a government 
                                                                                                                         
not contravene the State’s internal law – even if under that law, the 
State was actually bound to act that way.  
 
Id.  (citing JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1, 84 (Cambridge University Press 2002)).  
 
280 The Tecmed award transitions from an “effects test” to a proportionality test by 
drawing analytical support from the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence. Id. 
at ¶ 122 (citing Case of Mellacher & Others v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 24 
(Dec. 19, 1989); Case of Pressos Compañia Naviera & Others v. Belgium,   332 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 19 (Nov. 20, 1995)). Specifically, the Tribunal provided:  
 
Not only must a measure depriving a person of his property pursue, on 
the facts as well as in principle, a legitimate aim ‘in the public interest,’ 
but there must also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised… […]. 
The requisite balance will not be found if the person concerned has had 
to bear ‘an individual and excessive burden’ […] The Court considers 
that a measure must be both appropriate for achieving its aim and not 
disproportionate thereto. 
 
....Non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: Unlike 
nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or 
designation of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. 
Secondly, although a taking of property must always be effected in the 
public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals and 
non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for requiring 
nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-
nationals. 
 
Id. at ¶ 122 (citing Case of James & Others v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
¶¶ 50, 63 (Feb. 21, 1986)) (emphasis supplied) (internal footnotes omitted).  
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action, which in this case deprived the foreign investor of 
its investment with no compensation whatsoever. These 
factors must be weighed when trying to assess the 
proportionality of the action adopted with respect to the 
purpose pursued by such measure.281  
While the proportionality test introduced a public purpose balancing 
component, in applying the very test that it had reformulated for purposes 
of application in a treaty-based arbitration, the tribunal denaturalized the 
public purpose element by specifically concluding that only where the 
regulatory measure at issue is in furtherance of the protection from 
imminent peril to the ecological balance or public health would such a 
measure constitute an exception where an investment’s ownership is 
dislodged or its value fundamentally diminished.282 Therefore, according 
to the Tecmed holding and analysis the element of the proportionality test 
relating to public purpose only concerns a very narrow segment of the 
State’s regulatory space. 
                                                 
281 Id. at ¶ 133 (emphasis supplied). As to the meaning of “public interest” as referred to 
by the Tribunal, had identified “the protection of the environment, ecological balance and 
public health, as additional factors comprising its understanding of “public interest.” Id. 
at ¶ 129. 
 
282 As to this point, the Tribunal’s language could not be clearer: 
 
As expressed by the Respondent, the Landfill’s proximity to 
Hermosillo’s urban center, and not concrete evidence that the Landfill’s 
operation is harmful for the environment or public health, is the issue 
that concentrates opposition of the groups that are against the Landfill. 
 
Id. at ¶ 140. 
 
The Award further States: 
 
In this case, there are no similar or comparable circumstances of 
emergency [similar or comparable to the situation in Elettronica Sicula 
Sp.A. No serious social situation, nor any urgency related to such 
situations, in addition to the fact that the Mexican Courts have not 
identified any crisis. The actions undertaken by the authorities to face 
these socio-political difficulties, where these difficulties do not have 
serious emergency or public hardship connotations, or wide-ranging 
and serious consequences, may not be considered from the standpoint 
of the Agreement or international law to be sufficient justification to 
deprive the foreign investor of its investment with no compensation, 
particularly if it has not been proved that Cytrar or Tecmed’s behavior 
has been the determinant of the political pressure or the demonstrations 
that led to such deprivation, which underlie the Resolution and 
conclusively conditioned it. 
 
Id. at ¶ 147 (citing Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 
I.C.J. 15 (July 20)). 
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Tecmed’s extrapolation of proportionality from the European Court 
of Human Rights’ jurisprudence has the residual effect of serving 
primarily as an “effects test” based upon three key analytical premises. 
First, the tribunal engaged exclusively in an “effects test” suggestive of an 
expropriation.283 Second, the “effects test” was supplemented with a 
“private interest” element rendering possible a proportionality of the ratios 
between the burden of the measure on the investment and its relationship 
with the nature of the measure at issue, and the objective that this measure 
seeks to redress. Third, the tribunal defines the measure to be redressed as 
posing an immediate threat to the ecological balance, leading to a social 
crisis, or affecting health. This third level of the tribunal’s construction 
substantially limits the scenarios in which a measure could meet the 
exception and as a result carves out of the proportionality test the public 
purpose component—leaving only an “effects” standard favoring 
claimants. In so doing, it undermines the equipoise sought between 
capital-exporting (likely claimants) and capital-importing countries (likely 
Host States). The extent to which the Tecmed tribunal intended to identify 
a category of public purpose commanding greater deference in the 
proportionality analysis and enjoying exception status with respect to the 
measure at issue is left wholly unclear. In undertaking this exercise the 
tribunal remained silent and did not articulate any intent to create 
customary law by identifying a specific public purpose matrix.284 
The identification of public purpose categories serving as 
exceptions justifying the legitimate and non-discriminatory exercise of a 
State’s regulatory authority to the detriment of a foreign investment, even 
beyond the State necessity exception,285 finds support in the NAFTA and 
its jurisprudence.  
                                                 
283 Id. at ¶ 115. 
 
284 The Tribunal’s reasoning on this issue is somewhat truncated. While it is true that the 
evidence before it, as recited in the Award, underscored the location of the site as not an 
immediate threat to health, ecological balance, or a social crisis, it would appear to follow 
that political pressure incident to the Landfill’s location as being too close to an urban 
center, itself suggests a deeper State of apprehension arising from the increased risk of 
danger inversely proportional to the Landfill’s proximity to more densely populated 
areas. 
The duration and nature of the community reactions to the operation and transportation of 
hazardous waste from the facility gave rise to the filing of a complaint before Mexico’s 
National Commission of Human Rights. Id. at ¶ 135. 
 
285 The customary international law doctrine of necessity is reflected succinctly in Article 
25 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility for 
Wrongful Acts:  
 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an 
international obligation of that State unless the act: 
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3. The Tecmed Contribution 
Chapter Fourteen of the NAFTA entitled Financial Services is a 
helpful example of a framework that reveals the developmental potential 
of the public purpose doctrine. It exemplifies ways in which public 
purpose may be enriched by creating special categories defined with 
particularity that are to be accorded extraordinary status in tempering the 
conflicting interests pertaining to the protection of foreign investments and 
the autonomy of host-State regulatory space.286 The development of a 
                                                                                                                         
 
(a). is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential 
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b). does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State 
or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the 
international community as a whole. 
 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground 
for precluding wrongfulness if: 
(a). the international obligation in question excludes the 
possibility of invoking necessity; or 
(b). the State has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
  
International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), p. 80, available at   
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (last 
accessed Apr. 1, 2013) [Hereinafter ILC Articles]. The commentary further provides that 
there is “substantial authority in support of the existence of necessity as a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness. It has been invoked by States and has been dealt with by a 
number of international tribunals. In these cases the plea of necessity has been accepted 
in principle, or at least not rejected.” Id. at 80-81. 
 
286 Article 1401: Scope and Coverage, identifies the parameters of this public purpose 
category: 
 
1. This Chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party 
relating to:  
 
(a) financial institutions of another Party; 
(b) investors of another Party, and investments of such 
investors, in financial institutions in the Party’s territory; 
and  
(c) cross-border trade in financial services.  
 
2. Articles 1109 through 1111, 1113, 1114 and 1211 are hereby 
incorporated into and made a part of this Chapter. Articles 1115 
through 1138 are hereby incorporated into and made a part of this 
Chapter solely for breaches by a Party of Articles 1109 through 1111, 
1113 and 1114, as incorporated into this Chapter.  
 
3. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party, 
including its public entities, from exclusively conducting or providing 
in its territory:  
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functional public purpose doctrine embracing an objective substantive 
content shall require paradigms of public purpose categories that refine 
and limit application of public purpose exceptions as a general principle 
that currently are broadly related to the welfare of a State. Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance Company (Fireman’s Fund)287 was the first case, and as of the 
date of this writing remains as the only case, brought under the Financial 
Services Chapter of the NAFTA, and thus provided the tribunal in that 
matter with a unique opportunity to interpret the “reasonable measures for 
prudential reasons” standard contained in the Article 1410(1) 
exceptions.288 The case serves as a vast analytical source for any endeavor 
aspiring to redefine the public purpose doctrine for three principal reasons: 
First, the Article 1410(1) exceptions represent a special class of 
public purpose category that exceed in importance other regulatory 
measures that a State may undertake as part of its normal exercise of 
sovereignty. Any tribunal addressing application of such a public purpose 
category must reconcile a normative basis of the category with the burdens 
that the regulatory measure at issue imposes on a foreign investment. In 
doing so, the tribunal credibly has to address reasons why a generic 
“public purpose” formula, pursuant to which public purpose is merely 
defined as an act undertaken by a State with the intent to serve the general 
                                                                                                                         
(a) activities or services forming part of a public retirement 
plan or statutory system of social security; or  
(b) activities or services for the account or with the guarantee 
or using the financial resources of the Party, including its 
public entities.  
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1401 ¶¶ 1-3.  
 
287 See Fireman’s Fund, supra note 167. 
 
288 NAFTA Article 1410(1) (Exceptions) States: 
 
1. Nothing in this Part [5., i.e., “Investment, Services and Related 
Matters”] shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or 
maintaining reasonable measures for prudential reasons, such as: 
 
 (a) the protection of investors, depositors, financial market 
participants, policy-holders, policy-claimants or persons to 
whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial institution or 
cross-border financial service provider; 
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or 
financial responsibility of financial institutions or cross-border 
financial service providers; and  
(c) insuring the integrity and stability of a Party’s financial 
system.  
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1410 ¶ 1(a)-(c) (emphasis 
supplied). 
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welfare, is simply insufficient. This challenge is considerable. Indeed to 
date, no decisional award has met it in large measure because of the 
juridical cultural consensus that public purpose is a self-evident principle, 
which it is not. 
In a very basic sense, application of a special public purpose 
category in the context of dispute resolution leads to “an abandonment” of 
the orthodox public purpose doctrine because of its emphasis on the 
nature and character of the special public purpose class rather than on the 
particular factual configuration of the case. A public purpose doctrine that 
aspires to meet the needs of an economic globalization framework 
premised on the interdependence of States as an organizing principle must 
comprise special categories that are known a priori, in part, so that 
investor expectations can be met.  
In addition, the focus on the application of a special public purpose 
category mitigates negative consequences from an “effects only test.” 
Most notably, the chilling effect that an effects test may have on beneficial 
host-State regulatory pronouncements is somewhat mitigated. Similarly, 
States negotiating bilateral or multilateral investment treaties shall enjoy 
greater transparency in understanding the extent to which prospective 
investments may be adversely compromised by regulatory measures. This 
bilateral transparency, in addition to harmonizing party expectations, may 
serve for more robust treaty negotiation and drafting as to issues that touch 
and concern special public purpose categories.  
Second, the “reasonable measures for prudential reasons” standard 
introduces much needed “objective criteria” into the public purpose 
doctrinal analysis. The orthodox public purpose doctrine is premised on a 
subjective intent standard that presents practically insurmountable 
evidentiary challenges. For this reason the doctrine is often rendered 
inconsequential from a pragmatic standpoint or as a thinly veiled pretext 
presumably justifying an indirect expropriation that cannot be 
meaningfully assailed.289 Even though the terms “reasonable” and 
                                                 
289 The orthodox public purpose doctrine’s subjective constitution has contributed to 
inconsistencies in the understanding and application of the doctrine as evinced by the 
diametrically opposite results in Metalclad and Methanex. For example, in Feldman v. 
Mexico, in discussing what it perceived to be the challenge of applying to specific 
cases the general language of the NAFTA’s Article 1110(1)(a)-(d) the tribunal Stated: 
 
The view that the conditions (other than the requirement for 
compensation) are not of major importance in determining 
expropriation is confirmed by the ReStatement of the Law of Foreign 
Relations of the United States, a source relied on by many American 
and Canadian lawyers that has been discussed in the memorials of 
both the Claimant and the Respondent in this proceeding. For 
example, according to the ReStatement, the public purpose 
requirement ‘has not figured prominently in international claims 
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“prudential” within the standard are broad and susceptible to flexible 
constructions, they still bespeak universality and vest the public purpose 
doctrine with workable parameters.  
Third, the Article 1410(1) exceptions raise the predicate question 
concerning the manner in which, if at all, the legacy orthodox public 
purpose element of expropriation in public international law is to be 
applied in cases where special public purpose categories are likely to be 
triggered. Even though the meaning of expropriation is less than 
monolithic as a matter of customary and conventional international law 
within the very NAFTA anatomy itself,290 the public purpose doctrine or 
                                                                                                                         
practice, perhaps because the concept of public purpose is broad and 
not subject to effective reexamination by other States. 
 
Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 99 (Dec. 
16, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 341 (2005) [Hereinafter Feldman] (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712, cmt. g. (1987)) 
(emphasis supplied). 
 
290 NAFTA does not give a definition for the word ‘expropriation.’ In some ten cases 
in which Article 1110(1) of the NAFTA was considered to date, the definitions appear 
to vary. Considering those cases and customary international law in general, the 
present Tribunal retains the following elements: 
 
(a)  Expropriation requires a taking (which may include 
destruction) by a  government-type authority of an investment by an 
investor covered by the  NAFTA.  
(b)  The covered investment may include intangible as well as 
tangible property.  
(c) The taking must be a substantially complete deprivation of the 
economic use and  enjoyment of the rights to property, or of 
identifiable distinct parts thereof  (i.e., it approaches total 
 impairment).  
(d) The taking must be permanent and not ephemeral or 
temporary. 
(e) The taking usually involves a transfer of ownership to another 
person (frequently  the government authority concerned), but 
that need not necessarily be so in  certain cases (e.g. total destruction 
of an investment due to measures by a  government authority 
without transfer of rights).  
(f)  The effects of the Host State’s measures are dispositive, not 
the underlying  intent, for determining whether there is expropriation. 
(g)  The taking must be de jure or de facto. 
(h) The taking may be ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’ 
(i) The taking may have the form of a single measure or a series 
of related or  unrelated measures over a period of time (the so-
called ‘creeping  expropriation’). 
(j) To distinguish between a compensable expropriation and a 
non-compensable regulation by a host-State, The following 
factors (usually in combination) may be taken into account: 
whether the measure is within the recognized police powers of 
the Host State; the (public) purpose effect of the measure; 
whether the measure is discriminatory; the proportionality 
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any of its permutations, i.e., police powers, public interest, public welfare, 
etc., underlies the various definitions of expropriation. It is a constant 
common denominator in the doctrine of expropriation. Consequently, is 
public purpose as a doctrine to be taken seriously in determining whether a 
direct or indirect expropriation or nationalization has taken place? And if 
so, whether or not such taking is compensable where a public purpose is 
present, should public purpose within the meaning of Article 1110(1) of 
the NAFTA, and as articulated in the jurisprudence of expropriation more 
generally, be accorded a distinctive deference from the other elements that 
suggest treatment in pari materia? 
Fireman’s Fund is helpful because it places in sharp relief two 
important “special public purpose category” issues that are of practical and 
theoretical significance. First, is the discriminatory “lack of effort by Host 
State to rescue an investment that has become virtually worthless,” an 
expropriation or divestment of that investment?291 Second, where a 
measure adopted by a Host State is neither “reasonable” nor “prudential” 
within the meaning of Article 1410(1) of the NAFTA, does it then 
automatically give rise to liability? 
The Article 1410(1) exceptions foreclose actions that would 
constitute a violation under the NAFTA pursuant to Chapter Eleven. So 
long as the measure in question qualifies as a “reasonable measure taken 
for prudential reasons” from a methodological standpoint, a special public 
purpose category provides for discriminatory application without violating 
the national treatment standard. The tribunal in Fireman’s Fund correctly 
rejected claimant’s contention that “if a measure adopted or maintained by 
[the Host State] is found not to be reasonable or taken for prudential 
reasons, it would give rise to liability, or at least to a presumption of 
liability, under Article 1110.”292 
Regrettably, the tribunal disturbingly clouded its reasoning by 
focusing on the methodology incident to an Article 1110 analysis instead 
of elaborating on the status of a special public purpose category contained 
in Article 1410.293 A measure, for example, premised on a State’s 
                                                                                                                         
between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realized; and the bona fide nature of the measure.  
 
Fireman’s Fund, supra note 167, at ¶¶ 176(a)-(j) (internal footnotes omitted & emphasis 
supplied). 
  
291 Id. at ¶ 207 
 
292 Id. at ¶ 160. 
 
293 On this point, the tribunal reasoned: 
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protection of the integrity and stability of its financial system—and 
therefore falling within the ambit of an Article 1410 exception—should 
not be evaluated based upon an “effects test,” which is what “an initial” or 
“tentative” Article 1110 analysis would require. The tribunal did in fact 
grasp this principle in analyzing the proscribed discrimination claim under 
Chapter Fourteen that claimant sought to assert. It did observe that “the 
[discriminatory] exception applies to all provisions of Part Five 
‘Investments, Services and Related Matters’) of the NAFTA applicable to 
Financial Services including the National Treatment Article (Article 
1405),” and, therefore, “concludes that Article 1410(1) permits reasonable 
measures of a prudential character even if their effect (as contrasted with 
their motive or intent) is discriminatory. The Tribunal rejects the 
contention that a measure discriminatory in effect is eo ipso 
unreasonable.”294 The citation to the writings of the principal negotiator of 
Chapter Fourteen on behalf of the United States is instructive in 
illustrating application of a special public purpose category beyond just 
national treatment: 
Article 1410(1)(a)… carves out of the national treatment 
and other obligations of the Financial Services chapter, a 
right to take reasonable measures even though 
discriminatory in application, to protect the safety and 
soundness of the financial system. This regulatory 
prerogative to protect the integrity of the financial system is 
accepted internationally.295 
The proposition that the “condition preceding for invocation of the 
Prudential Measures Exception [is] a finding of expropriation,” has the 
consequence of subordinating application of the exception to an “effects 
test” and of treating a special public purpose category no differently than 
the “standard exceptions” articulated in Article 1110(1)(a) through (d).296  
                                                                                                                         
The Tribunal rejects this contention [that a measure adopted or 
maintained by a Host State found not to be reasonable or taken 
prudential reasons would give rise to liability]. As the Tribunal 
understands Article 1410 within the anatomy of the NAFTA, a 
judgment as to whether the exception applies is called for only after an 
initial, at least tentative, conclusion that Article 1110 or another 
applicable provision of the NAFTA may have been violated. 
 
Id.  
 
294 Id. at ¶ 162. 
 
295 Id. at ¶ 163 (citing to Olin L. Wethington, FINANCIAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION § 
5.07 (Sheppard’s McGraw Hill 1994)). 
 
296 Id. at ¶165. It is not being suggested that an orthodox expropriation analysis is 
altogether obviated where a special public purpose category is alleged. To the contrary, 
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The condition preceding the analysis here proposed both 
conceptually and analytically best comports with the tribunal’s treatment 
of the two above-mentioned questions. Namely, is the discriminatory 
“lack of effort by a Host State to rescue and investment that has become 
virtually worthless” an expropriation or divestment of that investment?297 
Second, where a measure adopted by a Host State is neither “reasonable” 
nor “prudential” within the meaning of Article 1410(1) of the NAFTA, 
does it then automatically give rise to liability?298 Both of these queries 
were decided in the negative. Critical to their determination is a 
preliminary assessment of the measure in question as rising to the level of 
a special public purpose category. A finding in the affirmative as to this 
predicate issue streamlines and fast-frames an expropriation or 
nationalization analysis.299  
                                                                                                                         
the proposition asserted maintains that only by first determining as a condition precedent 
that in fact a special public purpose category such as the Article 1410 Exceptions applies 
can the elements of an expropriation under the NAFTA and international customary law 
find its most efficient and analytically consistent workings. This methodology is 
particularly suited and appropriate for the NAFTA because, as the tribunal in Fireman’s 
Fund aptly noted, the NAFTA, much like the ICSID convention with “investment,” 
deliberately does not define “expropriation.” Therefore, a predicate analysis of the bona 
fide nature of the special public purpose category at issue would be required. The 
soundness of this approach is underscored even more because the single common 
denominator of the mosaic of “tests” each purporting to identify the dispositive 
expropriation cornerstone, is the public purpose element. 
 
297 Id. at ¶ 207. 
 
298 Id. at ¶ 162. The tribunal also reframed the issue as to the NAFTA’s Article 1110: 
“The question before the Tribunal is whether it could also give rise to a claim under 
Article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation) of the NAFTA since the Tribunal lacks 
competence over claims under Article 1102, 1105 and 1405.” Id. at ¶ 203. It responded in 
the negative: “The Tribunal concludes that it does not rise to a claim under Article 1110.” 
Id. 
 
299 In Fireman’s Fund the Tribunal ignored the status of the measure at issue as a special 
public purpose category clearly within Article 1410, when attempting to reconcile 
discriminatory treatment with nationalization or expropriation status. Rather than 
focusing on the conceptual link between the discriminatory treatment at issue as one 
arising from a measure falling with the province of Article 1410, the Tribunal undertook 
an analysis that carved out the conceptual effects of a special public purpose category 
altogether. Instead, it focused on the relationship between any form of discrimination and 
the general customary international law standard for expropriation by emphasizing three 
propositions. First, the finding of a discriminatory measure, without more, does not 
necessarily lead to a conclusion that an expropriation is present. Id. at ¶ 205. Second, a 
finding of discriminatory treatment is but one of several factors used to distinguish 
between a compensable expropriation and a non-compensable expropriation by a Host 
State. Id. at ¶ 206. Third and finally, a “misrepresentation” and “investor expectation” 
analysis ensued pursuant to which the Tribunal determined that “[n]or were there 
reasonable investor-backed expectations created by Mexico, even though Mexico should 
have pursued the conclusion of an agreement.” Id. at ¶ 207. Only because the Tribunal 
decided that the elements of an expropriation or nationalization were not met did it 
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Decided six years after Metalclad and one year after Methanex, it 
becomes necessary to ask whether Fireman’s Fund helped to narrow the 
conceptual and doctrinal chasm conceptually and doctrinally separating its 
two predecessors. Does Fireman’s Fund, as the first case under the 
NAFTA’s Chapter Fourteen contribute to our understanding of the public 
purpose doctrine generally and within the NAFTA, and if so how? Is the 
meaning of “public purpose” any clearer after Fireman’s Fund? Is the 
Tecmed proportionality test and its application rendered any more 
practical by the Fireman’s Fund award? Indeed, does the status of the 
measure at issue in Fireman’s Fund as falling within Article 1410 
contribute to the finding that there was no direct or indirect expropriation, 
or any actions tantamount to an expropriation of the property in question? 
The Fireman’s Fund award does not bring us any closer to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the application of an Article 1410 
exception. The tribunal’s analysis preempts consideration of the special 
public purpose category that the NAFTA’s Chapter Fourteen offers. In this 
very narrow sense, the award does not call attention to any specific 
methodology or doctrinal construction applicable to a NAFTA Chapter 
Fourteen case that would not attach to a “standard” Chapter Eleven 
contention. The award manages to obviate a special public purpose 
category Chapter Fourteen analysis because it only focused on the extent 
to which claimant had established that an expropriation took place within 
the meaning of the NAFTA’s Article 1110.300 The Fireman’s Fund award 
nearly segregates five principal grounds alleged for expropriation and 
rejects each pursuant to an Article 1110 analysis that nowhere references 
the effects or application of Article 1410 exceptions.301 The examination 
                                                                                                                         
conclude that liability did not attach despite a factual finding of discrimination. “In the 
Tribunal’s view, this is a clear case of discriminatory treatment of a foreign investor.” Id. 
at ¶ 203. 
 
300 The award, in pertinent part, States: 
 
The Tribunal concludes with respect to prudential measures that Article 
1410 of the NAFTA provides a defense to the State-Party if a tribunal 
has found a challenged measure to constitute an expropriation in 
violation of Article 1110 of the NAFTA. The validity of that defense, is 
necessary to decide a claim under Article 1110, is to be judged either 
by the Financial Services Committee, or if no request has been 
submitted for invoking the Committee procedure, by the arbitral 
tribunal. In the present case, the issue whether the challenged measures 
were reasonable or arbitrary is moot, because the Tribunal has not 
found these measures to constitute expropriation under the NAFTA....  
 
Id. at ¶ 68. 
 
301 The Tribunal found as follows with respect to the five specific averments identified 
and construed as not 
constituting an actionable taking of whatsoever ilk: 
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(i) “The first act alleged by [Fireman’s Fund] cannot be considered by any 
standard a taking that deprived [Fireman’s Fund] of the economic use and 
enjoyment of the Dollar Debentures.” Id. at ¶ 186 (emphasis supplied). 
 
“Assuming that the Government of Mexico ‘compelled’ [Fireman’s 
Fund] to participate in the Recapitalization Plan in early 1988, it was 
for the purpose of rescuing [Fireman’s Fund’s] investment, rather than 
taking it away from [them].” Id. at ¶ 189. (emphasis in original). 
 
(ii) “The contentions regarding the second act as alleged by [Fireman’s Fund] 
must also fail. It is based on a Recapitalization Program that never materialized. 
[Fireman’s Fund’s] Dollar Debentures were never redeemed and [Fireman’s 
Fund] never made the additional US$50 million capital contribution. Nor was 
the participation by a foreign bank accomplished. Consequently, the Mexican 
authorities cannot have proceeded ‘to thwart the Program’ or ‘destroyed’ that 
Program.” Id. at ¶ 192. (emphasis in original). 
 
(iii) “The third act is more troubling but does not constitute a taking under 
Article 1110 of the NAFTA either.” Id. at ¶ 200. 
 
“In the Tribunal’s view, this is clear case of discriminatory treatment of 
foreign investor.... Such treatment might have given rise to claim by an 
investor under Articles 1102 (National Treatment), Article 1105 
(Minimum Standard of Treatment), or Article 1405 (National 
Treatment) of the NAFTA, or under two or all of them. The question 
before the Tribunal is whether it could also give rise to a claim under 
Article 1110 (Expropriation and Compensation) of the NAFTA since 
the Tribunal lacks competence over claims under Articles 1102, 1105 
and 1405. The Tribunal concludes that it does not rise to a claim under 
Article 1110.” Id. at ¶ 203 (emphasis in original).  
. 
(iv) “The fourth act is the return of the loan portfolio by FOBAPROA in 
November 1998....” Id. at ¶ 210 (emphasis in original).  
  
“In any event, the effect of the return of the portfolio in November 
1998 cannot be said to have taken away the value of [Fireman’s Fund] 
investment. At that point in time, the financial position of BanCrecer 
was so bad, that it was de facto already in a State of insolvency. 
Moreover, the effect of the return of the portfolio appears to be 
included in BanCrecer’s financial Statements for 1999 only....” Id. at ¶ 
214. In addition, the Tribunal held that Fireman’s Fund did not 
reasonably rely on FOBAPROA’s commitments and, therefore, had no 
legitimate expectations that could have sustained a claim against 
Mexico. Id. at ¶¶ 214-215. 
 
(v) “Finally, the fifth act is the taking of control by IPAB of BanCrecer in 
November 1999.... It appears that the shareholders of BanCrecer, i.e., GFB 
voted in favour of a taking of control by IPAB over BanCrecer and a 
dissolution of liquidation of GFB. They did so in light of the hopeless 
financial position of BanCrecer and as a consequence of GFB. The facts do 
not demonstrate that the action by IPAB constituted a taking by IPAB in the 
sense of an expropriation on behalf of the State.” Id. at ¶ 216 (emphasis in 
original).  
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of all five premises upon which Fireman’s Fund’s claims rested were 
merely subjected to an “effects test” that hardly considered the nature and 
character of the measures at issue. Consequently, from both an analytical 
and doctrinal perspective, Fireman’s Fund does not shed much light on 
the extent to which treatment of a NAFTA Chapter Fourteen case at all 
differs from a Chapter Eleven proceeding where Article 1410 defenses do 
not apply. 
The case also fails to enhance the anatomy or application of the 
proportionality test first raised in Tecmed.302 This omission is quizzical as 
an Article 1410, or any other type of special public purpose category case, 
would be particularly amenable to a proportionality analysis. This 
omission is particularly odd because the tribunal references the 
proportionality test as constituting the penultimate element of its synopsis 
of the NAFTA decisional-law on expropriation predating the Fireman’s 
Fund award.303 The proportionality test’s aspiration of identifying, 
balancing, and analyzing two pivotal aspects of the regulatory measure at 
issue (means and ends) would be necessary to a Chapter Fourteen or 
special public purpose category case because of the need to provide for  
process legitimacy, among other considerations, in fleshing out a Host 
State’s exercise of regulatory sovereignty causing harm to a foreign 
investment/investor where compensation for such harm does not ensue as 
a matter of law.304 The policies underlying the NAFTA’s Chapter 
Fourteen may best be expressed as an analysis purporting to explain “the 
aim sought to be realized” by the Host State’s regulatory measure.305 
Fireman’s Fund, however, altogether passes on application of 
proportionality without explanation. 
A broad reading of Fireman’s Fund supports the proposition that 
where a foreign investment is, (i) significantly diminished in value,306 (ii) 
pursuant to a discriminatory measure imposed by a Host State,307 (iii) as a 
result of the regulatory measure at issue causing the investor significant 
                                                 
302 See Tecmed, supra note 168, at ¶ 122. 
 
303 Fireman’s Fund identifies and attributes the proportionality test to Tecmed. Fireman’s 
Fund, supra note 167, at ¶ 176(j) (“... the proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be realized.”) (citing Tecmed, supra note 168, at ¶ 122).  
 
304 Fireman’s Fund’s request for an award compensating it for the full value of its 
investment was denied and each Party was ordered to bear its own costs and to share in 
the Tribunal’s costs in equal shares corresponding to the Parties’ cost advances. See id. at 
¶¶ 226(2)-(3). 
 
305 Id.  
 
306 Id. at ¶ 176(c). 
 
307 Id. at ¶ 176(j). 
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losses,308 (iv) the taking is not compensable if the public purpose 
underlying it does not need a conventional expropriation analysis.309 This 
reasonable and eminently plausible construction of the holding in 
Fireman’s Fund is particularly troubling because of the manner in which 
the public purpose doctrine, from a purely conceptual standpoint, fashions 
the entirety of the legal reasoning. The tribunal’s award invests virtually 
no ink on the status of the doctrine either within or beyond Chapter 
Fourteen.310 Without explicitly acknowledging the relationship between a 
special public purpose category within the ambit of Article 1410 and its 
effect on the particular investment concerned, the tribunal does little more 
than to reduce its holding and reasoning to a mere “effects test” 
indistinguishable from Metalclad but lacking an equitable holding 
resulting in a compensable expropriation. Fireman’s Fund fails to shed 
any additional light on how best to understand the relationship between 
the substantive content of a special public purpose category and an 
orthodox expropriation analysis.  
While Fireman’s Fund does purport to have canvassed the ten 
previously decided NAFTA cases concerning expropriation in order to 
fashion a comprehensive test,311 it refrains from noting the very different 
                                                 
308 Id. at ¶¶ 206, 218. 
 
309 Id. at ¶¶ 205-208. 
 
310 Nowhere in paragraphs 186-210 or 216 of the award, where the five specific acts 
alleged are analyzed and contextualized, does the Tribunal allocate a single sentence to 
explain the manner in which without reference to legacy public purpose doctrine is being 
used to support its findings. Id. at ¶¶ 186-202, 210, 216. 
 
296 Id. at ¶ 176. The ten cases to which the Tribunal presumably was referencing are: 
  
1. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA Ch. 11/UNCITRAL, 
Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), 16 ICSID Rep. 40 
(2012).  
 
2. International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, NAFTA Ch. 
11/UNCITRAL, Final Award (Jan. 26, 2005), 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_award.pdf. 
 
3. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/3, Award (Apr. 30, 2004), 11 ICSID Rep. 361 (2007).  
 
4. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 134 (2006). 
 
5. Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 
99 (Dec. 16, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 341 (2005)  
 
6. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/99/2, Award (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 192 (2004).   
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weight and application accorded to the doctrine where relevant in each of 
those matters. Moreover, the tribunal amassed its expansive ten-category 
expropriation standard without noting any need to apply those principles 
within the public policies unique to the NAFTA and its Parties. Such 
contextualization necessarily would have entailed analysis of the various 
competing interests that the public purpose doctrine is saddled with 
reconciling. The award does not live up to its promise to meet the 
expectations attendant to its status as the first case to be decided under 
Chapter Fourteen of the NAFTA. 
The tribunal’s “reasoning” as to the actions or omissions on the 
part of the Host State are not doctrinally or analytically presented as part 
of a NAFTA Chapter Fourteen case and, therefore, appear to be without 
conceptual foundation and lacking in value as precedent or persuasive 
authority. These findings on the part of the Host State merely are 
advanced as just acts or omissions that do not rise to the level of an 
expropriation under the NAFTA’s Article 1110.312 The tribunal’s findings 
with respect to the first three acts of expropriation attributable to the Host 
State’s regulatory authority as claimant alleged are revealing. 
The initial averment that the Host State somehow compelled 
Fireman’s Fund to participate in a recapitalization plan313 for purposes of 
bolstering a financial institution falls squarely with the purview of Article 
1410(1)(a)-(c). Rather than emphasizing the very proximate connection 
between the Mexican Government’s actions and Article 1410 
                                                                                                                         
7. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, First Partial Award on Liability 
(Nov. 13, 2000), 8 ICSID Rep. 18 (2005)  
 
8. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, 
Award (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002)  
 
9. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Award (June 26, 2000), 7 
ICSID Rep. 69 (2005) [hereinafter Pope & Talbot].  
 
10. Robert Azinian et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/97/2, 
Award (Nov. 1, 1999), 5 ICSID Rep. 272 (2002).  
 
312 Fireman’s Fund, supra note 167, at ¶ 203. (“In the Tribunal’s view, this is a clear case 
of discriminatory treatment of a foreign investor....The question before the Tribunal is 
whether it could also give rise to a claim under Article 1110 (Expropriation and 
Compensation) of the NAFTA since the Tribunal lacks competence over claims under 
Articles 1102, 1105 and 1405. The Tribunal concludes that it does not rise to a claim 
under Article 1110.”); Id. at ¶217 (“In conclusion, none of the acts and omissions alleged 
by [Fireman’s Fund] constitutes individually, or taken together, an expropriation of 
[Fireman’s Fund’s] investment under Article 1110 of the NAFTA....”). 
 
313 Id. at ¶ 186. 
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requirements, the tribunal limits its analysis to a plain “effects test.”314 
Similarly, the second contention that claimant advanced in support of its 
expropriation claim was deemed to be of no moment in the tribunal’s 
analysis because of either “a change in the political climate in Mexico at 
the time,”315 or “due to [the] fact that Mexico amended its legislation… to 
the effect that any rescue plan of a bank required that the existing capital 
be first applied to losses.”316 Here, the tribunal identifies two plausible 
causes for the detrimental effects that the Host State’s actions had on the 
investment. The tribunal even notes that the Host State’s actions are 
inappropriate.317 Yet, instead of establishing the exculpatory nature of the 
measure because of its character as within the ambit of Article 1410, it 
settles for just substituting its judgment in lieu of any Article 1410 
analysis.  
The tribunal specifically advances that “such a failure cannot be 
elevated to interference by a Host State in the rights of an investor in the 
sense that it constitutes a deprivation of the investor’s rights in its 
investment within the meaning of Article 1110 of the NAFTA.”318  
Drawing a connection between Article 1410 and a Host State’s 
obligations to salvage a foreign investment would have vested the award 
with greater conceptual rigor that equally would have the effect of limiting 
the claim, rather than the adoption of the tribunal’s rather circular 
argument; “[a] failure to enter a binding agreement to improve that 
condition, and possibly [Fireman’s Fund’s] investment, does not deprive 
[Fireman’s Fund’s] investment of its economic use since there was 
virtually none at the time of the Government’s failure.”319  
The third example drawn from claimant’s expropriation allegations 
understandably identified the Mexican Government’s refusal to allow 
Fireman’s Fund both directly and indirectly to purchase the Dollar 
                                                 
314 The tribunal reasons that “[a]ssuming that the Government of Mexico ‘compelled’ 
[Fireman’s Fund] to participate in the Recapitalization Plan in early 1998, it was for the 
purposes of rescuing [Fireman’s Fund’s] investment, rather than taking it away from 
[Fireman’s Fund].” Id. at ¶ 189. 
 
315 Id. at ¶ 198. 
 
316 Id.  
 
317 It is observed that “[o]n the basis of the record before it, the Tribunal is of the view 
that the Mexican Authorities did not behave appropriately in failing to pursue the 
conclusion of an agreement.” Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 
318 Id. at ¶ 199. 
 
319 Id. 
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Debentures at face value as part of a discriminatory taking.320 Even the 
tribunal found itself impelled to State that this event “is more troubling”321 
and “certainly discriminated against [Fireman’s Fund],”322 “but [still] 
does not constitute a taking under Article 1110 of the NAFTA either.”323 
Again, the tribunal remains silent as to any relationship between the 
Mexican Government’s refusal to allow for a face value purchase of the 
instruments and the extent to which the nature of such a refusal comports 
with “the maintenance of the safety, solvency, integrity or financial 
responsibility of financial institutions or cross-border financial service 
providers,” [or] “ensuring the integrity and stability of [Mexico’s] 
financial system,” as prescribed by Article 1410(b) and (c).324 
Even within the context of Chapter Fourteen, the Fireman’s Fund 
award does not vest public purpose with objective normative content. Yet, 
it construes concrete actions on behalf of a sovereign as not constituting an 
expropriation despite (i) the discriminatory nature of the measures,  (ii) 
their palpable adverse effects on a foreign investment/investor, and (iii) 
perhaps even the presence of bad faith conduct on the part of the sovereign 
concerning the application of the measure to the investment. The case 
provides for exculpatory conduct on behalf of a sovereign but cloaks it in 
terms of not meeting a conventional standard for expropriation within the 
NAFTA’s jurisprudence.325 As with the standard for expropriation, the 
proportionality test was mentioned but never applied, let alone developed 
or modified to meet the workings of a special public purpose category 
(such as the category enunciated in Article 1410).326 The disproportionate 
weight accorded to the workings of the Host State’s regulatory space and 
the lack of analysis as to public purpose from a doctrinal perspective 
generally and within the NAFTA severely limits Fireman’s Fund’s 
standing as persuasive authority or even a helpful analytical rubric. To the 
                                                 
320 Id. at ¶ 202. 
 
321 Id. at ¶200. 
 
322 See id. at ¶ 201 (emphasis supplied).  
 
323 Id. at ¶ 200. 
 
324 See NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1410 ¶¶ (b)-(c). 
 
325 Even though a tribunal took considerable pains to ensure that it had canvassed the 
entire gamut of “expropriation standards” within the NAFTA’s jurisprudence, see id. at ¶ 
176, it did not undertake a systematic application of law to fact pursuant to which each of 
the 11 elements identified was applied to the facts of the case. From an analytical 
perspective, this standard was just mentioned but never applied. 
 
326 See id. at ¶ 122 (mentioning the proportionality test).  
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contrary, it further nourishes uncertainty327 and a “taking sides approach” 
that is conducive to “all or nothing” results.328 Similarly, little was 
accomplished by way of illustrating the workings particular to a special 
public purpose category within the meaning of Chapter Fourteen. These 
unsatisfactory results are in large measure prompted by the subjective but 
malleable constitution of the legacy public purpose doctrine, which invites 
a mild “effects test” to be juxtaposed against an enshrined Host State’s 
regulatory space. 
The NAFTA jurisprudence has carved a particular space for 
“police powers” that, depending on the authority consulted, is different, 
but not altogether removed, from public purpose. While the police powers 
NAFTA jurisprudence at first appears to contribute an organizing 
principle to an entire body of inconsistently applied precepts and 
definitions, it actually contributes to adding another layer of uncertainty to 
the meaning and role of the public purpose doctrine. 
4. The Police Power Dichotomy and Feldman v. Mexico 
Likely compelled by the need to distinguish between regulation 
that renders it possible for a sovereign to exercise its sovereignty in 
furtherance of more general public interest and an expropriation, the 
NAFTA jurisprudence distinctively has relied upon the police powers 
nomenclature.329 These cases draw a distinction between public purpose 
and police powers but do not articulate any basis for the perceived 
doctrinal differences between the two.330 Feldman v Mexico331 is just such 
                                                 
327 Essentially, as one commentator has suggested, the tribunal, “with the sparest of 
reasoning, both effectively adopts the proportionality test as stemming from earlier cases 
within NAFTA and points out the problems of Tecmed’s incorporation of it...It suggests 
that, rather than any kind of stare decisis across arbitrations, a sliding scale of respect for 
precedent is warranted depending on the regime context of the earlier decisions.” Steven 
R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented 
International Law, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 475, 527 (2008). 
 
328 The tribunal “neither strayed far from the consensus position under customary 
international law—rejecting most claims of regulatory takings—nor proved inconsistent 
even within the regime of NAFTA.” Id. at 511. 
 
329 See, e.g., Corn Products Int’l v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility, ¶ 87 (Jan. 15, 2008), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0244.pdf; Fireman’s Fund, supra 
note 167, at ¶ 176; Pope & Talbot, supra note 296, at ¶ 99; Feldman, supra note 291, at 
¶¶ 105-106. 
 
330 See, e.g.,  Fireman’s Fund, supra note 167, at ¶ 176 (listing “whether the measure is 
within the recognized police powers of the Host State” and “the (public) purpose and 
effect of the measure” as distinct factors for “distinguish[ing] between a compensable 
expropriation and noncompensable regulation by a Host State.”). 
 
331 Supra note 291. 
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a case. In that proceeding the tribunal affirmatively diminished the public 
purpose doctrine while relying upon a vague notion of police powers that 
it nowhere defines.332 The Feldman Tribunal virtually reduces public 
purpose to the status of a non-factor even within the language of Article 
1110: 
In the Tribunal’s view, the essential determination is 
whether the actions of the Mexican Government [Host 
State] constitute an expropriation or nationalization, or are 
valid government activity. If there is no expropriatory 
action, factors (a)-(d) are of limited relevance,333 except to 
the extent that they have helped to differentiate between 
governmental acts that are expropriation and those that are 
                                                                                                                         
 
332 One possible explanation of the tribunal’s disavowance of public purpose in adoption 
of police powers may be attributable to its reliance on the Third ReStatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (“the ReStatement”) from which it draws analytical 
support for the proposition that (i) “the public purpose requirement ‘has not figured 
prominently in international claims practice, perhaps because the concept of public 
purpose is broad and not subject to effective reexamination by other States,’” and (ii) in 
distinguishing between a non-compensable government regulation and an expropriation. 
Id. at ¶¶ 99, 105. With respect to this latter point, the Tribunal cites directly to the police 
power language of the ReStatement, § 712, comment g, which reads: 
 
A State is responsible for an expropriation of property under 
Subsection (1) when it subjects alien property to taxation, regulation, or 
other action that is confiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably 
interferes with, or unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an alien’s 
property or its removal from the State’s territory... a State is not 
responsible for loss of property or other economic disadvantage 
resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for a 
crime, or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within 
the police power of States, if it is not discriminatory....  
 
Id. at ¶ 105 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 cmt. g 
(1987))  (emphasis supplied). 
 
333 The Award is referencing Chapter 11, Article 1110 subsections (a)-(d) which provide:  
 
1.  No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a 
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an 
investment (“expropriation”), except: 
 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and  
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 
through 6.5.  
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110 ¶ 1. 
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not, or are parallel to violations of NAFTA Articles 1102 
and 1105. If there is a finding of expropriation, 
compensation is required, even if the taking is for a public 
purpose, non-discriminatory and in accordance with due 
process of law and Article 1105(1).334  
To the extent that the tribunal understands Article 1110 or 
customary international law to assert that compensation attaches even 
where an expropriation is undertaken for a public purpose, pursuant to due 
process and in a non-discriminatory manner, is indistinguishable from 
advancing that as to compensability public purpose is irrelevant where an 
expropriation has been found. 
Terms such as “bona fide,”335 “reasonable governmental 
regulation[s],”336 or “commonly accepted government regulations,”337 
often are associated with the exercise of a “police power” regulatory 
measure that does not support a claim for expropriation. While the tribunal 
in Feldman found it necessary to observe that “[n]o one can seriously 
question that in some circumstances government regulatory activity can be 
in violation of Article 1110,”338 it failed to articulate the boundaries of 
public purpose so that a regulatory measure tantamount to an 
expropriation can be rendered readily discernible. Indeed, despite 
language bolstering the proposition that in some circumstances 
government regulatory activity may constitute an expropriation or an act 
or series of acts tantamount to an expropriation under Article 1110, the 
Tribunal did not find a violation of Article 1110 in the case sub judice 
despite acknowledging that claimant had “experienced great difficulties in 
dealing with [government] officials,” and had been “treated in a less than 
reasonable manner.”339 As to unreasonable and disparate treatment 
suffered by claimant at the hands of government tax officials, general 
platitudes concerning public policy underlying tax laws, predictive value, 
and consistency on the part of tax authorities executing the responsibilities 
were advanced: 
Unfortunately, tax authorities in most countries do not 
always act in a consistent and predictable way… as in most 
                                                 
334 Feldman, supra note 291, at ¶ 98 (emphasis supplied). 
 
335 Id. at ¶ 106 
 
336 Id. at ¶ 103. 
 
337 Id. at ¶ 105. 
 
338 Id. at ¶ 110. 
 
339 Id. at ¶ 113. 
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tax regimes, the tax laws are used as instruments of public 
policy as well as fiscal policy, and certain taxpayers are 
inevitably favored, with others less favored or even 
disadvantaged.340 
It is not a broad construction of the tribunal’s analysis in Feldman to assert 
that it is common, and therefore acceptable, for the execution of a State’s 
police powers by government officials to lead in some instances to 
disparate treatment that materially disadvantages a class of persons and for 
those actions seeking to implement regulatory measures to lack 
consistency, uniformity, and predictive value. The “police powers” 
construction of “public purpose” within the anatomy of international 
claims practices generally provides for an even broader veneer with which 
to cloak the exercise of actionable regulatory measures that are detrimental 
to the protection of foreign investment and investors. This legal fiction is 
little more than a pretext for the expansion of regulatory sovereignty. It is 
unfortunate and regrettable that the debilities of governmental bureaucratic 
execution in connection with the implementation of regulatory measures 
are characterized as comprising an essential element of a State’s police 
powers. 
The expansive construction accorded to police powers has had the 
consequence of reducing an Article 1110 analysis to an intensive fact-
driven undertaking that in turn is to be analyzed against a mercurial legal 
standard.341 The expropriatory public purpose character ascribed to 
regulatory measures, and particularly to a sovereign’s authority to tax, 
further compels vesting police powers (public purpose) with objective 
substantive content and brings into the fold the public purpose doctrine 
more generally.342 Adding to the all-encompassing configuration of police 
                                                 
340 Id. 
 
341 As noted, supra note 292 in Fireman’s Fund the tribunal aptly observed that no single 
expropriation standard common to all cases had been enunciated in the ten arbitral 
proceedings that preceded it, thus inviting the Fireman’s Fund tribunal to fashion a 
comprehensive, all-encompassing standard that it then failed to apply systematically to 
the facts of that case. 
 
Following this very line of thought, the Feldman tribunal acknowledged that “[t]he 
Article 1110 language is of such generality as to be difficult to apply in specific cases.” 
Feldman, supra note 291, at ¶ 98. Consonant with this vision, it further observed that 
“under NAFTA Article 1136(1), ‘[a]n award made by a tribunal shall have no binding 
force except between the disputing Parties and in respect of the particular case,’ and that 
each determination under Article 1110 is necessarily fact-specific.” Id. at ¶ 107. 
 
342  The expropriatory character ascribed to police power and to specific regulatory 
measures such as taxation should not be viewed as per se exculpatory, but rather as 
creating a rebuttable presumption that may be overcome depending on the specific public 
purpose sought to be served. The Feldman tribunal noted this “expropriatory penchant” 
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powers within the NAFTA jurisprudence is the view that a State’s 
prerogative in a post-market entry to change or modify existing regulatory 
schemes to the material detriment of a foreign investor may render an 
economic activity “less profitable or even uneconomic to continue,” but 
not necessarily constitute an indirect or creeping expropriation under 
Article 1110.343 
The character and scope that the NAFTA jurisprudence has 
engrafted upon a State’s police powers necessarily gives rise to an 
inherent presumption of correctness attaching to regulatory acts. This 
presumption itself needs to be questioned in the context of a proliferation 
of public purpose usages that can only lead to an understandable loss of 
confidence in the efficacy of investment protection. It also further 
provides rogue States with formal juridical justification for substantive 
inequities that rise to the level of illicit conduct. The tribunal in S.D. 
Myers, for example,344 and Stated that “[t]he general body of precedent 
usually does not treat regulatory action as amounting to expropriation. 
Regulatory conduct by public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of 
                                                                                                                         
of a sovereign’s taxing authority, but did not link it to the exigency of analyzing it within 
the context of an objective public purpose framework: 
 
By their very nature, tax measures, even if they are designed to and 
have the effect of an expropriation, will be indirect, with an effect that 
may be tantamount to an expropriation. If the measures are 
implemented over a period of time, they could also be characterized as 
“creeping” which the tribunal believes is not distinct in nature from, 
and is subsumed by, the terms ‘indirect’ expropriation or ‘tantamount 
to expropriation’ in Article 1110(1). 
 
Id. at ¶ 101. 
 
343 As to this point the Feldman tribunal Stated: 
 
[T]he Tribunal is aware that not every business problem experienced by 
a foreign investor is an indirect or creeping expropriation under Article 
1110, or a denial of due process or fair and equitable treatment under 
Article 1110(1)(c). As the Azinian Tribunal observed, ‘it is a fact of life 
everywhere that individuals may be disappointed in their dealings with 
public authorities... it may be safely assumed that many Mexican 
Parties can be found who had business dealings with governmental 
entities which were not to their satisfaction...’ To paraphrase Azinian, 
not all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or 
impossible for an investor to carry out a particular business, change in 
the law or change in the application of existing laws that make it 
uneconomical to continue a particular business, is an expropriation 
under Article 1110. 
 
Id. at ¶ 112 (internal citations omitted). 
 
344 S.D. Myers First Partial Award, supra note 137. 
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legitimate complaint under Article 1110 of the NAFTA, although the 
Tribunal does not rule out that possibility.”345 This remarkable Statement 
is disconcerting.  
Treating regulatory measures as unlikely to constitute conduct 
tantamount to an expropriation, where the meaning of the word 
“tantamount” within Article 1110(1) only pertains to equivalent of an 
expropriation and not more,346 can only generate greater uncertainty and 
further contribute to undermining process legitimacy. Consideration of a 
State’s police powers should only serve to further principles of symmetry, 
bilateralism, and transparency in the relationship between capital-
exporting and capital-importing States. Anointing regulatory measures 
with a presumption of correctness and legitimacy cannot at all contribute 
towards equipoise between home and Host States. The use of 
nomenclature such as “police powers” should not serve as a means to 
circumvent the public purpose doctrine on the ground that historical 
conceptual legacies loosely associate specific State functions (principally 
those that can only be undertaken by a sovereign and not an individual 
person or juridical entity) to legitimize a State’s violation of its treaty 
obligations to foreign investors.347 Both analytically and substantively 
police powers and the public purpose should be considered as one and the 
same, each encompassing an identical scope. 
In assessing whether a regulatory measure constitutes an 
expropriation or the equivalent to an expropriation, both burdens and 
presumptions must be inverted to favor a claimant where substantial 
prejudice to an investment/investor is established or conceded. At that 
                                                 
345 Id. at ¶ 281. 
 
346 The NAFTA jurisprudence is of a single voice in agreeing that “tantamount to 
expropriation” within the meaning of Article 1110(1) does not extend beyond the 
customary scope of the term expropriation under international law, and simply means 
“equivalent,” and not greater than, an expropriation. See, e.g. id. at ¶¶ 285-286; 
Fireman’s Fund, supra note 167, at ¶ 176 n.159 (“According to certain case law, the 
expression ‘a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation’ in Article 1110 of 
the NAFTA means nothing more than ‘a measure equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation.’”) (citations omitted); see also Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶ 335 (Sept. 18, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0133_0.pdf; Pope & Talbot, 
supra note 296, at ¶¶ 96, 104; Feldman, supra note 291, at ¶ 100. 
 
347 One reason for not providing unyielding deference to this broad exception is that the 
scope of the police powers exception has never been fully developed at international law. 
Jason L. Gudofsky, Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) Concerning Expropriations: An Environmental Case Study, 21 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 243, 295 (2000) (“The full scope of the police powers exception under 
international law has not yet been fully developed. More case law and attention must be 
devoted to the exception.”). 
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time scrutiny is to be equally placed on the effect that a measure has on 
the investment as concerning more than just a “mere diminution in value,” 
as well as on the nature and extent to which the measure comports with a 
substantively objective public purpose category. The current NAFTA 
jurisprudence completely effaces consideration of this second component 
in favor of a non-rebuttable and virtually boundless public purpose 
category reconfigured with “police powers” nomenclature. 
5. Reflections on Conventional International Law’s Use of 
Public Purpose 
Having analyzed the public purpose doctrine within the 
conventional international law framework of the NAFTA it becomes 
readily apparent that the doctrine’s morphology is both elusive and 
perhaps even ostensibly contradictory. Despite the merits of Article 
1101(4)348  (the NAFTA Public Purpose Standard), the workings of a 
public purpose category within Chapter Fourteen,349 and the jurisprudence 
interpreting and applying public purpose within the meaning of Article 
1110, the very elements of public purpose at rudimentary levels remain ill-
defined. This problem is far-reaching. It suggests that the pivotal principle 
governing the effects of regulatory sovereignty on foreign investment 
protection remains under developed and in pragmatic and theoretical terms 
reduced or wrongfully elevated, to the status of a self-evident principle. A 
conceptual category that no longer can account for the burdens that 
regulatory sovereignty and economic globalization have placed on public 
purpose analysis. 
The subjective content of public purpose in its historical legacy 
iteration purports to be broad, i.e., as generally concerning the public 
welfare such that any conflicting interest pertaining to the protection of a 
foreign investment/investor would be vastly outweighed by the purported 
public purpose in furtherance of the common good. A broad subjective 
based conceptualization of the doctrine, even within the NAFTA’s 
conventional international law context, cries for greater specificity, clarity, 
and definition.350 This problem is meaningfully compounded because the 
broad public purpose category, “in furtherance of the general welfare,” in 
turn is premised on a Host State’s very particular understanding of public 
purpose. Therefore, this functional all-encompassing public purpose 
framework, pursuant to which any reasonable relationship between a 
                                                 
348 See supra notes 22-25 & accompanying text. 
 
349 See supra Chapter 1.F. 
 
350 Kevin Banks, NAFTA’s Article 1110—Can Regulation Be Expropriation?, 5 NAFTA: 
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 499, 510 (1999) (noting that “the range of public purposes included 
within the police power appears to be wide and relatively undefined.”). 
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State’s undertaking and a “public consequence” constitutes a “public 
purpose” within conventional international law, also includes a restrictive 
character arising from a State’s subjective understanding of public 
purpose.351 “Public purpose” thus is transformed and denaturalized into 
“political purpose,” a purpose that does not necessarily further a State’s 
common welfare but rather some (less likely all) of its administrative 
institutions.352 This denaturalization of public purpose shall continue to 
become more destabilizing to the investment-treaty and dispute resolution 
development of an integrated, interdependent paradigm of resources and 
economic coexistence. Indeed, public purpose has devolved into a 
substantively bankrupt doctrine that is nearly eviscerating itself.  
Are the teachings of conventional international law, albeit through 
the lens of the NAFTA, with respect to the public purpose doctrine 
rendered more developed or clearer by customary international law? Are 
there competing definitions of public purpose in conventional international 
law and customary international law? If so, how may these differences be 
harmonized? Is the architecture of conventional international law more 
conducive to articulating a public purpose doctrine that may meaningfully 
serve to harmonize the competing underlying policies of international 
trade law and international investment law? Has, in fact, customary 
international law given rise to a public purpose doctrine capable of 
reconciling conflicting interests concerning the legitimate expectations of 
foreign investors and Host State obligations to exercise their regulatory 
authority to protect or enhance the public welfare? Is there a public 
purpose doctrine that customary international law identifies, and, if so, is it 
vested with a content that leads to uniformity, predictability, and 
transparency of standard? Is the public purpose doctrine premised on a 
customary international law the same or similar to that codified in the 
NAFTA and presumably developed by the NAFTA’s decisional-law? Is 
the legacy public purpose doctrine found in customary international law 
suited to mitigating competing expectations between capital-exporting and 
capital-importing countries, or, as with its conventional international law 
counterpart, crafted a doctrinal category that unduly promotes regulatory 
sovereignty to the detriment of foreign investments/investors? 
                                                 
351 Id. at 510 (suggesting that “deference can be expected from international tribunals in 
the face of a State’s assertion of a public purpose.”). 
 
352 See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign 
Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 399-
400 (2011) (“If investment treaties are important elements in the foreign investment 
decision-making process because they protect against the risk of adverse political actions 
(like expropriation), it might be expected that companies whose line of business is to 
gauge such risks will incorporate the presence or absence of treaties into their 
evaluations.”). 
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Addressing all of these queries, let alone meaningfully purporting 
to answer them, is beyond this text’s aspiration. Having canvassed the role 
of the public purpose within the framework of conventional international 
law as it appears in the NAFTA, the necessary question is whether 
customary international law reveals a different public purpose doctrine, 
and the extent to which it separates itself from the NAFTA’s conventional 
international law iteration, as well as the pronouncements and role of the 
doctrine in the NAFTA’s decisional law. This inquiry does find space in 
this contribution. A related analysis addresses the grounds for the 
differences as to scope in the doctrine as it appears in these two sources of 
international law. The nature of the source of law, so it shall be asserted, is 
material to the doctrine’s morphology.  
The anatomy of customary international law is particularly 
relevant. It will be advanced that the longstanding debilities endemic to 
the very structure of customary international law merely serve to 
compound the lack of predictive value and universal definition that now 
pervades the orthodox public purpose legacy doctrine. It also shall be 
demonstrated that the public purpose doctrine’s status as represented in 
international instruments unduly amplifies regulatory sovereignty, thereby 
exacerbating the very challenge that the public purpose doctrine seeks to 
overcome. The historicity arising from the process of political and 
economic decolonization has given rise to such principles as (i) 
sustainable development and (ii) permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, both of which aim to assist underdeveloped countries and 
economies in transition. These principles, themselves experiencing 
refining and doctrinal development, are emblematic of a broader, if not 
nearly all-encompassing, public purpose doctrine. Although contained in 
multiple public international law instruments, both principles are yet to be 
uniformly defined, let alone applied. It follows, so the argument says, that 
the customary international law iteration of the public purpose doctrine 
generally multiplies the vagueness and inadequacies with which its 
conventional international law counterpart struggles at a more limited 
scale. Because of customary international law’s unique structural features, 
lacking in centralized legislating, decision making, and wanting in 
enforcement capacity, there is no basis from which to infer that it may be 
capable of at all addressing the doctrinal needs of the public purpose 
doctrine. A brief analysis of customary international law with emphasis on 
these framework features is necessary if public purpose is at all to be 
understood within this context. More specifically, it is necessary to 
identify the evidence of public purpose within the ambit of customary 
international law. 
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A. The Place of the Public Purpose Doctrine in Customary 
International Law  
1. Revisiting Fundamentals of Customary International 
Law 
The classical point of departure for any discussion on customary 
international law is Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”), which identifies “‘international custom’ as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law.”353 The “general practice” refers to the 
practice of States354 and must in turn be undertaken by States (most but 
not all members of the international community)355 as a binding legal 
                                                 
353 The Statute of the ICJ forms an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations. The 
Statute’s objective is to provide a framework for the ICJ’s composition and general 
workings. Article 7 of the United Nations Charter, among other organs, provides for the 
International Court of Justice. Article 93 of the Charter of the United Nations provides 
that “all members of the United “Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute. Non-
members... may become parties to the Statute and conditions to be determined. In each 
case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The 
underlying assumption is that the world political organization, already possessed of 
organs with executive, deliberative and administrative functions, would be incomplete 
unless it also had a fully integrated judicial organ of its own.” SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE 
WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 1, 26 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 5th 
ed. 1994).  
 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute reads: 
 
1. The Court whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, where a general or a particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting 
States; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a 
case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.  
 
I.C.J. Statute art. 38, paras. 1-2 (emphasis supplied). 
 
354 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 232 (Lachs, J., dissenting) (Feb. 20) 
(“In sum, the general practice of States should be recognized as prima facie evidence that 
it is accepted as law.”). 
 
355 Id. at 43-44 (majority opinion); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 
F.3d 111, 137 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Although all treaties ratified by more than one State 
provide some evidence of the custom and practice of nations, ‘a treaty will only constitute 
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obligation.356 This normative binding character of customary international 
law does not require the explicit acceptance of it by a State compelled to 
follow it.357 Brownlie observes that the terms “custom” and “usage,” 
although “used interchangeably” also “are terms of art and have different 
meanings. A usage is a general practice [that] does not reflect a legal 
obligation, and examples are ceremonial salutes at sea and the practice of 
exempting diplomatic vehicles from parking prohibition.”358 
The ReStatement of the Law Third, the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States draws a distinction between general and special custom. 
“Special” customary law arises from a “regional” or “special” grouping 
that in turn gives rise to regional customary law as binding on States of a 
particular region. Drawing on the Asylum Case359 it notes that the State 
                                                                                                                         
sufficient proof of a norm of customary international law if an overwhelming majority of 
States have ratified the treaty, and those States uniformly and consistently act in 
accordance with its principles.’) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); Flores v. S. 
Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003) (“In short, customary international 
law is composed only of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a 
sense of legal obligation and mutual concern. Of course, States need not be universally 
successful in implementing the principle in order for a rule of customary international 
law to arise. If that were the case, there would be no need for customary international 
law. But the principle must be more than merely professed or aspirational.” Of course, 
States need not be universally successful in implementing the principle in order for a rule 
of customary international law to arise. If that were the case, there would be no need for 
customary international law. But the principle must be more than merely professed or 
aspirational.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 
356 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987) (“Customary 
international law results from a general and consistent practice of States followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligation.”); see also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
1969 I.C.J. at 44 (“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they 
must also be ... carried out in such a way as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”); see also Flores, 414 
F.3d at 248 (“Furthermore, a principle is only incorporated into customary international 
law if States accede to it out of a sense of legal obligation.”). 
 
357 Even though customary international law follows conventional international law as 
Article 38 enunciates them, both conventional international law and customary 
international law share in the same normative standing i.e., they are both equally 
authoritative. See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International 
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 669 (1986).  
 
However, customary international law is not without its critics. J. Patrick Kelly, The 
Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 452 (2000) (arguing 
that customary international law “should be eliminated as a source of international legal 
norms and replaced by consensual processes.”). 
 
358 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 6 (Oxford University Press, 
7th ed. 2008) (citing Parking Privileges for Diplomats Case, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Fed. Admin. Ct., 70 ILR 396 (Jan. 22, 1971)). 
 
359 Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20th). 
 EAST\64724221. 3131 
alleged to be bound must have accepted or acquiesced in the custom as a 
matter of legal obligation, not merely for reasons of political 
expediency.”360 
While the source for customary international law rests with Article 
38 of the ICJ Statute, the material evidence from which custom and a 
consistent practice on the part of States may be gleaned is vast. Brownlie 
notes that it may include: 
[D]iplomatic correspondence, policy Statements, press 
releases, the opinions of official legal advisors, official 
manuals on legal questions, e.g., manuals of military law, 
executive decisions and practices, orders to naval forces 
etc., comments by governments on drafts produced by the 
International Law Commission, State legislation, 
international and national judicial decisions, recitals in 
treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of 
treaties in the same form, the practice of international 
organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the 
United Nations General Assembly.361  
The manner in which principles or rules become international law rising to 
the status of binding customary international law, in turn defines 
normative standing or the weight to be accorded to such precepts. Thus, 
the means of establishing from an evidentiary perspective that a 
“customary rule” has developed into customary international law depends 
upon primary evidence such as State practice as memorialized in official 
government documents and other indicia of government practice, and 
secondary evidence mostly in the form of authoritative commentators and 
reporters.362 
                                                                                                                         
 
360 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. e (1987). Section 
102(2) defines customary law as by drawing on “consistency in the practice giving rise to 
a binding principle of law,” and “a sense of legal obligation.” Id. § 102(2) (1987) 
(“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of States 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”) (emphasis supplied). 
361 BROWNLIE, supra note 360, at 6-7 
 
362 Without purporting to establish hierarchy in the order of the clause, Section 103(2) of 
the ReStatement references secondary evidence: 
 
(2) In determining whether a rule has become international law, 
substantial weight is accorded to  
a. the judgments and opinions of international judicial and 
arbitral tribunals; 
b. the judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals; 
c. the writings of scholars; 
d. pronouncements by States that undertake to State a rule of 
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Even though these elements of custom are readily identifiable,363 
the premises comprising these elements are far from clear and susceptible 
to interpretation.364 The less than “bright-line standard” incident to the 
                                                                                                                         
international law, when such pronouncements are not 
seriously challenged by other States.  
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 103(2) (1987). 
 
363 Commentators tend to agree that (i) duration of the practice at issue, (ii) uniformity 
and consistency of the practice, (iii) generality of the practice, (iv) opinio juris, and (v) 
protest and acquiescence. See BROWNLIE, supra note 360, at 7-10; MALCOLM N. SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 72-93 (Cambridge University Press, 6the ed. 2008); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 103 cmt. a-c (1987). 
 
364 By way of example, the required duration is wholly undetermined. While a protracted 
amount of time is preferred and of obvious benefit, there is no specific time frame 
requirement. In fact, Shaw speaks of “instant” customary law pursuant to which 
normative standing is attained without any meaningfully long gestation period. SHAW, 
supra note 365, at 74.  
  
For example, in holding that Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
of 1958, which provided for the equidistance-special circumstances principle had not yet 
formed part of customary law, and, therefore, was not binding on West Germany, the ICJ 
observed: 
 
An indispensable requirement would be that within the period in 
question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of 
States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both 
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked, 
and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general 
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.  
 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20). The “uniformity, 
consistency of the practice” element is equally undetermined. While most 
commentators agree that complete uniformity simply is not a predicate, the general 
consensus does require “substantial uniformity” a term that is hardly distinct or 
particular. Thus, in the Fisheries Case, concerning the question whether the ten-
mile rule for bays constitute custom international law, the Court Stated: 
 
In these circumstances the Court deems it necessary to point out that 
although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in 
their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although 
certain arbitral decisions have applied as between these States, other 
States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has 
not acquired the authority of a general rule of international law. In any 
event, the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against 
Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to 
the Norwegian coast. 
 
Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18) (emphasis supplied). In 
that case, (i) the disparate adoption of the rule by the community of countries and (ii) 
Norway’s longstanding objection to imposition or adoption of the rule with respect to its 
coastline negated application and, more importantly, mitigated against a finding that the 
ten-mile rule had met the customary international law threshold.  
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 Opinio juris is perhaps the most elusive tenet of the customary practice elements 
because it is essentially subjective. Its cornerstone proposition, that a particular practice 
shall not attain customary international law status unless the country engaging in the 
practice believes that it is legally bound to adhere to the practice at issue. Shaw succinctly 
States it as “States will behave a certain way because they are convinced it is binding 
upon them to do so.” SHAW, supra note 365, at 74. The manner in which a State views 
and understands its own conduct presents virtually insurmountable challenges. How is a 
State’s conduct to be examined in order to determine whether the State deems a recurring 
practice legally obligatory and in this way transforms a usage into a binding custom? In 
the Case of the S.S. Lotus, the ICJ’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, rejected France’s contention that customary international law recognizes a rule 
providing that in a maritime accident occurring in international waters the country of the 
flag State of the accused has exclusive jurisdiction over the national State of the victim. 
The French government premised abstention from criminal prosecutions arising from 
collision cases of this sort, that more frequently are brought before civil courts. The 
French went on to conclude that the paucity of such cases gives rise to an inference of 
State practice pursuant to which prosecutions only take place within the courts of the 
State whose flag is flown. It was on this factual predicate that France also relied on to 
demonstrate tacit consent among the international community of States. Case of the S.S. 
Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). The Court noted that: 
  
[T]his conclusion is not warranted. Even if the rarity of the judicial 
decisions to be found among the reported cases were sufficient to prove 
in point of fact the circumstance alleged by the Agent for the French 
Government , it would merely show that States had often, in practice, 
abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they 
recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such 
abstention were based under being conscious of having a duty to 
abstain would be possible to speak of an international custom. The 
alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious 
of having such a duty; on the other hand, as will presently be seen, 
there are other circumstances calculated to show that the contrary is 
true.  
 
Id. at 28 (emphasis supplied).  
   
 In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the Netherlands sought to impose on 
West Germany the “equi-distance-special circumstances principle” in conformance with 
Art. 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, as part of the general 
process of delimiting the Continental Shelf of the North Sea in furtherance of oil and gas 
exploration and exploitation. Because West Germany had neither signed nor ratified the 
1958 Geneva Convention, it was not found by that instrument. Accordingly, the extent 
to which the delimiting principle in Article 6 of the Geneva convention constituted 
customary international law became the case dispositive issue. The ICJ ruled in favor of 
West Germany and rejected arguments that the principle formed part of customary 
international law, either before or after the execution of the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. The Court’s reasoning as to opinio juris and the requisite time frame 
for normative rule making is instructive: 
 
Insofar as this contention is based on the view that Art. 6 of the 
Convention has had the influence, and has produced the effect, 
described [normative standing of the principle as part of customary 
international law], it clearly involves treating that Article as a norm-
creating provision which has constituted the foundation of, or has 
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very elements that serve as a standard for determining whether a rule, 
principle or doctrine rises to the level of a custom and in turn evinces a 
“general State practice” thus acquires the requisite normative standing to 
constitute binding customary international law is a concern that affects the 
status of the public purpose doctrine within a customary international law 
framework. In this regard, debilities pertaining to process legitimacy 
cannot be segregated from effects on the substantive rule at issue (here the 
public purpose doctrine). 
B. Foundational Concerns Endemic to Customary International 
Law Challenging the Development of a Public Purpose 
Doctrine  
In any effort to sketch a profile of public purpose as a doctrine 
forming part of customary international law, it is necessary to identify 
features of customary international law that may contribute to obscuring 
the actual content, application, and development of the public purpose 
doctrine. It is central to any inquiry seeking to address public purpose 
within the context of customary international law to emphasize these 
unique elements of uncertainty that pervade customary international law in 
order to select a source for the conduct of nations that may best articulate 
                                                                                                                         
generated a rule which, while only conventional or contractual in its 
origin, has since passed into the general corpus of international law, 
and is now accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as to have become 
binding even for countries which have never and do not become parties 
to the Convention. There is no doubt that this process is a perfectly 
possible one and does from time to time occur: It constitutes indeed, 
one of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary 
international law may be formed. At the same time this result is not 
likely to be regarded as having been attained.... 
 
As regards the time element, the Court notes that it is over ten years 
since the Convention was sign, but that it is even now less than five 
since it came into force in June of 1964, and that when the present 
proceedings were brought it was less than three years, while less than 
one had elapsed at the time when the respective negotiations between 
the Federal Republic [the former West Germany] and the other two 
Parties for a complete delimitation broke down on the question of the 
application of equidistance principle. Although the passage of only a 
short period of time is that necessarily or of itself, a bar to the 
formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of 
what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indisputable 
requirement will be that within the period in question, short though it 
may be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are 
specifically affected, should have been both extensive and virtually 
uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; — and should moreover 
have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a 
rule of law or legal obligation is involved. 
 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 41, 44 (Feb. 20) (emphasis supplied). 
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the scope and content of the public purpose doctrine. Such an element of 
proof can be evaluated despite the structural ambiguities of this normative 
system. In commenting on the contrast between international law 
generally and the domestic law of States, Shaw rightfully observes: 
The contrast is very striking when one considers the 
situation in international law. The lack of a legislature, 
executive and structure of courts within international law 
has been noted and the effects of this will become clearer 
as one proceeds. There is no single body able to create laws 
internationally binding upon everyone, nor a proper system 
of courts with comprehensive and compulsory jurisdiction 
to interpret and extend the law.One is therefore faced with 
the problem of discovering where the law is to be found 
and how one can tell whether a particular proposition 
amounts to a legal rule. This perplexity is reinforced 
because of the archaic nature of world affairs in the clash of 
competing sovereignties. Nevertheless, international law 
does exist and is ascertainable. There are ‘sources’ 
available from which the rules may be extracted and 
analysed.365 
This lack of institutional centralization and policy-making is amplified and 
ever apparent in the context of customary international law. 
As a point of departure, whether a generally accepted State 
practice is discernible at all constitutes a legitimate question that cannot be 
readily and fully satisfied. What is the governing phenomenology? A State 
practice uniformly repeated by a sovereign over time may be causally 
connected to specific non-permanent circumstances. Similarly, is a 
practice arising from the exercise of comity, by way of example, 
suggestive of a legal rule? It is unclear how and under what circumstances 
what ostensibly appears to be a general State practice actually becomes a 
legal principle, rule, or tenet. Inference from phenomenon alone cannot be 
deemed to be wholly conclusive.366  
                                                 
365 SHAW, supra note 365, at 70. 
 
366 See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
449, 453 (2000) (“Customary law may be discerned through the inductive method. 
Norms may be inferred from repeated and consistent acts that are believed to be required 
by a community, but customary law is not State practice. It is the community-wide belief 
that a norm is legally required that provides customary law with authority and legitimacy. 
The asserted CIL norms of the literature, however, are declared without either general, 
consistent practice or clear evidence that the vast majority of States have accepted the 
norm as a legal obligation. In short, CIL norms are not customary.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 685-86 (1998) (“The 
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The discernibility of State action or conduct rising to the level of 
customary international law is further obscured because of the very nature 
of a State. The surface and unavailing analogy between a State and a 
biological self-sustained organism is not helpful. A sovereignty comprises 
thousands of binding agencies, instrumentalities, governmental 
departments, and officials through which State’s act. Moreover, political 
regimes and their policy agendas are but a passing phenomenon. The 
inevitable question is raised. Which acts or omissions and by whom within 
a State unquestionably reflect the imprimatur  of the State? Can this 
inquiry be meaningfully addressed despite the less than uniform 
configurations of State governments administering the interests of 
disparate cultures and stages of industrial and economic development? 
These concerns directly affect the public purpose doctrine. 
In the context of competing interests, contradictory acts by 
different government instrumentalities, agencies, departments, and 
officials, at what point does a discernible act of omission give rise to the 
emergence of a new norm of customary international law? The corollary 
to this query is equally intriguing. What is the talisman for determining 
that an existing tenet of customary international law has been modified or 
altogether disallowed?367 Customary international law often is praised 
because of its flexibility and dynamic architecture. Yet, at what point is a 
precept in its original configuration no longer binding?368 
In the creation of new customary international law, how may the 
workings of opinio juris be reconciled?369 Opinio juris requires a State 
                                                                                                                         
States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. 
Therefore, in the words of another scholar, ‘the repetition of common clauses in bilateral 
treaties does not create or support an inference that those clauses express customary law. . 
. . To sustain such a claim of custom one would have to show that apart from the treaty 
itself, the rules in the clauses are considered obligatory.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
 
367 See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 784 (2001) (“The formation 
and modification of custom is an uncertain process because international law lacks an 
authoritative guide as to the amount, duration, frequency, and repetition of State practice 
required to develop or change a custom.”). 
 
368 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1999) (“CIL remains a puzzle. It lacks a centralized lawmaker, 
a centralized executive enforcer, and a centralized, authoritative decisionmaker. The 
content of CIL seems to track the interests of powerful nations. The origins of CIL rules 
are not understood. We do not know why nations comply with CIL, or even what it 
means for a nation to comply with CIL. And we lack an explanation for the many 
changes in CIL rules over time.”). 
 
369 “[F]or a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned ‘amount 
to a settled practice’, but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis.” 
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practice that conforms with established law. How then may a new 
customary international law principle develop if by definition it could not 
have formed part of a pre-existing legal canon, i.e., a practice that was not 
previously regarded as constituting evidence of law?370  
While international law generally suffers from lack of centralized 
authority at norm creation, application, and enforcement, this feature is 
minimized in the context of conventional international law and arguably 
maximized as to customary international law. Conventional international 
law makes up in structure what it lacks in radius coverage. Even within a 
rubric of a multinational agreement, conventional international law is 
limited to signatory nations only. Treaties such as the NAFTA and the 
DR-CAFTA,371 to draw on two widely consulted examples, will contain 
dispute resolution provisions and well-defined frameworks purporting to 
memorialize the underlying policy and intent of the signatory parties with 
respect to technical execution. At least in theory, the decisional law arising 
from the international dispute mechanisms of treaty law further help refine 
interpretation of terms in conformance with the intent of the signatory 
parties. No such frameworks are available to customary international law. 
It lacks treaty negotiating history, structured terms, and dispute-
enforcement mechanisms, all within the context of not enjoying the 
benefits of a decisional law that purports to have persuasive authority 
when refining the intent of the signatory parties.372 
Some of the most fundamental questions pertaining to customary 
international law remain as opaque as when first raised by classical 
                                                                                                                         
Military & Paramilitary Activities  in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 108-09 (June 27). 
 
370 SHAW, supra note 365, at 87-88. 
 
371 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 
2004, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter DR-CAFTA]. 
 
372 John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State 
Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 433, 472-73 (1997) (“Customary 
international law is not the instrument to which States now look in the development of 
purely consensual obligations, whatever the reality may have been at the time of the 
development of the sovereignty/consent thesis. A complex web of explicit contractual 
arrangements has developed a framework and rules for international trade, investment 
and finance. The occasion to invoke customary international law arises precisely where 
consensual arrangements are lacking or fall short and precisely because perceived unmet 
needs of the international community call for invoking a concept of binding law. This is 
evident in the familiar dynamic by which resort is made to ‘soft law’ declarations in an 
opinio juris building process looking to the development of binding customary 
international law.”).  
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scholarship.373 The very origins of customary international law remain 
unclear.374 Equally bewildering is the basic question of why nations 
comply with customary international law or what State acts count as 
evidence of customary international law? Is there such a thing as a 
recurring State practice generally accepted by nations that does not rise to 
the level of customary international law?375 
These structural features represent uncertainties that themselves in 
turn create ambiguities in the theoretical and practical assessment of the 
normative standing of customary international law. Commentators appear 
to fall into three relatively distinct schools of thought as to foundational 
normative standing. A considerable number of scholars opine that 
customary international law’s procedural shortcomings inhibit its ability to 
respond and adjust to rapid changes, for example, in the international law 
of human rights, trade, and investment.376 A second representative class 
                                                 
373 “For Grotius, international law had two sources: (1) the law of nature and (2) mutual 
consent--or, in his terms, ‘the law of nations.’ These two sources, however, were deeply 
and inextricably intertwined. An observed custom could be evidence of either a principle 
derived from the law of nature or of mutual consent. Rules of international law could be 
derived from natural reason, but customary international law was also evidence of what 
natural reason required. Grotius’s framework married custom and reason, imbuing the 
practice and opinio juris of States with great power and legitimacy.” Harlan Grant Cohen, 
Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 80 
(2007) (internal footnotes omitted).. 
 
374 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1999) (noting that the “origins of CIL rules are not 
understood”). 
 
375 Id. (“CIL’s standard definition raises perennial, and unanswered, questions. It is 
unclear which State acts count as evidence of a custom, or how broad or consistent State 
practice must be to satisfy the custom requirement. It is also unclear what it means for a 
nation to follow a custom from a sense of legal obligation, or how one determines 
whether such an obligation exists.”). 
 
376 For example, “[a]s recently as 1970, the International Court of Justice in the 
Barcelona Traction case found it ‘surprising’ that the evolution of international 
investment law had not gone further and that no generally accepted rules had yet 
crystallized in light of the growth of foreign investments and the expansion of 
international activities by corporations in the previous half-century.” Jeswald W. 
Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITS Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 68 (2005) (citing 
Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 46-47 (Feb. 
5)).  
 
One primary reason for this deficiency was that “applicable international law failed to 
take account of contemporary investment practices and address important issues of 
concern to foreign investors.” Id. (footnote omitted). Another issue was that “the 
principles that did exist were often vague and subject to varying interpretations. Thus, 
although there was strong evidence that customary international law required the 
payment of compensation upon nationalization of an investor’s property, no principles 
had crystallized on how that compensation was to be calculated.” Id. at 68-69 (footnote 
 EAST\64724221. 3139 
holds a diametrically opposite view. These commentators emphasize the 
decentralized configuration of customary international law as a flexible 
and universally accommodating phenomenon capable of generating quick 
and efficient principles in response to changing circumstances.377 Yet, the 
“democratic character” of customary international law is viewed by a 
considerable number of voices as having an impromptu and much-desired 
character pursuant to which custom is generated in ways that reflect 
legitimate social interests. Despite enshrining custom as a welcomed tenet, 
it is recognized that custom’s ability to provide uniformity and serve as a 
principle of integration of disparate and often competing social, political, 
                                                                                                                         
omitted). See also Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty 
Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151, 157-58 (2012) (“Since customary 
international law was inadequate to provide meaningful protection to foreign investors, 
the United States and other capital-exporting countries concluded BITs with 
underdeveloped countries in order to create binding international commitments where 
customary international law standards were inconclusive or non-existent.”) (footnotes 
omitted); Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for A Legal Assistance 
Center for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 
237, 242 (2007) (“Given the shortcomings of the customary international law, the United 
States and other capital-exporting nations turned to signing investment treaties to provide 
a source of clear and certain rules on foreign investment.”); John K. Setear, Treaties, 
Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 715, 721 (2005) (“Customary 
international law thus suffers from a lack of temporally distinct iterations and from 
ambiguous mechanisms for indicating formal consent....Because practice figures so 
prominently in defining customary rules, any change in such rules can only be effectuated 
after a period during which neither the old nor the new rule clearly governs. While a new 
rule articulated in a treaty takes full effect when the treaty enters into force, a new 
customary international legal rule has no discrete activation date.”); J. Steven Jarreau, 
Anatomy of A Bit: The United States - Honduras Bilateral Investment Treaty, 35 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 429 (2004) (“Foreign direct investment influences the world 
economy by promoting the transfer of capital, technology and managerial skills, 
improving economic efficiency through greater competition and enhancing market 
access. The United States and Honduras, appreciating the benefits of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) while mindful of the shortcomings of customary international law and 
the absence of a multilateral accord on FDI, entered into negotiations to promote and 
protect foreign investment in their respective countries.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 
377 John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1221-1222 (2007) (“Under certain conditions, customary law is 
likely to produce norms that increase efficiency. Customary norms under this theory 
evolve to create surpluses as interacting individuals or entities choose those norms that 
will provide them with the greatest possible increases in wealth. Accordingly, some have 
argued by analogy that customary international law is efficient.”); Anthony D’Amato, 
Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 385, 402 (1985) (“The rules of international law covering these subjects were 
not imposed on States from on high, but rather grew out of their interactions over 
centuries of practice and became established as customary international law. Thus the 
rules, almost by definition, are the most efficient possible rules for avoiding international 
friction and for accommodating the collective self-interest of all States.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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economic, and cultural forces now experiencing unprecedented 
transformations, is limited and restrictive.378  
Galvanized by custom as its organizing principle, the configuration 
of customary international law can be seen as a daunting mosaic in 
progress. So long as a State’s act, omission, publication, official 
Statement, legislative decree, domestic political institutions, or 
international projection of whatsoever ilk contains even a modicum of 
probative value from which “customary State practice” may be gleaned, 
such evidence may serve as a normative foundation for a principle of 
customary international law. We have selected to limit our analysis of the 
status of public purpose in customary international law to considering the 
role of public purpose (in all of its iterations) by (i) analyzing the status 
and meaning ascribed to public purpose international instruments; (ii) the 
status of the doctrine in BITs;379 and (iii) domestic legislation concerning 
the protection of foreign investments/investors.380 These three categories 
have been selected because of the probative value that they have in 
tending381 to demonstrate State practice with respect to the public purpose 
doctrine. The objective entails understanding the scope, content, and 
standard of the doctrine in customary international law. In doing so, it is 
legitimate to ask whether the public purpose doctrine articulated by 
customary international law differs from its conventional international law 
counterpart? How does customary international law’s unique features 
affect the actual status of the public purpose doctrine, its content, and 
application? Does customary international law enrich the public purpose 
doctrine and help it bring into being the harmonizing investor/investment 
protection and regulatory sovereignty? Is it clear that the scope, content, 
and application of a public purpose doctrine as articulated in customary 
international law contribute to a fair interaction between capital-exporting 
and capital-importing countries in an environment of economic 
globalization? Finally, is customary international law a vehicle for a 
public purpose doctrine that focuses more on shared responsibility than a 
winner-take-all dispute resolution approach?  
                                                 
378 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 379, at 1222 (“The first shortcoming of this argument 
lies again in the democracy deficit. Even if customs generated among States prove to be 
efficient, it only follows that they are efficient for State leaders, not for their subjects. 
Authoritarian and totalitarian States do not represent the preferences of their people. 
Thus, interactions among these States do not necessarily lead to rules that are efficient 
from the standpoint of the population as a whole.”). 
 
379 See infra Chapter 4. 
 
380 See infra Chapter 6. 
 
381 We do not find that the applicable presumption should be one of prima facie 
conclusiveness as to enjoying customary international law status simply by meeting any 
of these criteria. 
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C. Discovering and Reviving the Public Purpose Doctrine in 
International Instruments 
International instruments impose limitations on the exercise of 
sovereignty. Treaties are structured negotiated sovereignty concessions 
exchanged for perceived greater benefits arising from bilateral or 
multilateral agreements.382 This traditional view of the relationship 
between international instruments and the plenary exercise of sovereignty 
is universally accepted. It is necessary, however, to observe that it is 
premised on a very orthodox Westphalian understanding of sovereignty 
pursuant to which a sovereign may exercise its unbridled discretion, 
limited only by the physical boundaries of national territory, while 
sovereignty itself is understood as deeply related to territorial normative 
authority.383 While it is manifestly clear and somewhat obvious that 
international rules give rise to restrictions on the exercise of domestic 
regulatory autonomy or sovereignty, these very instruments (mostly 
treaties) also serve to vest States with “specific” or “particular” regulatory 
fiat that transforms a regulatory taking into an illegal fine imposed on a 
State merely for executing its obligations in furtherance of the greater 
public interest. It is in this context that the public purpose doctrine plays a 
dispositive role. 
The extent to which existing international instruments 
appropriately restrict the domestic regulatory space of States while also 
allowing sovereigns to apply domestic regulations in ostensible derogation 
of international instruments purportedly in the name of the common good 
is governed by the public purpose doctrine. As shall be demonstrated, the 
rubric of exceptions and reservations to international instruments 
represents techniques that have been applied in efforts to strike this 
balance not only between a State’s right to exercise its regulatory authority 
in the national/domestic realm and the expectations of foreign 
investors/investment, but also between national industries and the scope of 
domestic regulatory authority, including exceptions relating to the right to 
provide subsidies and to extend exceptions to taxation. While the GATT, 
the NAFTA, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT 
Agreement) certainly serve as valuable models illustrating resourceful 
approaches to these problems, as already suggested,384 they are far from 
                                                 
382 While “the conclusion of any Treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain 
from performing a particular act” is not a complete abandonment of sovereignty, “any 
convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the 
sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain 
way.” S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Japan), ¶ 35, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (Aug. 17). 
 
383 See supra note 51 & accompanying text. 
 
384 See supra Chapter 1.  
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conclusive with respect to the development of a public purpose standard 
that contributes to uniformity because of its subjective substantive content.  
The appearance of the public purpose doctrine in customary 
international law is accorded many names and asked to serve as a guiding 
principle in numerous contexts and disciplines, ranging from human 
rights,385 permanent sovereignty over natural resources,386 economic 
development,387 harmonizing investment and commercial law,388 to 
defining the domestic confines of a State’s regulatory authority.389 The 
public purpose doctrine’s formal nomenclature and contextual references 
argue in favor of the development of a substantive principle governed by 
objective content or an altogether reevaluation of the doctrine that 
meaningfully diminishes its role as a controlling principle.The latter 
option is replete with challenges and troubling consequences. 
                                                 
385 E.g., Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T. S. No. 009 (“Every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law 
and by the general principles of international law.”) (emphasis supplied) [hereinafter 
Euro. Conv. Protocol 1]. The entire Convention, as amended by Protocol 14, is available 
at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457 
5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf (last visited March 20, 2012). 
 
386 E.g., Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 
17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). (“Nationalization, 
expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, 
security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or 
private interests, both domestic and foreign.”) (emphasis supplied) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 
1803]. 
 
387 E.g., ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, art. 14, Feb. 26, 2009, available 
at 
http://aseansummit.mfa.go.th/14/pdf/Outcome_Document/ASEAN%20Compre%20Inves
t%20Agreement.pdf [hereinafter ACIA]. 
 
388 E.g., GATT, supra note 19, art. XX ¶ (a) (“Subject to the requirement that such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures...necessary 
to protect public morals.”). 
 
389 E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (“The disposition of this 
case therefore turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public 
purpose.’ Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our 
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.”). 
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D. The Many Names of the Public Purpose Doctrine: Exploring 
Uniformity and Multifarious Nomenclature. 
The initial challenge to discerning the actual existence of the 
public purpose doctrine within customary international law, let alone its 
content and scope, concerns fundamental nomenclature. “Public purpose,” 
defined as a doctrine, does not find any space in international instruments. 
Despite this absence of any definition, the customary international law 
expression of the public purpose doctrine appears under many names. 
Some of the most notable and recurring names for the doctrine as found in 
international instruments are: (i) public purpose,390 (ii) public interest,391 
(iii) public order,392 (iv) public utility,393 (v) public morals,394 (vi) 
                                                 
390 The literal “public purpose” term mostly appears in the context of an exception to a 
direct or indirect expropriation or nationalization, or of actions tantamount to an 
expropriation. See, e.g. U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 121st plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/62/PV.121 (Sept. 11, 2008); ACIA, supra note 389, art. 14 and annex 2; Future 
Government of Palestine, G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947). 
 
391 The “public interest” nomenclature is the most recurring iteration of the public 
purpose doctrine in 
customary international law. See, e.g., Euro. Conv. Protocol 1, supra note 387, art. 1; 
Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: 
Draft Consolidated Text ¶¶ 56, 81, 143, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998),  
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf. [hereinafter Draft MAI]; GATT, 
supra note 19, art. X; General Agreement on Trade in Services arts. 3, 14, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 
1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights arts. 8, 63(d), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]; 
Agreement on Government Procurement arts. 18-20, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf  (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) 
[hereinafter AGP]; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001 ¶ 22, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; 
United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, Nov. 6-8, 2002, Geneva, Switz., 
The Development Dimension of Foreign Direct Investment: Policies to Enhance the Role 
of FDI, in the National and International Context — Policy Issues to Consider (Note by 
UNCTAD Secretariat) 1, 3, U.N. Doc. TD/B/COM.2/EM.12/2 (Sept. 23, 2002) 
[hereinafter “UNCTAD FDI Policy Note”]. 
 
392 See, e.g., Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already 
included in the Convention and in the first Protocol thereto art. 2(3), Sept. 16, 1963, 
Europ. T.S. No. 046 [hereinafter Euro. Conv. Protocol 4]; Protocol No. 7 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1(2), 
Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117 [hereinafter Euro. Conv. Protocol 7]; Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 36, 48, 56, 135, 25 March 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter EEC]; ACIA, supra note 389, art. 17; American Convention, 
supra note 13; AGP, supra note 393, art. 23; GATS, supra note 393, art. 27; Report of 
the Economic & Social Council, Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the 
United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms: Respect for the right of everyone to own property alone as well 
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common interest,395 (vii) general or public welfare,396 (viii) public need,397 
(ix) security or police powers,398 and (x) permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.399 This list is not exhaustive of terms that are used in 
lieu or otherwise equivalent to the public purpose doctrine.400 For 
purposes, however, of identifying and determining the scope, content, and 
                                                                                                                         
as in association with others and its contribution to the economic and social development 
of Member States, Oct. 27, 1988, U.N. Doc. A/43/739; GAOR, 43rd Sess. (1988) 
[hereinafter 43rd Sess. Report]. 
 
393 See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 13, art. 21; G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 
388.  
 
394 See, e.g., GATT, supra note 19, art. XX; TRIPs, supra note 393, art. XVII. 
 
395 See, e.g., Charter of Economic Rights & Duties of States preamble, G.A. Res. 3281, 
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/29/3281 (1974) [hereinafter Charter of 
Economic Rights & Duties of States]. 
 
396 See, e.g., ACIA, supra note 389, annex II; 43rd Sess. Report, supra note 394. 
 
397 See, e.g., African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights art. 14, June 27, 
1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), (and entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African 
Charter]. Additionally, although domestic, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen, decreed in 1789 and accepted by the King in 1789, merits citation as 
especially influential in this realm of public international law. 
 
398 See, e.g., Euro. Conv. Protocol 7, supra note 394, art. 1(2); ACIA, supra note 389, art. 
17 n.12, GATT, supra note 19, art. XXI; GATS, supra note 393, art. XIV; TRIPs, supra 
note 393, art. 73; UNCTAD FDI Policy Note, supra note 393, at ¶ 45. 
 
399 The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources constitutes the most 
eloquent example of the public purpose doctrine amplifying the State’s regulatory space 
at the expense of foreign investment. As will be explained in a section allocated to the 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources expression of the public purpose 
doctrine, this doctrinal expression of public purpose bolsters the need to reform the 
public purpose doctrine so that it may shed its historical legacy-driven elements in 
favor of a more balanced and inclusive framework that embraces the geopolitical 
consequences of economic globalization. It shall be asserted that the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources is but an application of the public 
purpose doctrine in institutional form and found to a specific subject matter category 
that was historically driven because of the process of decolonization. See infra Chapter 
5. 
 
For international instruments comprising customary international law evincing the 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources iteration of the public purpose doctrine, 
see, e.g., G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 388; Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. 
A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 3171]; Charter of Economic Rights & Duties of 
States preamble, supra note 397. 
  
400 “Community interest,” “social interest or welfare,” and “common good,” among 
others, also tend to appear. 
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standard of the public purpose doctrine as enunciated in customary 
international law, the nomenclature represented by the ten terms identified 
is sufficient. Moreover, the use of two or more of these terms in a single 
document is common.401 Even where, however, multiple terms for the 
public purpose doctrine are used within a single international instrument, 
functional consistency is preserved, notwithstanding that greater rigor 
arising from uniformity is desired and proves to be ultimately necessary, 
as shall be more explicitly discussed. 
The want of uniformity of nomenclature is a shortcoming endemic 
to the unique structural features of customary international law. It is also 
indicative of the taking for granted of the public purpose doctrine by 
ascribing to it the doctrinal status of a self-evident principle that rightly is 
left in the hands of the invoking State for scope and content. The lack of 
uniformity is also witness to the doctrine’s fragmented content. Thus the 
doctrine, in its different iterations, appears without being defined. It is 
applied without being analyzed. The appearance of a doctrine with 
different nomenclature within a single international instrument casts 
material uncertainty as to the doctrine’s content and tends to bind the 
doctrine’s scope to the specific subject matter contextualizing the term. 
This phenomenon regrettably leads to a fragmentation of the doctrine that 
is in turn accompanied by inevitable inconsistent constructions in its 
application.  
A fragmented use of the doctrine within a single international 
instrument arising from varying nomenclature leads to normative 
problems attaching to the doctrine as pronounced in customary 
international law. In the context of these structural challenges, it is 
legitimate to inquire whether the iterations under different nomenclature 
of the public purpose doctrine are indeed references to a public purpose 
doctrine or different conceptual exceptions having a “public” common 
denominator but certainly not constituting a single public purpose 
doctrinal rubric? Are the various “public based” exceptions found in 
international instruments independent grounds for expanding the 
regulatory sphere of States, or part of a single overarching principle? The 
answers to these queries appear to be in the affirmative. 
A descriptive, content/normative and practical analysis suggests 
that the somewhat distinct and fragmented terms rooted in conceptual and 
etymological formulations of what is public is suggestive of a single 
precept viewed through the shattered prism of customary international 
                                                 
401 See, e.g., Euro. Conv. Protocol 4, supra note 394, art. 2(3) (referencing “public 
order”); Euro. Conv. Protocol 7, supra note 394, art. 1(2) (referencing “public order” and 
“national security”) American Convention, supra note 13, art. 21 (referencing “public 
utility”) and art. 22 (“public order”); ACIA, supra note 389, art. 14 (referencing “public 
purpose”). 
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law’s fractured and decentralized structure. The critical reading of texts 
helps. 
E. Evidence of Scope and Substance of the Public Purpose 
Doctrine in Select International Instruments 
1. Identification, Scope, and Content of the Public Purpose 
Doctrine Within International Instruments Concerning 
Transnational Trade and Investment: A Doctrine that 
Expands Sovereignty Within Instruments that Limit 
State Authority. 
The various iterations of the public purpose doctrine within 
customary international law share a very important common denominator. 
This common element bolsters support for the proposition that the various 
permutations of the public purpose doctrine all concern a simple principle, 
as here discussed. Despite forming part of instruments that by their very 
nature place constraints on signatory States as to regulatory sovereignty, 
the multiple manifestations of the public purpose doctrine have a 
diametrically contrary effect. Embedded in instruments that limit a State’s 
domestic regulatory space, the public purpose doctrine in all of its 
manifestations has both the theoretical and practical consequence of 
indiscriminately broadening the regulatory authority of States. This salient 
feature argues compellingly in favor of the proposition that what has been 
identified as multiple iterations of a single doctrine are in fact so. 
Descriptive and contextual analyses only serve to further this construction.  
2. Public Purpose in UNCTAD and WTO Instruments 
The tension between capital-exporting and capital-importing 
countries has contributed to the content and scope of the public purpose 
doctrine. Contextualizing this tension between developing and developed 
countries within the framework of efforts undertaken to fashion 
multilateral agreement on the international law of foreign investment, 
Sornarajah observes that 
Several attempts have been made at bringing about a 
comprehensive code on foreign investment [citing to the 
Havana Charter of 1948 As The First Attempt At Crafting 
Uniform Foreign Investment Provisions That Also Entailed 
An International Trade Organization], but they have 
resulted in failure simply because of the ideological rifts 
and clashes of interests that attend this branch of 
international law. Most drafts have been made with the 
objective of providing as much protection as is possible for 
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an investment. These have been rejected by capital-
importing States.402  
From a historical perspective, capital-importing countries have opposed 
prospective trade and investment agreements that seek to protect foreign 
investment, typically outbound from industrialized capital-exporting 
States, without at all subordinating the protection accorded to such 
investment/investors to concerns pertaining to human and animal health 
and life, national necessities, environmental concerns, and the financial 
institutional soundness of Host States.403 While capital-exporting countries 
steadfastly have maintained that the scope and substance of investment 
protection rules must be segregated from the traditionally domestic 
regulatory sphere of Host States, capital-importing countries view this 
aspiration as an unworkable proposition unduly detached from pragmatic 
realities.404 
The processes of decolonization and economic globalization, 
together with the inclusion of human rights and environmental activists 
into the discussion, have contributed to sharpening the debate concerning 
the extent to which investment treaties must be exclusively confined to 
investment protection. Despite the seductive appeal of this ongoing 
colloquy, this writing does not seek to resolve the contention or articulate 
arguments in support of a proponent to the detriment of another. Instead, it 
focuses on the extent to which the public purpose doctrine, either by 
                                                 
402 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (Cambridge 
University Press, 3rd ed. 2010). 
 
403 The once pristine dichotomy between capital-exporting and capital-importing States 
itself is undergoing an historic transformation. A notable trend has emerged and 
continues to develop. Consonant with this new phenomenon, a third category of States 
has arisen that are neither strictly capital-exporting or capital-importing. Developed but 
not optimally industrialized nations such as Colombia, Brazil, India, Chile, South Korea, 
and to some extent even China, herald a new category of sovereignties. Economic 
development compels a reassessment of the relationship between these and other 
comparable States to international commercial law generally and particularly 
international investment law seeking to regulate contentions between foreign investment 
protection and a Host State’s exercise of its regulatory authority. With the exception of 
Brazil, these States’ evolving views on a relationship between the scope of domestic 
regulatory authority and protection to be accorded to foreign investment is to some 
extent contained in the more reasoned bilateral investment treaties that they most 
recently have executed as signatories. 
 
404 “Traditionally, the vested interests of States concluding BITs fell into two categories: 
those on the side of capital-exporting States, with an interest in adopting strong 
protections for foreign investors; and those on the side of capital-importing States, with 
an interest not only in attracting foreign investment but also in attempting to preserve 
host country sovereignty and authority to promote the public interest.” Karen Halverson 
Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 151, 154 (2012). 
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happenstance or design, has been called upon to mitigate this friction, if 
not to altogether eviscerate it. Therefore, international instruments 
concerning economic development, international investment law, and 
international trade law have served as battlegrounds where industrialized 
States and underdeveloped States have debated the appropriate balance 
between investment protection and compliance with a State’s obligation to 
exercise its regulatory authority. The malleable and evasive nature of the 
public purpose doctrine, which for the most part has been held to a 
subjective standard that virtually defies evidentiary challenge, has been 
sequestered by proponents of all sides. The net effect has favored those 
States that have benefited from the expansion of the domestic regulatory 
space. This asymmetry poses numerous risks to any investor protection. 
3. Public Purpose and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) on September 23, 2002, published the Commission on 
Investment, Technology and Related Financial Issues Note arising from its 
Sixth Session held earlier that year (Jan. 21-25). The topic of that session 
and, therefore, of the Note, was framed as “An ‘Expert Meeting’ on the 
Development Dimension of FDI: Policies to Enhance the Role of FDI in 
Support of the Competitiveness of the Enterprise Sector and the Economic 
Performance of Host Countries, Taking into Account the 
Trade/Investment Interface, in the National and International Context.”405 
The Commission sought to explore how best international investment 
agreements may help capital-importing countries (underdeveloped States 
and economies in transition) maximize their ability to attract FDI 
investments, as well as attain a thorough understanding of the limitations 
on domestic regulatory authority that international investment agreements 
impose on Host States. It is worth observing that the Committee 
understood its objective as helping underdeveloped countries. 
Consequently, it is to be expected that their efforts sought to preserve, if 
not altogether enhance, the regulatory space of underdeveloped countries 
despite constraints that international investment agreements likely impose. 
In this connection, the terms of reference of the “Expert Meeting” is 
helpful: 
How can host country policies encourage synergy between FDI and 
domestic enterprises, to support the competitiveness of the latter, in the 
national and international context? 
What measures can home countries take to contribute to such outcome? 
                                                 
405 UNCTAD FDI Policy Note, supra note 393, at 3. 
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How can the interests of home and host countries be balanced, taking into 
account the development policies and objectives of host Governments as 
well their right to regulate in the public interest? 
How can safeguards be introduced to ensure that domestic enterprises are 
not adversely affected?406 
Moreover, as part of an effort directed at assisting capital-
importing countries and transition economies, the Commission also 
emphasized the difficulties that underdeveloped countries face in 
transitioning from “more interventionist policy approaches (at the point of 
FDI entry) to the regulation of markets [which] is difficult because of a 
lack of financial and human resources.”407 
The context and perspective of the Commission as represented in 
the UNCTAD Secretariat’s Note. is important to ascertain if indeed the 
public purpose doctrine is to be descriptively and contextually analyzed. 
The Committee’s finding is indispensable to this task: 
In conclusion, while international rules obviously imply a 
measure of restriction on domestic regulatory autonomy, 
several techniques have been used to strike the right 
balance. The GATT, the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (the TBT Agreement) and the GATS all use 
different approaches and may provide useful reference 
models for any future rule-making in the area of 
investment. With regard to both regional and bilateral 
                                                 
406 Id. at 4 ¶ 8. 
 
407 Id. at 9 ¶ 21. Because of the challenges that this issue presents, the Committee 
encouraged consideration 
of the following questions: 
 
(a) What host country government policies are particularly important 
for enhancing the ability of developing countries and economies in 
transition to attract and benefit from FDI in line with their 
development objectives? 
(b) How do international agreements at the bilateral, regional and 
multilateral levels effect the ability of countries to use these 
policies?  
(c) To what extent have various performance requirements help 
countries meet their development objectives?  
(d) What “yellow light” [a category of host country operational 
measures—HCOMs—explicitly prohibited but not by multilateral 
agreements] have been particularly useful in this regard? 
(e) How would developing countries benefit from making the use of 
such requirements more (or less) restrictive?  
 
Id. at 6 ¶ 22.  
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(international investment agreements), it is necessary to 
examine to what extent the right to regulate goes beyond 
‘regulatory takings’ and similar issues of investment 
protection to encompass the way other areas covered in the 
[international investment agreements] can be reconciled 
with the necessary preservation of policy space for 
development.408 
Preservation of the domestic regulatory space of Host States is 
treated as a predicate to maximizing the effects that FDI can have on 
underdeveloped States. It is within the context of this policy position that 
the Secretariat’s Note references the public purpose doctrine. It is of 
considerable importance to emphasize that the Note by the UNCTAD 
Secretariat does not purport to constitute a legal analysis, opinion or 
position paper. Understandably, it does not engage in a sustained 
dissertation on the content, scope, or application of the public purpose 
doctrine. Instead, it merely references the term within the context of a 
policy perspective endeavoring to fashion techniques that will enhance the 
domestic regulatory authority of underdeveloped States with respect to 
foreign investments, notwithstanding the limitations imposed by bilateral 
investment treaties that are negotiated only by two nations, at an ad hoc 
basis, and that cannot be said to reflect a coherent approach arising from a 
broader community of nations. 
The Secretariat’s Note references the public purpose doctrine on 
six occasions.409 All six references suggest that (i) “the right to regulate” is 
a central concern and (ii) public purpose is viewed as an exception that 
does not merit justification or explanation. 
The Secretariat’s Note’s first mention of the public purpose 
doctrine references the Doha Ministerial Declaration.410 The 
pronouncement is indicative of reliance on a doctrine to serve as an 
exception without a need to proffer any explanation. Again, the doctrine is 
accorded “self-evident status. 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration, in the context of the 
relationship between trade and investment, Stated in 
paragraph 22: ‘Any framework should reflect in a balanced 
manner the interests of home and host countries, and take 
due account of the development policies and objectives of 
                                                 
408 Id. at 18 ¶ 48. 
 
409 See id. at ¶¶ 31, 35, 39, 42, 45. 
 
410 See infra Chapter 2.G. 
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the host Governments, as well as their right to regulate in 
the public interest.’411  
The “right to regulate in the public interest” identifies “public 
interest” as the normative foundation for domestic regulation that may 
adversely affect “the interests of home [countries].” Stripped of any 
qualification, the term “public interest” is deemed to be sufficiently 
transparent and self-explanatory as to command freestanding status. The 
very grammatical construction also distinguishes the “right to regulate in 
the public interest” from (i) “development policies” and (ii) “objectives of 
host Governments.” It is the “public interest” component that purportedly 
both limits the “right to regulate” and also serves as that right’s normative 
foundation. The paradox that the legacy public purpose doctrine presents 
when serving as a constraint on regulatory sovereignty is problematic. 
Assuming that FDI triggers the issuance of new regulation in 
response both to pre-entry and post-entry FDI status within the context of 
a particular domestic industry sector, logic commands that as a general 
proposition such regulation would be narrow—that States would be 
doctrinally constrained in promulgating regulatory rubrics that may be 
adverse to FDI—particularly post-entry where due process concerns are 
likely to arise. A narrow exercise of the right to regulate that touches or 
concerns FDI also comports with universally valued precepts of 
uniformity, transparency and predictive value, which are central both to 
international trade and investment law. Yet, instead of serving as a 
temporary constraint on a sovereign’s right to regulate post-entry FDI, 
iterations of the public purpose doctrine such as “public interest,” as 
referenced in the Secretariat’s Note, furthers a diametrically opposed 
interest that is expansive and not restrictive. 
“Public interest,” as referenced in the Secretariat’s Note, through 
the prism of a plain and merely descriptive analysis refers to an 
inordinately broad category of “all things public.” Contextually within the 
writing at issue, “public interest” necessarily refers to an exception 
providing for what would be construed as legitimate encroachment on pre- 
and post-entry FDI arising from the “public” component to “public 
interest.” The most comprehensive exegesis, however, commands 
reference to the public purpose doctrine as historically empowering States 
to encroach upon FDI at any juncture by dint of its regulatory authority so 
long as such regulation (i) concerned a public purpose,  and (ii) the 
sovereign intended for the regulation to issue in furtherance of a public 
purpose. Under any analysis, premising the “right to regulate” on meeting 
a “public interest” standard so that the prejudicial effects of the regulation 
on FDI may be deemed to be legitimate and not actionable against a State, 
is tantamount to providing Host States with an unbridled license to 
                                                 
411 UNCTAD FDI Policy Note, supra note 393, at 13 ¶ 31 (emphasis supplied). 
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encroach upon FDI. Regrettably, by virtue of mechanical boiler-plate 
repetitions over time, “the right to regulate for a public purpose” 
superficially has been viewed as a narrow exercise of domestic regulatory 
fiat.  
Because of the perception that any basis for encroachment on FDI 
would be “limited” by this “rule of law,” the principles of transparency, 
uniformity, and predictive value were assumed in a sphere where nothing 
could be farther from the actual facts.412 The friction between capital-
exporting and capital-importing countries is only worsened by this 
application of the public purpose doctrine. The inevitable result shall 
continue to yield greater uncertainty and more transnational disputes. The 
lack of academic rigor, legacy weaknesses, and conflicting arbitral 
“decisional-law” touching upon the public purpose doctrine all conspire to 
lessen the likelihood of maximizing the potential benefits of FDI for all 
concerned: developed, developing, and transition economies.  
The second reference to the public purpose doctrine in the 
Secretariat’s Note is helpful to the understanding of the role that the 
doctrine plays in the effort to harmonize the tensions between home and 
Host States. It also maximizes the potential gains of a robust FDI 
international culture. The text suggests that interpretive techniques, among 
others, may serve to secure rights for signatories to regulate the domestic 
economy where such regulation may adversely affect FDI. This effort to 
carve out regulatory rights in the context of international trade and 
investment law challenges is placed squarely on the shoulders of the 
public purpose doctrine. Significantly, despite reference to an emphasis on 
interpretive techniques, there is no suggestion that the foundational 
exception, i.e., public purpose, requires any such expansive treatment. 
Quite the contrary, the mere reference to the concept, implies that 
doctrinal clarity already pervades the often cited precept and is universally 
known: 
                                                 
412 As will be demonstrated infra Chapter 4, the debilities endemic to the legacy public 
purpose doctrine are multiplied and made worse where the public purpose doctrine 
appears as an exception in Bilateral Investment Treaties negotiated only between two 
nations enjoying disparate marketing leverage, where the negotiations are had pursuant 
to very idiosyncratic features unique to the relationship between two States at issue. 
The resulting treaty embodies international principles and doctrines, such as the public 
purpose doctrine, but within the context of uniquely conceived, defined, and applied 
principles. The universe of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) negotiated and 
conceived in this manner now represents a universe of over 3,000 BITs that were 
independently negotiated, lack any centralized structure or organizing principle, and 
are both formally and substantively unrelated to each other. This configuration 
diminishes predictability, transparency and uniformity. Perhaps the proliferation and 
negative consequences of this phenomenon may be averted were States to consent to 
executing multilateral agreements in the realm of international investment law. This 
lack of consensus, however, likely shall continue to spawn BITs and thus perpetuate 
this paradox. 
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There are various ways to address the issue of the right to 
regulate. Some of these, with regard to both trade and 
investment agreements, are reviewed below. In all cases the 
ability of signatories to regulate the domestic economy is a 
governing concern. Insofar as this concept is reStated in an 
agreement, for instance, in its preambular language – it also 
serves an interpretive function vis-à-vis the provisions of 
the agreement. Furthermore, whenever countries enter into 
standard-of-treatment obligations, such as fair and 
equitable treatment, prohibition of arbitrary and 
discriminatory measures or most-favoured-nation treatment 
(MFN) and national treatment, various kinds of exceptions, 
reservations, derogations, waivers or transnational 
arrangements ensure that signatories retain the prerogative 
to apply non-conforming domestic regulations in certain 
areas. These can be general (e.g., for public order or 
national security), subject-specific (e.g., the so-called 
‘cultural exception’) or country-specific (e.g., as in the case 
of GATS schedules of commitments, with regard to 
commercial presence).413 
Also noteworthy is the dichotomy between the characterization of 
“public order” as a general exception, and the subjective standard 
governing the exception. 
The UNCTAD Note reStates the settled but untested principle of 
international law that Host States may discriminate against imports in 
favor of domestic products so long as that discrimination rests on a 
legitimate purpose. According to UNCTAD, the GATT Article XX public 
purpose exceptions constitute legitimate grounds justifying foreign 
product discrimination by Host States.414 Cloaked in its “public morals” 
                                                 
413 UNCTAD FDI Policy Note, supra note 393, at 13-14 ¶ 33. 
 
414 The Note on this issue in part provides: 
 
In the area of trade, the issue has been debated and litigated at length in 
the GATT/WTO system, where the dispute settlement process has been 
frequently used to police domestic regulatory measures that have an 
impact on trade. The main instrument for policing regulatory activities 
in the WTO comes from the 1947 GATT and is found in Article III’s 
non-discrimination (national treatment) obligation as complemented by 
the exceptions contained in Article XX. The general national treatment 
rule contained in Article III provides that internal taxes and 
regulations must not treat imports less favourably than domestic 
products. If a domestic regulatory measure is found to discriminate 
against imports, the regulating government may attempt to justify the 
discrimination by proving that it is necessary to achieve some 
legitimate purpose. Article XX of GATT defines these exceptions to 
include those necessary to protect public morals; to protect human, 
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iteration, host country discrimination in favor of domestic commercial 
interests also extends to the regulation of services for presumably 
legitimate public claims. The Secretariat’s Note suggests that exercise of 
its regulatory authority constitutes “the sovereign right of a country to 
regulate services for legitimate purposes,” even though it also asserts that 
the GATT’s “Article VI seeks to prevent the use of administrative 
decisions to disguise protectionist measures.”415 
The UNCTAD Note’s concern for “protecting” the domestic 
regulatory space of Host States is explicit enough, but nowhere clearer 
than in its treatment of “the right to regulate” in the context of investment 
protection agreements. The committee sets forth an accurate narrative 
detailing the connection between issues relating to the right to regulate, 
and regional and bilateral investment treaty language covering measures 
“tantamount” or “equivalent” to expropriation, as well as indirect and 
regulatory takings. The effects of “creeping expropriation” pursuant to 
which two or more legal regulatory acts carried out over a period of time 
have the effect of diminishing or substantially destroying the value of an 
investment is deemed an actionable expropriation providing the Host State 
with the obligation to tender compensation for the consequences of its 
exercise of “legitimate” and arguably “obligatory” regulatory authority. 
The Secretariat’s Note, however, somewhat implicitly suggests that the 
public purpose doctrine represents too narrow an exception for Host 
States, as this suggestion may appear to be when first considered: 
[BITs] [g]enerally impose conditions on expropriations if it 
is to be considered lawful, by adopting some variation of 
the traditional rule of international law that a State may 
not expropriate the property of an alien except for public 
purpose, in a nondiscriminatory manner, in accordance 
with due process of law and upon payment of 
compensation. Concerns have been expressed with regard 
to the impact that an expansive use of expropriation claims 
may have on sovereign governments’ right to regulate.416 
                                                                                                                         
animal and plant life or health; and relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible resources. It should be noted that this list of policies that 
can justify measures otherwise considered in violation of national 
treatment is ‘closed’ and thus provides limited scope for claiming an 
exception in many areas where countries may want to pursue 
regulatory action. 
 
Id. at 14 ¶ 35 (emphasis supplied).  
 
415 Id. at 15 ¶ 39. 
 
416Id. at 16 ¶ 42 (emphasis supplied). 
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While from a strict and literal perspective issues have been raised 
with respect to the expansive application of alleged breaches of direct or 
indirect nationalization or expropriations or actions tantamount to an 
expropriation,417 the prevailing concern has focused more on attempting to 
address the need for transparent and predictive standards governing the 
law of expropriation in all of its incarnations to allay the fears of capital-
exporting countries and thus maximize the benefits of FDI.418 The view 
that somehow the efficiencies of international investment law were being 
compromised because of concerns pertaining to the expansive use of 
expropriation claims has not been chronicled as posing a material 
challenge to the law of international investment or to treaty-based arbitral 
proceedings premised on public international law. 
The expansive scope of the public purpose doctrine under 
customary international law as memorialized in the UNCTAD Note also 
applies to “favourable tax treatment to investment by national companies 
without according the same treatment to investment by foreign 
companies,” such as in Protocol No. 2 of the Indonesia-Switzerland 
BIT.419 Therefore, the UNCTAD Note broadens and enriches the public 
purpose doctrine by according normative status to a State’s economic 
development plight. Protocol No. 2 of the Indonesia-Switzerland BIT 
allowing for derogation from national-treatment, in pertinent part 
provides:  
                                                 
417 See, e.g., Matthew C. Porterfield, State Practice and the (Purported) Obligation 
Under Customary International Law to Provide Compensation for Regulatory 
Expropriations, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 159, 165 (2011) (“The concept of 
indirect expropriation under investment agreements applies to a broad range of 
government actions, including not only regulatory measures but taxation as well.”); 
Alberto R. Salazar V., Ph.D., NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and 
Domestic Counter-Advertising Law, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 39 (2010) (citing 
Metalclad as an example of the how the “concept of regulatory expropriation, 
characterized by a focus on the use of property and the expectations of foreign investors, 
broadens the protection granted to the latter.”). 
 
418 See generally Martinez-Fraga, supra note 51; see also Julie A. Maupin, Transparency 
in International Investment Law: The Good, The Bad, and The Murky, in TRANSPARENCY 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14, n.81 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., forthcoming 
2013); Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr. & Niranjali Manel Amerasinghe, Transparency and 
Public Participation in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 337 
(2009); Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 
U. KAN. L. REV. 1301 (2006); Statement by the OECD Investment Committee, 
Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Procedures, June 2005, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentpolicy/34786913.pdf; Fulvio Fracassi, 
Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213 (2001). 
 
419 UNCTAD FDI Policy Note, supra note 393, at 17 ¶ 45. 
 
 EAST\64724221. 3156 
En signant la Convention concernant l’encouragement et la 
protection réciproque des investissements conclue entre le 
Gouvernement de la Confédération Suisse et le 
Gouvernement de la République Indonésienne, les 
plénipotentiaires soussignés sont en outre convenus des 
dispositions suivantes, qui font partie intégrante de ladite 
Convention: 
(2) Par dérogation au traitement national prévu 
à l’article 4, paragraphe 3, de la présente 
Convention, le Gouvernement de la 
République Indonésienne, vu le niveau de 
développement actuel de l’économie 
nationale indonésienne, réserve comme il 
suit sa position à l’égard du traitement 
national des investissements suisses sur le 
territoire de la République Indonésienne:420 
Both exceptions, (i) favorable tax treatment to investment by national 
companies to the detriment of investment by foreign companies and (ii) 
the abrogation of the national-treatment standard on the ground of a 
State’s economic development, materially contribute to amplifying the 
public purpose doctrine’s scope and content, consonant with the 
Secretariat’s Note where the public purpose doctrine is referenced. The 
abrogation of national-treatment standard in favor of a State’s economic 
development and for tax purposes form part of customary international 
law as part of the public purpose doctrine, notwithstanding the sweeping 
reach and subjective standard accorded to the doctrine. 
The UNCTAD Secretariat’s Note explicitly references the public 
purpose doctrine. Any descriptive predicate for the identification of the 
doctrine in customary international law is amply met. This international 
instrument engrafts upon the doctrine the status of an exception that 
legitimizes a State’s discriminatory use of its regulatory authority as to 
international investment, trade, or services so long as such regulation is in 
furtherance of a public purpose. The Secretariat’s Note observes that a 
State’s right to regulate is legitimate so long as it is in furtherance of a 
public purpose, notwithstanding the effects that such regulation may have 
on foreign investment, trade, or services. Further, the abrogation of the 
national-treatment standard in favor of application of tax legislation 
favoring domestic interests over foreign trade or investment can be 
construed as the exercise of regulatory authority in furtherance of a public 
purpose and, therefore, constituting a legitimate act of sovereignty. 
                                                 
420 Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Indonesia 
Concerning the Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Switz.-Indo., Feb. 6, 1974, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/suisse_indonesie.pdf. 
. 
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Regulatory acts that arise from or are connected to a State’s economic 
development policy have been identified as rising to the level of 
exceptions in several BITs and, therefore, arguably also form part of 
customary international law.  
4. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012 
The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012 heralds a “new 
generation” of investment policies that meaningfully broadens the 
regulatory space of income-importing countries with respect to FDI.421 
One construction of the 2012 Report leads to a seemingly paradoxical 
conclusion. Even though it acknowledges the ostensible competing 
interests between the promotion and development of FDI through 
liberalization and constraining measures pertaining to a Host State’s 
regulatory imperatives that may take the form of protectionism, the 
UNCTAD Report represents a testament to an unmitigated broadening of 
the public purpose doctrine that finds no precedent. The drafters 
acknowledged: 
This new generation of investment policies has been in the 
making for some time, and is reflected in the dichotomy in 
policy directions over the last few years, with simultaneous 
moves to further liberalize investment regimes and promote 
foreign investment on the one hand, and to regulate 
investment in pursuit of public policy objectives on the 
other. It reflects the recognition that liberalization, if it is to 
generate sustainable development outcomes, has to be 
accompanied – if not preceded – by the establishment of 
proper regulatory and institutional frameworks. The key 
policy change is to strike balance between regulation and 
openness.422  
What the drafters referred to as “the dichotomy in policy 
directions” permeates the UNCTAD Report.423 The lack of clarity ailing 
                                                 
421 United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, World Investment Report 2012, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2012, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.3 (2012) [hereinafter WIR 
2012].The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of 
Investment Policies, is also referred to as the 2012 Investment Report. 
 
422 Id. at 101 (from World Investment Report 2010 Epilogue) (emphasis supplied). 
 
423 The tension between interests and expectations of capital-exporting States (foreign 
investor/investment) and the right to regulate as understood by Host States mostly 
underdeveloped countries or transition economies) constitute a recurring theme 
throughout the Report. By way of example, a key investment policy challenge is 
identified as the need “[t]o adjust the balance between the rights and obligations of States 
and investors, or making it more even.” Id. at 103. 
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investment law that arises from conflicting policy interests does violence 
to core principles of uniformity, transparency, and predictability. The 
absence of these basic tenets in turn fosters uncertainty and may explain in 
large measure the very stark decline of investment treaty-making. 
The decline in the momentum of traditional investment treaty-
making is undeniable. BITs and other types of international investment 
agreements (IIAs) reached maximum proliferation in 1995 and 1996 with 
notable spikes in 2001 and 2002.424 In 2011 only 47 ITAs international 
investment agreements were signed (33 BITs and 14 other IIAs).425 
Equally significant is the decline of the economic significance of BITs. As 
of December 31, 2001, 3164 international investment agreements were 
registered as in force. These included 2833 BITs and the remaining 331 
were other types of IIAs.426 The 2012 Report asserts that while “[i]n 
quantitative terms, bilateral agreements still dominate international 
investment policy-making; however, in terms of economic significance, 
there has been a gradual shift towards regionalism.”427 The Trans-Pacific 
                                                                                                                         
Harmonizing these competing interests is also noted in the Report as a condition 
preceding to negotiating sustainable-development-friendly international investment 
agreements. The drafters observed:  
 
Ensuring an appropriate balance between protection commitments and 
regulatory space for development: IIAs [international investment 
agreements] protect foreign investment by committing host country 
governments to grant certain standards of treatment and protection to 
foreign investors; it is the very nature of an IIA’s standards of 
protection, and the attendant stabilizing effect, to place limits on 
government regulatory freedom…. Countries can safeguard some 
policy space by carefully crafting the structure of IIAs, and by 
clarifying the scope and meaning of particularly vague treaty provisions 
such as the fair and equitable treatment standard and expropriation as 
well as by using specific flexibility mechanisms such as general or 
national security exceptions and reservations.  
 
Id. at 136. Here it is important to note that the treaty language that the drafters refer to as 
in need of further clarification for purposes of preserving party expectations concerns 
standard s of treatment provided by the Host State to the foreign investor/investment. 
There is an equal and even greater need, however, to identify with specificity those 
principles, most notably the public purpose doctrine, that govern a State’s exercise of 
sovereignty through its regulatory-making authority.  
 
424 Id. at 84. 
 
425 Id. 
 
426 Id. 
 
427 Id. 
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Partnership Agreement,428 the 2012 Trilateral Investment Agreement 
between China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea,429 and EEU measures 
arising from the EU Council’s Directive to the EU Commission to Initiate 
Negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with Canada, India, and 
Singapore is an excellent example. The material economic significance of 
such an agreement is highlighted by the financial strength of the member 
States, which comprises approximately twenty-five percent of the Global 
GDP and fifty percent of Global FDI.430 
The UNCTAD Report advances two general propositions, among 
others, for the decline in traditional international investment agreement 
treaty-making. First, it is asserted that the phenomenon may result from 
the “gradual shift towards regional treaty-making, where a single regional 
treaty takes the place of a multitude of bilateral pacts and where regional 
blocs (instead of their individual members) negotiate with third States.”431 
                                                 
428 This agreement is in its twelfth round of negotiations and includes nine participating 
countries (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Perú, Singapore, 
the United States, and Vietnam). Moreover, Canada and Mexico have been tendered 
formal invitations to participate in the negotiations. Japan has expressed interest in 
forming part of the effort. Should all twelve countries reach agreement, a free trade zone 
shall be created comprising 35% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) and 
potentially replacing 47 IIAs in the form of 18 BITs and 29 other types of IIAs, 
governing current international trade and investment relationships between these 
countries. Id. at 85. 
 
429 From an economic perspective, this agreement is comparable to the NAFTA. These 
three signatories account for one-fifth of the global GDP. The agreement accords foreign 
investment/investors with the panoply of protection standards common to most BITs and 
regional investment treaties such as (i) promotion and protection of [Article 2], (ii) 
national treatment [Article 3], (iii) most-favoured nation treatment [Article 4], (iv) “fair 
and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security,” which are defined as not 
requiring “treatment in addition to or beyond any reasonable and appropriate standard of 
treatment in accordance with generally accepted rules of international law” [Article 5], 
(v) prohibition of performance requirements [Article 7] and, (vi) expropriation and 
compensation [Article 11], quite substantive regulatory space is carved out. Signatories 
reserve the right to implement measures that otherwise would violate provisions of the 
agreement, in the form of (i) security exceptions [Article 18], (ii) temporary safeguard 
measures [Article 19], (iii) prudential measures [Article 20], (iv) taxation [Article 21], 
and (v) environmental measures [Article 23]. Moreover, Article 11 [Expropriation and 
Compensation] virtually mirrors that of the NAFTA’s Article 1110 paragraph 1(a)-(d) 
and, as with the NAFTA, provides for a “public purpose” exception. Also, similar to the 
NAFTA, measures “equivalent” to an expropriation or nationalization are recognized. 
The NAFTA speaks in terms of measures “tantamount” to a nationalization or 
expropriation. See Agreement Among the Government of Japan, the Government of the 
Republic of Korea and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment, May 13, 2012, 
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/20120513001-3.pdf. 
 
430 WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 85. 
 
431 Id. at 84. 
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Second, the Report cites to IIAs as “becoming increasingly controversial 
and politically sensitive, primarily owing to the spread of IIA-based 
investor-state arbitrations.”432 
Both grounds in considerable measure are related to the 
shortcomings of the legacy public purpose doctrine. This proposition, 
however, is nowhere observed in the UNCTAD literature. Indeed, the 
Report is paradoxical because in identifying the flawed treaty management 
dichotomy between the capital-exporting countries and capital-importing 
countries, it not only overlooks problems related to the uncertainties 
arising from an ill-defined underlying public purpose doctrine, but actually 
argues in favor of an even more expansive legal construction of the 
doctrine based upon the policy of “sustainable development.”433 In fact, 
the UNCTAD Report views an active regulatory course of conduct by 
States as favorable to FDI rather than as a source of concern for 
prospective investors from capital-exporting States.434  
The trend towards regional or multilateral treaties in lieu of BITs is 
a testament to a Global appetite for greater uniformity and certainty that 
would proscribe increasing and recurring frustration of expectations on the 
part of capital-exporting and capital-importing States. It is an untested 
assumption, however, to posit that regional or multilateral agreements 
shall eliminate the fundamental ills giving rise to these tensions where the 
scope of general or specific exceptions, most notably those based on 
public purpose, manifestly favor or empower Host States to infringe on 
foreign investments in ways that parties to the agreement could not have 
reasonably contemplated. Also, the success in achieving the objectives of 
international trade law do not necessarily imply that the goals incident to 
international investment law also are likely to be met. The NAFTA 
                                                 
432 Id. 
 
433 “Sustainable development” may be characterized as a “policy” but its practical 
application and theoretical underpinning suggest that both doctrinally and conceptually it 
is best treated as a principle. Standing as a “principle” instead of a “policy” best promotes 
uniformity and regulatory transparency. Moreover, policies are more properly associated 
with specific States and regimes in contrast with the delocalized and territorially detached 
nature of principles. 
 
434 The 2012 UNCTAD Report views regulation as not only a State right, “but also a 
necessity. Without adequate regulatory framework, a country will not be attractive for 
foreign investors, because such investors seek clarity, stability, and predictability of 
investment conditions in the Host State.” Id. at 109. In addition, the Report views 
increased government role in investment policy as a plus that gives rise to “strategies 
[that] often contain elements of targeted investment promotion or restriction, increasing 
the importance of integrated and coherent development and investment policies.” Id. at 
100. 
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arguably stands as a faithful and representative example of the material 
disconnect that may characterize an international investment agreement.435 
The second ground identified as “a likely reason” for the decline of 
BIT-making, e.g., increased controversy surrounding international 
investment agreements primarily resulting from treaty-based arbitrations 
that are expensive, time-consuming, politically polarizing, and often 
lacking predictive value while also yielding awards with pretentions of 
being universally executable but practically raising almost insurmountable 
enforcement challenges, constitutes a descriptive phenomenon and not a 
causal first principle. As with the proliferation of regional or multilateral 
international investment and trade agreements, general transparency and 
particular lucidity as to fundamental standards of care that attach to 
foreign investments/investors, are predicates to fulfilling the expectations 
of treaty signatories and participants/beneficiaries. Policies pertaining to 
international investment or trade cannot be fashioned and implemented in 
the abstract. Such policies must heavily weigh a new Global paradigm 
shift from independence to interdependence that most comprehensively 
and efficiently comports with an environment of economic globalization, 
and a juridical historical juncture that has begun to understand orthodox 
conceptions of international law as unresponsive to shared Global 
crises.436 The shared transnational problems facing the community of 
nations (environmental and climate challenges, poverty, institutionalized 
corruption, infant mortality, vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation, 
and stark disparities globally in the distribution of natural resources, to 
name just a few) have contributed to the creation of a Global 
consciousness of shared obligations and benefits.  
                                                 
435 The NAFTA’s economic success is undisputed. See, e.g., Jeffrey Turk, Compensation 
for “Measures Tantamount to Expropriation” Under NAFTA: What It Means and Why It 
Matters, 1 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 41, 77 (2005) (stating “NAFTA is generally 
considered to be a great economic success”); David R. Haigh, Q.C., Chapter 11 - Private 
Party vs. Governments, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 
26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 115 (2000) (“Measured by the increase of trade and investment among 
the three North American economies, the NAFTA appears to have been an unparalleled 
success.”); Daniel Griswold, NAFTA at 10: An Economic and Foreign Policy Success, 
FREE TRADE BULL. NO. 1 (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/FTB-001.pdf (arguing that NAFTA “has 
spurred trade, investment, and integration between the United States and Mexico”); see 
generally OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NAFTA: A 
Decade of Success (July 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-
sheets/archives/2004/july/nafta-decade-success. 
 
The NAFTA decisional law and textual analysis, suggest that the lack of definition of 
special and general exceptions premised on the public purpose doctrine or any of its 
permutations cause considerable uncertainty and often spawns conflicting doctrinal 
analyses. 
 
436 See supra Chapter 2.B. 
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The current IIA regimes, whether in the form of BITs or 
multilateral agreements, are conducive to a pattern of international dispute 
resolution that culminates in “all or nothing” arbitral awards, primarily 
with respect to direct or indirect expropriation or nationalizations, or 
averments tantamount to expropriation. Contemporary expectations of 
shared duties and benefits are inimical to orthodox doctrines providing for 
“zero-sum game” legal frameworks. The “increasingly controversial and 
politically sensitive” issues that the 2012 Report identifies as “primarily 
owing to the spread of IIA-based investor-state arbitrations,” are not 
caused by the formal or substantive structure of BITs, but rather as a result 
of legacy orthodox legal concepts, that obscure the boundaries between 
competing treaty interests and objectives, such as the public purpose 
doctrine. The ad hoc nature of treaty-based arbitration that gives rise to 
awards that do not and cannot constitute binding precedent and that 
reference protection standards common to most BITs as to nomenclature 
but not definition, certainly does not help. 
The 2012 Report explicitly and implicitly identifies the public 
purpose doctrine while adhering to the legacy practice it follows the 
practice of assuming that public purpose in content, scope, and application 
is universally understood. The drafters amplified the doctrine’s scope by 
linking it to policies of sustainable development.437 It becomes necessary 
                                                 
437 Sustainable development or economic development policies are broadening the scope 
and enriching the content of the public purpose doctrine as part of what the UNCTAD 
World Investment Report 2012 identifies as “a new generation of investment policies.” 
These international instruments may be viewed as part of an international customary law 
trend providing “economic development policies” with the status of a normative 
foundation that grants States a right to regulate that may have adverse consequences with 
respect to foreign economic interests. The following representative, and hardly 
exhaustive, list evinces this trend:  
(i) The 2012 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
Although aspirational the principles seek the implementation of the 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” rubric that was presented by the UN 
Special Representative John Ruggie in 2006. These principles 
encourage the modification of international investment agreements to 
provide for a regulatory space allowing for the protection of human 
rights. They also call for business disclosure of the effects of their 
commercial activities on human rights to relevant stakeholders;  
 
(ii) The 2012 Revision of the International Chamber of Commerce’s 
Guidelines for International Investment (1972) The 2012 revision 
promotes responsible investment that comports with the economic 
development of Host States and in addition to underscoring the need for 
investors to obey municipal and international labor law, suggests that 
investors conduct environmental impact studies as a predicate to 
investment development. The Guidelines emphasize the need for Home 
States to generate FDI that may contribute to the economic 
development of Host States; 
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to inquire whether the legacy public purpose doctrine, broadened to 
include the principle of sustainable development primarily undertaken by 
capital-importing countries (presumably Host States), can reasonably limit 
the scope of sustainable development as a principle of both customary and 
conventional international law? Put differently, if sustainable development 
forms part of the public purpose doctrine and, therefore, is to constitute a 
universally recognized exception mostly favoring Host State domestic 
regulatory activity, is the legacy public purpose doctrine in its current 
form sufficient to balance application of the exception without 
compromising Home State expectations or Host State obligation standards 
for the protection of foreign investment? Only by ascribing to sustainable 
development based exceptions the status of a special public purpose 
category subject to qualifications will it be able to further the development 
objectives of most capital-importing countries without just outright vesting 
them with a boundless license to regulate irrespective of treaty-based 
obligations to protect foreign investment/investors. 
5. The Public Purpose Doctrine and Sustainable 
Development 
The UNCTAD report identifies a shift in policy-making, as a 
reaction to shared Global crises, that in turn gives rise to four specific 
consequences bearing on the development and application of the public 
purpose doctrine. According to the argument, first, it is asserted that 
economic and market prices “[have] accentuated a longer-term shift in 
economic weight from developed countries to emerging markets.”438 This 
unsolicited protagonistic role has caused underdeveloped countries to have 
greater participation in Global policy-making.439 It should be added that 
the economic development in prospering nations such as China in 
particular, also has contributed to providing developing nations and 
economies in transition with greater standing in addressing policies for 
current Global issues.440 Second, the Global financial crisis has increased 
                                                                                                                         
(iii) The Doha Mandate, adopted at the UNCTAD XIII Ministerial 
Conference 2012. The Mandate synthesizes UNCTAD’s mission as 
primarily consisting in the (i) promotion of sustainable development 
and (ii) inclusive growth with respect to investment and enterprise; and  
 
(iv) The 2012 Rio Plus 20 Conference leading to the Outcome 
Document, “The Future We Want.” The Future We Want promotes 
investment in sustainable development frameworks that may contribute 
to reducing poverty. 
 
438 WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 99. 
 
439 Id. 
 
440 China’s sustained economic growth at an average rate of 10.41%  during the past 20 
years, WORLD BANK, World Development Indicators: GDP growth (annual %), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=1 (last visited Apr. 8, 
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domestic government regulation in both capital-exporting and capital-
importing States.441 This increase in more vibrant and robust regulatory 
activity is a positive development, but unlike the authors of the 2012 
Report who opine that vibrant government intervention in promoting 
regulations leads to transparency and thereby encourages FDI, the 
foundation for this proposition remains unclear.442 There is a paucity of 
empirical data supporting the proposition that a “developed” or “robust” 
regulatory rubric allays home country investor concerns. Only regulatory 
transparency can meet this concern. It is much more likely that objective 
and clearly delineated limits on the application of domestic regulation in 
ways that may affect international investment protection standards may 
best contribute to this objective. In this regard, a public purpose doctrine 
governed by objective criteria that serves both to regulate and to limit 
regulation in transparent ways that justify investor expectations would be 
an appropriate technique that may serve as an exception, as well as a 
principle conducive to legitimate home and host country expectations. It is 
the limits, not the complexity, of a regulatory framework that gives rise to 
process legitimacy. 
Third, the UNCTAD report observes that Global challenges 
require Global responses and solutions.443 It is precisely this synergy 
between crisis and solution that best advocates for the development of 
transnational, and not just international, legal principles that serve more 
than  mere regulation of relations between two specific States on a limited 
agenda basis. Fourth, the primacy of social and environmental challenges 
has led “policy makers to reflect on an emerging new development 
paradigm that places inclusive and sustainable development goals on the 
same footing as economic growth and development goals.”444  
As part of UNCTAD’s effort to enhance the sustainable 
development dimension of international investment policies, thus placing 
sustainable development squarely within the purview of the public 
purpose doctrine, three self-contained frameworks that include meaningful 
references to the public purpose doctrine have been crafted: (i) core 
                                                                                                                         
2013), meaningfully has contributed to the economies of resource-rich developing 
nations such as Brazil. Economic development in a global market and framework 
necessarily fosters greater interdependence that results in more meaningful policy 
standing for underdeveloped countries. 
  
441 WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 99. 
 
442 See id. at 108. 
 
443 The drafters specifically State that “the nature of the challenges, which no country can 
address in isolation, make  better international coordination imperative.” Id., at 99. 
 
444 Id. 
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principles for investment policy making for substantial development,445 
(ii) national investment policy guidelines,446 and (iii) Elements of 
International Investment Agreements: Policy Options.447 
The core principles for investment policy making for sustainable 
development are particularly helpful to identifying the role of public 
purpose in customary international law, as well as in connection with the 
sustainable development public purpose category, because these central 
precepts are traceable to a substantial gamut of existing international law, 
international law instruments, treaties, and declarations.448 Even though 
the public purpose doctrine arguably plays a role in all eleven Core 
Principles,449 it is explicitly referred to in principle number six (the right to 
                                                 
445 Id. at 107. 
 
446 Id. at 123. 
 
447 Id. at 143. 
 
448 The World Investment Report provides, in relevant part: 
 
Several other international instruments relate to individual Core 
Principles. They comprise, in particular, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, the Convention on the Establishment of the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency, the World Bank Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, the UN Global Compact, the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy, and several WTO-related agreements, including the 
GATS, the TRIMs Agreement and the Agreement on Government 
Procurement. 
 
Id. at 106.  
 
449 These Core Principles are (i) investment for sustainable development (“The 
overarching objective of investment policy making is to promote investment for inclusive 
growth and sustainable development.”); (ii) policy coherence, (“Investment policies 
should be grounded in a country’s overall development strategy. All policies that impact 
on investment should be coherent and synergetic at both the national and international 
level.”); (iii) public governance and institutions (“Investment policies should be 
developed involving all stakeholders, and embedded in an institutional framework based 
on the rule of law that adheres to high standards to public governance and ensures 
predictable, efficient and transparent procedures for investors.”); (iv) dynamic policy 
making (“Investment policies should be regularly reviewed for effectiveness and 
relevance and adapted to changing development dynamics.”); (v) balanced rights and 
obligations (“Investment policies should be bound in setting out rights and obligations of 
State’s and investors in the interest of development for all.”); (vi) right to regulate (“Each 
country has the sovereign right to establish entry and operational conditions for foreign 
investment, subject to international commitments, in the interest of the public good and to 
minimize potential negative effects.”) (emphasis supplied); (vii) openness to investment 
(“In line with each country’s development strategy, investment policy should establish 
open, stable, and predictable entry conditions for investment.”); (viii) investment 
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regulate) in the form of “the interest of the public good.”450 According to 
the notes on principle six, the right to regulate, from a sovereignty 
perspective, is expressed as generally being (i) an absolute right stemming 
from sovereignty, (ii) a necessary right encompassing legal, administrative 
frameworks, and industry-specific rules, and (iii) a condition preceding 
without which prospective investors would be dissuaded from investing in 
host countries because of lack of regulatory framework transparency.451 
The general right to regulate proposition is tempered by noting 
that its seemingly absolute fiat “can be subject to international obligations 
that countries undertake; with regard to the treatment of foreign investors 
this often takes place at the bilateral or regional level. International 
commitments thus reduce ‘policy space’. This principle advocates that 
countries maintain sufficient policy space to regulate for the public 
good.”452  
                                                                                                                         
protection and treatment (“Investment policies should provide adequate protection to 
established investors. The treatment of established investors should be non-
discriminatory.”); (ix) investment promotion and facilitation (“Policies for investment 
promotion and facilitation should be aligned with sustainable development goals and 
designed to minimize the risk of harmful competition for investment.”); (x) corporate 
governance responsibility (“Investment policies should promote and facilitate the 
adoption of a compliance with best international policies of corporate social 
responsibility and good corporate governance.”); and (xi) international cooperation (“The 
international community should cooperate to address shared investment-for-development 
policy challenges, particularly in least developed countries. Collective efforts should also 
be made to avoid investment protectionism.”). Id.   
 
450 Id. at 106. 
 
451 The Report describes this right as: 
 
[A]n expression of a country’s sovereignty. Regulation includes both 
the general and legal and administrative framework of host countries as 
well as sector- or industry-specific rules. It also entails effective 
implementation of rules, including the enforcement of rights. 
Regulation is not only a State’s right, but also a necessity. Without an 
adequate regulatory framework, a country will not be attractive for 
foreign investors, because such investors seek clarity, stability and 
predictability of investment conditions in the host country.  
 
Id. at 109. 
 
As has been observed, the “adequacy” of a regulatory framework that is material to 
foreign investment concerns clear and predictable limits to the regulatory structure at 
issue. A functional public purpose doctrine would foremost place such limits uniformly 
on a transnational basis. 
 
452 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
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The UNCTAD Notes to Principle Six (the right to regulate) 
references the public purpose doctrine, this time in the guise of “the public 
good,” as the precept that allows countries to secure a regulatory space in 
the midst of treaty obligations imposing upon it standards to protect 
foreign investment/investors, and presumably, home country investor 
expectations. 
Two observations merit emphasis with respect to the Core 
Principles generally and Principle Six (the right to regulate) in particular. 
First, the public purpose doctrine (“the public good”) is nowhere defined 
despite its pivotal role.453 Second, the doctrine is presented as a precept 
allowing countries (presumably mostly Host State underdeveloped 
countries) to avail themselves of the public purpose doctrine in order to 
“maintain sufficient policy space” to exercise the right to regulate despite 
limitations imposed on that exercise of sovereignty by bilateral or regional 
investment treaties.454 Viewed from this perspective the concern would 
appear to be the likelihood of encroachment on the right to regulate arising 
from duly negotiated treaty-based obligations and thus transform a right to 
regulate into an illicit action on behalf of the State warranting imposition 
of a fine in the form of liability in favor of foreign investors.  
A different approach would be to understand the public purpose 
doctrine as a principle of international law that neither fosters nor 
proscribes regulatory activity, but rather harmonizes it as a reconciling 
principle pursuant to an objective criteria disengaged from a State’s intent. 
Fashioning the doctrine in this manner most closely comports with more 
malleable principles of sovereignty, economic globalization, and 
paradigms of interdependence. It also is conceptually closer to a 
proportionality premised resolution of disputes that challenge the 
boundaries between investment protection and the right to regulate. 
Regrettably, the concept of public purpose, its standard, content, and 
practical application, all are assumed. The term “public good” within the 
meaning of Principle Six of the Core Principles is nowhere defined. “Self-
evident status,” again is accorded to the doctrine. Just as public purpose 
cannot be extended to all things that touch and concern the polity, the 
                                                 
453 Even though only Principle Six (right to regulate) explicitly references the public 
purpose doctrine expressed as the public good, the doctrine is central to most, if not to all, 
of the Core Principles. By way of example, Principle 5 (balance rights and obligations) 
seeking to harmonize the interests of home and Host States, necessarily entails the 
workings of a public purpose doctrine. Similarly, Principle 8 (investment protection and 
treatment) proscribing discriminatory practice aimed at foreign investors and fostering 
“adequate protection to established investors” would lack all practical application were it 
to lack a public purpose doctrine organizing tenet providing for regulatory space while 
limiting the effects of regulatory pronouncements on the reasonable expectations of 
foreign investors.  
 
454 WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 109. 
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policy of sustainable development unrestricted by a public purpose 
construct, would attach to all financial or economic endeavors undertaken 
by a developing nation under the welcoming banner of “economic 
development.”  
The National Investment Policy Guidelines455 (“NIPG”) aspire to 
translate the Core Principles into practical and “implementation friendly” 
policy strategies that may help develop and frame rules and regulations 
amenable to sustainable development. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the public purpose doctrine is both just as fleeting and central to the NIPG 
as it is to the Core Principles and the NIPG. The public purpose doctrine is 
never defined or otherwise explained. Its presence, however, is obvious 
even in instances where neither the doctrine nor any of its iterations are 
explicitly referenced, as is the case with respect to Subsection 2.2-2.2.3.456 
The explicit reference to “not only the right but the duty to regulate,”457 
because of the conceptual relationship between the Core Principles and the 
National Investment Policy Guidelines, established that public purpose is 
the doctrinal governing principle as to this subsection. Within the 
framework of the UNCTAD Report, the right to regulate is subject to a 
legitimate and cognizable public purpose.458 Accordingly, Subsection 
2.2.3 of the NIPG must be viewed as directly and explicitly dependent on 
the public purpose doctrine.  
Along the lines of Subsection 2.2.3, Subsection 2.2.7  “Investment 
Contract” also fails to identify the public purpose doctrine by any of its 
orthodox iterations. Instead, however, it references an abbreviated and 
surface definition:  
States should honor their obligations deriving from 
investment contracts with investors, unless they can invoke 
fundamental change of circumstances or other legitimate 
reasons in accordance with national and international 
law.459  
                                                 
455 Id. at 123.  
 
456 Id. at 124. Section 2 (Investment Regulation and Promotion), Subsection 2.2 
(Treatment and Protection of Investors Treatment under the Rule of Law Core Standards 
of Treatment), paragraph 2.2.3 reads: “While recognizing that countries have not only the 
right but the duty to regulate, regulatory changes should take into account the need to 
ensure stability and predictability of the investment climate.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
457 Id. (emphasis in original).  
 
458 See supra note 455 & accompanying text. 
. 
459 WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 125 (emphasis supplied).  
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This subsection, however, is best understood when read together 
with Subsection 2.2.8, “Expropriation,” which does in fact refer to the 
doctrine by explicit nomenclature. This subsection reads:  
When warranted for legitimate public policy purposes, 
expropriations or nationalizations should be undertaken in a 
non-discriminatory manner and conform to the principle of 
due process of law and compensation should be provided. 
Decisions should be open to recourse and reviews to avoid 
arbitrariness.460 
Subsection 2.2.8 expands on the abbreviated “legitimate reasons” 
enunciated in Subsection 2.2.7 by linking legitimate with public policy 
purposes. This is a wholesale regurgitation of the public purpose doctrine 
in the context of expropriation or nationalization in the NIPG to the 
general rule of international law—providing that expropriations, 
nationalizations, whether direct, indirect, or comprising of other actions 
tantamount to expropriation are proscribed unless they are undertaken in 
furtherance of (i) a public purpose, (ii) in accordance with due process of 
law, (iii) on a non-discriminatory basis, and (iv) for compensation.461 It 
follows that the NIPG, while serving as compelling evidence that the 
public purpose doctrine is present and actually featured as a conceptually 
fundamental premise in international instruments and therefore by such 
measure part of customary international law, does not bring jurists, 
commentators, or practitioners any closer to a meaningfully functional 
understanding of the doctrine.  
The third pillar of the sustainable development exception here 
contextualized as falling within the ambit of the public purpose doctrine, 
are the Elements of International Investment Agreements: Policy Options 
(“International Policy Options”)462 Consonant with the Core Principles 
and the NIPG, the international policy guidelines seek to incorporate the 
Core Principles into the rule-making space of international law, i.e., the 
fashioning of treaties and other international agreements as with the Core 
Principles and the NIPG, the public purpose doctrine occupies a special 
place that both identifies the central and determinative features of the 
legacy public purpose doctrine as well as the non-workable elements that 
are no longer responsive to the transnational needs of home and Host 
States within a framework of interdependence and economic globalization. 
In fact, all three explicit references to the doctrine within the international 
policy guidelines merit detailed consideration.  
                                                 
460 Id. (emphasis supplied).  
 
461 Cf. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110. 
 
462 WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 143. 
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Four explicit references to the public purpose doctrine are 
contained in the international policy options as viable alternatives that can 
be incorporated into international investment agreements. First, Section 
2.3 (Exclusions from the Scope) suggests the use of carve-out provisions 
in treaty language. Public purpose related carve-outs are divided into (i) 
specific policy areas, and (ii) specific sectors and industries.463 Subsidies 
and grants, public procurement, and taxation are listed as examples of 
specific policy areas that can be excluded from treaty language.464 
Similarly, essential social services (such as health and education) and 
sensitive industries (cultural industries, fisheries, nuclear energy, defense, 
and natural resources), also are identified as counterpart-specific sectors 
and industries that can be removed from treaty jurisdiction.465 The 
rationale underlying Section 2.3 quite lucidly identifies the basic 
mechanics between constraints placed on a Host State arising from a 
broader treaty scope as to the capital-importing country’s policy space and 
possible liability to investor claims, and the sustainable development 
(public purpose) related Host State objectives.466 The International Policy 
Options, however, are admittedly exploring ways in which international 
investment agreements may further sustainable development. Put 
differently, but preserving the substantive meaning of this objective, the 
International Policy Options seek to maximize the regulatory space in 
which the right to regulate is exercised, while realistically considering the 
potential detrimental effect of such carve-outs on prospective FDI.467 
                                                 
463 Id. at 145. 
 
464 Id.  
 
465 Id. 
 
466 The drafter’s annotations on the sustainable development implications of treaty carve-
out or scope techniques aptly reflects a keen awareness of the dynamics between home 
and Host States: 
  
The broader a treaty’s scope, the wider its protective effect and its 
potential contribution to the attraction of foreign investment, however, 
a broad treaty also reduces a Host State’s policy space and flexibility 
and ultimately heightens its exposure to investors’ claims. States can 
tailor the scope of the agreement to meet the country’s [sustainable 
development] agenda. 
 
Id. Framing the relative concerns and expectations of home and Host States in terms of 
claim exposure is not a comprehensive framing of the issue that the drafters themselves 
identified, i.e., rendering a Host State an attractive FDI target while preserving the Host 
State’s right to regulate for a public purpose. A “claims analysis” approach, albeit 
practical, conceptually is too limited. Id.  
 
467 The International Policy Options’ emphasis on Host States, without according due 
consideration to the expectations of foreign investors may easily be gleaned from the 
annotations “By carving out specific policy areas and sectors/industries from treaty 
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The use of carve-out provisions in treaty language is a practical 
and transparent approach to preserving a State’s regulatory space without 
frustrating the expectations of Home State investors. A litany of carve-out 
provisions within a treaty may give rise to interpretive constructions that 
undermine the very goals that the carve-outs in the first instance sought to 
advance.468 Section 4.5 on expropriation complies with the obligatory 
reference to public purpose as one of four conditions that must be met in 
the event of a dispossession of an investment by a Host State.469 In fact, 
three of the four conditions—(i) public purpose,(ii) non-discrimination, 
and (iii) due process—are expressed as “substantive conditions.” 
Moreover, only by violating any of these three substantive conditions shall 
“full reparation” ensue.470 Subsection 4.5.1 is particularly encouraging 
because it provides a foundational challenge to crafting a special public 
purpose category pertaining to sustainable development.471 Despite the 
                                                                                                                         
coverage, States preserve flexibility to implement national policies, such as industrial 
policies (e.g., to grant preferential treatment to domestic investors or to impose 
performance requirements), or to ensure access to essential/public services.” Id. 
 
468 By way of example, Article 32 (“Supplementary Measures of Interpretation”) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for recourse “to supplementary means 
of interpretation.” VCLT, supra note 105, art. 32. The veritable chestnut expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius applied to an instrument that contains multiple carve-out provisions 
may lead to a restrictive construction of the public purpose doctrine under specific facts. 
For example, in applying the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the 
United States Supreme Court, citing Chancellor Kent, Stated in Tucker v. Alexandroff: 
 
‘Treaties of every kind . . . are to receive a fair and liberal interpretation 
according to the intention of the contracting parties, and to be kept with 
the most scrupulous good faith. Their meaning is to be ascertained by 
the same rules of construction and course of reasoning which we apply 
to the interpretation of private contracts.’ 
 
183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902); see also Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“General rules of statutory construction may be brought to bear on difficult or 
ambiguous passages, but we also look beyond the written words to the history of the 
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the signatory parties in 
determining the meaning of a treaty provision.”); Coplin v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 115, 
127 (1984) (“[T]he enumeration of certain powers with respect to a particular subject 
matter is a negation of all other analogous powers with respect to the same subject 
matter.... The rule is curtly Stated in the familiar legal maxim, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.”) (citing Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 436 (1902)). 
 
469 WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 148. 
 
470 Id. 
 
471 Subsection 4.5.1 reads: 
 
Limit protection in case of indirect expropriation (regulatory taking) by 
 establishing criteria that need to be met for indirect expropriation 
to be found, 
 
 EAST\64724221. 3172 
International Policy Options’ developing country agenda focused on 
furthering sustainable development—in part through appropriate drafting 
of international investment agreements—the challenge of how best to 
balance the competing interests between FDI protection expectations and 
Home State right to regulate concerns pertaining to critical sectors was 
clearly acknowledged.472 The drafters sought to mitigate prospective 
liability against Host States arising from this issue by relying on drafting 
techniques rather than seeking to modify existing principles of 
international law: 
To avoid undue constraints on a State’s prerogative to 
regulate in the public interest, an IIA may set out general 
criteria for State acts that may (or may not) be considered 
an indirect expropriation. While this does not exclude 
viability risks altogether, it allows for better balancing of 
investor and State interests.473 
Treaty-drafting techniques may contribute to furthering process 
legitimacy and party expectation concerns, but they will not eviscerate the 
detrimental consequences stemming from a public purpose doctrine that 
adheres to a subjective standard and that is unduly expansive as to content. 
In addition, the balancing of interests between capital-exporting and 
capital-importing countries in the realm of international investment law 
should not be framed in terms of what may be necessary from the 
                                                                                                                         
 defining in general terms what measures do not constitute 
indirect expropriation (non-discriminatory good faith regulations 
relating to public health and safety, protection of the environment, 
etc.) 
 
 clarifying that certain specific measures do not constitute an 
indirect expropriation (e.g., compulsory licensing in compliance 
with WTO rules).  
 
Id.  
 
472 The annotations to Section 4.5 (Expropriation) of the International Policy Options 
provide, in relevant part: 
 
IIA provisions typically cover ‘indirect’ expropriation, which refers to 
regulatory takings, creeping expropriation and acts ‘tantamount to’ or 
‘equivalent to’ expropriation. Such provisions have been used to 
challenge general regulations with an alleged negative effect on the 
value of an investment. This raises the question of the proper borderline 
between expropriation and legitimate public policymaking (e.g., 
environmental, social or health regulations). 
 
Id. 
 
473 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
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perspective of Host State efforts “[to] exclude liability [and] risks 
altogether.”474 Instead, the objective should be to use or develop existing 
principles so that obligations running in favor of foreign investment 
protection may be duly balanced as to the exercise of domestic regulatory 
authority, all within a framework of interdependence and shared 
responsibility. Interdependence and shared responsibility in turn bespeak 
the need to re-examine application of proportionality and an end to 
“winner take all” resolutions. 
The third reference to public purpose within the International 
Policy Options is in Section 5, entitled: “Public Policy Exceptions.”475 In 
the same spirit as Section 4.5, which encourages the drafting of general 
criteria in order to identify indirect expropriations arising from regulatory 
fiat, Section 5 emphasizes the use of drafting techniques, both to broaden 
and to “limit” public-purpose-based exceptions.476  
The scope of the suggested public purpose exceptions, however, is 
problematic because it suffers from being overbroad and conceptually 
indistinguishable from “limiting” the public purpose doctrine as pertaining 
“only” to all things public. Even though Subsection 5.1.3 purports to be a 
provision that encourages limiting the exception, the suggested limitation 
is fundamentally boundless. It provides: 
5.1.3  Limit the exception by specifying: 
- that the exception only relates to certain 
types of measures, e.g., those relating to 
trafficking in arms or nuclear non-
proliferation; or taken in pursuance of 
State’s obligations under the UN Charter for 
the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security;  
- that it only applies in times of war or armed 
conflict or in emergency in international 
relations.477 
Certainly, categorical specificity serves as a meaningful limitation as to 
scope. Further qualification as suggested still remains a necessity. A 
general category is only as functional as additional specifications in the 
                                                 
474 Id. 
 
475 Id. at 151. 
 
476 Id.  
 
477 Id. 
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form of subcategories that have a narrowing effect akin to concentric 
circles such that very specific acts or omissions would trigger application 
of the exception. Section Five’s objective is to broaden the regulatory 
space of Host States. Subsection 5.1.2, for example, encourages 
“[b]roaden[ing] the exception by clarifying that national security may 
encompass economic security.”478  
The expansive and all-encompassing definition of public purpose 
asserted in Section Five simply cannot be cured by enumerating a rosary 
of categories as Subsection 5.1.4 suggests. That subsection invites IIA 
negotiators and drafters “[to]include exceptions for domestic regulatory 
measures that aim to pursue legitimate policy objectives” such as those 
aiming to: 
- protect human rights, 
- protect human health, 
- preserve the environment (e.g., biodiversity, 
climate change), 
- protect public morals or maintain public 
order, 
- preserve cultural and/or linguistic diversity,  
- ensure compliance with laws and regulations 
that are not inconsistent with the treaty, 
- allow for potential measures (e.g., to 
preserve the integrity and stability of the 
financial system), 
- allow for broader safeguards, including on 
development grounds (to address host 
countries’ trade , financial and 
developmental needs), 
- prevent tax evasion, 
- protect natural resources of artistic, historic 
or archeological value (or ‘cultural 
heritage’).479 
                                                 
478 Id. 
 
479 Id. 
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All of the suggested public purpose categories of exceptions asserted in 
Subsection 5.1.4 merely invite tautological reasoning. The protection of 
public morals or maintenance of public order is illustrative in this regard. 
Conceptually, virtually any State action or omission may reasonably fall 
within this category. As a matter of evidentiary proof, the all-
encompassing scope of these two categories suggest that any particular act 
allegedly falling with their respective purviews would be asserted as part 
of a self-judging standard that would be difficult, if not altogether 
impossible, to challenge.  
As to Section Five, Public Policy Exceptions, the UNCTAD 
Report’s drafters specifically contemplated amplifying Host States’ 
regulatory space by suggesting that general exceptions be crafted as self-
judging, i.e., pursuant to the subjective intent of the invoking State.480 The 
UNCTAD Report’s unvarnished admission that a self-judging standard is 
conducive to (i) reducing investor confidence and (ii) enhancing the 
likelihood the “possibilities for abuse”481 [presumably on the part of Host 
States against the interests of foreign investors], quite starkly identifies the 
very problem that needs to be averted pursuant to the adaptation and 
adoption of a functional public purpose doctrine.  
Vesting States with functionally limitless discretion under the 
banner of the “right to regulate” in furtherance of a public purpose 
represents the very conceptual deficit of the legacy public purpose 
doctrine that needs to be modified. Besides the obvious deterrents to FDI 
endemic to such an approach, enhancing the likelihood of abuse and 
corruption undoubtedly shall continue to contribute to a crisis in process 
legitimacy at every critical juncture of international investment law.482 A 
                                                 
480 The annotations to Section Five, Public Policy Exceptions, State: 
 
A number of features determine how easy or difficult it is for a State to 
use an exception. To avoid review of the relevant measure by court or a 
tribunal, the general exception can be made self-judging (i.e., the 
necessity/appropriateness of the measure is judged only by the invoking 
State itself). This approach gives a wide margin of discretion to States, 
reduces legal certainty for investors and potentially opens possibilities 
for abuse. In contrast, exceptions designed as not self-judging imply 
that in case of a dispute, a court or tribunal will be able to determine 
whether the measure in question is allowed by the exception. 
 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 
481 Id. 
 
482 “Corruption within procurement systems has been prevalent throughout the world and 
is not limited to developing countries.” Anne Janet DeAses, Developing Countries: 
Increasing Transparency and Other Methods of Eliminating Corruption in the Public 
Procurement Process, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 553, 554 (2005). Efforts to curb such 
corruption have include the U.N. Convention Against Corruption, the Inter-American 
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self-judging standard for public purpose is inimical to the international 
appetite for greater transparency and objective criteria concerning issues 
pertaining to international trade and investment law.483 The self-judging 
criteria not only would generate a greater number of expensive and 
politically sensitive international disputes primarily in the form of treaty-
based arbitrations, but also contribute to the development of doctrinally 
inconsistent arbitral “decisional-law.”484 The legacy public purpose 
doctrine founded on a subjective standard cannot help but to contribute to 
a body of persuasive precedent in the form of arbitral awards that lack 
uniformity, predictive value, and transparency of standard in seeking to 
strike the appropriate mean between an obligation in favor of protecting 
FDI and the right (actually duty) to regulate. 
Finally, Section 6.2 is the fourth provision in the International 
Policy Options that most directly concern or explicitly reference the public 
purpose doctrine. This section also relies on specific treaty drafting rather 
than the development of appropriate legal precepts, as a methodology for 
limiting the exposure of Host States to arbitral claims.485 The emphasis on 
treaty negotiation and drafting suggested in subsection 6.2.4 suffers from 
the identical shortcomings that also attach to the NIPG as to the extent to 
which treaty drafting techniques may correct what is fundamentally a 
doctrinal and conceptual legal issue. Also as with the NIPG, this 
suggestion gives rise to a new set of concerns spawned by application of 
these very treaty-drafting methodologies.486 The strictures of Subsection 
                                                                                                                         
Convention Against Corruption, and the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention). Id. 
at 561-68. 
 
483 See supra note 141 & accompanying text. 
 
484 See, e.g., supra  Chapter 1.H. 
 
485 Subsection 6.2.4 provides: 
 
Limit States’ exposure to ISDS [investor-State dispute settlement], e.g.: 
 
- Clarify that certain treaty provisions and/or sensitive areas are 
excluded from ISDS, e.g., national security issues, including 
incoming investments; measures to protect the environment, 
health and human rights; prudential measures; measures 
relating to transfer of funds (or respective IIA provisions); tax 
measures that do not amount to expropriation; IIA provisions 
on transparency;  
 
- Specify only those issues/provisions to which ISDS should 
apply (e.g., only to the expropriation provision).  
 
WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 152.  
 
486 See supra at Chapter 2.E(4). 
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6.2.4 of the International Policy Options, calling for the proliferation of 
carve-out provisions in treaties so as to limit the subject matter of 
international arbitration jurisdiction, stands in considerable contrast with 
the annotations to Section 6.2 that identify generally the nature of the 
issues that most commonly give rise to treaty-based arbitral disputes. 
Embedded in the actual annotations are the very grounds that explain why 
treaty-drafting techniques at most only may serve to minimally mitigate 
challenges to abuse of regulatory authority in the context of FDI 
protection. The most relevant part of the annotation on this issue reads: 
As the number of ISDS [investor-state dispute settlement] 
cases increases, questions have arisen with regard to the 
effectiveness of the SD implications of ISDS. Many ISDS 
procedures are very expensive and often take several years 
to resolve. ISDS cases increasingly challenge domestic 
regulatory measures implemented for public policy 
objectives. Almost all ISDS cases lead to the breakdown of 
the relationship between the investor and the Host State. 
Due to the lack of a single, unified mechanism, different 
tribunals have issued divergent interpretations of similarly 
worded treaty provisions, resulting in contradictory 
outcomes of cases involving identical/similar facts and/or 
treaty language. Many ISDS proceedings are conducted 
confidentially, which has raised concerns when tribunals 
address matters of public policy.487  
The annotation plainly emphasizes challenges to domestic regulatory 
measures as an important cause of disputes and the eventual collapse of 
relationships between investors and Host States. Quite remarkably, it very 
aptly draws a connection between regulatory challenges and 
“contradictory outcomes”488 generated by treaty-based arbitral tribunals. It 
also observes that “similarly worded treaty provisions”489 lead to 
contradictory results. Accordingly, the fundamental problem is not one of 
formal uniformity, i.e., a common nomenclature, but rather a conceptual 
disparity pertaining to the actual scope and content of the principles at 
issue. The fundamental investor protection standards are uniform as to 
form (i.e., nomenclature but not substance). The content is typically the 
subject matter of negotiations under negotiating circumstances that rarely 
generate written evidence of “intent.” Regrettably, BIT negotiations 
evolve from a practice based on “model” (euphemism for “form”) treaties 
                                                                                                                         
 
487 WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 152. 
 
488 Id. 
 
489 Id. 
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that scarcely were submitted to rigorous academic analysis. Even 
cornerstone terms such as “IMS” (international minimum standard) remain 
less than static as to content and thus in negotiating scenarios. The 
suggested drafting techniques asserted in Subsection 6.2.4, which detail 
little more than engaging in an exhaustive recitation of subject matters, is 
hardly adequate to address this problem. The issue is fundamentally of a 
normative and doctrinal nature. 
6. The Public Purpose Doctrine and Lessons From 
UNCTAD 
Both the UNCTAD Secretariat’s Note—Concerning the 
Development Dimension of Foreign Direct Investment: Policies to 
Enhance the Role of FDI in the National and International Context as well 
as the 2012 World Investment Report explicitly and implicitly reference 
the public purpose doctrine. They contribute to the universe of evidence in 
the form of international instruments establishing that the public purpose 
doctrine constitutes part of customary international law. The UNCTAD 
pronouncements identify the public purpose doctrine as central to what is 
referred to as the right to regulate for the public interest (also expressed as 
a duty),490 and as one of four principles that render an expropriation legal.  
Even though the UNCTAD instruments identify an expansive 
domestic regulatory space harmful to FDI, the public purpose doctrine is 
used as an exception justifying a practically unbridled regulatory fiat on 
the part of Host States. Sustainable development, as contained in the 
UNCTAD documents, can be construed as a special public purpose 
category. Regrettably, sustainable development is, to the extent that it is 
“defined” at all, explained as encompassing practically all aspects of 
economic and finance that may reasonably be related to a State’s 
subjective development need. Put simply, this special public purpose 
category is so broad that it cannot help but to displace any tempered and 
harmonious relation between a State’s obligation to protect foreign 
investments and its qualified right to regulate.  
As expressed in the UNCTAD international instruments, the public 
purpose doctrine is contemplated as a self-judging category the 
appropriate application of which can only be determined by the invoking 
State, which is generally a Host State developing country or economy in 
transition. Substantial development, i.e., the public purpose doctrine, is 
accorded broad content and a subjective standard as to both content and 
application, even though the UNCTAD views that the amplification of the 
regulatory space through this methodology is conducive to protracted, 
                                                 
490 Peter D. Szigeti, Territorial Bias in International Law: Attribution in State and 
Corporate Responsibility, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 311, 332 (2010) (arguing that 
“the duty to regulate others’ acts is inherent in sovereignty, indeed in all political 
power”). 
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expensive, and politically sensitive treaty-based arbitration disputes, and 
also often leads to political corruption. 
Although the UNCTAD concedes uncertainty and international 
disputes are caused to proliferate because of conflicting constructions by 
tribunals of like or similar treaty (presumably protection standards) 
provisions, and these contentions in turn discourage FDI, the problem is 
not framed as a legal issue pursuant to which doctrinal and conceptual 
developments are warranted, but rather as a subject to cure through 
application of treaty-drafting techniques. The analysis is problematic. This 
lack of appreciation for the relationship between the need for doctrinal and 
conceptual development and a proposed solution in the form of treaty 
drafting and editing techniques is emblematic of the deeper crisis that the 
legacy public purpose doctrine in considerable measure has caused. The 
mechanical recitation of public purpose, in all of its incarnations, has 
created a culture of acceptance and presumption that the meaning of 
public purpose is understood by all and in the same way. This fallacy in 
turn has led to the frustration of party expectations in the field of 
international investment law and caused capital-exporting States to 
question the efficacy of international arbitral tribunals that generate 
conflicting “decisional law” because of their adherence to an untested 
assumption configured by broad content and a subjective (self-judging) 
standard. 
While the UNCTAD pronouncements specify a type of public 
purpose doctrine believed to be required for the establishment of norms 
that presumably are to govern the relationship between FDI and Host 
States within a framework of substantial development, the effort appears 
to be too partial in favor of Host States and prescribes drafting techniques 
as a solution to a doctrinal and conceptual problem. The remedy does not 
fit the ill.  
F. What Does it All Mean? 
The Core Principles, NIGP, and the International Policy Options, 
all purport to instruct States on domestic and international rule-making. 
They thus must be accepted as probative evidence indicative of State 
practice for purposes of determining whether the public purpose doctrine 
as presented in the various UNCTAD pronouncements constitutes part of 
customary international law. Such an affirmative finding also entails 
acceptance of sustainable development as the broadest, economic-based 
expression of the public purpose doctrine. The public purpose doctrine, 
embracing this principle of sustainable development of recent vintage has 
started to find a space in BITs.  
This new development certainly emphasizes the importance of the 
public purpose doctrine in both conventional and customary international 
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law, but also compounds the challenges endemic to a subjective standard 
and an arguably boundless realm of application. Engrafting a sustainable 
development content to the public purpose doctrine, as is plainly 
established from the very embryonic development of this phenomenon in 
BITs, merely has the practical—and, at times, intentional—effect of 
transforming the right to regulate into an absolute right to regulate 
irrespective of obligations to foreign investments/investors, so long as 
such regulation is reasonably related to a State’s sustainable 
development. Hence, the scope of the right to regulate in furtherance of 
sustainable development also may be rephrased: a State’s right to regulate 
may infringe upon foreign investments/investors where such regulation 
relates to a financial or economic concern of the host country. While 
public purpose in the form of sustainable development is laudable, a 
sustainable development expression of the public purpose doctrine should 
not be used as a precept adopted by a developing State in order to cure 
what it perceived to be asymmetries between its obligation to protect 
foreign investments/investors and the right to regulate. 
1. The South African Development Community Model 
Bilateral Treaty Template 
The insertion of the sustainable development iteration of the public 
purpose doctrine into BITs arguably may have as much to do with 
correcting the perceived asymmetry between home and host countries, as 
it does with technically providing for a special category public purpose 
exception. The South African Development Community (“SADC”) Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Template provides further evidence of the role 
of the public purpose doctrine in furtherance of sustainable development 
in BITs,491 as well as of the use of this expression of the doctrine as a 
means to correct to perceived inequitable asymmetries between capital-
exporting and capital-importing States.492 This approach to the public 
purpose doctrine and to BITs generally, may have the negative collateral 
effect of placing broad economic burdens on investors who may be asked 
to subsidize by way of relinquishing rights, Host State domestic policies. 
The subsidization is a discernible trend that will require detailed analysis. 
                                                 
491 The expression of the fundamental iterations of the public purpose doctrine in BITs is 
discussed infra at Chapter 4.   
 
492 South African Development Community, SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Template with Commentary, July 2012, available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf [hereinafter SADC 
Model BIT Template] 
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The SADC Model BIT Template encompasses eight sections493 
that most eloquently establish how the sustainable development expression 
of the public purpose doctrine is used to: (i) correct perceived asymmetries 
between States; (ii) amplify the domestic regulatory space of Home States; 
(iii) reduce reasonable investor protection obligations on the part of Host 
States; and (iv) help shift the economic burden of Host States to foreign 
investors/investments. 
The SADC Model BIT’s anatomy contains eight specific 
references to the public purpose doctrines. Each of these references, 
however, help establish that the doctrine is being used to do more than just 
secure a reasonable space for the domestic exercise of regulatory authority 
by Host States. Each of these references commands close scrutiny. 
First, the very preamble of the SADC Model BIT bespeaks an 
effort committed to interests of Host States that does not fully articulate 
countervailing Home State concerns. Under the heading “Reaffirming” the 
Preamble in pertinent part reads: 
Reaffirming the right of the State Parties to regulate and to 
introduce new measures relating to investments in their 
territories in order to meet national policy objectives, and – 
taking into account any asymmetries with respect to the 
measures in place – the particular need of developing 
countries to exercise this right.494 
The purported reaffirmation itself is less than clear because there is no 
evidence from which to infer or otherwise conclude that there existed any 
“asymmetries with respect to the measures in place,” let alone specificity 
as to both “asymmetries” and “measures.” Thus the preamble purports to 
reaffirm a policy that is not at all identified with a similarly generic 
reference to a measure, presumably within the context of a general need 
pervading all “developing countries” (herein referred to as 
“underdeveloped countries or underdeveloped States”) with respect to the 
exercise of a right. This reaffirmation in the SADC Model BIT calls into 
question the very propriety of the treaty’s nomenclature itself, as it is far 
more than an investment treaty, and purports to have bilateral rights. The 
reaffirmation only speaks to “underdeveloped countries” and references 
“national policy objectives” within the context of Host States.  
The Commentary to the Preamble corroborates a reading of the 
Preamble as referencing a framework beyond attracting greater investment 
and according such foreign direct investment additional levels of juridical 
                                                 
493 Such references appear in Articles 1, 6, 13, 20, 22, and 25 as well as in the preamble. 
Id. 
 
494 Id. at 5. 
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protection so as to render the effort appetizing to capital-exporting States. 
Specifically, the Commentary asserts that a preamble to a bilateral 
investment treaty should be sufficiently broad so as to avert the immediate 
conclusion that presumptions favoring investor protection mostly or 
exclusively underlie a BIT. The most relevant language in this connection 
reads: 
In these circumstances [where an arbitral tribunal seeks 
interpretive help by consulting the preamble of a BIT], 
there have been several instances where arbitral tribunals 
have examined a preamble of a given treaty and found only 
references to the promotion of investment and the provision 
of investor rights under the treaty. As a result, the preamble 
has been held to establish a presumption that the sole 
purpose of the treaty is the protection of the investor in 
order, presumably, to attract higher levels of investment. 
This has led to several instances where arbitrators have 
specifically held that this creates a presumption in favour of 
broader over narrower rights for the investor, fewer and 
more limited rights for government regulatory activity in 
relation to an investment, and an overall presumption of 
investor-friendly interpretations. 
Although there are several arbitrations that have rejected 
this approach and it has been the subject of much academic 
and other professional criticism, it continues to be used in 
some instances. This includes in decisions made as recently 
as in 2010 and 2011. As a result, the preamble set out 
above is crafted to: 
Reflect development goals of SADC Member States, both in general terms 
and specifically in relation to FDI. 
Be balanced, as between development objectives and investor interests, so 
as to preclude unintended expansive interpretation of substantive 
provisions in favour of investors on the basis of the intent to protect 
investors expressed in the preamble, as seen in several arbitrations. 
Be focused on key issues and not become a listing of all of the issues 
reflected in the final text. 
The paragraph on the right to regulate and the recognition 
of asymmetry issues, with modification for the broader 
subject matter here, is drawn from the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), which of course has all developed 
countries as State Parties. This should enhance its 
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acceptability in a north-south negotiating context. At least 
in some measure, asymmetry is part of the policy mix for 
developing States’ development policy building. This 
preamble recognizes such asymmetries as part of this mix 
for international investment law purposes, which overlaps 
with Mode 3 of the GATS. Hence there is a strong 
correlation between the two, and the proposed text can be 
seen as derived from the already agreed upon GATS.495 
Even though the Commentary references the aspiration of obtaining a 
balance “as between development objectives and investor interests,”496 the 
objective is quite narrow and only addresses possible prejudice as to Host 
States only. Nowhere is there mention of the need to ensure that “the right 
to regulate” is confined to the promulgation of measures that comport with 
the expectation of both parties to a bilateral investment treaty. The 
Commentary travels on the presumption that frustrated expectations and 
asymmetrical issues only prejudice and concern capital-importing 
countries. While it is true that there likely are instances where a 
developing country may have negotiated less than favorable terms in 
becoming a signatory to a treaty with a capital-exporting State, the 
assumption that all or most underdeveloped countries are disadvantaged 
and prejudiced because of asymmetrical issues and overly expansive 
foreign investment protection rights finds no foundation in theory or 
fact.497  
The connection between the recognition that asymmetry issues 
with the WTO GATS, notwithstanding the qualifying clause, “with 
modification for the broader subject matter here,”498 is of some concern. 
The scope and issues attendant to the WTO GATS pertaining to 
international trade law are materially distinct from those topics within the 
ambit of international investment law.499 
                                                 
495 Id. at 5-6. 
 
496 Id. 
 
497 To the contrary, in 2011 and 2012 ICSID upheld investors claims either in whole or in 
part 46% and 63% of the time, respectively. https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp 
(last visited April 28, 2013). 
 
498 SADC Model BIT Template, supra note 494, at 6. 
 
499 Supra note 128 & accompanying text. 
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Moreover, the SADC Model BIT also assumes that to the extent 
that BITs do carry a “presumption of investor-friendly interpretations,” 
such a presumption is not in a Host State’s best interest.500  
Article 1 of the SADC Model BIT qualifies the principal objective 
of the BIT as encouraging an increase in FDI that will “[support] the 
sustainable development of each Party.”501 The Commentary to Article 1 
provides that part of the intent behind the provision is to emphasize the 
connection between FDI and the promotion of sustainable development. It 
specifically States that this connection “between foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the promotion of sustainable development” is intended to stress 
that FDI is not “an end in itself.”502 
The proposed objective, as drafted, raises exquisitely complex 
challenges. Is “sustainable development” much like the public purpose 
doctrine, a specifically defined principle of law? If so, where? Is 
sustainable development an absolute public purpose category, or one that 
                                                 
500 The scholarship asserting the proposition that FDI is directly proportional to the 
presumption that foreign investment enjoys juridical protection, or that BITs are subject 
to a “presumption of investor-friendly interpretations,” are vast. See, e.g., Leon E. 
Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 608 (2012) (“The signing 
of bilateral investment agreements incorporating investor-State arbitration is therefore not 
simply about developed States imposing their will on developing States. Rather, these 
agreements are strategically important and States elect among them in a calculated 
manner according to the perceived benefits arising from prospective investment flows.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 
501 Article 1 States: 
 
The main objective of this Agreement is to encourage an increase 
investments [between investors of one State Party into the territory of 
the other State Party] that support the sustainable development of each 
Party, and in particular the Host State where an investment is to be 
located. 
  
SADC Model BIT Template, supra note 494, at 8 (emphasis supplied).  
 
502 The Commentary States: 
 
Many treaties include an objective article to highlight, in a succinct 
manner within the substantive text, the treaty’s main goal. This gives 
added weight to the objective as an interpretational guide, beyond that 
which is normally attributed to the preamble. The link between foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and the promotion of sustainable development 
is recognized in the Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP) and other 
SADC instruments. It is used here to support the key objective of the 
SADC Member States: for FDI to contribute to the development 
objectives of each State and the region as a whole, rather than simply 
being an end in itself. 
Id. 
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is contingent on the development needs of particular States? If the latter, is 
a prospective investor charged with knowledge of a Host State’s specific 
sustainable development needs as a matter of law? Assuming that an 
investor is charged with knowledge of the sustainable development 
content of the public purpose doctrine as expressed in Article 1 of the 
SADC BIT, is it conceptually or doctrinally possible then for the 
sustainable development expression of the public purpose doctrine to be 
self-judging, i.e., subjective, on the part of the invoking State?  
Without pristine answers to these queries it is unlikely that Article 
1 of the SADC Model BIT will gain traction with the universe of 
sophisticated FDI prospective investors who are sensitive to the delicate 
balance between a State’s exercise of sovereignty through regulatory 
enactments within its domestic space and the equally important and 
demanding obligation to protect foreign investor/investments. 
The third material reference to the public purpose doctrine in the 
SADC Model BIT appears in Article 6 within the context of an 
expropriation provision that presents two options as to the compensation 
obligation. In contrast with Article 1110 of the NAFTA, Article 6.1 of the 
SADC Model BIT omits any reference to non-discriminatory treatment 
with respect to the four orthodox exception elements rendering the 
expropriation legal and charging the State only with an obligation to pay 
some form of compensation, depending on the applicable rubric.503 
Therefore, pursuant to this proposed expropriation exception, 
discriminatory regulation on the part of a Host State is countenanced 
where the taking is discriminatory but (i) in the public interest, (ii) in 
keeping with due process of law, and (iii) where fair and adequate 
compensation is tendered within a reasonable period of time.504 This 
                                                 
503 Section 6.1 reads: “A State Party shall not directly or indirectly nationalize or 
expropriate investments in its territory except: (a) in the public interest; (b) in accordance 
with due process of law; and (c) on payment of fair and adequate compensation within a 
reasonable period of time.” Id. at 24. Cf. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110.  
 
504 However, it should be noted that Subsection 6.7. of Article 6 does seem to suggest that 
a discriminatory indirect expropriation under the Model BIT may trigger a compensation 
standard more favorable to a foreign investor than the “fair and adequate” criteria, 
providing: “A [non-discriminatory] measure of a State Party that is designed and applied 
to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety 
and the environment, does not constitute an indirect expropriation under this Agreement.” 
SADC Model BIT Template, supra note 494, at 26 (brackets in original). 
 
The commentary to paragraph 6.7 suggests an intent on the part of the drafters to 
foreclose Home State investors from asserting that non-discriminatory regulatory 
enactments constitute expropriations within the scope of the Model BIT: 
 
The exclusion for regulatory measures in paragraph 6.7 is specific and 
clear, rather than leaving open possibilities for investors to argue 
otherwise. This is the traditional customary international law approach, 
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proposition places still greater reliance on the public purpose element of 
the provision. The tolerance of a discriminatory nationalization or 
expropriation that is either direct or indirect evinces an expansive 
domestic regulatory space and arguably would command more than a 
reasonable showing of public purpose in connection with the taking. This 
model provision invariably prompts the question as to whether different 
showings of public purpose are necessary and warranted depending upon 
the number of elements required in order to constitute a legal and 
legitimate taking.  
Section 6.1 is devoid of the “tantamount” or “equivalent to an 
expropriation” language present in Article 1110 of the NAFTA.505 Thus, 
the provision arguably forecloses claims for expropriation arising from a 
series of regulatory enactments which, when taken together, render an 
investment only nominally valuable or altogether lacking in commercial 
purpose. This construction also materially amplifies the domestic 
regulatory space of Host States while weakening Host State obligations to 
protect foreign investment.  
This proposition is quite extraordinary. Viewed from this 
perspective, the workings of Section 6.1 would render juridically sound a 
series of regulatory acts undertaken within a fixed time frame that are 
discriminatory in nature and have the direct and proximate consequence of 
rendering a foreign investment commercially unviable so long as such acts 
comport with the three other delineated strictures. The proposition also 
invites the additional inquiry as to whether each such discreet 
discriminatory act must be in and of itself subject to a public interest 
requirement, or does such requirement attach only to the totality of the 
subject regulatory actions within the context of their cumulative effect? 
The answer to this inquiry, in turn, would presumably dictate the content 
of the public purpose doctrine against which any such alleged taking must 
be analyzed.  
                                                                                                                         
drawn from the notion that ‘police powers’ measures are not, by 
definition, acts of expropriation. The text is inspired by the COMESA 
CCIA and ASEAN texts. The 1990s and early 2000s’ texts did not 
include such provisions, but these types of clauses are becoming 
increasingly common and should be made clear and apparent in the 
treaty text. Indeed, it is likely that a failure to include such a provision 
now would lead to the assumption that such a clear exclusion was not 
meant to be included and create the risk that a tribunal will hold that by 
not excluding regulatory measures the parties meant to include them 
within the scope of the expropriation article. 
 
Id.  
 
505 See NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110. 
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The meaningful reliance of the public purpose doctrine within the 
framework of the SADC Model BIT generally, and in particular the 
workings of Subsection 6.1 on expropriation, is emphasized because of the 
very unique relationship between the public purpose doctrine and the 
methodology for compensating foreign investors under this provision. 
Two options are articulated with respect to the valuation of a foreign 
investment that has been nationalized or expropriated within the meaning 
of Article 6. The first option places the public purpose doctrine at the very 
center of a valuation analysis that favors the interests of Host States, twice 
appealing to the doctrine. This single sentence valuation tenet renders the 
term “fair market value” as only one of numerous factors to be considered: 
6.2.  Option 1:  The assessment of fair and adequate 
compensation shall be based on an equitable balance 
between the public interest and interest of those affected, 
having regard for all relevant circumstances and taking into 
account the current and past use of the property, the history 
of its acquisition, the fair market value of the property, the 
purpose of the expropriation, the extent of previous profit 
made by the foreign investor through the investment, and 
the duration of the investment.506 
This first option fails to explain how it is that the public interest incident to 
the expropriation is to be weighed or balanced against the “interest of 
those affected.” Similarly, it is less than clear how “the purpose of the 
expropriation” is to be weighed or considered with respect to the “fair 
market value of the property.” Equally obscured is the relationship 
between profits that a foreign investor realized from the investment, and 
the duration of the investment. What does stand out as clear, however, is 
that the public purpose component of the proposed assessment of value 
methodology enunciated in Option 1 is instrumental in diminishing “fair 
market value of the property” and transforming it into “fair and adequate 
compensation” pursuant to which fair market value is depreciated by 
considering the alleged public purpose component of the expropriation.  
The second option actually suggests that “fair market value” of the 
subject property immediately prior to the expropriation is to be used as the 
operative standard, except in cases where it is deemed more “appropriate” 
to assess fair and adequate compensation instead of fair market value. In 
such cases, the public purpose doctrine again is called upon to form part of 
a species of a proportionality test pursuant to which fair and adequate 
compensation is arrived at by balancing public interest against the 
                                                 
506 SADC Model BIT Template, supra note 494, at 24 (emphasis supplied).  
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interests of those prejudiced. This part of the proportionality test is 
consonant with the compensation analysis contained in Option 1.507  
The importation of the public purpose doctrine into expropriation 
damages analysis, creates uncertainty and expands the role of the doctrine 
beyond considerations only pertaining to liability.  
The most balanced compensation proposal that would best appear 
to harmonize the interests of home and Host States is Option 3. Partially 
equitable in nature, the provision is unique in its absence of any mention 
of the public purpose doctrine: 
6.2.  Option 3:  Fair and adequate compensation shall be 
assessed in relation to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the 
expropriation took place (“date of expropriation”) and not 
reflect any change in value occurring because the intended 
expropriation had become known earlier. 508 
This compromise position retains the “fair and adequate” compensation 
element, which is meaningfully removed from actual fair market value, 
fair market value, or actual value, while still using fair market value as of 
a fixed date as a point of departure and standard. Moreover, by discarding 
consideration of the depreciation that the investment may have suffered 
(and in many cases indeed did experience) as a result of predicate acts to 
the expropriation or actions taken prior to the actual taking,509 orthodox 
                                                 
507 Subsection 6.2, Option 2 States: 
 
Fair and adequate compensation shall normally be assessed in relation 
to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately 
before the expropriation took place (“date of expropriation”) and shall 
not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended 
expropriation had become known earlier. However, where appropriate, 
the assessment of fair and adequate compensation shall be based on an 
equitable balance between public interest and interest of those affected, 
having regard for all relevant circumstances and taking account of: the 
current and past use of the property, the history of its acquisition, the 
fair market value of the investment, the purpose of the expropriation, 
the extent of previous profit made by the foreign investor through the 
investment, and the duration of the investment. 
 
Id.(emphasis supplied). 
 
508 Id. at 25. 
 
509 It is common for investments to suffer material depreciation in value arising from the 
pre-expropriation process. Quite often, by way of example, public pronouncements 
precede actual regulatory enactments. These publications, usually industry-wide and 
available to the relevant universe of commercial interests, have the effect of diminishing 
investment value. In a non-expropriation context, such depreciation naturally would be 
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valuation methodologies510 are being discarded to ensure that the valuation 
methodology comports with an expropriation framework that is somewhat 
severed from this sphere of commercial or juridical compensation 
paradigms.511  
                                                                                                                         
considered in any appraisal or valuation of an asset. In fact, one tribunal has awarded 
compensation for wrongful acts occurring prior to BIT coverage, and noted “the project 
was by then already severely damaged from earlier events for which the Respondent 
bears no liability under the BITs; and it remained subject to several commercial, legal 
and political risks.” Gemplus, S.A., SLP, S.A. and Gemplus Industrial, S.A. de C.V. v. 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/3 & ARB(AF)/04/4, Award Part 
XIII ¶ 96 (Jun. 16, 2010), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0357.pdf. 
 
510 See generally Manuel A. Abdala & Pablo T. Spiller, Damage Valuation of Indirect 
Expropriation in International Arbitration Cases, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 447, 454 
(2003) (delineating the orthodox valuation methods for assets damaged in an 
expropriation). 
 
511 Damage theories of restitution or that otherwise seek to render an aggrieved party 
whole, i.e. either placed in the same position that the party was in prior to the alleged 
prejudice or enjoying the status that the prejudiced party would have enjoyed had the 
non-compliant party performed the terms of a contract finding no place in the 
compensation scheme of public international law with respect to expropriation. There is 
no explanation for not awarding an injured party the depreciation caused by the acts or 
omissions of a Host State during a fixed and identifiable time frame leading up to the 
expropriation, which constituted part of the subject of regulatory takings, other than the 
proposition that (i) the injured party assumed the risk of a lawful expropriation and 
therefore should not be made whole and (ii) obligating States to tender full “fair market 
value” rather than “fair and adequate compensation” would be tantamount to imposing a 
fine on the Host State merely for exercising its duty to regulate in furtherance of a public 
purpose. See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International 
Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award ¶¶ 29-53 (Jul. 25, 2007), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0462.pdf (discussing the proper 
method for compensation, whether it be restitution, fair market value, or fair and 
adequate). 
 
Article 1110(2) of the NAFTA excludes from the compensatory scheme of takings 
depreciation or damage occurring prior to the actual act depriving the owner of its 
investment, much like Option 3, but in contrast with Option 3, sets forth a “fair market 
value” standard: 
 
Art. 1110(2): Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value 
of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation 
took place (“date of expropriation”), and shall not reflect any change in 
value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known 
earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value 
including declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as 
appropriate, to determine fair market value.  
 
NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1110 ¶ 2. 
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Yet another sustainable development expression of the public 
purpose doctrine within the SADC Model BIT is contained in Article 13, 
entitled “Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.” This provision 
prescribes a two-pronged pre-entry requirement for investors. One 
requirement entails investor compliance with environmental green criteria 
and assessment processes relevant to the investment at issue in 
conformance with the laws of the host and Home States, as well as the 
International Finance Corporation’s performance standards on 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, “whichever is more 
rigorous in relation to the investment in question.”512 The second part of 
the requirement concerns a social assessment subject to the same strictures 
as the environmental study.513 
The scope of these impact assessments is to include both static and 
progressive analyses on the human rights “of the persons in the areas 
potentially impacted by the investment.”514 Article 13 charges investors 
with the obligation of rendering the environmental and social impact 
assessments public, including on the Internet,515 and available to local 
communities or other sectors that may be potentially affected by the 
investment “in an effective and sufficiently timely manner so as to allow 
comments to be made to the investor, investment, and/or government prior 
to the completion of the Host State processes for establishing an 
investment.”516 The rigors of transparency and lead time engraft material 
preconditions to investors/investments subject to the SADC Model BIT’s 
progenies. Even though this precondition technically applies both to home 
and Host States, as the substantive law on the relevant social and 
environmental issues that are the subject of the assessments pertaining to 
both jurisdictions, as a matter of practical implementation the burden of 
                                                 
512 SADC Model BIT Template, supra note 494, at 34. 
 
513 Article 13.1. provides: 
 
Investors or their Investments shall comply with environmental and 
social assessment screening criteria and assessment processes 
applicable to their proposed investments prior to their establishment, as 
required by the laws of the Host State for such an investment [[or the 
laws of the Home State for such an investment][or the International 
Finance Corporation’s performance standards on Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment], whichever is more rigorous in relation to 
the Investment in question.]  
 
Id. at 34 (brackets in original). 
 
514 Id.  
 
515 See id. (Art. 13.13).   
 
516 Id. at 34. 
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the requirement will have its greatest effect on Home States. It will 
therefore increase foreign investors’ participation in and financial 
contribution to the implementation of Host State domestic policies, which 
has been identified as a salient feature of the sustainable development 
expression of the public purpose doctrine.517 The Environmental Impact 
Assessment pursuant to Article 13 must be consonant with the 
Precautionary Principle.518 
The sixth sustainable development expression of the public 
purpose doctrine in the SADC Model BIT appears under Article 20 
(“Right of States to Regulate”).519 The drafters identify the right of States 
to regulate in conformance with: (i) principles of sustainable development; 
(ii) legitimate social objectives; and (iii) economic policy goals as an 
obligation of Host States arising from customary international law.520 In 
fact, the “right to regulate” as framed in Article 20 is further identified as 
falling “within a balance of the rights and obligations of Investors and 
                                                 
517 See supra at Chapter 2.E(5).  
 
518 Principle 15 of the United Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
defines the precautionary principle, which is followed by the majority of States: 
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall 
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where 
there are threats of serious irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
 
United Nations Conference on Environment & Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 
3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment & Development, U.N. 
Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992). Under such guidance, 
Paragraph 13.4 of Article 13 reads: 
 
Investors, their investments and the Host State authorities shall apply 
the precautionary principle to their environmental impact assessment 
and to decisions taken in relation to a proposed investment, including 
any necessary mitigating or alternative approaches to the investment, or 
precluding the investment if necessary. The application of the 
precautionary principle by investors and investments shall be described 
in the environment impact assessment.  
 
SADC Model BIT Template, supra note 494, at 34 (internal citations omitted). 
519 Id. at 39. 
 
520 Paragraph 20.1 of Article 20 provides: 
 
In accordance with customary international law and other general 
principles of international law, the Host State has the right to take 
regulatory or other measures to ensure that development in its territory 
is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development, 
and with other legitimate social and economic policy objectives.  
Id. 
 
 EAST\64724221. 3192 
Investments and Host States, as set out in [the Model BIT].”521 
Furthermore, non-discriminatory acts undertaken by Host States in 
furtherance of compliance with other treaty obligations also are to be 
construed as part of a “right to regulate,” notwithstanding the burdens that 
such compliance may place on foreign investment.522 
Article 20 identifies a right to regulate as having a normative 
foundation in the sustainable development expression of the public 
purpose doctrine. Besides requiring such measures be “non-
discriminatory” and in accordance with “expressly Stated” “exception[s] 
to the obligations of this Agreement,”523 the right to regulate is viewed as 
an expansive prerogative of Host States that appears to be unbridled as to 
scope. Furthermore, it does not take into consideration any countervailing 
interests on the part of Home States and investors. The Commentary to 
Article 20.2 confirms this construction of the right to regulate principle. 
The drafters viewed the Article 20 “right to regulate” language as ensuring 
an understanding that the Model BIT’s progeny are not construed as 
wresting from Host States any pre-treaty rights,524 and to present the 
agreements based on the Model BIT as providing for more than only 
investor rights.525 The right to regulate presented under Article 20 is not 
                                                 
521 Id. at 40. 
 
522 Id. (Art. 20.3). 
 
523 Id. (Art. 20.2). 
 
524 This intent is somewhat uncommon as it is fundamental that treaties are the means 
pursuant to which States yield sovereignty as a concession to the attainment of an 
international objective concerning one or more States. 
 
525 The commentary in its totality provides: 
 
This article confirms that the treaty does not alter the Host State’s basic 
right to regulate, but without eliminating all the effects of the investor 
protections. [Here, “the effects of the investor protections” refers to 
effects with respect to the Host State, and not to the Investor or the 
Home State.] It should be read with more specific articles that enable 
performance requirements to be imposed, and carefully define the non-
discrimination and expropriation rules, for example. All of these 
provisions are intended to work together. 
 
The broader goal is reStated in paragraph 20.2, again ensuring that 
some of the predilections of arbitrators to view investment treaties 
purely as investor rights would be untenable under the present 
approach. In view of the broad obligations in BITs, it is useful to 
reaffirm the Host State’s right to regulate investments in the public 
interest.  
 
Id. at 40 (bracket language supplied). 
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even contingent upon a “subjective necessity” requirement. It does 
subordinate all investor rights to non-discriminatory regulatory measures 
that a Host State may undertake without consequence to the Host State 
despite prejudice to the Home State’s foreign investor. 
Whether the right to development as described in Article 20 at all 
exists as part of customary international law is less than clear.526 
Embedded in the SADC Model BIT, this basic assumption, without more, 
is likely to work against the very policies that the BIT purports to protect 
and to promote. At some fundamental level it is a challenge to conceive of 
a negotiated treaty that does not cause its signatories to assume burdens 
and obligations in the form of conceded rights to regulate. To the extent 
that the SADC Model BIT drafters understood that the effects of investor 
protections under BITs had a negative effect on Host States because 
parties and arbitrators “exploited ambiguities” in the standards of 
protection against the interests of Host States,527 specifying the content 
and scope of standards of protection within the BIT is a more efficient 
course of conduct than a right to regulate that is boundless and, therefore, 
likely to discourage foreign investment. 
The final and seventh pronouncement of the public purpose 
doctrine is contained in Article 25 entitled “Exceptions.”528 This article 
introduces no less than four standards in the application of seven 
expressions of the public purpose doctrine.529 The proposed exceptions 
                                                 
526 The right does appear in the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. See African Charter, supra note 399, art. 21.   
 
527 SADC Model BIT Template, supra note 494, at 46-47 (providing rationale for detailed 
exceptions). 
 
528 Id. at 46. 
 
529 Article 25 expressly addresses the following seven public purpose categories all 
within the context of sustainable development: (i) public morals, (ii) public safety, (iii) 
the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health, (iv) the conservation of living or 
non-living exhaustible natural resources, (v) protection of the environment, (vi) fiscal and 
monetary financial sums, and (vii) security. The relevant paragraphs in Article 25  
provide:  
 
25.1. [Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination pursuant to Article [4]] Nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to oblige a State Party to pay 
compensation for adopting or enforcing measures taken in good 
faith and designed and applied: 
(a) to protect public morals and safety; 
(b) to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources; and 
(d) to protect the environment. 
 EAST\64724221. 3194 
framework contemplates that as a matter of post-entry investor rights, an 
investor shall have no rights where a regulatory measure is enacted 
pursuant to a non-arbitrary discriminatory measure or a justifiable 
regulatory act.530 Such deliberate discrimination or “justifiable 
discrimination” in the way of regulatory measures shall be deemed to 
constitute an exception when purportedly taken in furtherance of the 
public purpose categories enunciated in Article 25. 
Paragraph 25.1 exonerates a State from any obligation to tender 
compensation so long as such measures are “taken in good faith” and 
“designed and applied”531 to the public categories enunciated in 
subparagraphs (a) through (d). This postulate, under the joint banner of 
good faith and the public purpose doctrine, amplifies the domestic 
regulatory space beyond what may be the reasonable expectations of 
investors from capital-exporting States. It can be synthesized as a 
subjective standard on the part of the State invoking the exception; this 
standard in turn rests upon a principle of good faith that is also self-
judging (subjective) and thus lacking universal content. 
As constructed, the limiting factor, i.e., the most closely objective 
elements contained in Paragraph 25.1(a)-(d), are the public purpose 
                                                                                                                         
 
25.2.  For greater certainty, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to oblige a State Party to pay compensation if it 
adopts or maintains reasonable measures for prudential reasons, 
such as: 
(a) the protection of investors, depositors, financial market 
participants, policy-holders, policy-claimants, or persons to 
whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial institution; 
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or 
financial responsibility of financial institutions; and 
(c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a State Party’s 
financial system. 
 
25.5.  Nothing in this Agreement shall apply to a State Party’s 
measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security, or the protection of its national 
security interests. 
 
25.6  Nothing in this Agreement requires a State Party to furnish or 
allow access to any information, the disclosure of which it 
determines to be contrary to its national security interests  
 
Id. (emphasis supplied; brackets in original). 
 
530 Id. The first sentence of paragraph 25.4 refers to “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination pursuant to Article 4.” 
 
531 Id. 
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categories identified in these subparagraphs. They in turn, would need to 
be vested with some element of necessity if they are to serve any type of 
limiting, categorical function. 
Two additional standards are introduced in Paragraph 25.2: (i)  
reasonableness, and (ii) prudential.532 That paragraph provides that a State 
party may enact or maintain regulatory measures without penalty of 
having to pay compensation so long as the measures are “reasonable” and 
used or intended “for prudential reasons.”533 Such “prudential reasons” 
include534 the protection of fiscal and monetary policies, including 
investors, depositors, financial market participants, etc.,  as well as 
measures relating to the State’s financial system.535 A “reasonableness” 
standard by which the adoption or maintenance of regulatory acts are to be 
measured is simply too broad and suffers from vagueness. Absent an 
aberrant conception, most, if not all, duly enacted regulatory measures will 
meet a reasonableness standard. Pursuant to this criteria, the challenged 
measure would need to be irrational or otherwise unsustainable under any 
rational theory of equity, fact, or law.536 
                                                 
532 Id. (Art. 25.2).  
 
533 Id. 
 
534 The term “include” is here used because the paragraph indicates the two categories 
given as examples are not exhaustive, relying on the term “such as.” Id. 
 
535 Paragraph 25.2 States: 
 
For greater certainty, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
oblige a State Party to pay compensation if it adopts or maintains 
reasonable measures for prudential reasons, such as: 
 
(a) the protection of investors, depositors, financial market 
participants, policy-holders, policy-claimants, or persons 
to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial 
institution; 
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity, or 
financial responsibility of financial institutions; and 
(c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a State Party’s financial 
system.  
 
Id.(emphasis supplied).  
 
536 Most enactments found to violate standards of treaty protection are rational in and of 
themselves and are frequently enacted by members of the international community. The 
reasonableness of a measure is qualitatively separate and distinct from the effect that it 
may have on a foreign investment/investor pursuant to a treaty protection obligation. 
Accordingly, the “reasonable measure” criteria asserted in the SADC Model BIT does 
not constitute a meaningful restriction or qualification as to the form or substance of the 
measure.  
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The term prudential reasons is also laced with vagueness and an 
over inclusive scope. This term is also problematic because, despite its 
“term of art” status as confirmed by the examples listed, the application 
and effects of these principles at a microeconomic level warrants more 
specific criteria or reference to an international NGO as an enabling check 
and balance.537 
Only measures that cannot be justified on rational grounds 
purportedly enacted for non-prudential reasons that do not at all touch or 
concern the categories enunciated in subparagraph (a)-(c) would give rise 
to an actionable claim against a State  party under the SADC Model BIT. 
Article 25 precisely emphasizes the very subjective standard that has been 
identified as a lethal debility of the sustainable development expression of 
the public purpose doctrine and of the public purpose doctrine more 
generally. The commentary to Paragraph 25.1, however, emphasizes the 
exculpatory effects of the self-judging principle of good faith in Paragraph 
25.1, the scope of which is also further unduly amplified because of the 
wholesale importation of international trade law exceptions drawn from 
Article XX of the GATT.538 
The Article 25 “Exceptions” represent an amalgamation of 
investment law, trade law, and incorporation of the sustainable 
development of the expression of the public purpose doctrine. It vastly 
                                                 
537 SADC Model BIT Template, supra note 494, at 46. 
 
538 The commentary to paragraph 25.1 in pertinent part provides: 
 
This article combines a number of exceptions, issues seen in various 
regional and bilateral agreements. Each is considered in order. 
 
Paragraph 25.1 is drawn from Article XX of the GATT, and is also 
reflected in the COMESA CCIA and other bilateral agreements. 
However, it is more specifically drafted to make clear that no 
compensation is required to be paid to an investor for the types of 
measures set out therein as long as they are taken in good faith. This 
avoids a situation, for example, where a measure is ‘made legal’ by 
virtue of paying compensation. Hence the test is not one being a 
breach of the treaty or not, but a more refined and specific Statement 
that the covered measure simply does not require compensation when 
taken in a bona fide manner. 
 
Paragraph 25.2 relates to measures to ensure the stability and integrity 
of the financial system. The notion of prudential measures in this text is 
intended to relate to the technical use of that term in relation to the 
financial sector only. It may be seen as complimentary to the provision 
on safeguards measures enabling certain limitations on the export of 
assets by an investor. 
 
Id. at 46-47. 
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amplifies the Host State’s domestic regulatory space without according 
any concession to the Home State interest in protecting investors by dint 
of obligations contained in treaty-based protection standards. To the 
contrary, the spirit of the SADC Model BIT is one that seeks to diminish 
investor protection in order to attract greater FDI as the principal objective 
of the treaty. This is accomplished by addressing treaty principles in ways 
that may enable Host States to remedy existing asymmetries. Thus, the 
very fundamental nature of the BIT is transformed into a more general and 
far-reaching instrument aimed at restructuring the anatomy of financial 
relationships between and among States. This overarching aspiration will 
also be encountered in analyzing the relationship between the public 
purpose doctrine and international human rights law. 
The protagonistic role of the public purpose doctrine in the form of 
the principle of sustainable development throughout the BIT is laudable as 
a policy objective, but technically deficient as presented because of its 
lack of bilateralism and rudimentary symmetry. Based on the literal 
language of BIT provisions in the SADC Model BIT, Home State 
investors are asked to give up protection rights on investments in order to 
help finance internal Host State legislation described as “necessary” to the 
development of a particular State. The net effect of the Model BIT’s 
workings is to render it unsignable because of its overwhelming penchant 
favoring Host States and adherence to the proposition that the BIT does 
not at all represent any limited relinquishment of sovereignty on the part 
of Home States. These challenges are further exacerbated by the 
incorporation of the legacy public purpose doctrine together with an 
additional emphasis on Host State self-judging criteria. Instead of 
furthering the sustainable development goals that the Model BIT quite 
laudably articulates, and enhancing FDI, the BIT’s framework offers little 
incentive to investors and protection transparency as to their investments. 
Much of these shortcomings, however, can be adjusted by using a public 
purpose doctrine that is vested with substantive content, limited by 
definition, applied through a proportionality principle, and rooted in 
objective standard.  
2. The Sustainable Development Expression of the Public 
Purpose Doctrine in BITs 
Notwithstanding the UNCTAD 2012 Report539 and the SADC 
Model BIT,540 the sustainable development expression of the public 
purpose doctrine remains as opaque as the legacy iteration of the public 
purpose doctrine itself. The sustainable development “principle” is 
nowhere defined conceptually and doctrinally in legislation, decisional 
                                                 
539 Discussed supra at Chapter 2.E(4). 
 
540 Discussed supra at Chapter 2.F(1). 
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law, academic writings, or international instruments.541 It is legitimate to 
inquire, “what is sustainable development?” Even though this question 
may not be susceptible to a comprehensive answer, it does lead to a more 
modest and attainable inquiry. What is the relationship between the 
sustainable development doctrine as expressed in the SADC Model BIT 
and actual BITs in force? Are the broad policy objectives embodied in the 
UNCTAD 2012 Report and the SADC Model BIT discernible in actual, 
negotiated BITs that do not purport to be aspirational paragons? Has the 
sustainable development expression of the public purpose doctrine as a 
principle to be applied in correcting asymmetries in the trade law and 
investment law relationship between States found a voice in BITs? Lastly, 
is there a place for the sustainable development expression of the public 
purpose doctrine in BITs between industrialized States?  
As part of the effort to identify and explore the contours of the 
public purpose doctrine in customary international law, a non-random 
sample of exactly 300 BITs542 were selected (the “Sample BITs”).543 This 
set of BITs yielded only six BITs544 that purported to incorporate 
                                                 
541 Here a difference is being drawn between reference to our mention of sustainable 
development and authoritative writings that define sustainable development in such a way 
that references to the term trigger a succinct and uniform conceptual category that has 
been embraced by a significant number of States comprising the international 
community.  
 
542 See infra Annex II. 
 
543 This terminology, “Sample BITs,” is used throughout. 
 
544 The following six BITs from the Sample BITs contained reference to the sustainable 
development expression of the public purpose doctrine: 
 
(i) Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-China, Sept. 9, 2012, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_china.pdf 
[hereinafter Canada-China BIT]; 
 
(ii) Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Peru, Nov. 14, 2006, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_peru.pdf 
[hereinafter Canada-Peru BIT]; 
 
(iii) Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Colombia for 
the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investments, Jap.-Col., 
Sept. 12, 2011, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Japan_colombia%20BIT.pd
f [hereinafter Colombia-Japan BIT]; 
 
(iv) Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the 
Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Jap.-Pap. New Guin., Apr. 26, 
 EAST\64724221. 3199 
sustainable development as a principle pervading the treaty.545 These six 
BITs, all executed  between 2006 and 2012, suggest that the process of 
negotiation considerably curtails the scope of the sustainable development 
policy.546 The rigors of the interState treaty negotiating process 
notwithstanding, sustainable development contributes to yet a greater 
broadening of the legacy public purpose doctrine. Both the effects of the 
rigors of interState treaty negotiation and the amplification of the legacy 
doctrine merit scrutiny as they manifest themselves in these five BITs. 
 
a. The Canada - China BIT 
The Agreement between Canada and China for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (“Canada-China BIT”) mentions sustainable 
development in its very first sentence: 
RECOGNIZING the need to promote investment based on 
the principles of sustainable development.547 
Other than this fleeting reference, the term “sustainable development” 
nowhere appears in the BIT. There is no definition or explanation of the 
term anywhere in the text. The BIT also is devoid of reference to external 
sources that may help define the term. Notably, the “Exceptions” Article 
                                                                                                                         
2011, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Japan-
PNG%20BIT%2026042011.pdf [hereinafter Japan-Papua New Guinea 
BIT]; and  
 
(v) Agreement Between Government of the Republic of Croatia 
and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Promotion 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Cro.-Azer., Nov. 2, 2007, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Croatia_Azerbaijan.pdf 
[hereinafter Croatia-Azerbaijan BIT].  
 
(vi) Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, Can.-Jor., Jun. 28, 2009, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Canada-JordanFIPA-
eng.pdf [hereinafter Canada-Jordan BIT].  
 
545 These six BITs referencing sustainable development are not being held out as the 
entire universe of BITs incorporating the principle or its nomenclature. They are, 
however, the only BITs at all referring to sustainable development that form part of the 
Sample BITs. 
 
546 It is here assumed that a near reference to the principles of sustainable development 
does not and cannot trigger an otherwise incorporation by reference of the sparse but 
broad precepts ascribed to the various narratives pertaining to sustainable development. 
 
547 Canada-China BIT, supra note 546, at 1. 
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of the BIT (Article 8) only extends conventional limits to foreign 
investment.548 In fact, Article 10 (“Expropriation”) materially differs from 
the expropriation provision that the SADC Model BIT promotes.549 By 
way of example, the expropriation exception elements include “non-
discriminatory manner.” Similarly, and also in stark contrast with the 
SADC Model BIT, the expropriation compensation is to be valued at the 
“fair market value of the investment expropriated,” and even unlike the 
NAFTA, includes a valuation “before the expropriation, or before the 
impending expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is 
earlier.”550 Expropriation compensation also is to include “interest at a 
                                                 
548 In addition to limiting the application the most-favored nation treatment, and national 
treatment to non-conforming measures, paragraphs 4 and 5 read: 
 
4. In respect of intellectual property rights, a Contracting Party may 
derogate from Articles 3 [Promotion and Admission of Investment], 5 
[Most Favoured Nation Treatment] and 6 [National Treatment] in a 
manner that is consistent with international agreements regarding 
intellectual property rights to which both Contracting Parties are 
parties. 
 
5. Articles 5, 6 and 7, do not apply to: 
 
(a) procurement by a Contracting Party; 
(b) subsidies or grants provided by a Contracting Party, 
including government- supported loans, guarantees and 
insurance. 
 
Id. art. 8. ¶¶ 4-5. 
 
549 Article 10 (Expropriation) in relevant part reads: 
 
1. Covered investments or returns of investors of either Contracting 
Party shall not be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to measures 
having an effect equivalent to expropriation or nationalization in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party (hereinafter referred to as 
“expropriation”), except for a public purpose, under domestic due 
procedures of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and against 
compensation. Such compensation shall amount to the fair market 
value of the investment expropriated immediately before the 
expropriation, or before the impending expropriation became public 
knowledge, whichever is earlier, shall include interest at a normal 
commercial rate until the date of payment, and shall be effectively 
realizable, freely transferable, and made without delay. The investor 
affected shall have a right, under the law of the Contracting Party 
making the expropriation, to prompt review, by a judicial or other 
independent authority of that Contracting Party, of his or its case and of 
the valuation of his or its investment in accordance with the principles 
set out in this paragraph.  
 
Id. art. 10 ¶ 1 (emphasis supplied). 
 
550 Id. 
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normal commercial rate until the date of payment.”551 Most significantly, 
the expropriation provision extends to “measures having an effect 
equivalent to expropriation or nationalization in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party.”552 This element also represents a material difference 
between the Canada-China BIT and the paradigmatic sustainable 
development SADC Model BIT.  
The policies underlying the expropriation provision of the Canada-
China BIT hardly bespeak any penchant favoring Host States. To the 
contrary, considerable deference in the form of compensation with interest 
based upon actual fair market value is accorded to the Home State 
investor. It is safe to conclude that the sustainable development principle 
did not help shape the elements of the expropriation standard contained in 
the BIT. The scope and content of this standard of protection is more in 
keeping with the succinct but eloquent second sentence of the preamble 
that follows the reference to sustainable development. It reads: 
“DESIRING to intensify the economic cooperation of both States, based 
on equality and mutual benefit.”553 This Statement of objectives is simply 
poles apart from the SADC Model BIT’s preamble, which centered on 
explaining that investment protection for purposes of attracting greater 
FDI was not the primary objective of the BIT and would only be 
welcomed to the extent that such investment comported with the principle 
of sustainable development as articulated in the Model BIT.554  
The sustainable development expression of the public purpose 
doctrine does find a space in two very important articles of the Canada-
China BIT (Articles 12 and 33). Article 12 allows for regulation of 
transfers relating to a covered investment virtually on a limitless basis so 
long as the proscription is “equitable,” “non-discriminatory,” and meets 
with “good faith application” of the relevant law.555 Most of the Article 
can be described as constituting an exception that provides the Host State 
with an unrestricted license to temper or altogether proscribe transfers 
pertaining to covered investments. The subject matters falling within this 
transfer exception range from criminal law and bankruptcy concerns to the 
soundness of a Contracting Party’s balance of payment status.556 The 
                                                 
551 Id. 
 
552 Id. 
 
553 Id. preamble. 
 
554 See supra notes 494-498 and accompanying text for comparison with the preamble of 
the SADC Model BIT. 
 
555 Canada-China BIT, supra note 546, art. 12 ¶ 3. 
 
556 Article 12 in pertinent part provides: 
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scope of the exception pursuant to Paragraph 4 exclusively concerns 
financial effect at a macroeconomic level. Even though the Global cross-
industry consequences of fiscal policies pertaining to FDI may have a 
macroeconomic effect on Host States, individual FDI represent 
microeconomic events, typically limited to a single industry sector, and 
structured to enjoy a limited or even abbreviated economic cycle or 
lifespan. Thus, BIT exceptions premised on macroeconomic concerns, but 
likely to apply indiscriminately to specific foreign private investment, 
command strict scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                         
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, 
a Contracting Party may prevent a transfer through the equitable, non-
discriminatory and good faith application of its laws relating to: 
 
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection of the rights of 
creditors; 
(b) issuing, trading or dealing in securities; 
(c) criminal or penal offenses 
(d) reports of transfers of currency or other monetary 
instruments; or 
(e) ensuring the satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory 
proceedings. 
 
4. (a) Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining measures that restrict 
transfers when the Contracting Party experiences serious balance of 
payment difficulties, or the threat thereof, provided that such measures: 
 
(i) are of limited duration, applied on a good-faith basis, 
and should be phased out as the situation calling for 
imposition of such measures improves; 
(ii) do not constitute a dual or multiple exchange rate 
practice; 
(iii) do not otherwise interfere with an investor’s ability to 
invest, in the territory of the Contracting Party, in the 
form chosen by the investor and, as relevant, in local 
currency, in any assets that are restricted from being 
transferred out of the territory of the Contracting Party; 
(iv) are applied on an equitable and non-discriminatory 
basis; 
(v) are promptly published by the government authorities 
responsible for financial services or central bank of the 
Contracting Party; 
(vi) are consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund done at Bretton Woods on 
22 July 1944; and 
(vii) avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, 
economic and financial interests of the other 
Contracting Party.  
 
Id. art. 12 ¶¶ 4-5.  
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The Article 33 “General Exceptions” of the Canada-China BIT are 
broad as to subject matter even though they invite classification into only 
three categories. The article represents a veritable confluence of dissimilar 
public purpose categories and attendant policies. The domestic regulatory 
space carved out in Paragraph 2 draws extensively from Article XX of the 
GATT.557 Notably, the relationship between the need to regulate transfers 
arising from covered investments, and that need’s connection to 
environmental measures and the protection of “human, animal or plant life 
or health,”558 is not at all clear.559 While the mechanical and boiler plate 
incorporation of international trade law principles into investment law 
exceptions certainly serves to broaden the public purpose doctrine and to 
impose constraints on investment protection obligations running from 
Host States in favor of foreign investors/investments, it does not advance 
the policies underlying international investment protection and the 
promotion of FDI. 
Paragraph 3 of Article 33 adopts “prudential financial measures” 
that also are found in the UNCTAD 2012 Report560 and in the SADC 
Model BIT.561 This public purpose exception, as in the SADC Model BIT, 
relies on a “reasonable standard to determine ‘measures for prudential 
reasons.’”562 Even though “prudential reasons” in this context is a term of 
                                                 
557 Paragraph 2, Article 33 of the Canada-China BIT States: 
 
2. Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining 
measures, including environmental measures: 
 
(a) necessary to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or 
(c) relating to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption. 
 
Id. art. 33, ¶ 2 (emphasis supplied). 
 
558 Id. 
 
559 See infra Chapter 5 discussing the wholesale importation of international commercial 
law principles into investment law instruments, particularly BITs. 
 
560 See discussion supra at Chapter 2.E(4).  
 
561 See discussion supra at Chapter 2.F(1).  
 
562 Canada-China BIT, supra note 546,  art. 33 ¶ 3. 
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art, the “reasonable measures” standard broadens even further the scope of 
the exception beyond the already liberal industry sector subject matter.563 
The third category of exceptions are much like those contained in 
Article XXI of the GATT, which pertains to State security. Even though 
this category finds a place within the seemingly all-embracing sustainable 
development principle as articulated by the UNCTAD 2012 Report and 
the SADC Model BIT, the exception traditionally finds its way into the 
public purpose doctrine by way of what historically has been described as 
a State’s “police powers.”564 The verbatim transposition of GATT Article 
                                                 
563 Paragraph 3 of Article 33, States: 
 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining reasonable measures 
for prudential reasons, such as: 
 
(a) the protection of depositors, financial market participants 
and investors, policy-holders, policy-claimants, or persons 
to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial 
institution; 
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or 
financial responsibility of financial institutions; and 
(c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a Contracting 
Party’s financial system.  
 
Id. (emphasis supplied).Paragraph 4 further amplifies the prudential financial measures 
exception, providing: 
 
4. Nothing in this Agreement shall apply to non-discriminatory 
measures of general application taken by any public entity--in pursuit of 
monetary and related credit policies or exchange rate policies. This 
paragraph shall not affect a Contracting Party’s obligations under 
Article 12. [the transfer article]. 
 
Id. art. 33 ¶ 4. 
 
564 Paragraph 5 of Article 33 reads: 
 
5. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
 
(a) to require a Contracting Party to furnish or allow access to any 
information if the Contracting Party determines that the disclosure 
of that information is contrary to its essential security interests; 
 
(b) to prevent a Contracting Party from taking any actions that it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests: 
 
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war into such traffic and transactions in 
other goods, materials, services and technology 
undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of 
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XXI Exceptions into the general exceptions of the BIT emphasizes a 
dissonance between the policy objectives of the BIT and the broad 
macroeconomic and distinct character of the security exceptions. By way 
of example, it is a challenge to conceive the manner in which a Host 
State’s investment protection obligations would justify being curtailed 
because of the Host State’s actions arising from its “essential security 
interests relating to the implementation of national policies or international 
agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.”565 Notwithstanding this conceptual 
incompatibility, the unbridled vestiture of authority to implement “non-
discriminatory measures of general application” render it likely that a 
State may use seemingly unrelated subject matters under the guise of 
national security to limit its foreign investment protection obligations with 
respect to a specific FDI or industry sector. 
Generally, the sustainable development principle is present in the 
Canada-China BIT, but it is materially limited in scope. The direct 
reference to the principle in the preamble certainly may be construed to 
amplify the scope of existing exceptions. The confluence of general 
exceptions extracted from principles of international trade law, 
                                                                                                                         
supplying a military order or other security 
establishment,  
(ii) in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations, or  
(iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or 
international agreements respecting the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
or  
 
(c) to prevent a Contracting Party from taking action in pursuance of 
its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security. 
 
Id. art. 32, ¶ 5. As one commentator has provided:  
 
‘But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or 
less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the 
extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, 
or a law to punish offences, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring 
certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its 
own limits, in every case it exercises the same powers; that is to say, 
the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within 
the limits of its dominion.’ 
 
 In other words, the police power and State sovereignty are synonymous. 
 
D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 
471, 477 (2004) (quoting Thurlow v. Com. of Mass., 46 U.S. 504, 583 (1847)). 
 
565 Canada-China BIT, supra note 530, art. 33 ¶ 5(b)(iii). 
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international investment law, and economic development policies—all 
falling within the umbrella of the public purpose doctrine— broadens the 
doctrine, contributes to ambiguity, and continues to cloud the predictive 
value and workings of the doctrine as a normative foundation for an 
expansive right to regulate on the part of Host States. 
Despite a more limited scope as expressed in the Canada-China 
BIT, the sustainable development iteration of the public purpose doctrine, 
despite the effects of international treaty negotiation, demonstrates that 
treaty-drafting techniques alone are not enough to endow the principle 
with an objective standard and limited application. The technical challenge 
is conceptual and doctrinal, and not only one of lack of precision of 
expression, even though this latter issue does follow once there is an 
agreement on doctrine and concept. Specificity of subject matter, 
proportionality in application, and non-self-judging standard all are 
necessary predicates to the application of international treaty-drafting 
techniques that the doctrine must experience. 
The Canada-China BIT, executed between the second and the 
eleventh largest economies in the world,566 raises a most fundamental 
question: Is there a place for the sustainable development iteration of the 
public purpose doctrine in investment protection treaties where the co-
signatories are developed industrialized States? Are the policies articulated 
in the UNCTAD 2012 Report and the commentaries to the SADC Model 
BIT—the correction of asymmetries and the non-yielding of rights that 
may be construed as reasonably related to economic development—at all 
relevant, let alone necessary, in the context of industrialized States? Is the 
invocation of the sustainable development principle in this context more 
helpful than harmful? When considering the problems endemic to the 
public purpose doctrine, the equally problematic iterations of the 
sustainable development principle, and the paucity of material purporting 
to ascribe a limited definition and content to public purpose and its 
sustainable development iteration, the answer to the queries ranges from 
highly unlikely to no. The economic status of industrialized States does not 
warrant the correction of historical asymmetries pursuant to principles 
embedded in investment treaties that favor Host States. The Canada-China 
BIT contributes to an empirical understanding of the changes that 
international arm’s length treaty negotiation process imposes on 
                                                 
566According to the World Bank, as of 2011 China had the second largest economy in 
terms of GDP and Canada ranked eleventh. WORLD BANK, Gross domestic product 2011, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/GDP.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
As of this writing, the World Bank has yet to release the data for 2012. 
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sustainable development as a normative ground for limiting Host State 
investor protection obligations.567  
The Agreement Between Japan And The Republic of Colombia for 
the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment (“Colombia-
Japan BIT”), signed in 2011, does provide greater recognition to the 
sustainable development principle than the Canada-China BIT. It does so 
without just merely referencing the principle while also acknowledging as 
paramount the need to promote investment: 
Recognizing the growing importance of the progressive 
liberalization of investment for stimulating initiative of 
investors and for promoting prosperity and mutually 
favorable business activity in the Contracting Parties; 
Recognizing that these objectives and the promotion of 
sustainable development can be achieved without relaxing 
health, safety and environmental measures of general 
application.568 
b. The Colombia-Japan BIT 
The Colombia-Japan BIT569 does carve out broad exceptions to 
performance requirements in Article 5(6) subject to “unjustifiable” or 
“arbitrary” qualifications that are not particularly stringent and have 
                                                 
567 The agreement between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments was entered into on November 14, 2006, and very much 
resembles the Canada-China BIT in terms of the treaty’s incorporation of the sustainable 
development iteration of the public purpose doctrine. Generally it is materially 
indistinguishable from the Canada-China BIT. The Canada-Peru BIT, however, does 
contain an article on health, safety, and environmental measures, providing: 
 
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. 
Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or 
offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an 
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or 
retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party 
considers that the other Party has offered such encouragement, it may 
request consultation with the other Party and the two Parties shall 
consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement. 
  
Canada-Peru BIT, supra note 546, art. 11. 
 
568 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, preamble. 
 
569 This BIT is analyzed in considerable detain in the Chapter 5 regarding public purpose 
in BITs. 
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proven to be amply flexible as a matter of scope.570 This proposition needs 
to be qualified by observing that the public purpose categories constituting 
the subject matter of the public purpose exception are significantly closer 
to the language in Article XX of the GATT than to the more generic 
development language that one may associate with the principle of 
sustainable development. 
This BIT does contain a quite extraordinary provision in the 
expropriation and compensation Article 11 that quite clearly establishes 
the importance of the public purpose doctrine to Host States. Even though 
the BIT’s expropriation article provides for Hull formula compensation 
(“payment of a prompt, adequate, and effective compensation”)571 and 
meaningfully deviates from the SADC Model BIT paradigm such as in the 
inclusion of “any measure equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalization,”572 these “pro-Home State” expropriation and 
compensation terms that broaden the application of the exception are 
tempered by the likely Host State’s (here Colombia) emphasis on public 
purpose as more than just a boiler plate term of art mechanically included 
in expropriation provisions in BITs. The paragraph merits consultation: 
1. Neither Contracting Party may expropriate or 
nationalize investments in its Area of investors of the other 
Contracting Party or take any measure equivalent to 
expropriation or nationalization (hereinafter referred to as 
‘expropriation’), except, for a public purpose, in 
accordance with due process of law and Article 4, in a non-
discriminatory manner, and upon payment of a prompt, 
                                                 
570 Paragraph 6 reads: 
 
6. Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner and provided that such measures do not constitute 
a disguised restriction on international trade or investment activities, 
nothing in subparagraphs 1(b), (c) and (f) and 2(a) and (b) shall be 
construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining 
measures, including environmental measures: 
 
(a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or 
(c) related to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources. 
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 5 ¶ 6(a)-(c). 
 
571 Id. art. 11 ¶ 1. 
 
572 Id.  
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adequate and effective compensation pursuant to 
paragraphs 2 through 4. 
Note: In the case of the Republic of Colombia, the term 
‘public purpose’, being used in this paragraph, is a term 
used in  international agreements and may be expressed in 
the domestic law of the Republic of Colombia using terms 
such as: ‘public purpose’ or ‘social interest.’573 
Quite significantly, Colombia, the likely Host State in this treaty 
relationship because of its status as an economy in transition,574 caused the 
public purpose doctrine within the meaning of the BIT’s expropriation 
provision to be defined jointly by (i) “international agreements” and (ii) 
“the domestic law of the Republic of Colombia.” This reference to 
international agreements also likely concerns the application of the 
customary international law of public purpose to the public purpose 
component of the BIT’s Article 11 expropriation and compensation 
provision. The invocation of public purpose in international agreements or 
international customary law only is conducive to the legacy public purpose 
doctrine, which in turn would well serve both the expectations and needs 
of developing State signatories to BITs, here Colombia. A generic 
reference to international agreements further bolsters the proposition that 
what Colombia intended was to define public purpose as broadly as 
possible, as would inevitably ensue from a definition premised on 
international agreements that are multidisciplinary and ranging from 
human rights to international commercial law to international investment 
law. 
The laws of Colombia provide for an expansive construction of the 
terms public purpose, public interest, and social interest. By way of 
example, Article 58 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991 is structured 
around the public purpose doctrine and emphasizes the deep connection 
between the doctrine, property rights, and a right to regulate based on 
public purpose:  
Original Translation 
Art. 58. Se garantizan la 
propiedad privada y los demás 
derechos adquiridos con arreglo a 
Art. 58. Private property is 
guaranteed together with all 
other rights arising from 
                                                 
573 Id. (emphasis supplied).  
 
574 See, e.g., Robert W. McGee , Corporate Governance in Transition and Developing 
Economies: A Case Study of Colombia (August 25, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665056 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1665056 (last visited 
April 29, 2013) (evaluating Colombia as a transition economy under relevant OECD 
standards). 
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las leyes civiles, los cuales no 
pueden ser desconocidos ni 
vulnerados por leyes posteriores. 
Cuando de la aplicación de una 
ley expedida por motivo de 
utilidad pública o interés social, 
resultaren en conflicto los 
derechos de los particulares con 
la necesidad por ella reconocida, 
el interés privado deberá ceder al 
interés público o social. 
 
La propiedad es una función 
social que implica obligaciones. 
Como tal, le es inherente una 
función ecológica. 
 
El Estado protegerá y promoverá 
las formas asociativas y 
solidarias de propiedad. 
 
Por motivos de utilidad pública o 
de interés social definidos por el 
legislador, podrá haber 
expropriación mediante sentencia 
judicial e indemnización previa. 
Esta se fjará consultando los 
intereses de la comunidad y del 
afectado. En los casos que 
determine el legislador, dicha 
expropriación podrá adelantarse 
por vía administrativa, sujeta a 
posterior acción contenciosa 
administrativa, incluso respecto 
del precio. 
 
 
 
 
Con todo, el legislador, por 
razones de equidad, podrá 
determinar los casos en que no 
haya lugar al pago de 
indemnización, mediante el voto 
favorable de la mayoría absoluta 
de los miembros de una y otra 
legislation, which rights cannot 
be disavowed or violated by 
subsequent legislation. 
Wherever emergency 
legislation arises from a matter 
of public or social interest, and 
such legislation results in a 
conflict with the rights of 
private parties, private interests 
must yield to public or social 
interests.  
 
 
Property is a social function 
that entails obligations. 
Accordingly, inherent in these 
obligations is an ecological 
responsibility. 
The State shall protect and 
promote all collective and 
private forms of property 
rights. 
 
Based upon concerns 
pertaining to public utility or 
social interests as defined by 
the legislature, legal 
expropriations may take place 
pursuant to judicial judgment 
or prior indemnity. Any such 
expropriation shall balance 
community interests and those 
of the aggrieved party. As set 
forth by the legislature, any 
such expropriation may be 
expedited pursuant to an 
administrative proceeding 
subject to a subsequent 
administrative challenge that 
may also pertain to valuation.  
 
The legislature based upon 
equity considerations, may 
legislate instances where 
payment of indemnity pursuant 
to an expropriation shall not 
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Cámara. Las razones de equidad, 
así como los motivos de utilidad 
pública o de interés social, 
invocados por el legislador, no 
serán controvertibles 
judicialmente. 
issue. These cases, however, 
shall be subject to a majority 
vote of all members of 
Congress at the time. The 
legislature’s premises based on 
equity, public utility or social 
interest shall not be subject to 
judicial review. 575 
 
The invocation of the domestic law of the Republic of Colombia as a basis 
for defining public purpose within the meaning of the Article 11 
expropriation and compensation provision of the Colombia-Japan BIT, 
also speaks to Colombia’s intent as the presumed Host State, to apply a 
public purpose doctrine that is self-judging (based upon a subjective 
standard) and content expansive so as to defy a specific subject matter 
content that would limit its application.576 The qualification in the note of 
the very text, “[i]n the case of the Republic of Colombia,” 577 [not 
applicable to Japan] raises the issue as to whether the public purpose 
doctrine as embodied in customary international law should be construed 
by itself or also (i) within the context of the domestic law of the invoking 
State, (ii) the domestic law of all signatories to the treaty, or (iii) only the 
domestic law of the party to the treaty explicitly identified (if any) in the 
text. While the annex referred to in Article 11 (Annex III) is silent on this 
issue, it does support a liberal construction of public purpose based upon a 
self-judging subjective standard and thus argues for a hybrid legacy-
domestic law approach.578 The comment to public purpose within the 
                                                 
575 Constitution of 1991 of the Republic of Colombia (translation & emphasis supplied by 
author). See also Daniel Bonilla, Liberalism and Property in Colombia: Property as a 
Right and Property as a Social Function, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1135 (2011).   
 
576 A note to Article 11 provides:  
 
Note: In the case of the Republic of Colombia, the term “public 
purpose,” being used in this paragraph, is a term used in international 
agreements and may be expressed in the domestic law of the Republic 
of Colombia using terms such as “public purpose” or “social interest.” 
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 11. 
 
577 Id. 
 
578 The Note in the text at the conclusion of Article 11 (Expropriation and Compensation) 
reads: “Note: For greater certainty, Article 11 shall be interpreted in accordance with 
Annex III.” Id. Paragraph 3 of Annex III provides: 
 
3. Except in such circumstances as when a measure or a series of 
measures is so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be 
reasonably reviewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith, 
non-discriminatory measures of a Contracting Party that are designed 
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meaning of Article 11 explicitly refers to the exclusion of “measures [that 
are] so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot reasonably 
[be]viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith.”579 The 
purportedly explanatory Annex III to the article arguably creates greater 
uncertainty than certainty it may otherwise ever aspire to redeem. 
The Colombia-Japan BIT, in contrast with the expansive security 
exception approach of the SADC Model BIT and most of the Sample 
BITs, qualifies in a restrictive manner the public order element to the 
“general and security exceptions” contained in Article 15.580 The Note 
contained in the text rests on four words, “genuine,” “sufficiently serious,” 
and “fundamental,” to qualify the exercise of a public order exception by 
providing: 
Note: The public order exception may be invoked only 
where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to 
one of the fundamental interests of society.581 
Taken together, the use of public purpose within Article 11 
(“Expropriation and Compensation”), and public order within Article 15 
(“General and Security Exceptions”), notably evince the effects of the 
international treaty negotiation process. The Article 11 “Expropriation and 
Compensation” provision, arguably favoring the protection of Home State 
                                                                                                                         
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 15, do not constitute indirect 
expropriation. 
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, annex III ¶ 3. 
 
579 Id. 
 
580 The relevant provisions of Article 15 read: 
 
1. Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied by a 
Contracting Party in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against the other Contracting 
Party or a disguised restriction on investments of investors of that other 
Contracting Party in the Area of the former Contracting Party, nothing 
in this Agreement other than Article 12 shall be construed to prevent 
that former Contracting Party from adopting or enforcing measures, 
including those to protect the environment: 
 
(a)  necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(b) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public 
order.  
 
Id. at art. 15, ¶ 1 (a)-(b) (emphasis supplied). 
  
581 Id. 
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investments, is substantively materially qualified by a very expansive 
construction of the public purpose exception that would tend to favor Host 
States. Similarly, but in reverse order, the broad Article 15 “General and 
Security Exceptions” that would typically favor Host States is tempered by 
a very narrow construction of the public order exception. Likely, the very 
severity of the international treaty negotiation process provided for a 
reference to sustainable development in the preamble582 that exceeded the 
brief mention of the principle in the Canada-China BIT, but was not 
overtly implemented throughout the Colombia-Japan BIT. The more 
detailed reference in the BIT’s preamble does facilitate any likely 
interpretive broadening of the application of the public purpose doctrine 
by a signatory.583 
c. The Croatia-Azerbaijan BIT 
Yet another BIT from the Sample BITs to reference sustainable 
development is the Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (“Croatia-Azerbaijan 
BIT”), which was signed in 2007. Unlike the Canada-China BIT between 
two industrialized countries with leading economies, and the Colombia-
Japan BIT between an industrialized leading economy and an economy in 
transition, the Croatia-Azerbaijan BIT is between two underdeveloped 
                                                 
582 See generally ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW & PRACTICE (Cambridge 
University Press 2007).  
 
583 Even though the sustainable development iteration of the public purpose doctrine is 
not widely or very overtly implemented throughout the BIT, aspects of the principle are 
accorded considerable weight. By way of example, Article 21 (Measures on Health, 
Safety, Environment, and Labor) is sufficiently broad so as to fall squarely within the 
sustainable development dialogue: 
 
1. Each Contracting Party recognizes that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment activities of investors of the other Contracting 
Party and of a non-Contracting Party by relaxing its domestic health, 
safety or environmental measures or by lowering its labor standards. 
Accordingly, each Contracting Party should not waive or otherwise 
derogate from such measures or standards as an encouragement for the 
establishment, acquisition or expansion in its Area of investments by 
investors of the other Contracting Party and of a non-Contracting Party. 
 
2. Each Contracting Party may adopt, maintain or enforce any 
measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment 
activities in its Area are undertaken in a manner not incompatible with 
its environmental law, provided that such measure is consistent with 
this Agreement.  
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 21 ¶¶ 1-2. 
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countries or economies in transition.584 It is unlikely that, whatever 
economic or developmental statistics may distinguish these countries from 
each other, they find themselves fundamentally at parity. It would likely 
follow that, absent the need to satisfy an exigent strategic resource need, 
neither State enjoyed a strategic or tactical negotiating posture over the 
other at the time of the signing of the BIT. These factors lend considerable 
interest to the Croatia-Azerbaijan BIT’s treatment of the sustainable 
development iteration of the public purpose doctrine. 
The term “sustainable development” appears only once in the 
treaty. The preamble in a single sentence mentions sustainable 
development in connection with the protection of health, safety, and the 
environment, even though the term is separated from these categories by a 
“conjunctive.”585 In contrast with the SADC Model BIT, Article II of the 
BIT identifies the promotion and protection of investments as the 
foundational policy underlying the Agreement, in part, by detailing 
investment protection obligations extending from the Host State in favor 
                                                 
584 Even though Azerbaijan and Croatia have striking differences, they also enjoy 
material similarities pertaining to their respective economic development. 
 
Annual Data – 2011 
 
 Azerbaijan Croatia 
Population (m)  9.1 4.4 
GDP (US$ m; market exchange rate 57,773 62,493.4 
GDP (US$ m; purchasing power 
parity)  
119,560 78,620 
GDP per head (US$; market exchange 
rate)  
6,341 14,197 
GDP per head (US$; purchasing 
power parity) 
13,122 17,860 
Exchange rate (av)  0.790 Manat:US$ 5.34 HRK:US$ 
 
 
Historical Averages (%) – 2007-2011 
 
 Azerbaijan Croatia 
Population growth 1.3 -0.2 
Real GDP growth 9.7 -0.3 
Real domestic demand growth 6.3 -1.2 
Inflation 10.3 2.9 
Current-account balance (% of 
GDP) 
28.5 -4.6 
FDI inflows (% of GDP) -1.9 5.1 
 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (most figures estimated).  
 
585 The reference reads: “DESIRING to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent 
with the protection of health, safety, and the environment and the protection of 
sustainable development.” Croatia-Azerbaijan BIT, supra note 546, preamble.  
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of foreign investments-investors.586 Although the detailing of orthodox 
investor protection standards in the form of (i) customary international 
law’s minimum standard of treatment of aliens, (ii) fair and equitable 
treatment, (iii) full and constant protection and security, and (iv) the 
proscription of unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory measures, the 
absence of sustainable development qualifying language is noticeable, and 
to some extent, at odds with the preamble’s mention of sustainable 
development as a principle underlying the BIT. In this same vein, the 
general exceptions provision (Article 5) is remarkably narrow as to scope, 
omitting exceptions having their origins in the GATT, financial prudential 
measures, and even State security, or those exceptions typically associated 
loosely with State police powers.587 The BIT hardly carves any 
                                                 
586 Article II (Promotion and Protection of Investments) provides: 
 
1. Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favorable 
conditions in its State territory for investments by investors of the 
other Contracting Party and in exercise of powers conferred by its 
national legislation shall admit such investments. 
 
2. Each Contracting Party shall at all times accord in its State 
territory to investments and returns of investors of the other 
Contracting Party treatment in accordance with the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full and constant 
protection and security. 
 
3. Each Contracting Party shall not impair by unreasonable, arbitrary 
or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment, acquisition or disposal of investments in its State 
territory of investors of the other Contracting Party. 
 
4. Each Contracting Party shall not impose mandatory measures on 
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party concerning 
purchase of materials, means of production, operation, transport, 
marketing of its products or similar orders having unreasonable or 
discriminatory effects. 
 
5. Each Contracting Party shall, within the framework of its national 
legislation, consider in good faith all applications for necessary 
permits in connection with investments in its State territory, 
including authorizations for engaging executives, managers, 
specialists and technical personnel of the investor’s choice.  
 
Id. art. 2. 
 
587 A separate “security interests” provision is contained under Article 10 under the 
nomenclature “essential security interests.” In addition to being brief, the single sentence 
Article does limit its application to “essential security interests”: 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any 
Contracting Party from taking any action that it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests deriving from its 
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meaningful, or even orthodox, exceptions that seek to broaden the 
domestic regulatory space of a presumably Host State. 
Within the context of two underdeveloped States, at least pursuant 
to the Croatia-Azerbaijan BIT, the sustainable development iteration of the 
public purpose doctrine in fact finds no voice, a fact that cannot be 
altogether surprising. The BIT terms plainly State that its foremost 
objective is to foster foreign investment by according such investments the 
“orthodox standards of protection” without material qualifications or 
restrictions in the form of exceptions. In addition, the BIT is neither used 
as a methodology for addressing perceived or actual asymmetries in the 
relationship between States, nor as a means to finance internal policies 
characterized as “development” efforts pursuant to the tenet limiting 
foreign investments only to the extent that they are compatible with the 
principle of “sustainable development.” Countries of equal or comparable 
industrial development, economies, and spheres of political influence, 
appear to be less likely to seek protection from a peer contracting party 
through adherence to the principle of sustainable development. Similarly, 
it is improbable that they would have sufficient negotiating gravitas to 
secure it. 
d. The Japan - Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea BIT 
The Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the 
Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment(“Japan – Papua New Guinea 
BIT”), signed in 2011, also references sustainable development. In 
addition to a preamble that recognizes sustainable development as in pari 
materia with foreign investment,588 transfer exceptions premised on 
                                                                                                                         
membership in a customs, economic or monetary union, a common 
market or a free trade area.  
 
Id. art. 10. 
 
588 Because of the notably balanced approach that this BIT takes with respect to the 
promotion of foreign investment and the sustainable development iteration of the public 
purpose doctrine, the preamble merits citation in its entirety with emphasis placed on 
specific language: 
 
Recognising the importance of foreign investment for national 
development, economic growth and general welfare of the citizens in 
Japan and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘the Contracting Parties’); 
 
Desiring to promote investment in order to strengthen the economic 
relationship between the Contracting Parties; 
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national law and based upon “good faith application” also constitute 
prominent elements of the BIT that enhance the Host State’s regulatory 
space.589 
                                                                                                                         
Intending to create stable, equitable and favourable conditions for 
greater investment by investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of 
the other Contracting Party; 
 
Recognising that economic development, social development and 
environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing 
pillars of sustainable development and that cooperative efforts of the 
Contracting Parties to promote investment can play an important role 
in enhancing sustainable development; 
 
Recognising also that these objectives can be achieved without relaxing 
health, safety and environmental measures of general application; 
 
Acknowledging the importance of the cooperative relationship between 
labour and management in promoting investment between the 
Contracting Parties; and 
 
Convinced that this Agreement will contribute to the further 
development of the overall relationship between the Contracting 
Parties.  
 
Japan – Papua New Guinea BIT, supra note 546, preamble (emphasis supplied).  
 
589 The transfer of funds arising from covered investments exceptions pertains to laws or 
regulations found to be “relating to” a broad subject matter regulated by national law. 
Although seemingly national or parochial in nature, the “relating to” rubric is particularly 
broad. Article 14 (“Transfers”) in pertinent part provides: 
 
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, a Contracting Party may 
delay or prevent a transfer through the equitable, non-discriminatory 
and good-faith application of its laws and regulations relating to: 
 
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection of the rights of 
creditors; 
(b) issuing, trading or dealing in securities; 
(c) criminal or penal offences; or 
(d) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in adjudicatory 
proceedings. 
 
Id. art. 14, ¶ 3 (a)-(d) (emphasis supplied). Measures tantamount to transfer exceptions in 
the international arena and under the heading of “temporary safeguard measures,” are 
contained in Article 17, paragraph 1, subsections (a) and (b). This provision underscores 
the contrast between the multiple cross-industry sector foreign direct investments, which 
generally may only be characterized as microeconomic events and policies giving rise to 
exception fiat at a national level ostensibly premised on macroeconomic considerations: 
 
1. A Contracting Party may adopt or maintain measures not 
conforming with its obligations under Article 2 relating to cross-
border capital transactions and Article 14: 
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The Japan-Papua New Guinea BIT structurally resembles the 
Colombia-Japan BIT in that both agreements segregate exceptions arising 
from the GATT’s Article XX, Prudential Measures, and Health, Safety, 
and Environmental Measures and Labour Standards.590 As to all three 
categories, however, the Colombia-Japan BIT accords the Host State with 
broader scope as to these public purpose exceptions. The sustainable 
development principle in this treaty largely is limited to an expansive 
preamble and the fundamental exceptions contained in Articles 14, 17, 18, 
and 22. The tempered expression of the sustainable development principle 
throughout the BIT to some extent comports with the treatment accorded 
to sustainable development in the Colombia-Japan BIT, but within the 
context of Papua New Guinea, and not Colombia, facing Japan, an 
industrialized State with considerable more resources and political 
influence than Papua New Guinea. This BIT helps to corroborate the 
proposition591 that treaty-drafting techniques, without more, are 
insufficient in placing constraints on the public purpose doctrine or its 
sustainable development iteration. Also, notwithstanding the rigors of 
international treaty negotiations between an industrialized State and a 
developing State, enough of the principle survives to accord both States 
considerable latitude in the exercise of their right to regulate. The 
“sustainable development BITs” further buttress the case for finding that 
the public purpose doctrine generally, and in its sustainable development 
configuration, (i) forms part of customary international law and (ii) finds a 
materially broader expression under customary international law than 
within conventional international law, such as the NAFTA. 
G. The Public Purpose Doctrine in WTO International 
Instruments  
The public purpose doctrine finds ample expression in WTO 
international instruments.592 Throughout these instruments the public 
                                                                                                                         
(a) in the event of serious balance-of-payments and external 
financial difficulties or threats thereof, or 
(b) in cases where, in exceptional circumstances, movements of 
capital cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties for 
macroeconomic management, in particular, monetary and 
exchange rate policies. 
 
Id. art. 17 ¶ 1(a)-(b) (emphasis supplied).  
 
590 See id. art. 18 (“Prudential Measures”), art. 22 (“Health, Safety and Environmental 
Measures, and Labor Standards”).  
 
591 See supra note 486 & accompanying text. 
 
592 By “WTO international instruments” a collective reference is intended to pertain to (i) 
The WTO General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (1947), (ii) The WTO General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (1994), (iii) The WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (1994) (iv) The WTO General Agreement on Trade and Services (1994), (v) 
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purpose doctrine emerges as a central organizing principle that is 
fundamental in the creation of a hierarchy of constraints and premises that 
affect “regulatory sovereignty,” and under an orthodox paradigm, “the 
right to regulate.” From an evidentiary perspective, the WTO international 
instruments, without more, well suffice to establish the existence of a 
vibrant public purpose doctrine within customary international law’s 
normative sphere. These instruments demonstrate six fundamental 
propositions concerning the customary international law expression of the 
public purpose doctrine.  
First, the international trade law exceptions broaden the subject 
matter content of the public purpose doctrine because of their 
macroeconomic policies. Second, the public purpose doctrine within the 
framework of the WTO international instruments is expressed as a 
paramount precept to which principles of confidentiality, transparency, 
and compliance with legal authority are subordinated. Third, the public 
purpose doctrine, whether by design or happenstance, in part, is identified 
as necessary to the effort of harmonizing the policies and goals underlying 
international trade and international investment law. Fourth, the 
sustainable development expression of the public purpose doctrine that is 
so central to the UNCTAD 2012 Report, and the SADC Model BIT, for 
example, has its genesis in WTO international instruments. Fifth, despite 
the reiteration of and conceptual reliance on the public purpose doctrine 
throughout the WTO international instruments, the doctrine is nowhere 
defined and self-judging (subjective) standards are implicitly referred to 
for the doctrine’s application. Sixth, the WTO international instruments do 
not provide an actual or conceptual foundation for the proposition that 
“the right to regulate” remains one and the same irrespective of whether 
such regulatory exercise takes place within the context of foreign 
investment protection or the administration of international trade barriers. 
The prominence of the public purpose doctrine in the WTO 
international instruments is testimony to the doctrine’s importance. The 
absence, however, of substantive content, uniformity as to nomenclature, 
application, as well as the dogmatic insistence on a self-judging 
methodology of application, all argue in favor of a meaningful 
reexamination of the doctrine through the lens of economic globalization, 
and a paradigm of interdependence that commands transforming “the right 
to regulate” into “considerations of regulatory sovereignty” that are 
conducive to multilateral policy consequences.593  
                                                                                                                         
The WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994), 
and (vi) The WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001). 
 
593 By “multilateral policy consequences” reference is made to the new use of public 
purpose as a principle that furthers the interests of both developing and developed States. 
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1. WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration: November 14, 2001 
The WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration adopted on November 14, 
2001 (“the Doha Declaration”), much like the UNCTAD international 
instruments,594 references the public purpose doctrine in the context of a 
multilateral trading system. Thus, at first sight, public purpose within the 
context of the Doha Declaration would appear to be distinct from public 
purpose as a legal exception broadening the right to regulate to the 
detriment of an obligation to protect foreign investment. Careful 
consideration, however, demonstrates that the distinct iterations of the 
public purpose doctrine throughout the Doha Declaration are no different 
from the exceptions found in Articles XX and XXI of the GATT, as well 
as in the SADC Model BIT and other actual BITs in force in the form of 
the sustainable development principle. Consequently, the public purpose 
doctrine is, to a great extent, both a legal and economic principle. This 
dual character is markedly apparent in the Doha Declaration. 
The preamble to the Doha Declaration is testament to the 
sustainable development expression of the public purpose doctrine and to 
sustainable development’s dual configuration. While the second and sixth 
paragraphs of the preamble quite significantly reference the preamble to 
the Marrakesh Agreement,595 Paragraph 6 explicitly mentions the 
                                                                                                                         
By emphasizing interdependence and a policy of transnational cooperation where 
investor-State disputes find resolution in more than just “all or nothing” juridical rubrics. 
 
594 See discussion supra at Chapter 2.E. 
 
595 The Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization concluded on April 15, 
1994, a.k.a., “Marrakesh Agreement” first identified the principle of sustainable 
development in connection with an international trade system and as a global objective. 
The principle is contained in embryonic form and the preamble enjoys a neutral 
multilateral tone that does not express any particular penchant favoring industrialized or 
underdeveloped States. Instead, its emphasis is on the development of an integrated 
multilateral international trade framework that would maximize global efficiencies. It 
reads: 
 
The Parties to this Agreement, 
 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the 
optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development, 
 
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to 
ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed 
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“objective” and “promotion” of sustainable development.596 This 
paragraph sets forth the premise that eventually would serve to bolster the 
public purpose doctrine found in international trade law, and later 
incorporated into international investment law. By identifying exceptions, 
States are provided with the right to regulate for specific public purposes, 
“subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the 
provisions of the WTO Agreements.”597  
Identifying public purpose with the right to regulate within the 
framework of international trade law “at the levels [that a State] considers 
appropriate,”598 also provides foundation for the subjective application of 
the doctrine at least within the confines of international investment and 
trade law.599 The public purpose doctrine, whether expressed in the form 
                                                                                                                         
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development, 
 
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations, 
 
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable 
multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts,  and all 
of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization preamble, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 
596 Doha Declaration, supra note 393, at ¶ 6. 
 
597 Id. 
 
598 Id. 
 
599 Paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration provides: 
 
6. We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sustainable 
development, as Stated in the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. 
We are convinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding an open 
and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for the 
protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable 
development can and must be mutually supportive. We take note of the 
efforts by members to conduct national environmental assessments of 
trade policies on a voluntary basis. We recognize that under WTO rules 
no country should be prevented from taking measures for the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health, or of the environment at the 
levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
 EAST\64724221. 3222 
of the sustainable development principle or otherwise, necessitates a 
hybrid economic-law configuration. In this regard, the Marrakesh 
Agreement’s preamble together with the Doha Declaration contribute 
mightily to the doctrine’s multifaceted constitution. Indeed, the Doha 
Declaration further developed this duality by emphasizing the relationship 
between trade and investment. The public purpose doctrine must be able to 
contribute to harmonizing the underlying legal and economic policies 
pertaining to trade and investment while at the same time serving their 
respective efficiencies. Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Doha Declaration 
directly speak to the need to meet the expectations of industrialized States 
in the arena of investment protection.600 
As part of reconciling incongruities between industrialized States 
by maximizing investment, but also requiring regulatory transparency 
within an investor friendly and stable environment, the Doha Declaration 
                                                                                                                         
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, and 
are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the WTO 
Agreements. We welcome the WTO´s continued cooperation with 
UNEP and other inter-governmental environmental organizations. We 
encourage efforts to promote cooperation between the WTO and 
relevant international environmental and developmental organizations. 
 
Id. preamble ¶ 6.  
 
600 Paragraphs 20 and 21 in pertinent part provide: 
 
20. Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure 
transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross-
border investment, particularly foreign direct investment, that will 
contribute to the expansion of trade, and the need for enhanced 
technical assistance and capacity-building in this area as referred to in 
paragraph 21, we agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth 
Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be 
taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of 
negotiations. 
 
21. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed 
countries for enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity 
building in this area, including policy analysis and development so that 
they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral 
cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human 
and institutional development. To this end, we shall work in 
cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organisations, 
including UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral 
channels, to provide strengthened and adequately resourced assistance 
to respond to these needs.  
 
Id. ¶¶ 20-21. 
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addresses the need to reconcile Host States’ developmental objectives and 
regulatory authority with Home State expectations. It observed: 
Any framework should reflect in a balanced manner the 
interests of Home and Host countries, and take due account 
of the development policies and objectives of Home 
governments as well as their right to regulate in the public 
interest.601 
The Doha Declaration is fair and reasonable on this issue inasmuch as it 
does not fashion a general imperative that irreversibly amplifies the 
regulatory sovereignty of least developed or underdeveloped countries, but 
rather aspirationally provides that the particular needs of States are to be 
considered as part of any framework that touches or concerns transnational 
trade and investment between capital-exporting and capital-importing 
States.602  
The Doha Declaration argues for a tempered and balanced 
approach to public purpose that, at minimum, aspires to reconcile any 
conflict between policy and trade objectives pertaining to Home States and 
Host States. To be sure, the Doha Declaration expresses concern for the 
plight of developing and “least developed” State, but does not do so in a 
manner that may undermine the “transparency” and “stability” 
expectations of capital-exporting countries.603 What language the Doha 
                                                 
601 Id. ¶ 22 (emphasis supplied).  
 
602 As to this proposition the Declaration provides:  
 
The special development, trade and financial needs of developing and 
least-developed countries should be taken into account as an integral 
part of any framework, which should enable Members to undertake 
obligations and commitments commensurate with their individual 
needs and circumstances. Due regard should be paid to other relevant 
WTO provisions. Accounts should be taken, as appropriate, of existing 
bilateral and regional arrangements on investment. 
 
Id.  (emphasis supplied).  
 
603 For example, paragraphs 49 and 50 provide: 
 
49.  The negotiations shall be conducted in a transparent manner 
among the participants, in order to facilitate the effective of 
participation of all. It shall be conducted with a view to ensuring 
benefits to all participants and to achieving an overall balance in the 
outcome of the negotiations. 
 
50. The negotiations and the other aspects of the Work Programme 
shall take fully into account the principle of special and differential 
treatment for developing and least-developed countries embodied in: 
Part IV of the GATT 1994; the Decision of 28 November 1979 on 
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Declaration may have favoring capital-importing States does not exceed a 
distinguished treatment based upon consent that never abandons the need 
to have fundamental principles in place, such as transparency and stability, 
in order to maximize the likelihood of success and benefits redounding to 
all States. Consequently, the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration 
conceptually comports with the adoption of a proportionality test in the 
application of the public purpose doctrine in order to determine the extent 
to which, if at all, the right to regulate may infringe upon a State’s 
obligation to protect foreign investments/investors. The broad content of 
the doctrine compels consideration of competing interests if in fact it is to 
further the aims of all parties and to contribute to the creation of a stable 
and transparent international investment community between 
industrialized States, underdeveloped States, and economies in transition.  
2. Public Purpose and the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) 
Article 8 of the 1994 WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (the “WTO Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Rights”) identifies the public purpose doctrine (in the form of 
“public interest”) as providing a normative basis for regulatory activity in 
a very distinct space identified as “sectors of vital importance to [ States’] 
socio-economic and technological development.”604 The exercise of this 
right to regulate is Stated as self-judging (subjective). Even though the 
term “necessary” generally is suggestive of some objective standard, 
contextually the use of this adjective is more indicative of an internal 
criteria best rooted in the perceived needs of individual countries. 
Similarly, the term “vital importance” is not defined and its relationship to 
such broad subject matters such as “socio-economic and technological 
development” hardly narrows the doctrine’s substantive content. The first 
part of the conjunctive “and,” pertaining to the protection of “public health 
and nutrition,” most closely resembles the special category public purpose 
                                                                                                                         
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries; the Uruguay Round Decision on 
Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries; and all other 
relevant WTO provisions. 
 
Id. ¶¶ 49-50 (emphasis supplied).  
 
604 Article 8, paragraph 1, provides in full: 
 
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures 
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
 
TRIPs, supra note 393, art. 8 ¶ 1.  
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subject matter contained as exceptions in Article XX of the GATT. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 8 (“Principles”) read in its totality as a single 
sentence paragraph materially resembles the principle of sustainable 
development. 
Pursuant to the guise of ordre public or public morality, signatories 
may proscribe the commercial exploitation of inventions within their 
territory.605 Such public order or morality may serve as an exception to 
exclude from patentability, inventions, or their commercial exploitation 
based upon the GATT’s Article XX Special Public Purpose Categories.606 
This instrument also subordinates confidentiality to the public 
interest iteration of the public purpose doctrine607 in the form of “security 
exceptions” that also find space in the WTO Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Rights, much in keeping with the subject matter spectrum 
enunciated in Article XXI of the GATS.608 In keeping with most 
                                                 
605 Id. art. 27 ¶ 2 (“Patentable Subject Matter”). 
 
606 Article 27, paragraph 2 (“Patentable Subject Matter”), States:  
 
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention 
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice 
to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely 
because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.  
 
Id. (emphasis supplied).  
 
607 Article 63, paragraph 4, provides that: “[n]othing in paragraphs 1,2 and 3 shall require 
Members to disclose confidential information which would impede law enforcement or 
otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial 
interests of particular enterprises, public or private.” Id. art. 63 ¶ 4 (emphasis supplied).   
 
608 Article 73 (“Security Exceptions”) States: 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
 
(a) to require a Member to furnish any information the 
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential 
security interests; or  
 
(b) to prevent a Member from taking any action which it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests;  
 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from 
which they are derived; 
 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods 
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references to the public purpose doctrine, exercise of a security exception 
is based on a subjective standard, notwithstanding the use of the term 
“essential” as a presumably objective qualifying factor. Thus, within the 
confines of Article 73, confidentiality or non-disclosure obligations are 
subordinated to the security exception iteration of the public purpose 
doctrine. This exception is common to WTO international instruments.609 
3. The Public Purpose Doctrine in the WTO General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (1994) 
The subordination of the principle of confidentiality or obligations 
of non-disclosure to the public purpose doctrine is certainly not limited to 
security-centered iterations of the doctrine. The 1994 WTO General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) presents an illustrative 
example. Article III of that Agreement sets forth the following 
transparency imperative:  
Each Member shall publish promptly and, except in 
emergency situations, at the latest by the time of their entry 
into force, all relevant measures of general application 
which pertain to or affect the operation of this Agreement. 
International agreements pertaining to or affecting trade in 
services to which a Member is a signatory shall also be 
published.610 
Article III bis, however, subordinates the obligation to provide 
transparency to “public interest.”611 In doing so, it places the public 
purpose doctrine on equal footing with a normative foundation to act that 
                                                                                                                         
and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for 
the purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations; or  
 
(c) to prevent a Member from taking any action in pursuance 
of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security. 
 
Id. art. 73 (emphasis supplied).  
 
609 See, e.g., GATS, supra note 393, art. XIV bis (containing identical security 
exceptions); AGP, supra note 393, art. XXIII ¶ 1; GATT, supra note 19, art. XXI 
(containing identical language). 
 
610 GATS, supra note 393, art. III ¶ 1. 
 
611 Id. art. III bis. 
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would arise from (i) impeding law enforcement or (ii) prejudicing 
legitimate commercial interests.612 
Subject to general qualifications that are nowhere defined and are 
broad and malleable as to both meaning and scope, under the banner of the 
protection of “public morals” or the maintenance of “public order,”613 
signatories are authorized to implement whatever measure arguably may 
meet these broad public purpose categories.614 The Agreement likewise 
enunciates the common international trade law public purpose exception 
that now has found space in BITs: “measures necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.”615  
The GATS further amplifies the public purpose category that the 
customary international law expression of the doctrine presents. Materially 
indistinguishable from the standard found in Paragraph 25.2 of Article 25 
of the SADC Model BIT, 616 the Agreement carves out considerable 
regulatory space in the form of prudential measures as to finance and 
macroeconomics.617 The all-encompassing scope of the prudential 
                                                 
612 Article III bis (Disclosure of Confidential Information) reads: 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall require any Member to provide 
confidential information, the disclosure of which would impede law 
enforcement, or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, or which 
would prejudice legitimate commercial interests of particular 
enterprises, public or private. 
 
Id.  
 
613 Footnote 5 to Article XIV (“General Exceptions”) of the WTO General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (1994) does restrict measures adopted for the purported maintenance of 
“public order” by asserting that “the public order exception may be invoked only where a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of 
society.” Id. art. XIV n.5. Despite a strict construction of this constraining factor, the 
relative meaning of such rudimentary elements of the qualifying sentence, such as 
“fundamental interests of society,” “genuine” and “sufficiently serious threat,” limit its 
effectiveness. 
 
614 Id. art. XIV ¶ (a).  
 
615 Id. art. XIV ¶ (b). 
 
616 SADC Model BIT Template, supra note 494, at 46-47. 
 
617 The exception entitled “Domestic Regulation” reads: 
 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member 
shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, 
including for the protection of investors, depositors, policyholders or 
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service 
supplier, or to ensure the integrity or stability of the financial system. 
Where such measures do not conform with the provisions of the 
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measures exception is purportedly limited “[w]here such measures do not 
conform with the provisions of the Agreement,” or otherwise are “used as 
a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the 
Agreement.”618 This language, however, is tantamount to asserting that in 
cases where the measure undertaken for prudential reasons would give rise 
to a breach of the agreement, only then would it be deemed excessive. 
Consequently, the exception remains unfettered.  
Even though the WTO international instruments embrace the 
principle of sustainable development of the public purpose doctrine, they 
still aspire to fashion “a multilateral framework of principles and rules…” 
aimed at promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually 
advantageous basis and that securing an overall balance of rights and 
obligations, while giving due respect to national policy objectives.”619 
From a structural perspective, unlike the UNCTAD instruments620 or the 
SADC Model BIT621 the interests of both industrialized States and 
underdeveloped countries are treated as being equally important.  
This aspiration notwithstanding the public purpose doctrine in its 
various iterations unduly broadens the domestic regulatory space of its 
members. The public purpose doctrine is used as an exception that 
supersedes: (i) the right to confidentiality;622 (ii) the right to 
transparency;623 (iii) the right to patentability of inventions;624 and (iv) 
                                                                                                                         
Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the 
Member’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement.  
 
(b) Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to require a Member 
to disclose information relating to the affairs and accounts of individual 
customers or any confidential or proprietary information in the 
procession of public entities. 
   
GATS, supra note 393, annex on financial services ¶ 2.  
 
618 Id. 
 
619 Id. preamble. 
 
620 For the purpose of this writing, “UNCTAD Instruments” refers to (1) the UNCTAD 
FDI Policy Note, supra note 393; and (2) the 2012 World Investment Report, supra note 
423. 
 
621 See supra Chapter 2.F(1).  
 
622 See supra notes 609-10 & accompanying text. 
 
623 Id.  
 
624 See supra notes 607-08 & accompanying text. 
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rights arising from contractual commitments.625 It also provides the State 
with a regulatory sovereignty that is practically unrestricted. States may 
enact measures of any kind in furtherance of: (i) public order,626 (ii) public 
morality,627 (iii) the protection of human, animal or plant life or health,628 
(iv) protection of the environment, (v) security629 and (vi) financial 
institutional or economic soundness630 among other interests. The 
customary international law profile of the public purpose doctrine that 
arises from these texts is one that shall inevitably lead to asymmetries 
between States. An unbridled right to regulate also is conducive to 
conflicts that are “resolved” pursuant to “all or nothing” arbitral 
adjudications. No principle of proportionality finds a voice in these 
international texts with respect to the public purpose doctrine. These 
complexities are made worse by the vast scope of special public purpose 
categories such as the principle of sustainable development, which in its 
pristine State within the context of the SADC Model BIT would render 
any measure colorably related in any way to economic development a 
justifiable infringement on an obligation to protect foreign investment. 
The self-judging standard of most iterations of the public purpose doctrine 
also militates against uniformity, predictability, and process legitimacy. 
Finally, treaty drafting techniques may alleviate, but certainly not cure the 
ills arising from a legacy public purpose doctrine devoid of content that is 
subjective in application.  
                                                 
625 See, e.g., GATS, supra note 393, art. III.  
 
626 See, e.g., ACIA, supra note 389, art. 17; American Convention, supra note 13; AGP, 
supra note 393, art. 23; GATS, supra note 393, art. 27 . 
 
627 See, e.g., TRIPs, supra note 393, art. 27 ¶ 2.   
 
628 See, e.g., Doha Declaration, supra note 393, at ¶ 6.   
 
629 See, e.g., TRIPs, supra note 393, art. 73.  
 
630 See, e.g., GATS, supra note 393, annex on financial services ¶ 2.  
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The actual status of the public purpose doctrine in customary 
international law cannot be ascertained without reference to what is 
perhaps the most universal principle that prescriptively qualifies and 
constrains the exercise of sovereignty: human rights.631 The relationship 
between the public purpose doctrine and human rights is both complex 
and inexhaustible. Because of these qualities, this effort is limited to 
contextualizing and analyzing the scant but ever-present references to the 
public purpose doctrine in only three international human rights 
instruments.632 Several observations on the relationship between the public 
purpose doctrine and international human rights as identified in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, and the public 
purpose doctrine are necessary as a condition to understanding more 
comprehensively the scope and content of the public purpose doctrine in 
customary international law. The connection between these two precepts 
(public purpose and human rights) is both antagonistic and 
complementary. 
The orthodox or legacy public purpose doctrine since its 
meaningful origins in the writings of Plato,633 Aristotle,634 and 
Thucydides,635 has had its normative foundations in a public interest and 
common welfare that overrides the interests of any single individual. The 
prescriptive foundation is in an overarching common welfare. The 
description of the doctrine, however, is one that assumes that the polis or 
State that makes possible the execution and instantiation of this principle 
                                                 
631 For a discussion on the juxtaposition of international standards and national authority, 
see Bas De Gaay Fortman, Beating the State at its Own Game: An Inquiry into the 
Intricacies of Sovereignty and the Separation of Powers, in CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF 
SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CEES FLINTERMAN 41 (Ineke 
Boerefijn & Jenny Goldschmidt, eds., Intersentia 2008). See also Fons Coomans, 
Sovereignty Fading Away? Prioritising Domestic Health Needs Versus Promoting Free 
Trade, in CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF CEES FLINTERMAN 123 (Ineke Boerefijn & Jenny Goldschmidt, eds., 
Intersentia 2008); JOSÉ E. ÁLVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW MAKERS 
156 (Oxford University Press 2005) (discussing the relationship between human rights 
and what the author describes as “the shrinking concept of domestic jurisdiction.”).   
 
632 The authors have selected (i) the European Convention, supra note 16 (ii) the 
American Convention, supra note 13; and (iii) the African Charter, supra note 399. 
 
633 See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Alan Bloom, trans., Basic Books, 
pub., 2nd ed.). , 
 
634 See generally ARISTOTLE, NECOMACHIAN ETHICS (Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. 
Collins, trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2011); ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Carnes Lord, 
trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2011, 1st ed.). 
 
635 See generally THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (M. I. Finley, ed., 
Rex Warner, trans., Penguin Classics 1954).  
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of public welfare. Such polis or State in turn has interests commensurate 
with its understanding of the broader public purpose that justifies placing 
decisions based upon the public interests and the common good above the 
pursuits of any single individual or even any identifiable group or 
community within the very State. Therefore, in broad strokes, the legacy 
public purpose doctrine is an expression of the preeminence of the 
concerns of the public, i.e., presumably the State, over the individual—an 
expression of the normative standing of the general over the specific 
International human rights principles serve to safeguard the 
individual from the de jure or de facto deprivation of fundamental rights 
on the part of the State.636 While the invocation of public purpose is an 
exercise of regulatory sovereignty that broadens the State’s regulatory 
space,637 the principles of international human rights law aspire, at least in 
part, to diminish the State’s exercise of regulatory sovereignty where such 
exercise infringes upon the rights of an individual, groups of individuals, 
or a peoples.638 In fact, international human rights law attempts to place 
stark constraints on the States’ exercise of regulatory fiat against an 
individual or a peoples, even in instances where such regulation purports 
to be justified by public purpose considerations.639 Viewed from this 
                                                 
636 “The purpose of human rights is at root in harmony with the purpose of the rule of 
law, properly understood as establishing conditions under which human dignity, freedom, 
and equality will flourish.” Kevin T. Jackson, The Normative Logic of Global Economic 
Governance: In Pursuit of Non-Instrumental Justification for the Rule of Law and Human 
Rights, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 71, 145 (2013). As such, when “in jeopardy, human rights 
must be entrenched not only in centralized and formal coercive systems of ‘hard’ rules of 
international law, but even more importantly in decentralized and informal systems of 
‘soft’ norms of economic governance régimes. Regardless, the rule of law ideal which 
underwrites these respective normative systems demands that the norms be binding and 
overriding in their essential characters.” Id. at 145-46.  
 
637 See supra note 51 & accompanying text (discussing the Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty).  
 
638 See, e.g., Eric Allen Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal System: 
The Post-Westphalian Legal Order, 23 QLR 23, 32 (2004) (“[T]he principles of national 
self-determination and human rights contradict the Westphalian concept of sovereignty. 
This contradiction cannot be harmonized because the competing poles tend toward 
mutually exclusive outcomes.”).  
 
639 While “[n]o strong historical basis exists for the protection of an individual’s human 
rights from violations by his or her own government” as “[a] State’s treatment of its 
nationals was tradition ally a matter of State sovereignty,” Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-
American Human Rights System: Establishing Precedents and Procedure in Human 
Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297, 302 (1995), there has been a recent 
trend towards according international human rights a preeminent status on the hierarchal 
ladder of international law. 
 
A strong indication of the super-priority given to human rights regulation can be gleaned 
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Union in the case of 
Kadi v. Council. Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. 
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perspective, international human rights champions are very specific and 
“narrow” universe  interests of an individual, individuals or peoples over 
the imposition of competing measures by the State, or the “primacy” of 
the particular over the general. Analytically, pursuant to an international 
human rights normative framework, the prescriptive content of general 
human rights law is satisfied by the fundamental rights that provide the 
individual with particular standing within the State as to a person’s right to 
action and omission within the organizational constraints of the State. 
Therefore, it follows that the prescriptive basis of this hierarchy in turn 
rests with principles that purport to be the most common and, therefore, 
universal, and for this reason, higher than any interest that a State may 
possibly justify based upon mere invocation of public purpose.640  
                                                                                                                         
INT’L L. 291, 311 (2006) (citing Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council (Eur. Ct. Justice Sept. 
21, 2005)). In that case “[t]he Court opined that from the standpoint of international law, 
the obligations of the UN member States ‘clearly prevail’ over every other obligation of 
domestic law or international treaty law, including, for those that are members of the 
Council of Europe, their obligations under the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.” Id. at 311 (footnote omitted). Ultimately, 
however, the Court left room for individual protections to prevail, as Stated succinctly by 
Shelton:  
Thus, the Court’s judicial review, in principle, did not extend to the 
lawfulness of Council measures. Lest this conclusion call into question 
the entire framework of human rights guarantees established in Europe 
since the end of World War II, the Court found an exception to the 
notion of unreviewable and unlimited Security Council power: 
 
Nonetheless, the Court is empowered to check, 
indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the 
Security Council in question with regard to jus 
cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of 
public international law binding on all subjects of 
international law, including the bodies of the United 
Nations, and from which no derogation is possible. 
 
This astonishing conclusion was rationalized by the Court’s Statement 
that the UN Charter itself ‘presupposes the existence of mandatory 
principles of international law, in particular, the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the human person.’ The UN Charter also 
provides that the Security Council is to act in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of Charter Article 24(2). In effect, the Court 
claimed that the entire body of human rights law constitutes jus cogens, 
referring to ‘the mandatory provisions concerning the universal 
protection of human rights, from which neither the Member States nor 
the bodies of the United Nations may derogate because they constitute 
intransgressible principles of international customary law.’ 
 
Id. at 311-12 (internal citations omitted). 
 
640 For example, as noted by Dinah Shelton:  
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Conventional and customary international human rights law, 
however, is to find its perfect workings by supporting or supplementing 
domestic law.641 International human rights law does not aspire to 
dislodge domestic law even though it serves as a “check and balance” on 
domestic law. To the extent that domestic law infringes upon cognizable 
international human rights precepts, human rights law serves as a meta-
State recourse for relief. It is within this framework that in an era of 
informational and economic globalization, orthodox paradigms of 
Westphalian sovereignty yield to a more expansive, malleable, and 
flexible conception of sovereignty contemplating a juridical hierarchy 
where international law preempts domestic juridical authority.642 Despite 
                                                                                                                         
Apart from treaty provisions, claims of primacy may be made by those 
involved in promoting or ensuring respect for a particular body of 
international law. Some human rights institutions, for example, have 
asserted the priority of human rights guarantees in general over other 
international law, without necessarily claiming that the entire body of 
law constitutes jus cogens. The UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, in a 1998 Statement on globalization and 
economic, social, and cultural rights, declared that the realms of trade, 
finance, and investment are in no way exempt from human rights 
obligations. The Committee’s concerns were raised a second time in a 
Statement urging members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
adopt a human rights approach to trade matters, asserting that the 
“promotion and protection of human rights is the first responsibility of 
Governments.” 
Id. at 294 (internal footnotes omitted). However, as demonstrated by Shelton, this 
primacy has yet to run its course through a wide-spread State practice:  
 
The asserted primacy of all human rights law has not been reflected in 
State practice. If eventually accepted, it will reject the notion of lex 
specialis for trade or other fields where States can claim to be free from 
human rights obligations. It could also profoundly affect the work of all 
international organizations, which commonly claim to be governed 
only by their constituting legal instruments and the mandate therein 
conferred. 
Id. at 294. 
 
641 “The purpose of international human rights treaties is not to limit a State’s policy 
choices, but to ensure that the policy eventually chosen still allows the individual to enjoy 
his basic freedoms and rights.” Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising 
from Conduct of Non-State Actors, 11 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21, 28 (2005). See also  
Dr. Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Rise of Equality in International Law and Its Pitfalls: 
Learning from Comparative Constitutional Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 38 (2010) 
(“The purpose of human rights norms is to set basic standards for the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, not to unduly limit legislative discretionary power by 
providing a judicially prescribed model for legislation.”). 
 
642 See generally Carlos M. Vazquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A 
Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern 
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this presumed “hierarchy,” international human rights law cannot be 
altogether severed from municipal law. Because international human 
rights law is to operate in tandem with municipal law, a robust, content-
rich, and objective (not self-judging) public purpose doctrine is not only 
welcomed, but actually indispensable. The doctrine serves as a conceptual 
point of convergence where international humans rights law, international 
investment law, the interests of home and Host States (particularly as 
concerns foreign investment) all find a meaningful space.  
The European Convention on Human Rights (“European 
Convention”), the American Convention on Human Rights (“American 
Convention”), and the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ 
Rights (“African Charter”), all have preambles that frame the particular 
historical context of their respective jurisdictions. Sensitivity to this 
historical framework is necessary. It points to the substantive role of 
historicity in the regional and Global formation and transformation of 
international human rights, and, therefore, also of the public purpose 
doctrine. The content and scope of human rights conventional law is 
materially defined by the social and economic history of the signatory 
States.643 In this sense, its aspiration to uniformity is challenged and must 
be questioned in analyzing its relation to the public purpose doctrine. 
Similarly the subject matter and application of the public purpose doctrine 
also must be understood as differing accordingly.644 The preamble, of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, for example, nowhere mentions 
explicitly or alludes to implicitly economic or financial development. 
Economic development and human rights find no resonance in this 
Preamble.645 The preamble does not contain any etymological iteration of 
                                                                                                                         
Position,  86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (2011); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern 
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).  
 
643 See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and 
World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 237, 
242-43 (1969).  
 
644 The content, scope, and application of public purpose expressions such as the 
Principle of Sustainable Development, supra Chapter 2.E(5) and the Principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, infra Chapter 5, are illustrative 
examples of expressions of the public purpose doctrine that cannot be meaningfully 
understood or submitted to sustained analysis without first exploring their connection to 
underdeveloped States and the process and consequences of decolonization. 
 
645 The preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by 
Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, is succinct and reads as follows: 
 
THE GOVERNMENTS SIGNATORY HERETO, being members of 
the Council of Europe,  
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the words “economic” or “financial.” The only connection between the 
European Convention’s preamble and economic development as a 
foundational human right is through its consideration of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It is noteworthy that the European 
Convention does not incorporate by reference or otherwise explicitly 
embrace all of the principles enunciated as rights in that Declaration.646 
                                                                                                                         
Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 10th December 
1948;  
  
Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and 
effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared;  
 
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement 
of greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by 
which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms;  
 
Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which 
are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best 
maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on 
the other by a common understanding and observance of the human 
rights upon which they depend; 
 
Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are 
like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, 
freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective 
enforcement of certain of the rights Stated in the Universal 
Declaration,…  
 
European Convention, supra note 16, preamble. 
 
646 The European Convention on Human Rights studiously uses the participle 
“considering” in connection with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights two of the 
three times that the Declaration is at all referenced in the preamble. The reference to the 
Declaration not containing the “considering” language also qualifies the wholesale 
incorporation of the Declaration by asserting that the signatories to the European 
Convention are taking “the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the 
rights Stated in the Universal Declaration,…” Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 
 The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights directly or indirectly 
references economic development as a fundamental principle in the following six articles: 
 
Art. 17.  
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others. 
 
(2)  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
 
Art. 22.  
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security 
and is entitled to realization, through national effort and 
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international co-operation and in accordance with the organization 
and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.” 
 
 Art. 23. 
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, 
to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment. 
 
  (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal 
pay for equal work.  
 
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable 
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence 
worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other 
means of social protection. 
 
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests. 
 
Art. 24. 
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including responsible 
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.  
 
Art. 25. 
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, 
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control. 
 
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall 
enjoy the same social protection. 
 
Art. 26. 
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at 
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary 
education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional 
education shall be made generally available and higher education 
shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 
 
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious 
groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of peace. 
 
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that 
shall be given to their children. 
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The preamble does affirmatively State that its paramount objective 
is “the achievement of greater unity between its members,”647 which it 
asserts to be achievable through the addition of “realisation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”648 This preamble, in addition, asserts 
that is through an “effective political democracy” and the observance of 
human rights that “fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of 
justice and peace in the world are best maintained.”649 The European 
Convention also invokes uniformity of thought and “heritage of political 
traditions,”650 as a foundation for “collective enforcement.”651 
In high relief, the preambles of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
both explicitly reference the very deep relationship between economic 
development and human rights.652 Historicity, in the affirmative and in 
contrast with the European Convention, displays its hand in both of these 
Conventions, but specially so as to the African Charter. The preamble to 
African Charter further refers to the process of decolonization, in addition 
to economic rights and social rights, construed as rising to the level of 
human rights. It specifically reaffirms: 
                                                                                                                         
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 
647 European Convention, supra note 16, preamble. 
 
648 Id. 
 
649 Id. 
 
650 Id. 
 
651 Id. While the Convention’s references to “like-minded” and “a common heritage of 
political traditions” may perhaps appear as too euphemistic a descriptive account of a 
“like-minded[ness]” that witnessed two world wars in the twentieth century, as well as a 
commonality as to a “heritage of political traditions” that more closely resembles a 
mosaic than a monolithic Euclidian plane, the good faith aspirational underpinnings of 
the Declaration command respect. 
 
652 The Preamble to the American Convention on Human Rights in pertinent part States: 
 
Considering that the Third Special Inter-American Conference (Buenos 
Aires, 1967) approved the incorporation into the Charter of the 
Organization itself [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] of 
broader standards with respect to economic, social, and educational 
rights and resolved that an inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights should determine the structure, competence, and procedure of 
the organs responsible for these matters…. 
 
American Convention, supra note 13, preamble. 
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[T]he pledge they [African member States] solemnly made 
in Article 2 of the said Charter to eradicate all forms of 
colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify their 
cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the 
peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation 
having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.653  
                                                 
653 The preamble in its entirety States: 
 
The African States members of the Organization of African Unity, 
parties to the present convention entitled ‘African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’, 
 
Recalling Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, 
Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 1979 on the preparation of a ‘preliminary 
draft on an African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights providing 
inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect human 
and peoples’ rights’; 
 
Considering the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which 
stipulates that ‘freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential 
objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the 
African peoples’; 
 
Reaffirming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said 
Charter to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate 
and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for 
the peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation having 
due regard to the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights;  
 
Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the 
values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize 
their reflection on the concept of human and peoples’ rights; 
 
Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from 
the attributes of human beings which justifies their national and 
international protection and on the other hand that the reality and 
respect of peoples’ rights should necessarily guarantee human rights; 
 
Considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the 
performance of duties on the part of everyone; convinced that it is 
henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to 
development and that civil and political rights cannot be disassociated 
from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as 
universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural 
rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights; 
 
Conscious of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the 
peoples of which are still struggling for their dignity and genuine 
independence, and undertaking to eliminate colonialism, neo-
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Just as the European Convention on Human Rights must be read within 
the context of what is perceived as being one common European history 
with shared political values among European States, the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights needs to be contextualized within the 
framework of a history of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and de-
colonialism. The sustainable development iteration of the public purpose 
doctrine too must be embraced as a human rights principle within the 
parameters of both the American Convention and the African Charter. 
Because the scope and content of the conventional international law of 
human rights varies based upon the relevant history and region concerned, 
the interface between the public purpose doctrine and international human 
rights law also varies. The European Convention’s silence on economic 
development cannot be altogether disassociated from the workings of the 
public purpose doctrine within the constraints of this Convention. 
Moreover, this omission is a testament to the expectations of, at a 
minimum, one group of industrialized States with respect to the scope and 
content of conventional international human rights law, as well as of the 
public purpose doctrine.654 
While the European Convention on Human Rights is selective in 
its adoption of principles from the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, and does not engage in a verbatim incorporation by 
reference of this Declaration,655 both the American Convention on Human 
                                                                                                                         
colonialism, apartheid, zionism and to dismantle aggressive foreign 
military bases and all forms of discrimination, particularly those based 
on race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion or political 
opinions; 
 
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles of human and peoples’ 
rights and freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions and 
other instrument adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the  
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations; 
 
Firmly convinced of their duty to promote and protect human and 
peoples’ rights and freedoms taking into account the importance 
traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa.  
 
African Charter, supra note 399, preamble. 
 
654 The disparate economic, social, and juridical histories of industrialized and 
underdeveloped States also gives rise to materially differing opinions as to the scope and 
content of the public purpose doctrine. This dissonance is immediately translated into 
different expectations concerning the fundamental relationship between the right to 
accord standard protections to foreign investment and regulatory sovereignty, or the right 
to regulate. The differences between the conventional international human rights law 
between industrialized and non-industrialized States or economies in transition, it is here 
asserted, can be directly transposed to the different expectations between industrialized 
and underdeveloped States as to the public purpose doctrine.   
 
655 See UDHR, supra note 648.  
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Rights656 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights directly 
reaffirm and incorporate by reference the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.657 These different perspectival approaches 
to international human rights law cannot be altogether severed from their 
corresponding understanding of the public purpose doctrine. 
The three conventions also represent contrasting conceptions of the 
prescriptive foundation of human rights law that may serve to reconcile 
different expectations as to the scope and content of human rights and 
public purpose. The European Convention on Human Rights speaks of 
“fundamental freedoms” deemed to be “the foundation of justice and 
peace in the world [that] are best maintained… by an effective political 
democracy.”658 In fact, it mentions “human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” in the conjunctive.659 This Convention does not present human 
rights as being disassociated or completely separate and distinct from the 
State. The State, in turn, is an idiosyncratic historical experience. This 
“historicity” permeates the Convention’s spirit and technical framework. It 
also disavows any pretense of “uniformity among Conventions,” in this 
mercurial field. Terms such as “political traditions” and “political 
democracy” find prominent spaces in the preamble. The American 
Convention and the African Charter represent different fundamental 
conceptions of the prescriptive foundation of conventional international 
human rights. 
The American Convention on Human Rights and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights both understand the essential 
rights of man classified as “human rights” as not deriving from the State. 
The American Convention specifically provides that: 
[T]he essential rights of man are not derived from one’s 
being a national of a certain State, but are based upon 
attributes of the human personality, and that they therefore 
justify international protection in the form of a convention 
reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by 
the domestic law of the American States.660  
                                                                                                                         
 
656 See American Convention, supra note 13, preamble ¶¶ 3-4 (adopting the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
 
657 See African Charter, supra note 399, preamble ¶¶ 3-4 (adopting the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).  
  
658 European Convention, supra note 16, preamble. 
 
659 Id. 
 
660 American Convention, supra note 13, preamble. 
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Similarly, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights asserts that: 
[F]undamental human rights stem from the attributes of 
human beings which justifies their national and 
international protection and on the other hand that the 
reality and respect of peoples[sic] rights should necessarily 
guarantee human rights.661 
This unique perspective of human rights as separate and distinct from any 
right associated with or deriving from the State—intrinsic to the individual 
and not the citizen—represents a considerable departure from the 
proposition of that “public purpose” or the “collective good” overrides the 
particular interests or well-being of a private individual or interest group. 
It is an understanding of rights that does not tend to broaden regulatory 
sovereignty. This reasoning comports with the very general proposition 
that a State’s obligation to protect individual rights certainly may 
outweigh its right to regulate. Thus, it would follow, that a public purpose 
doctrine that serves to diminish individual rights in furtherance of the 
broadening of the State’s regulatory rights would do violence to a higher 
order of principles based upon the individual person, separate and apart 
from the State. This prescriptive approach to rights and, therefore, to 
obligations, argues in favor of regulatory sovereignty exclusively 
predicated on general conceptions on public welfare; thus, to be applied in 
conjunction with a subjective (self-judging) standard, such application 
should be subordinated to a higher set of norms.  
The public purpose doctrine should provide for a more tempered 
application accounting for instances where private interests would prevail 
over certain matters of State. This conceptualization of the public purpose 
doctrine comports with a view of international human rights law as 
supporting and supplementing national law and not just serving as a 
parallel higher set of rules whose function it is to police the national law of 
States. This unique relationship between international human rights law 
and the domestic law of States requires a delicate balance. That balance, in 
turn, can only be attained where the public purpose doctrine adequately 
broadens and constrains the right to regulate, as is the case when State 
abuse of the public purpose doctrine may trigger application of 
international human rights law. 
The European Convention on Human Rights references the public 
purpose doctrine three times. The first such mention is found in Article 1 
in connection with “the peaceful enjoyment” of possessions and the 
proscription against the deprivation of a natural or legal person’s 
                                                                                                                         
 
661 African Charter, supra note 399, preamble. 
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possessions “except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”662 
The unequivocal Statement of this right is tempered by a recognition of 
orthodox regulatory sovereignty premised on the public purpose doctrine 
(“general interest”) as the operative talisman. The article’s second 
directive notably does not speak to direct or indirect expropriation or 
nationalization or actions equivalent to or tantamount to such taking. 
Instead, it relies on the word “control” in asserting that the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of possession and property “shall not, however, in any 
way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary 
to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”663 Thus, 
“public interest” and “general interest” are identified as precepts that 
actually may serve to limit the application of international human rights 
law providing for the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and the 
fundamental right to property. 
Critical to this framework is both a substantive and functional 
understanding of the public purpose doctrine. The deprivation of 
possessions referenced in the first provision of Article 1 and the control of 
the use of property enunciated in the second provision are genuine and 
lawful only to the extent that they comport with a legitimate understanding 
of the public purpose doctrine. Absent this assumption, Article 1 merely 
would be promoting a very general right to property, possession, and 
enjoyment of property and possession, subject to an arbitrary and 
subjective regime of public purpose to be indiscriminately applied by 
States ostensibly pursuant to domestic law in furtherance of orthodox 
regulatory sovereignty. This conception, or misconception, of the 
workings and interface between the public purpose doctrine and 
conventional international human rights law is necessary if in fact the 
strictures of cognizable human rights law are ever at all to be applied in 
                                                 
662 European Convention, supra note 16, art. 1 (emphasis supplied). Article 1 (“Protection 
of Property”) reads: 
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and 
by the general principles of international law. 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the 
use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.  
 
Id. (emphasis supplied).  
 
663 Id. 
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defense of individuals against the illegal and unjustified infringement of 
such rights by States.664 
The second notable reference to the public purpose doctrine in the 
European Convention on Human Rights is contained in Article 2 
(“Freedom of Movement”). Notwithstanding the four single-sentence 
succinct structure of the article, eight public purpose categories are 
referenced, including explicit mention of “ordre public” and “public 
interest.”665 Structurally, the first two paragraphs set forth an unqualified 
Statement of the right to freedom of movement both within the territory of 
a State and to leave any country, including a citizen’s own national 
State.666 As with Article 1 (“Protection of Property”), the public purpose 
doctrine is central to the theoretical and practical viability of the right to 
freedom of movement. The only constraints on the right are the two 
iterations of the public purpose doctrine (ordre public and public interest) 
and the six public purpose categories otherwise comprising the article. 
                                                 
664 Even though the first provision of Article 1 concerning an actual deprivation of 
possessions, in contrast with “control” of the use of property in the second provision of 
the Article, does not mention the right to compensation or the loss of property to the 
State, it may well do so as a matter of treaty construction by dint of referencing the 
qualifying clause, “subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.” As a matter of general public international law, a taking 
of property directly or as a result of a series of regulatory measures, cannot be lawfully 
effectuated without compensation. At issue in the juridical dialog on this question is the 
formula determining compensation, i.e., prompt, adequate and effective compensation 
(the Hull formula), fair and adequate compensation or fair market value as the governing 
remedy.  
 
665 Article 2 (“Freedom of Movement”) States: 
 
1.  Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that 
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose 
his residence. 
 
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.  
 
3.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other 
than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of a national security or public safety, 
for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.  
 
4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, to 
particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and 
justified by the public interest in a democratic society.  
 
European Convention, supra note 16, art. 2. 
  
666 Id. art. 2 ¶¶ 1-2. 
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Without being contextualized as public purpose categories that may find 
substantive definition within the public purpose doctrine as expressed in 
conventional or customary international law, the broad scope and thematic 
content would render the unqualified right to freedom of movement 
enunciated in Paragraphs 1 and 2 meaningless. Specifically, the six public 
purpose categories—(i) “the interest of national security,”667 (ii) “the 
interest of…public safety,”668 (iii) “for the prevention of crime,”669 (iv) 
“for the protection of health,”670 (v) “for the protection of…morals,”671 
and (vi) “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”672—are 
simply too expansive to engraft any meaningful constraints on these 
categories. Absent an objective standard for application and a substantive 
rubric pervaded by the tempering effects of proportionality, the public 
purpose categories would nearly invite abuse derived from the right to 
regulate. Moreover, as is the case with Article 1, the triggering of the 
right’s protection becomes problematic where, as here, the governing 
standard (the six public purpose categories) turns out to be all-
encompassing.  
The conceptual problems stemming from a legacy public purpose 
approach to Article 2 is compounded because “the maintenance of “ordre 
public”673 is also found in the very midst of the public purpose categories. 
The maintenance of the ordre public cannot be challenged, particularly 
within the anatomy of a self-judging framework. It would be eminently 
plausible to posit that any act that a State undertakes is susceptible to 
being characterized as representing a measure in furtherance of the 
maintenance of the ordre public, irrespective of subject matter 
consideration. Also, the six public purpose categories in Paragraph 3 can 
all be categorized as falling within the ambit of ordre public. 
The last quarter of this symmetrically structured article, first 
advancing two pronouncements pertaining to one right followed by two 
sets of qualifications limiting application of that same right, explicitly 
invokes “public interest.”674 Here the right to freedom of movement, in a 
                                                 
667 Id. art. 2 ¶ 3. 
 
668 Id. 
 
669 Id. 
 
670 Id. 
 
671 Id. 
 
672 Id. 
 
673 Id. 
 
674 Id. art. 2 ¶ 4. 
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grammatically efficient sentence authored by the conjunctive “and,” 
asserts that this fundamental right “may also be subject, in particular areas, 
to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public 
interest in a democratic society.” 675 Arguably, the public interest 
                                                                                                                         
 
675 Id. (emphasis supplied). The term “democratic society” is nowhere defined. The 
collected edition of the Travaux Preparatoires of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention 
suggests that the term was imported from the United Nations International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966). Furthermore, the work of Sub-committee No. 12 reflects that the first draft did 
not include the term “democratic society,” providing:  
 
In this form Article 2 showed the following differences by comparison 
with the corresponding provision in the text finally adopted by the 
Assembly: 
 
a) Definition of the rights protected came after the Statement of 
restrictions to their exercise; 
 
b) The restrictions were to be governed by ‘any general law’ whereas 
the final text refers to  ‘law’; 
 
 The restrictions had to be ‘reasonable’: this condition is not 
mentioned in the final text; 
 The restrictions were to be ‘necessary to protect’ a number of 
interests listed, but the text did not define such necessity as that 
existing “in a democratic society.” 
 The following inherent necessities were not listed among the 
restrictions: 
 The economic welfare of the country; 
 The maintenance of law and order; 
 The prevention of crime. 
 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES” OF 
PROTOCOL NO. 4 TO THE CONVENTION, SECURING CERTAIN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY INCLUDED IN THE CONVENTION AND IN THE FIRST 
PROTOCOL THERETO, at 176 (Strasbourg 1976), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-P4-BIL2907919.pdf 
(emphasis supplied) [hereinafter Travaux Preparatoires to Protocol No. 4]. Moreover, the 
preparatory work follows with an explanatory memorandum, which reads, in pertinent 
part:  
 
Article 2 of the draft reproduces paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Draft 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Human Rights, Apart 
from the Following Amendments: 
 
a) This Article has been re-worded to bring it into line with most of 
the Article’s in Section I of the Convention on Human Rights. 
Thus the rights in question are defined in the first paragraph, while 
the second paragraph sets out the permitted restrictions to the 
application of those rights.  
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qualification in Paragraph 4 both encompasses and exceeds conceptual 
restraints on the right enunciated in Paragraph 3. Independent of this 
possible construction, but within the framework of the right to freedom of 
movement, it is the public purpose doctrine that serves as the single 
qualification to the exercise of this coveted right. The doctrine limits 
exercise of the right and empowers a right to regulate that may infringe or 
altogether eviscerate this right so long as the regulation also comports 
“with law.”676 Accordingly, the presence of the doctrine in the Article (and 
the Convention for that matter) only is dwarfed by the daunting task that it 
is asked to perform. 
Article 2 raises additional complexities for the public purpose 
doctrine that merit reference but cannot be addressed within the scope of 
this effort, which is limited to understanding the nature of the evidence 
supporting the public purpose doctrine as part of customary international 
law and the scope of such a principle. In contrast with Article 1, Article 2 
of the European Convention mentions the term “democratic society,” and 
does so twice.677 The public purpose categories, including the ordre 
public, are themselves qualified by the term “democratic society.” It is 
thus suggested that, at least for purposes of Article 2 (“Freedom of 
Movement”), there is a public purpose endemic to a “democratic society” 
that rises to the level of a qualifying factor as to a human rights norm. The 
“democratic society” realm within which the public purpose doctrine may 
rise to the level of engrafting constraints on the freedom of movement 
human rights norm bespeaks a normative connection between a 
democratically organized geopolitical subdivision and the substantive 
content of the public purpose doctrine. It is only in conformance with this 
connection that the public purpose necessary within a democratically 
structured society may give rise to an application of the doctrine that may 
normatively justify curtailing so fundamental a right as freedom of 
movement. It is less clear why the “democratic society” term is found in 
Article 2 in relation to public purpose, but not at all in Article 1, which 
qualifies the right to possession and enjoyment of property on “public 
interest,” much as Paragraph 4 of Article 2 resorts to “public interest” in 
limiting the freedom of movement. The relationship between a 
“democratic society” and public purpose as a prescriptive foundation for 
limiting freedom of movement is perhaps an explicit acknowledgement 
                                                                                                                         
c) On the other hand, in the draft Protocol, the second paragraph 
stipulates that the restrictions permitted would be those which are 
‘necessary in a democratic society’.   
 
Id. at 178-79 (emphasis supplied).  
 
676 Id. 
 
677 European Convention, supra note 16, art. 2 ¶¶ 3-4. 
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that the legacy public purpose doctrine—itself enjoying only general 
content that is ill-defined and having its application based on a self-
judging standard—can only function where the rule of law endemic to a 
democratic society pervades the very doctrine’s content. 
Limiting application of the public purpose doctrine as a principle 
of law that empowers States to limit the right of movement based upon a 
higher norm in the form of regulatory sovereignty  perhaps may only be 
entrusted to democratic societies where peoples’ right to move within the 
national territory and to leave the national territory can only be 
subordinated to a public purpose that finds expression within a 
democratically organized society. Even though the European Convention 
on Human Rights presumably is comprised of European States that are 
politically democratic, the drafters, negotiators, and signatories very 
implicitly proscribed non-democratic signatories from restricting domestic 
or international travel.678 
But for the use of the public purpose doctrine in Articles 1 and 2, 
the balance of the Convention only once references public purpose, and 
fleetingly at that.679 
The American Convention on Human Rights “PACT of San José, 
Costa Rica,” like the European Convention, also uses the term 
“democratic society.” The term appears only on three occasions.680 These 
scant appearances throughout the eighty-two-article convention are 
connected to explicit references to the public purpose doctrine in a manner 
similar to that of the European Convention. The select use of the term in 
tandem with public purpose suggests an express intent by the drafters and 
signatories to limit a State’s use of the doctrine in placing limits on 
fundamental freedoms of movement, assembly, and association only to 
nations that have embraced democratic principles of governance. 
                                                 
678 See supra note 677 & accompanying text.  
 
679 Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in Article 1 (“Procedural safeguards relating to the expulsion of 
aliens”), paragraph 2, States: 
 
2.  An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights under 
paragraph 1.a, b and c of this Article, when such expulsion is necessary 
in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national 
security.  
 
Euro. Conv. Protocol 7, supra note 394, art. 1 ¶ 2 (emphasis supplied). 
 
680 See American Convention, supra note 13, Article 15 (“Right of Assembly”), Article 
16 (“Freedom of Association”), and Article 22 (“Freedom of Movement and 
Residence.”).  
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The movement, residence, assembly, and association of citizens is 
fundamental to social conditions that may give rise to a democratic society 
and to the perpetuation of democratic rule. Studious “democratic society” 
limitation on the exercise of the public purpose doctrine, as evident from 
the European Convention and the American Convention, exists due to the 
need to fashion a public purpose doctrine that eliminates or may 
substantially mitigate the likelihood of “legitimate abuse” by States hiding 
behind a “right to regulate” that is only formally (not substantively) 
legitimate. This sporadic particular linking of the term “democratic 
society” with public purpose also supports the broader propositions that: 
(i) application of the doctrine should be subject matter specific; (ii) 
specific circumstances warrant a limit on State application of the doctrine; 
and (iii) limits on a State’s recourse to the doctrine to infringe on 
established and protected rights should be subject to an objective standard, 
such as, i.e., a “democratic society.” As to this latter premise, what 
constitutes a “democratic society” within the confines of the signatories to 
the American Convention becomes an inevitable query.681  
                                                 
681 A number of Latin American countries—most notably Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
Venezuela—while formally purporting to subscribe to the rule of law and the majesty of 
the democratic process have instead substantively expanded the powers of the executive 
branch to the detriment of the judicial and legislative branches. In some instances, the 
executive branch has pronounced that the judiciary must subordinate juridical analysis 
and the rule of law to “revolutionary principles” or the “best interests of the revolution.” 
Similarly, process legitimacy has been abused in furtherance of the promulgation of 
constitutional amendments that have the single purpose of perpetuating the head of State. 
In these “democracies” fundamental freedoms such as human rights and the right to 
assembly have been altogether eviscerated. See generally ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, 
DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT 
(Cambridge University Press 2010). Brewer-Carías argues that the influence of the 
Venezuelan executive branch has trumped any checks and balances with respect to the 
judicial and legislative branches.  Four fundamental propositions pervade the text. First, 
despite the ostensible semblance of democracy, Brewer-Carías argues that: 
 
The 1999 Constituent Assembly was, then, the instrument the President 
used to dissolve and interfere in all branches of government 
(particularly the judiciary) into dismissal, public officials who had been 
elected just a few months earlier in November 1998: namely, the 
representatives to the National Congress, the State legislative 
assemblies, and the municipal councils, as well as the State governors 
and municipal mayors. The sole exception to this interference was the 
President of the Republic itself, precisely the author of the 
constitutional fraud, whose tenure was not affected. In addition, the 
Constituent Assembly interfered in all other branches of government, 
particularly in the judiciary, whose autonomy and independence was 
progressively and systematically demolished. The result was tight 
executive control  over the judiciary, particularly regarding the newly 
appointed Supreme Tribunal of Justice whose Constitutional Chamber 
has been the most the ominous instrument for consolidating 
authoritarianism in the country.  
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Id. at 13 (internal citations omitted).  Second, Brewer-Carías further observes:  
 
Article 17 of the transitory regime decree also provided for  the 
termination of the Supreme Court of Justice to give way to the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice, even if the Constitution that created it was not still 
in force. (It was published on Dec. 30, 1999). For such purpose, the 
three chambers of the former Supreme Court of Justice (political-
administrative, criminal, and civil cassation) were extinguished and its 
magistrates dismissed. 
 
Id. at 76. Third, as to the legislative branch, Brewer-Carías chronicles that the interior 
regulations of the Assembly were openly manipulated and reformed in 2003 and 2004 to 
allow the incorporation of deputies without formal requirement and to allow the 
Assembly to annul its own previous decisions by simple majority. Sessions of the 
Assembly were held outside the Parliament official headquarters, in public spaces, to 
prevent the participation of opposition representatives because of violent threats from the 
so-called Bolivarian circles. The provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing 
representatives the right to vote according to their conscience has never been enforced, 
and never during the past decade have representatives been accountable to their 
constituency, as provided for in the Constitution. Id. at 395.  
  
Fourth, Brewer-Carías contends that essential elements of democratic elections set forth 
in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, such as “periodic, free and fair elections based 
on secret balloting and universal suffrage that expression of the sovereignty of the 
people,” have never formed part of “Venezuelan democracy” under President Chávez’s 
administration. Id. at 397. See also Frank M. Walsh, The Legal Death of the Latin 
American Democracy: Bolivarian Populism’s Model for Centralizing Power, Eliminating 
Political Opposition, and Undermining the Rule of Law, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 241 
(2010). 
 
A strong argument regarding the substantive dissonance present between the appearance 
of democratic rule and the actual rule of law can be found in the Expert Report of 
Vladimiro Álvarez Grau recently filed in the Southern District of New York in Chevron 
Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, where Grau 
States that, in his opinion:    
 
Ecuador’s problem is that since 2004 the Government has continually 
violated the rule of law. It is my conviction that under President Correa, 
the country is experiencing a severe institutional crisis. If the 
Government and certain politicians do not stop influencing the 
decisions of the Courts and Tribunals, the fact that today there is no 
independence in the administration of justice will not change. The 
judiciary can no longer act impartially and with integrity, and is instead 
subject to constant pressure and threats that influence its decision. 
 
2010 WL 6380602, at * (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010) (Expert Report and Affidavit); see also 
International Bar Association,  Ecuador: Un Análisis Sobre la Independencia de la 
Función Judicial (June 2005),  
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=6a00e1fb-6974-41bc-
a2bb-479f37b5f65c. As to Bolivia, see International Bar Association, Justicia Denegada: 
La Apremiante Necesidad de Implementar una Reforma Significativa en el Sistema 
Judicial de Bolivia (Aug. 2006),  
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=DFCA2074-046A-422C-
94A2-68FF1AA49C3E. The IBA’s report concludes that there is no separation between 
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The public purpose doctrine is fundamental to the American 
Convention’s framework. It is the organizing principle of six of its 
articles.682 Article 12 (“Freedom of Conscience and Religion”) is 
constituted by four single-sentence paragraphs. The first two paragraphs 
assert the right and its scope, while the symmetrical balance of the 
paragraphs deliberately articulate limitations on the right.683 Aside from 
the right accorded to parents or guardians to impart “religious and moral 
education [to] their children or wards that is in accord with their own 
convictions,”684 the single limitation to the right of freedom of conscience 
and religion is in the form of the public purpose. The doctrine, in the form 
of (i) “public safety,” (ii) “public order,” (iii) “public health,” and (iv) 
“morals,” is the single normative constraint on this fundamental 
freedom.685 Similarly, the doctrine expressed as in the form of (i) “national 
security,” (ii) “public order,” (iii) “public health,” and (iv) “public 
morals,” is identified as the principal possible limitation on the freedom of 
thought and expression together with “respect for the rights or reputation 
                                                                                                                         
the legislative and the executive branches of power in Bolivia. Moreover, judicial process 
lacks transparency and independent authority in the administration of justice.  
 
682 See American Convention, supra note 13, art. 12 (“Freedom of Conscience and 
Religion”), art. 13 (“Freedom of Thought and Expression”), art. 15 (“Right of 
Assembly”), art. 16 (“Freedom of Association”), art. 21 (“Right to Property”), and art. 22 
(“Freedom of Movement and Residence”). 
 
683 Article 12 (“Freedom of Conscience and Religion”) of the American Convention of 
Human Rights States: 
 
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. 
This right includes freedom to maintain or to change one’s religion or 
beliefs, and freedom to profess or disseminate one’s religion or beliefs, 
either individually or together with others, in public or in private. 
 
2.  No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his 
freedom to maintain or to change his religion or beliefs. 
 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only 
to the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others. 
 
4.  Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide 
for the religious and moral education of their children or wards that is 
in accord with their own convictions. 
 
Id. art. 12.  
 
684 Id. art. 12 ¶ 4. 
 
685 Id. art. 12 ¶ 3. 
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of others.”686 The application of the doctrine, however, pursuant to Article 
13(2)(a)-(b) is limited to the imposition of liability and not censorship. 
This application of the doctrine is instructive because it does not represent 
an absolute exception but rather one that is qualified and, in this limited 
regard, supports the broader principle that application of the public 
purpose doctrine may be such so as to avoid an “all or nothing” result. A 
compromising and qualified outcome bespeaks proportionality. Imposition 
of liability in lieu of absolute censorship comports with a “proportionality” 
approach to the otherwise absolute public purpose exception.687 This 
contribution is an important one within the framework of identifying the 
existence and scope of a public purpose doctrine within the framework of 
customary international law. 
The modified (proportional) approach to the application of the 
doctrine within the context of the fundamental human right of freedom of 
thought and expression is also evinced in Article 13(4). This provision 
provides that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, 
public entertainments may be subject by law to prior 
censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them 
for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.688  
The application of the doctrine to a “special class” represents yet another 
technique pursuant to which the principle may be applied in ways that are 
absolute but only where such rigor in turn is compelled and justified by 
the subject matter at issue, in this case “the moral protection of childhood 
and adolescence” within the narrow category of “public entertainments.”  
                                                 
686 Article 13 (“Freedom of Thought and Expression”) establishes this public purpose 
qualification on this right, providing in relevant part:  
 
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph 
shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to 
subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established 
by law to the extent necessary to ensure: 
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or 
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public 
health or morals. 
 
Id. art. 13 ¶ 2(a)-(b). 
 
687 .The principle of proportionality finds ample support in the context of international 
human rights law. See discussion of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights infra Chapter 3.A(3).  
 
688 American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13 ¶ 4 (emphasis supplied).  
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As previously discussed,689 the American Convention readily 
avails itself of the public purpose doctrine albeit within the context of 
States that may be described as having “a democratic society” with respect 
to the four essential rights that are migratory or of movement: (i) Article 
15 (“Right of Assembly”); (ii) Article 16 (“Freedom of Association”); (iii) 
Article 22 (“Freedom of Movement”); and (iv) Article 22 (“Freedom of 
Residence”). In all four of these rights the language expressed in the 
Convention is materially indistinguishable.690 
Much like Article 1 (“Protection of Property”) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 21 (“Right to Property”) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights also speaks to “enjoyment” of 
property but not to “ownership.” As to “enjoyment,” the second sentence 
of the first paragraph asserts that “[t]he law may subordinate such use and 
enjoyment to the interest of society.”691 Ownership is implicit in the 
qualification to the right to property in the negative (deprivation of a 
person’s property) based upon “payment of just compensation” and “for 
reasons of public utility or social interest.”692 A third amorphous 
qualification on the otherwise unbridled right to property appears in the 
                                                 
689 See supra note 677 & accompanying text.  
 
690 As to Article 15 (“Right of Assembly”), the qualifying language provides that:  
 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than 
those imposed in conformity with the law and necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or 
public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or 
freedom of others. 
 
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 15. The qualification asserted in Article 16 
(“Freedom of Association”) States that:  
 
The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such restrictions 
established by law as may be necessary in a democratic society, in the 
interest of national security, public safety or public order, or to protect 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Id. art. 16. Finally, the Article 22 (“Freedom of Movement and Residence”) 
restriction States that:  
 
The foregoing rights may be restricted only pursuant to a law to the 
extent necessary in a democratic society to prevent crime or to protect 
national security, public safety, public order, public morals, public 
health, or the rights or freedoms of others.  
 
Id. art. 22. 
 
691 Id. art. 21 ¶ 1.(emphasis supplied).  
 
692 Id. art. 21 ¶ 2. 
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form of language providing “in the cases and according to the forms 
established by law.”693 
A. Public Purpose Doctrine as a Fulcrum for a Hierarchy of 
Human Rights 
The select application of the doctrine throughout the European 
Convention, as well as the American Convention on Human Rights, 
suggests that there exists an unStated hierarchy of human rights.694 Thus, 
whether pursuant to the public purpose doctrine or a matter of “State 
emergency,” certain rights cannot be suspended or otherwise modified 
without delegitimizing the particular human rights convention in its 
totality. It is certainly beyond man’s wit to conceive of a public purpose, 
public danger, or a State of necessity that could justify infringement on the 
right to freedom from slavery, the right to humane treatment, or the right 
to life, to mention only three such rights that happen to be contained in the 
American Convention.695 Conceptual and analytical support for the 
proposition that the public purpose doctrine, at least in its legacy iteration, 
must have subject matter limitations, is also certainly provided for in the 
human rights context in Article 27 (“Suspension of Guarantees”) of the 
American Convention. This provision is tasked with balancing the 
protection of fundamental human rights against the rights of States to 
regulate in times of crises, i.e., the most extreme expression of the public 
purpose doctrine: State emergency. Article 27 in part States: 
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the 
independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating 
                                                 
693 Id. As to compensation, this provision appears to codify a very general Statement of 
the broad principle of customary international law providing that a nationalization or 
expropriation, a direct or indirect nationalization or expropriation, or an infringement on 
property that is tantamount or the equivalent to a direct or indirect expropriation or 
nationalization is contrary to law where compensation for the taking does not ensue.  
 
Article 21 specifically references “payment of just compensation.” Id. This element of the 
provision is less settled even in general terms as a matter of customary international law. 
There is considerable authority for compensation to be legally sufficient if payment is 
made in a form that is “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation” (the “Hull 
formula”). See , e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429 (1963). 
Equally authoritative sources hold that compensation should reflect fair market value. 
See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1110 ¶ 2. A third line of authority suggests that “fair 
and just compensation” is sufficient. See generally United Nations Conference on Trade 
& Development, Taking of Property, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15, U.N. Sales No. 
E.00.II.D.4 (2000).  
 
694 See generally Tom Farer, The Hierarchy of Human Rights, 8 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 115 (1991).  
 
695 See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 13, art. 4 (“Right to Life”), art. 5 (“Right 
to Humane Treatment”), and art. 6 (“Freedom from Slavery”). 
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from its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the 
period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided 
that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race, 
color, sex, language, religion, or social origin. 
The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the 
following articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 
(Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 
(Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), 
Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of 
the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child), 
Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in 
Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of 
such rights.696 
Even a surface reading demonstrates that in a very fundamental 
way, no general public good can outweigh any of the eleven enumerated 
rights: (i) the right to juridical personality; (ii) the right to life; (iii) the 
right to humane treatment; (iv) the right to freedom from slavery; (v) the 
right to freedom from ex post facto laws; (vi) the right to freedom of 
conscience and religion; (vii) the rights of the family; (viii) the right to a 
name; (ix) the rights of the child; (x) the right to nationality; and (xi) the 
right to participate in government. To the contrary, the public purpose 
doctrine, even amidst the most extreme expression of national necessity, 
exists for purposes of ensuring conditions so that fundamental rights of 
this nature may exist, develop, and prosper. Subject matter limitation on 
the public purpose doctrine represents a meaningful contribution to 
international human rights law. It is equally a contribution to the 
customary international law development of a public purpose doctrine 
comparable in significance only to examples of instances where the 
qualified application of the doctrine leads to more than just a mere 
semblance of proportionality between the public purpose asserted and the 
extent to which the right at issue is at all altered. 
1. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, consonant 
with the European Convention on Human Rights, and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, asserts fundamental human rights to 
assembly and movement within the national territory and to travel beyond 
the country subject to law or restrictions arising from an expansive public 
purpose doctrine. As to the right of assembly, the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (“the African Charter”) provides that, while 
                                                 
696 Id. Ch. IV (“Suspension of Guarantees”) art. 27. 
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every individual has the right “to assemble freely with others,” this right 
may be restricted “by law in particular those enacted in the interest of 
national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of 
others.”697 The right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of a State is qualified only by the imperative obligating 
individuals to abide by law. Here, the constraint on the human right to 
freedom of movement and residence is considerably broader, and certainly 
having greater predictive value, than the strictly public purpose doctrine 
qualification on the right contained in the European and American 
conventions on human rights.698 The right to leave a country, including an 
individual’s own nation, is subject to a much broader, less transparent, 
more predictable constraint in the form of a public purpose doctrine than 
the right to freedom of movement and residence also asserted in Article 
12.699 The inclusion of public purpose categories such as health, morality, 
order, and national security, provides the “right to regulate” with 
considerable analytical premises with which to infringe upon the human 
right to leave any country including a person’s own country. 
In sharp contrast with the European and American Human Rights 
Conventions, the African Charter does not distinguish between 
“democratic society” and a non-democratic society in qualifying States 
that may restrict the fundamental freedoms of (i) movement, (ii) residence, 
and (iii) the right to leave any country including an individual’s own 
nation.  
The African Charter also identifies the right to property, without 
reference to ownership, taking, deprivation of possessions, or 
compensation as an element incident or attendant to any type of taking of 
property.700 The right to property also does not reference “use or 
                                                 
697 African Charter, supra note 399, art. 11. 
 
698 Id. art 12 ¶ 1. 
 
699 Article 12 of the African Charter provides:  
 
1.  Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and 
residence within 
the borders of a State provided he abides by the law. 
 
2.  Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including 
his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to 
restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, 
law and order, public health or morality. 
 
700 Article 14 of the African Charter provides: 
 
The right to property shall by guaranteed. It may only be encroached 
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the 
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws. 
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enjoyment” and provides that such right “may only be encroached”701 
based upon “interest of public need” or the “general interest of a 
community.” 
The importance of the public purpose doctrine within the meaning 
of Articles 11, 12, and 14 of the African Charter is considerable. Its select 
and somewhat studious presence is testimony to the doctrine’s central 
importance and not to a classification of its rule as a secondary precept in 
the Charter’s mechanics. The doctrine is treated equally and in tandem 
with the obligation to follow the law as the only restrictions on any 
freedom contained in the Charter’s entirety.702 
The Charter recognizes a right that does resemble the sustainable 
development expression of the public purpose doctrine discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section E. The principle, however, is Stated as a right and not 
as an exception to a right that justifies exercise of regulatory sovereignty 
to the detriment of obligations running from the State to individuals. 
Because, however, the Charter speaks of the “right to development” in 
individual and particular terms, a selective or “public” right to 
development conceptually provides normative support for its use as a 
constraint on protection obligations that a State may owe to private natural 
or juridical persons. Thus, broad as this “sustainable development” 
individual and collective human right may be, its public purpose doctrine 
counterpart in the form of an exception legitimizing the right to regulate 
would be broad and problematic, as we have found the sustainable 
development public purpose expression to be.703 Reading “right to 
                                                                                                                         
 
Id. art. 14.  
 
701 Id. 
 
702 The only restrictions on human rights contained in the Charter are exceptions based on 
either the public purpose doctrine, or in compliance with law. See id. art. 6; art. 9 ¶ 2;  art. 
10 ¶ 1; art. 11; art. 12 ¶¶  1-2; art. 14. Notably, in contrast with the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, the right of 
association prescribed in the Charter under Article 10(1) cannot be modified under the 
public purpose doctrine, but only on the ground of non-compliance with the law. Id. art. 
10 ¶ 1.  
 
703 The collective and individual “sustainable development” iteration of a human right 
rather than an exception to the right to regulate is set forth in Article 22(2). Paragraph 1 
of this article helps contextualize the “right to development.” Article 22 reads: 
 
1.  All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and 
cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and 
in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. 
2.  States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure 
the exercise of the right to development. 
 
Id. art. 22 ¶¶ 1-2.  
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economic development” into the “right to development” is not too much of 
a conceptual indiscretion where a collective right to development also is at 
stake. 
Just as Article 22(2) of the Charter suggests a relationship with the 
sustainable development expression of the public purpose doctrine 
exception to the right to regulate, Article 21(4)-(5) analogously expresses 
a right comparable to the permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
exception that is typically relied upon by Host States to challenge long-
term exploration and exploitation contracts entered into with industrialized 
States.704 The human right expressed in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 21 
has both an individual and a collective character, but the individuality and 
collectivity applies to State parties acting on behalf of their citizenries 
with respect to wealth and natural resources.705  
The African Charter thus materially distinguishes itself from the 
anatomy and content of the European and the American Conventions. The 
Charter’s very name speaks to “human and peoples’ rights.” Paragraphs 4 
and 5 of Article 21 of the African Charter specifically reference “[s]tates 
parties to the present Charter”;  thus, this “human” right is one attaching to 
States (i) for the protection of its citizens, (ii) against other States, and (iii) 
only against the State of which individuals are citizens to the extent that 
such sovereign acts against its own right to explore, exploit, and dispose of 
its wealth and natural resources.706 Consonant with Article 21 generally 
                                                                                                                         
 
704 The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is addressed in Chapter 
5 of this text.  
 
705 See African Charter, supra note 399, art. 21 ¶ 4.  
 
706 Article 21 of the African Charter States: 
 
1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural 
resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of 
the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it. 
 
2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to 
the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate 
compensation. 
 
3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised 
without prejudice to the obligation of promoting international 
economic cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange 
and the principles of international law.  
 
4. States parties to the present Charter shall individually and 
collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and 
natural resources with a view to strengthening African unity and 
solidarity. 
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and Paragraphs 4 and 5 in particular, the public purpose doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources—generally invoked as an 
exception justifying exercise of a right to regulate in such a manner as to 
limit obligations extending to foreign investors—finds robust resonance in 
the African Charter. It is present as both an affirmative human right 
ultimately held by citizens and also by States in the form of both a right 
that presumably may be asserted by an individual against his own nation, 
and as an exception raised by a State against infringement on the 
exploration, exploitation, and disposal of wealth and natural resources by a 
foreign State, presumably notwithstanding international contracts 
providing for foreign access to the resources falling within the purview of 
Article 21. 
Construed together, States and their citizens possess a human right 
to development that extends to exploration, exploitation, and disposition 
of wealth and natural resources. This right, presumably premised on the 
highest public interests of individuals and peoples, is intended to 
safeguard the use of wealth and natural resources of States. Pursuant to the 
most conventional paradigm, the Article 22 “right to development” and 
the Article 21 “wealth and natural resources” principles are used by States 
to justify the right to regulate in disavowance of rights arising from 
treaties and other international instruments, often to the detriment of 
foreign investors/investments. A second and less conventional paradigm 
would be recourse to these principles by individuals against their own 
governments for purposes of denouncing in international super-State fora, 
unconstitutional or illicit disposition of resources by regimes that are 
impervious to the rule of law, and the legitimate public interest of its own 
citizenry. This latter scenario most commonly takes place where States 
engage, for example, in the illicit privatization of strategic resources. 
While this activity regrettably can hardly be characterized as rare or 
sporadic, the denouncement of such abuses by corrupt regimes on the part 
of private citizens most commonly is fraught with insurmountable 
challenges.707  
The African Charter exemplifies perhaps the broadest expression 
of the use of the public purpose doctrine within the framework of the three 
human rights conventions analyzed. It shares with the European 
                                                                                                                         
5. States parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all 
forms of foreign economic exploitation particularly that practiced 
by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully 
benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources.  
 
Id. art. 21. 
 
707 The entrenchment of those only formally purporting rather to subscribe to rule of law 
in Latin America despite ongoing opposition is demonstrative of the difficulties inherent 
in denouncing such a regime. See supra note 683.  
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Convention and the American Convention the use of the doctrine in the 
context of property-related human rights. It also features the doctrine in 
the context of human rights concerning the right to assemble, the right to 
freedom of movement, and the right to leave any country (including one’s 
own). As to these specific rights, however, in contrast with the European 
and American Conventions, the African Charter does not distinguish 
between democratic and non-democratic societies as a predicate to 
exercise of the doctrine by a State in ways that may infringe upon or 
altogether eviscerate such rights. Also, the African Charter speaks to the 
rights of “peoples” and “State Parties” in connection with expressions of 
the public purpose doctrine that merges the doctrine into both affirmative 
human rights and regulatory exception categories in contrast with the 
European and American Conventions. Specifically, the sustainable 
development and permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
expressions of the public purpose doctrine are codified by the African 
Charter as “human rights and peoples’ rights.” In this connection, it vastly 
amplifies the doctrine as to entities in which the doctrine vests (States and 
private individuals) and the very doctrine’s scope.  
2. The Findings and Effects of the European and 
American Human Rights Conventions, and the African 
Charter on the Customary International Law 
Development of the Public Purpose Doctrine. 
International human rights law applies to the public purpose 
doctrine even though it never defines it. Its contribution to public purpose 
in customary international law is quite meaningful. Based upon the three 
conventions analyzed, it is evident that the public purpose doctrine is 
central to international human rights law despite the paucity of 
international instruments and writings purporting to establish the 
connection between the doctrine and the workings of international human 
rights customary and conventional law. Generally, the public purpose 
doctrine serves to amplify the scope of States’ right to regulate to the 
detriment of its legal obligation to protect foreign investors/investments. 
International human rights law represents a constraint on States’ right to 
regulate, and in this sense operates as a constraint on the exercise of 
orthodox sovereignty.708 The public purpose doctrine bolsters additional 
sovereignty paradigms by enhancing regulatory sovereignty in its most 
traditional form.  
Although seemingly at odds with respect to their respective 
relationship to conventional notions of regulatory sovereignty, as well as 
to the manner in which the doctrine and international human rights serve 
individuals and States, the two are inextricably interdependent. 
                                                 
708 See supra at Chapter 3.A.   
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International human rights does not purport to displace or modify national 
or municipal law, which in turn rests on the public purpose doctrine as an 
organizing principle. To the contrary, as noted, international human rights 
law aspires to supplement and work together with domestic law.709 
Accordingly, there is an imperative need for international human rights to 
be able to rely upon a robust iteration of the public purpose doctrine that is 
objective (and not self-judging) and content-rich (not driven by all things 
public as characterized by a particular State). The teachings of the public 
purpose doctrine, as referenced in the European Convention, the American 
Convention, and the African Charter, identifies public purpose as a central 
organizing principle in international human rights law that forms part of 
customary international law. Moreover, the doctrine plays a critical role in 
tempering application of international human rights. It also plays a pivotal 
part in the organizational framework of international human rights. Seven 
distinct applications of the public purpose doctrine can be gleaned from 
the doctrine’s role in the European and American Conventions, and the 
African Charter. 
First, the scope and application of the public purpose doctrine is 
qualified as to the (i) subject matter, and (ii) at least in the European and 
American Conventions, States’ right to apply the doctrine in order to 
curtail entitlement to human rights protection is predicated on a 
purportedly “objective” standard: specifically, the presence of a 
“democratic society.”710 
Second, the public purpose doctrine is indispensable to the actual 
formation of a hierarchy of international human rights norms that is not 
explicitly expressed or defined as such in these instruments. The mere 
presence of the doctrine in some but not all of the human rights contained 
in these conventions itself gives rise to a hierarchy of human rights. This 
proposition is supported, by way of example, by Article 27 of the 
American Convention (“Suspension of Guarantees”).711  
Third, the content, and therefore also the application, of the public 
purpose doctrine is materially different depending on the human rights 
convention at issue. Each convention analyzed is substantively influenced 
by the history and current economic status of the signatory States. Thus, 
the very human rights norms vary accordingly as does the scope, content, 
and application of the public purpose doctrine contextualized by a specific 
convention. Therefore, the preambles of the three conventions analyzed 
considerably vary in content and in the signatory parties’ understanding of 
                                                 
709 See supra at Chapter 3, Introduction. 
 
710 See supra notes 683, 692  & accompanying text. 
 
711 American Convention, supra note 13, art. 27.  
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the right to be applied in connection with a wrong to be avoided or 
corrected. Overarching these differences, however, is a proposition 
common to all three conventions: the public purpose doctrine is broader in 
scope than its iteration in the NAFTA, the GATT, or any of the UNCTAD 
instruments analyzed in this writing.712  
Fourth, the conventions, specifically Article 13 of the American 
Convention, comport with a “proportionality” approach to the application 
of the doctrine that seeks avoidance of “all or nothing” outcomes. 
Qualifying certain freedoms of thought and expression on the ground of 
public purpose that lead to liability and not censorship is illustrative of this 
point. This application of the doctrine represents a meaningful 
contribution to the crafting of a public purpose rubric that, unlike its 
legacy iteration, best satisfies a Global paradigm among nations of 
interdependence and not independence.713  
Fifth, application of the public purpose doctrine as a complete bar 
to a human right is applicable only to a special class category meriting 
extraordinary protection, as is the case with Article 13(4) of the American 
Convention concerning “the moral protection of childhood and 
adolescence.”714  
Sixth, depending on the human rights convention consulted, a 
particular expression of the public purpose doctrine may serve as an actual 
human right that under some scenarios rightfully limits State sovereignty, 
or as an exception that amplifies regulatory sovereignty to the detriment of 
rights owed to individuals.715  
Seventh, much like the public purpose doctrine of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources,716 the exploitation and disposition of 
wealth and resources may be characterized as a peoples’ right that can 
serve both as an affirmative right and an exception triggering application 
of regulatory sovereignty.717  
                                                 
712 For a discussion of the NAFTA, see supra Chapter 1. Regarding the GATT and 
UNCTAD Instruments, see supra Chapter 2.  
 
713 See discussion of proportionality infra Section 3.  
 
714 American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13 ¶ 4.  
 
715 See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 399, art. 21.  
 
716 Addressed infra at Chapter 5.  
 
717 See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 399, art. 21  
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The American and European Conventions, as well as the African 
Charter, analyzed serve as material evidence supporting the (i) existence 
of a public purpose doctrine, (ii) having the characteristics set forth in the 
preceding seven propositions, (iii) which are broader as to scope and 
application than the conventional international law iteration of the public 
purpose doctrine present in the NAFTA, in part because of the structural 
configuration of customary international law. Consequently, there is ample 
support for the proposition that the scope, content, and application of the 
public purpose doctrine find different expressions in customary 
international law and in conventional international law. This dichotomy 
further emphasizes the need to fashion a new public purpose doctrine 
vested with content and uniformity, or to modify materially the legacy 
iteration of the doctrine.  
3. The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and Public Purpose Constraints on Regulatory 
Sovereignty. 
The European Court of Human Rights has generated a 
jurisprudence that aids in  understanding the relationship between 
international human rights and the domestic application of the public 
purpose doctrine as part of the exercise of regulatory sovereignty. Notably, 
the Court has adopted and applied a proportionality test to claimants who 
allege denial of the fundamental human right to own, use, possess or 
otherwise enjoy property. In an eloquently alleged wrongful expropriation 
action brought under Article 2 of the European Convention, the Court 
artfully applied the proportionality test in determining whether the public 
purpose doctrine had been wrongfully used in executing an expropriation 
where compensation ultimately was not tendered. The case is particularly 
relevant because it is an example of where an appropriate proportionality 
test was applied to the legacy public purpose doctrine articulated pursuant 
to an unduly broad statutory definition of public purpose consonant with a 
subjective (self-judging) standard. 
a. Farrugia v. Malta 
In the Farrugia v. Malta decision,718 the applicants were deprived 
of property that they used for their livelihood as farmers. The taking 
followed receipt of a letter from the Ministry of Public Works and 
Construction of the Country of Malta. This letter requested the applicants’ 
predecessor in interest to reach an agreement concerning the sale of the 
                                                 
718 Farrugia v. Malta, Fourth Section Decision, App. No. 67557/20 (Mar. 6, 2012) 
[hereinafter Farrugia]. 
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subject property to a private third party upon penalty of commencement of 
expropriation proceedings if an agreement was not reached.719 
Having failed to reach an agreement for the sale-purchase of the 
property, the relevant third party seeking acquisition of the property 
petitioned the government to expropriate the land on the basis that it 
constituted the single access to its property. Contemporaneously with this 
petition, the third party applied for a permit to build residential apartments 
and garages on the property concerned.720 In furtherance of the applicable 
statutory framework, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta—the Land 
Acquisition Public Purposes Ordinance (“LAPPO”)—the Government 
Gazette announced that the property concerned was being expropriated 
“for a public purpose.”721 
Applicants initiated a constitutional redress proceeding in 
observance of local law on the ground that the expropriation was illicit 
because no compensation was tendered, let alone “adequate 
compensation,” and the taking was for the benefit of a private party and 
not the government. As such, the applicants argued that the taking did not 
meet the requisite public interest stricture.722 Additionally, applicants 
averred that the proposed roadway would affect their farm and cultivated 
farmland in a manner that would materially diminish productivity. In this 
connection, applicants “noted that they had been cultivating and breeding 
animals on said land for forty years, long before the arrival of the present 
developer.”723 Furthermore, the applicants asserted that “they had not been 
informed of the expropriation until work on the construction of the road 
was commenced.”724 
The first instance tribunal denied applicants’ claim based upon 
want of public interest. The trial court provided that:  
[I]t considered that Article 2 of the LAPPO did not exclude 
that an expropriation could also serve the interests of third 
parties. Thus, while it was true that the expropriation in the 
present case had been triggered by third party’s request, 
since the land had originally been earmarked as a road it 
                                                 
719 Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. 
 
720 Id. at ¶ 5. 
 
721 Id. at ¶ 6. 
 
722 Id. at ¶ 7. 
 
723 Id.  
 
724 Id.. 
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could not be said that the taking had not been in the public 
interest.725  
Further observing that the property constituted less than one-eighth of 
applicants’ entire property, the trial court concluded that the burden to 
applicants was outweighed by the ingress/egress now made available for 
public use.726  
In processing applicants’ application, the European Court of 
Human Rights (“the Court”) noted that the rule contained in the second 
sentence of Article 1—asserting that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law”—
requires satisfaction of the “proportionality” talisman in addition to the 
requisite “public interest” standard. In this connection, the Court asserted 
that:  
[A] fair balance must be struck between the demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of 
the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights, the 
search for such a fair balance being inherent in the whole of 
the Convention. The requisite balance will not be struck 
where the person concerned bears an individual and 
excessive burden.727 
The Court thus summarized its task as having to determine whether 
application of the proportionality test yields “the requisite balance” in a 
way that comports with applicants’ right of property.728 Pursuant to its 
own precedent, the proportionality test fails where, for example, it is 
determined that a taking of property occurred without compensation or 
payment in an amount that is not reasonably related to its value.729 Either 
scenario as a matter of law creates a “disproportionate inference” in the 
application of the proportionality test.730 
                                                 
725 Id. at ¶ 9. 
 
726 Id.  Applicants also had asserted claims based on Article 1 (“Protection of property”), 
Protocol No. 1, Article 3 (“Prohibition of torture”), and Article 8 (“Right to respect for 
private and family life”). 
 
727 Id. at ¶ 20 (citing Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 61 
(1982)). 
 
728 Id. at ¶ 20 (citing Abdilla v. Malta, First Section Decision, App. No. 38244/03 (Nov. 
3, 2005)).. 
 
729 Id. at ¶ 20. 
 
730 See, e.g., Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 71 (1994). 
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Upon assuming “the lawfulness of the interference [with the 
subject property] which was confirmed by the domestic courts and of 
which the applicants have not complained,”731 the Court engaged in a 
“public interest” analysis and reiterated the principle that: 
[T]he compulsory transfer of property from one individual 
to another, may, depending on the circumstances, constitute 
a legitimate means for promoting the public interest. In this 
regard, the taking of property effected in pursuance of 
legitimate social, economic or other policies may be ‘in the 
public interest’ even if the community at large has no direct 
use or enjoyment of the property taken.732  
As to the expropriation sub judice, while observing that “the system of 
expropriation initiated at the request of third parties in Maltese domestic 
law is novel,” it held that the public purpose component of the inquiry had 
been amply met.733  
Having established that the taking comported with the public 
purpose doctrine, it became clear to the Court that the single outstanding 
issue was whether lack of compensation triggered a violation of Article 2 
of the European Convention. The finding in the negative was premised on 
a determination that applicants, “through their own fault,”734 failed to 
exhaust domestic remedies and for this reason did not allow for a finding 
on “the question of whether the compensation offered was sufficient to 
preserve a fair balance between the demands of the general interest and the 
requirements of the protection of the applicants’ rights.”735 The Court’s 
analysis as to the application of the proportionality prong raises 
considerably more questions than it can possibly address, in large measure 
because of the absence of any commentary as to why specifically 
applicants were at “fault” such that absolute non-payment of 
compensation for the taking does not affect proportionality.736 The 
                                                                                                                         
 
731 Farrugia, supra note 720, at ¶ 21. 
 
732 Id. at ¶ 22 (internal citations omitted).  
 
733 Id. 
 
734 Id. at ¶ 25. 
 
735 Id. at ¶ 23 (citing J. Lautier Company Ltd. v. Malta, Decision, App. No. 37448/06 
(Dec. 2, 2008)).  
 
736 Irrespective of whether applicants wrongfully limited their first instance prosecution to 
the issue of lack of public purpose and as a result rendered the record bereft of any 
evidence of quantum as to compensation, it remains uncontroverted that no compensation 
at all issued. Extended to its logical consequence, the Court’s treatment of compensation 
and the proportionality test leads to the conclusion that Malta was estopped from 
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proposition that a taking took place without any compensation, without 
more, bespeaks more analysis from the Court than mere reliance on a 
technical procedural matter arising from domestic law. The burden of a 
taking without compensation must form part of any proportionality 
analysis. Ultimately, however, it is the public purpose analysis that causes 
the Court to dismiss applicants’ complaints. 
Farrugia quite eloquently illustrates the relationship between 
international human rights and the public purpose doctrine. It also airs 
many of the reasons why the legacy public purpose doctrine is an obstacle 
to the efforts undertaken by international human rights’ law to redeem its 
promise to work together with and supplement domestic law. Beyond the 
technical and unremarkable inquiry concerning the extent to which a 
compulsory transfer of property to a private party may satisfy a taking’s 
public purpose requirement and thus fail to trigger an Article 2 violation, 
the relevant public purpose inquiry concerns the relationship between the 
meaning of the doctrine within the relevant domestic law and the extent to 
which that definition comports with property rights as a fundamental 
human right under Article 2. Thus framed, the exigent need for a content-
rich and objective public purpose doctrine that may functionally trigger 
human rights protection becomes much clearer. A broad and seemingly 
boundless definition of public purpose invites consistently reaching the 
wrong result for the right reason. Farrugia could not be more revealing as 
to this broader point. 
The operative definition of public purpose under the laws of Malta 
much resembles a codification of the legacy doctrine that simply is too 
broad and unqualified to be meaningful in identifying an abuse of the 
doctrine. Article 2 of the LAPPO, purporting to define “public purpose” 
within the meaning of the statute—a definition which the Court did not 
question or comment upon—provides:  
‘Public purpose’ means any purpose connected with 
exclusive Government use for general public use, or 
connected with or ancillary to the public interest or utility 
(whether the land is for use by the Government or 
otherwise), or for town planning or reconstruction or the 
generation of employment, the furtherance of tourism, the 
                                                                                                                         
payment of compensation in connection with a taking because “the Constitutional Court 
considered that the applicants’ appeal was solely related to the public interest 
requirement,” even though a public interest analysis cannot be altogether severed from 
application of a proportionality test. Moreover, the inference or conclusion that a State is 
somehow estopped from meeting its obligation to tender payment in connection with an 
expropriation where the affected party on technical grounds failed to plead properly that 
the expropriation was legally defective because no payment at all was tendered, 
represents but tautological reasoning that exhorts form over substance. The stark fact of 
record unequivocally establishes that the expropriation took place without any 
compensation. 
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promotion of culture, the preservation of the national or 
historical identity, or the economic well-being of the State 
or any purpose connected with the defence of Malta or 
connected with or ancillary to naval, military or air 
operations; and includes any other purpose specified as 
public by any enactment; and for the purposes of this 
definition, where the purpose for the exercise of any right 
under this Ordinance is connected with the utilisation of 
any land or any right in connection or in relation therewith 
for any purpose connected with the supply, storage or 
distribution of few or other sources of energy, or in 
connection with the provision of any utility or municipal 
services or infrastructural project shall be deemed to be 
connected with or ancillary to the public interest or 
utility.737  
The definition of public purpose within LAPPO places little constraint on 
regulatory sovereignty based upon a public purpose analysis. The Court is 
simply silent as to this point. It fails to observe that practically any human 
undertaking in connection with organized society may be rightfully 
construed as within the ambit of or ancillary to a “public purpose” within 
the meaning of the statute. Instead of placing subject matter in parameters, 
Article 2 of the LAPPO appears only to be referenced for purposes of 
contextualizing public purpose and the direct or indirect connection to a 
public purpose that a compulsory transfer of property between private 
individuals is likely to have. Accordingly, as to the LAPPO legislation, it 
is virtually impossible conceptually for any activity concerning real 
property not to be interpreted as a public purpose, empowering a State to 
engage in regulatory sovereignty to the detriment of private persons, both 
foreign and domestic.  
Even though the Court quite understandably lacks jurisdiction to 
sit in judgment of a Maltese legislative enactment, it certainly has 
jurisdiction to publish its understanding of the shortcomings of such an 
expansive and overbroad statutory framework that likely cannot be 
construed as in violation of any interest in property in derogation of 
Article 2, thus rendering a public purpose analysis under this statute as 
fundamentally meritless. The Court substitutes this challenging but 
necessary doctrinal scrutiny with merely announcing that the public 
purpose requirement is met because the Court “considers that the 
construction of a road which would give access to a housing complex, 
even though private, may be considered as being in the public interest.”738 
                                                 
737 Farrugia, supra note 720, at ¶ 13 (replicating Article 2 of the LAPPO—Malta’s 
relevant domestic law) (emphasis supplied).  
 
738 Id. at ¶ 22 (emphasis supplied).  
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Because the Court is charged with doing more than just participating in 
perfunctory affirmations of first-instance adjudications finding a 
legitimate public purpose exercised, it has authority to assert that the 
doctrine, even as defined by statute, must be narrower if it is to be 
reconciled with a specific human right at stake. The violation of the right 
to property would then be doctrinally linked to non-compliance with the 
public purpose requirement.  
A legacy public purpose doctrine that subordinates international 
human rights law to domestic regulatory governance shall have the effect 
of minimizing the protection against State abuse that international human 
rights aspires to guard against. The European Court of Human Rights’ 
acceptance of an unqualified expropriation where it was uncontested that 
no compensation was tendered leaves much to be desired. 
 
 
b. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey 
The need for a robust public purpose doctrine in the realm of 
international human rights law becomes all the more apparent in cases 
where the quality of domestic law restricting freedoms of expression and 
of religion are found to be “proportional” when weighed against the public 
order that such restrictions ostensibly are intended to secure. Only the 
broadest construction of a self-judging public purpose standard will yield a 
lack of disproportionate inference in the restriction of the fundamental 
human rights of expression and religion. A tempered public purpose 
analysis would serve as a necessary protection between individual human 
rights and the State’s infringement of those rights under the banner of 
regulatory sovereignty exercised in furtherance of public order. The 
incongruity arising from application of an unbridled public purpose within 
the framework of regulatory sovereignty is compounded, made worse, and 
highlighted where fundamental human rights are restricted in 
contravention of the very domestic laws of the State issuing such 
restrictions, and in defiance of the domestic laws of the majority of 
members of the community of nations addressing the identical issue. A 
paradigm example of the dysfunctional interface between international 
human rights law and the legacy public purpose doctrine is found in the 
European Court of Human Rights’ analysis and adjudication in the case of 
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey.739  
In Şahin, the applicant, then in her fifth year at the Faculty of 
Medicine at Bursa University, had enrolled in the Cerrahpasa Faculty of 
                                                 
739 Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173 [hereinafter Şahin]. 
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Medicine at Istanbul University. The Court’s judgment reflects that “she 
wore the Islamic headscarf during the four years she spent studying 
medicine at the University of Bursa and continued to do so until February 
1998.”740 On February 23, 1998, the Vice-Chancellor of Istanbul 
University issued a circular—allegedly based upon the case law of the 
Supreme Administrative Court and the European Commission of Human 
Rights—proscribing admission to lectures and tutorials to students 
wearing the Islamic headscarf and also to students with beards.741 Upon 
being denied access, the applicant filed for issuance of an order setting 
aside the circular, averring that it infringed her rights as guaranteed by 
Article 8 (“Right to Respect for Private and Family Life”), Article 9 
(“Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion”), Article 14 
(“Prohibition of Discrimination”), and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (“Right 
to Education”). The applicant specifically Stated that “there was no 
statutory basis for the circular and the Vice-Chancellor’s Office had no 
regulatory power in that theater.”742  
The applicant exhausted her judicial remedies before domestic 
courts,743 but not before the entry into force of legislation granting 
                                                 
740 Id. at 3 ¶ 15. 
 
741 Id. at 3 ¶ 16.  The circular at issue in pertinent part provides: 
 
By virtue of the Constitution, the law and regulations, and in 
accordance with the case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court and 
the European Commission of Human Rights and the resolutions 
adopted by the university administrative boards, students whose ‘heads 
are covered’ (who wear the Islamic headscarf) and students (including 
overseas students) with beards must not be admitted to lectures, 
courses or tutorials. Consequently, the name and number of any 
student with a beard or wearing the Islamic headscarf must not be 
added to the lists of registered students. However, students who insist 
on attending tutorials and entering lecture theatres although their names 
and numbers are not on the lists must be advised of the position and, 
should they refuse to leave, their names and numbers must be taken and 
they must be informed that they are not entitled to attend lectures. If 
they refuse to leave the lecture theatre, the teacher shall record the 
incident in a report explaining why it was not possible to give the 
lecture and shall bring the incident to the attention of the university 
authorities as a matter of urgency so that disciplinary measures can be 
taken. 
 
Id. (emphasis supplied).  
 
742 Id. at 4 ¶ 18. 
 
743 The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the application on the very narrow 
ground that “a University Vice-Chancellor, as the executive organ of the university, had 
power to regulate students’ dress for the purposes of maintaining order.” The Supreme 
Administrative Court dismissed a subsequent appeal. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 19-20 (emphasis 
supplied). 
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students amnesty from penalties imposed for alleged disciplinary 
violations and “resulting disabilities.”744 Based upon Article 9 (“Freedom 
of Thought, Conscience, and Religion”) of the Convention, the applicant 
perfected an action before the European Court of Human Rights asserting 
that “the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf in institutions of higher 
education constituted an unjustified interference with her right to freedom 
of religion, specifically, her right to manifest her religion.”745 The 
application was denied by the Court’s Chamber, which issued a judgment 
characterizing the restriction contained in the Istanbul University 
regulations proscribing the right to wear the Islamic headscarf as one of 
the legitimate objectives contained in the second paragraph in Article 9 of 
the Convention. Indeed, the restriction was viewed as “justified in 
principle and proportionate to the aims pursued and could therefore be 
regarded as having been ‘necessary in a democratic society.’”746  
On appeal to the Grand Chamber, the applicant narrowly 
challenged the specific grounds on which the Chamber had concluded that 
no violation of Article 9 of the Convention had taken place.747 Moreover, 
in what appeared to be a keen and practical procedural adjustment, the 
applicant asserted that her redress was not one that sought a universal right 
of recognition for all women to wear the Islamic headscarf in all places 
and without qualification. She noted that “[i]mplicit in the section 
                                                                                                                         
 
744 Id. at 5 ¶ 26. 
 
745 Id. at 17-18 ¶ 70. Article 9 of the Convention reads: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this includes freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.  
 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.   
 
European Convention, supra note 16, art. 9 ¶¶ 1-2 (emphasis supplied).  
 
746 Şahin, supra note 741, at 18 ¶ 71 (citing paragraphs 66-116 of the Fourth Section’s 
Chamber Judgment of Jun. 29, 2004, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61863). 
 
747 Id. at 18 ¶ 72. 
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judgment is the notion that the right to wear the headscarf will not always 
be protected by freedom of religion. I do not contest that approach.”748  
The nuanced issue edited to apply only to the specific case before 
the Court did not at all advance applicant’s cause. Notwithstanding the 
Court’s penchant for formal, technical arguments—most notably whether 
transitional section 17 of Law no. 2547 provided a legal basis for a 
regulatory provision proscribing use of the Islamic headscarf749—it 
ultimately premised its analysis and holding on deference to the workings 
of the public purpose doctrine within the sphere of regulatory sovereignty 
in a “democratic society.” In ratifying the Chamber’s reasoning, the Court 
reproduced the lower court judgment as follows: 
The Court ... notes the emphasis placed in the Turkish 
constitutional system on the protection of the rights of 
women ... Gender  equality – recognised by the European 
Court as one of the key principles underlying the 
Convention and a goal to be achieved by member States of 
the Council of Europe  was also found by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court to be a principle implicit in the values 
underlying the Constitution ... 
... In addition, like the Constitutional Court ..., the Court 
considers that, when examining the question of the Islamic 
headscarf in the Turkish context, it must be borne in mind 
the impact which wearing such a symbol, which is 
presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may 
have on those who choose not to wear it. As has already 
been noted, the issues at stake include the protection of the 
                                                 
748 Id. at 18 ¶ 73.  
 
749 The applicant had alleged that there was no legislative norm in existence capable of 
constituting a legal basis for the regulatory provision. Accordingly, she asserted that the 
circular 8 of February 23, 1998, upon which the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf 
was based, simply could not be compatible with transitional section 17 of Law no. 2547, 
“as that section did not proscribe the Islamic headscarf and there were no legislative 
norms in existence capable of constituting a legal basis for a regulatory provision.” Id. at 
21 ¶ 86. Consequently, following this line of thought, the Court undertook extensive 
review of the meaning of such fundamental terms as “in accordance with the law” and 
“prescribed by law,” as asserted in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, in an effort to 
canvas the extent to which the domestic legislature of the respondent State in fact had 
issued finding regulations relevant to wearing an Islamic headscarf. Because the terms 
“in accordance with the law” and “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Articles 8 to 
11 of the Convention are accorded broad constructions as to the meaning of the word 
“law,” the Court was able to find “that there was a legal basis for the interference in 
Turkish law, namely transitional section 17 of Law no. 2547 [when] read in light of the 
relevant case-law of the domestic courts.” Id. at 23 ¶ 98. Furthermore, the Court found 
that the legislation met both accessibility and foreseeability requirements. 
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‘rights and freedoms of others’ and the ‘maintenance of 
public order’ in a country in which the majority of the 
population, while professing a strong attachment to the 
rights of women and a secular way of life, adhere to the 
Islamic faith. Imposing limitations on freedom in this 
sphere may, therefore, be regarded as meeting a pressing 
social need by seeking to achieve those two legitimate 
aims, especially since, as the Turkish courts Stated ..., this 
religious symbol has taken on political significance in 
Turkey in recent years. 
... The Court does not lose sight of the fact that there are 
extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to 
impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and 
conception of a society founded on religious precepts ... It 
has previously said that each Contracting State may, in 
accordance with the Convention provisions, take a stance 
against such political movements, based on its historical 
experience  The regulations concerned have to be viewed in 
that context and constitute a measure intended to achieve 
the legitimate aims referred to above and thereby to 
preserve pluralism in the university.750 
In the name of pluralism and public order, the Court found that an 
inference of disproportionality between the constraints imposed on the 
Article 9 human right and the legitimate objective pursued by the subject 
interference.751  
                                                 
750 Id. at 28 ¶ 115 (citing paragraphs 107-109 of the Fourth Section’s Chamber Judgment) 
(emphasis supplied & internal citations omitted).   
 
751 As to proportionality, the Court observed that: 
 
Having found that the regulations pursued a legitimate aim, it is not 
open to the Court to apply the criterion of proportionality in a way that 
would make the notion of an institution’s ‘internal rules’ devoid of 
purpose. Article 9 does not always guarantee the right to behave in a 
manner governed by a religious belief and does not confer on people 
who do so the right to disregard rules that have proved to be justified. 
 
In light of the forgoing and having regard to Contracting States’ margin 
of appreciation in this sphere, the Court finds that the interference and 
issue was justified in principle and proportionate to the aim pursued.  
 
 Consequently, there has been no breach of Article 9 of the Convention. 
 
 Id. at 30 ¶¶ 121-123 (internal citations omitted). 
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Thus, Article 9 was subordinated to the preservation of a 
“democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention.752 In turn, the 
Court found “pluralism” to be “indissociable from a democratic 
society.”753 The public purpose doctrine serves as the theoretical fulcrum 
upon which the privacy of religious freedom as a matter of individual 
conscience may be balanced against the right to the freedom to manifest 
one’s religion publicly within a community. Upon acknowledging that 
“Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by religion or 
belief,”754 the Court asserted:  
In democratic societies, in which several religions coexist 
within one and the same population, it may be necessary to 
place restrictions on freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various 
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected. 755  
Public purpose, here in the form of “public order,” is thus used as a 
precept justifying the curtailment of a freedom for the greater glory of 
“true religious pluralism, which is vital to the survival of a democratic 
society.”756 Indeed, analytic support was drawn from Karaduman v. 
Turkey,757 where  
[T]he Convention institutions found that in a democratic 
society the State was entitled to place restrictions on the 
wearing of the Islamic headscarf if it was incompatible 
with the pursued aim of protecting the rights and freedoms 
of others, public order and public safety.758  
The Court’s reliance on an unbridled understanding of public purpose, 
together with untested assumptions concerning the term “democratic 
society” are indeed disappointing and, even worse, conceptually 
unavailing. The record, consonant with the Court opinion’s narrative, is 
lacking any facts from which it may be inferred that the regulation at issue 
                                                 
752 Id. at 24 ¶ 104. 
 
753 Id. 
 
754 Id. at 24-25 ¶ 105 (citing Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], App. No. 
27417/95, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 73). 
 
755 Id. at 25 ¶ 106. 
 
756 Id. at 27 ¶ 110 (citation omitted).  
 
757 Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 
(1993) [hereinafter Karaduman]; see also Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 
447 [hereinafter Dahlab]. 
 
758 Şahin, supra note 741, at 27 ¶ 111 (emphasis supplied). 
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was necessary upon penalty of endangering the public or otherwise 
assuming the risk of general disorder arising from the sight of a medical 
student sporting the Islamic headscarf. The analysis is problematic. 
Pluralism in the Court’s analysis does not comport with diversity and 
multiculturalism. Also, absent is any showing that “pluralism” in a 
democratic society within the meaning of the Convention would somehow 
be placed in jeopardy as a result of the applicant wearing the Islamic 
headscarf. 
Rather than deferring to tautological argument asserting a need to 
subordinate the Article 9 human right to the preservation of pluralism 
within a democratic society by dint of the public purpose doctrine, the 
Court should have questioned the brazen exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty in the pursuit of secularism and democratic values that led to 
the detriment of human rights. Both proportionality and public purpose, as 
standards governing the likelihood of infringement on a fundamental 
human right, were viewed strictly through the self-judging lens of the 
signatory State. Neither the public purpose doctrine nor the principle of 
proportionality were contextualized by the specific facts underlying the 
case. 
The analysis, from a public purpose scope and content perspective, 
was defective on the additional ground that it did not at all accord any 
weight to the manner in which the specific issue before it had been treated 
by the majority of States in the relevant community of nations. Customary 
international law arising from the practice of States should serve as a 
source for substantive content that may be ascribed to principles such as 
the public purpose doctrine with respect to specific issues, such as the 
relationship between Article 9 human rights and domestic legislation. The 
Court’s opinion demonstrates a diversity of treatment by the community of 
nations as to the issue in question: regulating the wearing of religious 
symbols in educational institutions generally, and in institutions of higher 
learning in particular. 
Article L. 141-5-1 of the Education Code of France, for example, 
provides:  
In State primary and secondary schools, the wearing of 
signs or dress by which pupils overtly manifest a religious 
affiliation is prohibited. The school rules shall State that the 
institution of disciplinary proceedings shall be preceded by 
dialogue with the pupil.759 
                                                 
759 Id. at 14 ¶ 56. 
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This Act, however, does not apply to State universities. A circular issued 
on May 18, 2004 establishes that the act is only limited to “….signs such 
as the Islamic headscarf, however named, the kippah, or a cross that is 
manifestly oversized, which make the wearer’s religious affiliation 
immediately identifiable.”760 The policy underlying the interference is 
manifestly aimed at proscribing what may be perceived as undue influence 
among minors and for this reason should not extend to State universities. 
The wearing of the Islamic headscarf by adults in State universities 
constitutes a protected religious expression in France. 
The Court’s opinion also acknowledged that in Belgium “there is 
no general ban on wearing religious signs at school.”761 Indeed, a Belgian 
decree issued on March 13, 1994 in the French Community “stipulates that 
education shall be neutral within the Community. Pupils are in principle 
allowed to wear religious signs.”762 This right to wear religious signs, 
however, is qualified by the public purpose doctrine.763 In the Flemish 
Community, religious or philosophical signs to be worn are not uniformly 
regulated. Here, too, restrictions on such vestments may attach based upon 
“hygiene or safety.”764 
In Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, Muslim peoples and students are 
allowed to wear the Islamic headscarf.765 The Court observed that:  
In Germany, where the debate focused on whether teachers 
should be allowed to wear the Islamic headscarf, the 
Constitutional Court Stated on 24 September 2003 in a case 
between a teacher and the Land of Baden-Württemberg that 
the lack of any express statutory prohibition meant that 
teachers were entitled to wear the headscarf. Consequently, 
it imposed a duty on the Länder to lay down rules on dress 
                                                 
760 Id. 
 
761 Id. at 15 ¶ 57. 
 
762 Id.  
 
763 The Court makes reference to the fact that in Belgium the right may be infringed upon 
“only if human rights, the reputation of others, national security, public order and public 
health and morals are protected and internal rules complied with. Further, teachers must 
not permit religious or philosophical proselytism under their authority or the organisation 
of political militancy by or on behalf of pupils.” Id. 
 
764 Id. 
 
765 Id. at 15 ¶ 58. 
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if they wished to prohibit the wearing of the Islamic 
headscarf in State schools. 766  
As in the Belgian Flemish Community, Austria does not proscribe the 
wearing of the headscarf, turban, or kippah, but recognizes a right to 
regulate on the grounds of health or safety hazard for peoples.767 Despite 
canvassing the status of the law with respect to the issue of wearing the 
Islamic headscarf as part of a fundamental human right in these countries, 
the Court also observed that in Russia, Romania, Hungary, Greece, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, this concern “does not yet appear 
to have given rise to any detailed legal debate.”768 
The dissenting opinion registered by Judge Tulkens focuses 
precisely on the Court’s surface treatment of the majority view on this 
issue as expressed by the community of nations and principally the 
signatories to the Convention. Judge Tulkens asserts that the “margin of 
appreciation” methodology pursuant to which deference is accorded to 
national authorities on the ground that they are “better placed” to 
determine their optimal compliance with Convention obligations, is 
fundamentally flawed because of the failure to incorporate meaningfully 
the positions taken by the majority of States on this issue: 
I would perhaps have been able to follow the margin-of-
appreciation approach had two factors not drastically 
reduced its relevance in the instant case. The first concerns 
the argument the majority use to justify the width of the 
margin, namely the diversity of practice between the States 
on the issue of regulating the wearing of religious symbols 
in educational institutions and, thus, the lack of a European 
consensus in this sphere. The comparative-law materials do 
not allow of such a conclusion, as in none of the member 
States has the ban on wearing religious symbols extended 
to university education, which is intended for young adults, 
who are less amenable to pressure. The second factor 
concerns the European supervision that must accompany 
the margin of appreciation and which, even though less 
extensive than in cases in which the national authorities 
have no margin of appreciation, goes hand in hand with it. 
However, other than in connection with Turkey’s specific 
historical background, European supervision seems quite 
simply to be absent from the judgment. However, the issue 
                                                 
766 Id. at 15 ¶ 59. 
 
767 Id. at.15 ¶ 60. 
 
768 Id. at 16 ¶ 65. 
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raised in the application, whose significance to the right to 
freedom of religion guaranteed by the Convention is 
evident, is not merely a “local” issue, but one of importance 
to all the member States. European supervision cannot, 
therefore, be escaped simply by invoking the margin of 
appreciation.769  
Judge Tulkens’s observation requires context if it is to be analyzed within 
the framework of public purpose as the doctrine underlies this writing. The 
Court deferred to domestic law on the issue of whether Article 9 human 
rights were compromised by domestic law proscribing the wearing of the 
Islamic headscarf in institutions of higher learning. Foreclosing 
consideration of the European consensus on this fundamental human right 
comports with application of a public purpose doctrine that is self-judging 
by the invoking State—in this instance, Turkey—whose exercise of 
regulatory sovereignty was the subject matter of the application before the 
Court. The margin-of-appreciation approach is but an ancillary 
methodology that institutionalizes from a tactical perspective the 
proposition that only the invoking State is properly positioned to 
determine the extent to which regulatory sovereignty premised on public 
purpose may legitimately and genuinely infringe upon individual rights 
and corresponding State obligations attendant to such rights. Although 
analytically sound and intuitively appealing, the Court’s reliance on the 
objective standard that the European consensus represents would have 
signaled a major paradigm shift in the treatment of public purpose from a 
subjective criteria that is content-free to an objective rubric narrower in 
scope and substantively infused by the practice of the majority of 
European States. Judge Tulkens’s analysis properly acknowledges that 
European supervision based upon an objective standard in relation to a 
fundamental human right cannot be viewed as just a “local issue” subject 
to constraints pursuant to the application of a parochial public purpose 
talisman. The enshrining of secularism over religious freedom is in great 
measure is based upon and supported by the proposition that Article 9 
rights relating to the manifestation of the person’s religious beliefs in a 
secular university are appropriately restricted by the overriding public 
purpose obligation to protect adult students from “fundamentalist religious 
movements.”770 The Court’s reading of the Commission’s procedural 
                                                 
769 Id. at 44 ¶ 3 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).  
 
770 Id. at 27 ¶ 111 (majority opinion).  
 
The Court misconstrues the legal principle that the Commission articulated in 
Karaduman as supporting the premise that:  
 
[M]easures taken in universities to prevent certain fundamentalist 
religious movements from exerting pressure on students who did not 
practise their religion or who belonged to another religion were not 
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analysis in Karaduman is analytically more than a shade off because of 
both the legal issues addressed, and the very unique factual configuration 
of that proceeding.  
Reliance on the Dahlab decision is equally misplaced. In that 
proceeding, the applicant was Swiss national employed as a primary-
school teacher and living in Geneva.771 Applicant had been asked by the 
Canton of Geneva Directorate for Primary Education to refrain from 
wearing a headscarf in the performance of her teaching duties because, so 
the argument alleged, such vestment was incompatible with Section 6 of 
the Public Education Act.772 Upon unsuccessfully exhausting domestic 
remedies, the applicant perfected an appeal with the Court, alleging that 
Section 6 of the Public Education Act infringed her freedom to manifest 
her religion consonant with Article 9 of the Convention. As part of her 
challenge, applicant further averred that the Swiss Courts committed 
judicial error in holding that the measure (i) enjoyed sufficient foundation 
in law, and (2) in finding “that there was a threat to public safety and to 
the protection of public order” arising from applicant’s wearing of the 
                                                                                                                         
considered to constitute interference for the purposes of Article 9 of the 
Convention. Consequently, it is established that institutions of higher 
education may regulate the manifestation of the rites and symbols of a 
religion by imposing restrictions as to the place and manner of such 
manifestation with the aim of ensuring peaceful coexistence between 
students of various faiths and thus protecting public order and the 
beliefs of others. 
 
Id. This interpretation of the Karaduman opinion simply finds  no support based upon the 
facts presented and the issues addressed in that case. 
 
771 Dahlab, supra note 759, at 1.  
 
772 Id. at 7.  Section 6 of the Canton of Geneva Public Education Act, dated Nov. 6, 1940 
reads: 
 
The public education system shall ensure that the political and religious 
beliefs of pupils and parents are respected. 
 
Section 120(2) of the Public Education Act States: 
 
Civil servants must be lay persons; derogations from this provision 
shall be permitted only in respect of university teaching staff. 
 
Article 27, §3 of the Federal Constitution, May 29, 1874 reads: 
 
It shall be possible for members of all faiths to attend State schools 
without being affected in any way in their freedom of conscience or 
belief. 
 
 Id.  
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Islamic scarf.”773 As to this latter proposition, applicant asserted “that she 
[had] wor[n] an Islamic headscarf and had gone unnoticed for four years 
and did not appear to have caused any obvious disturbance within the 
school.”774 
Upon discarding applicant’s challenge to the subject measure as 
not meeting the “prescribed by law” requirement of Paragraph 2 of Article 
9,775 the Court applied a proportionality test weighing the requirements of 
the protection of the rights and liberties of others against the conduct at 
issue. In doing so, weight was accorded to the extent to which wearing 
such “a powerful external symbol” may affect the religious belief of her 
pupils.776 Similarly, the Court noted that the domestic tribunal had placed 
emphasis on:  
[T]he very nature of the profession of State school teachers, 
who were both participants in the exercise of educational 
authority and representatives of the State, and in doing so 
weighed the protection of the legitimate aim of ensuring the 
neutrality of the State education system against the freedom 
to manifest one’s religion.777  
Upon conceding that  “very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful 
external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the 
freedom of conscience and religion of very young children,”778 the Court 
stressed the young ages of the children who served as applicant’s students: 
The applicant’s pupils were aged between four and eight, 
an age at which children wonder about many things and are 
also more easily influenced than older pupils. In those 
circumstances, it cannot be denied outright that the wearing 
of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising effect, 
seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept 
which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal 
Court noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender 
equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the 
wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of 
                                                 
773 Id.  
 
774 Id. (emphasis supplied).  
 
775 Id. at 11. 
 
776 Id. at 13.  
 
777 Id. at 12. 
 
778 Id. at 13.  
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tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and 
non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society 
must convey to their pupils. 779 
Applicant’s status as a teacher and the youth of her pupils are two facts 
that render the Dahlab decision inapposite to Leyla Şahin v. Turkey. 
Instead of grade school students, Şahin concerns a university setting and 
an interference arising from a circular promulgated pursuant to university 
rules. Moreover, while applicant in Dahlab was in a role model capacity 
and serving as a government representative in a public post as a school 
teacher, in Şahin the applicant was an adult student studying in a 
university and having no professional or other government ties. The 
remarkable misapprehension of the Court of its own “precedent” and 
wholesale importation of boiler plate recitations and concepts such as 
“democratic society,” “public order,” and “public safety,” is testimony to 
the workings of a public purpose doctrine that cannot appropriately 
balance the objectives of international human rights law, regulatory 
sovereignty, and the exercise of human rights by individual citizens. In 
fact, Şahin, Karaduman, and Dahlab, all reach the identical conclusion 
based upon application of the same principles of law, concerning a 
common human right (the Article 9 right to manifest religious belief), and 
notwithstanding materially disparate facts: (i) the Islamic scarf worn by a 
student in a secular university in defiance of university rules; (ii) a picture 
ID affixed to a diploma bearing the image of a person wearing an Islamic 
headscarf; and (iii) a teacher of grade-school-aged children employed by 
the government wearing an Islamic headscarf in defiance of federal 
legislation. 
The tendency to defer to domestic law that in turn is premised on a 
content-impoverished self-judging public purpose doctrine shall more than 
likely disfavor the interests of the invoking State over those of the private 
individual whose rights are being infringed based upon political agendas 
and social prejudices that are disguised with the “public purpose” cloak of 
legitimacy. Development of a new paradigm must include consideration of 
the teachings of the case studies examined as representatives of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights where the public 
purpose doctrine: (i) appears as an organizing principle tempering the 
brittle relationships among customary and conventional human rights law; 
(ii) is pivotal to the exercise of regulatory sovereignty;  and (iii) is 
necessary in providing access to the Court’s supervisory powers on the 
part of individuals whose rights have been violated. Public purpose serves 
a central role regarding the development and application of the European 
international human rights rubric. Here, public purpose plays a decisive 
role. 
                                                 
779 Id. at 13. 
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Despite this prominence, the public purpose doctrine is never 
defined even though its content and substantive effect always appear to be 
assumed. The unchallenged treatment of public purpose as a content-
neutral precept encompassing all things public and deemed to be best 
understood and applied by invoking States necessarily tends to favor the 
interests of States over those of individuals whose rights have been 
compromised. Because international human rights law purports to 
supplement and work together with domestic law, it shall tend to yield to 
domestic legislative acts and decisional-law that in turn purport to find 
normative standing based upon its conceptual compatibility with such 
vague notions as “a democratic society” and “public interest” or “public 
safety.”780  Drawing upon the practice of nations, the European consensus 
in the case of the European Court of Human Rights, represents a 
substantive source that may serve to provide the public purpose doctrine 
with concrete content. It is only one of a number of possible 
methodologies available for re-engineering a public purpose doctrine that 
may best serve the many exacting demands that international human rights 
law imposes upon it. Additionally, it also serves to help wrest from States 
the monopoly of the doctrine as a tool with  which to expand regulatory 
sovereignty in specific fields to the detriment of State compliance with 
obligations owed to individuals or even to other nations. 
 
                                                 
780 The frailties of the term “democratic society” have been singled out supra at Chapter 
3.A(2).  
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A. An Analysis of The Relationship Between Structure And 
Content: A Fragmented Framework Within A Decentralized 
Body of International Law, And A Legacy Public Purpose 
Doctrine. 
1. Unsettled Structural Issues in the Framework of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties. 
The structural status of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) 
contributes to the perpetuation of a dysfunctional legacy public purpose 
doctrine. The public purpose doctrine constitutes an integral part of BITs. 
It is one of the cornerstone exceptions common to all BITs.781 The 
fragmented configuration of BITs, however, much like the decentralized 
framework of customary international law generally, wrests from the 
public purpose doctrine found in BITs any semblance of formal or 
substantive uniformity.782 Because the BIT framework is substantively 
laced with a want of a uniform framework, this fractured structure 
impedes orthodox recourse to statutory interpretations that would 
otherwise mitigate the challenges incident to discerning the substantive 
content and scope of the doctrine within the BIT network. 
The universe of BITs is constituted by a fragmented system of 
approximately 3,000 treaties that are not at all interconnected, 
conceptually organized, or sharing monolithic material standards.783 The 
universe of multilateral regional and bilateral investment treaties is 
completely devoid of structure, hierarchy, or of any comparable 
                                                 
 
781 Even though not all extant bilateral investment treaties have been canvassed to 
confirm this proposition, it would be conceptually at odds with the very foundation of 
“bilateralism” in public international law generally and the construct of a bilateral 
investment treaty purporting to attract foreign investment while preserving strategic 
regulatory sovereignty to lack this exception. Moreover, none of the sample 300 BITs 
studied for purposes of this writing lacked some fundamental iteration of the doctrine that 
was accorded a prominent conceptual role in preserving regulatory sovereignty, 
potentially at material detriment to the expectation of compliance with a Host State’s 
obligations to protect foreign investment.  
 
782 The lack of uniform terminology and attendant context within the universe of BITs 
does not altogether obscure discernible patterns of iterations of the doctrine throughout 
the BIT “system.” 
 
783 One commentator creatively has analogized the rubric as “a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of around 
3,000 overlapping bilateral and regional treaties, tens of thousands of transnational 
contracts, and an unknown number of domestic statutes whose purported aim is to 
stimulate economic development by attracting and protecting foreign investments within 
the sovereign territories of individual Host States.” Maupin, supra note 420, at 14 n.81. 
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organizing principle.784 This lack of structural-formal uniformity is present 
at substantive levels. By way of example, rudimentary protection 
standards contained in BITs remain materially unsettled. Perhaps the 
cornerstone standard contained in BITs is the fair and equitable treatment 
standard (“FET”) of protection provided to foreign investors.785 
Significant questions surrounding this basic standard linger and arouse 
considerable polemic as to such fundamental issues as whether FET is a 
“principle” or a “standard”?786 In this same vein, FET’s relationship to the 
international minimum standard (“IMS”) also has galvanized a number of 
competing theories of practical consequences to international dispute 
resolution.787 Is IMS the same or different from FET? If substantively 
                                                 
784 In this regard, international investment law stands in high relief with its international 
trade law counterpart, which has been duly endowed with a framework and multi-
institutional standing, such as the WTO. 
 
785 The fair and equitable treatment standard is perhaps the most malleable and, therefore, 
susceptible even to unintentional over-use by claimants seeking to assert multiple claims 
arising from the same or overlapping infractions. Commentators have criticized the 
standard as conducive to abuse by claimants seeking to engraft it on violations, that, 
according to these writings, are substantively distinct from the fair and equitable 
treatment claim. Olivia Chung, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and 
Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 953, 961 (2007) 
(quoting CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Award of the Tribunal, ¶ 274 (May 12, 2005), 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Award.pdf) (citing Carlos G. Garcia, All the 
Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of 
Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 301, 306 (2004)) (“Fair and equitable 
treatment clauses…have become ‘black holes of investment treaties’ that invite a flood of 
litigation not originally contemplated by developing countries.”).  
 
786 See generally ROLAND KLÄGER, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Cambridge University Press 2011).   
 
787 See, e.g., Ioana Tudor, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2011).  The author cogently asserts that 
FET is separate and distinct from IMS and points to, inter alia, the aberrant development 
of the standard as being one that first was codified and only subsequently forming part of 
customary international law, in contrast with the converse conceptual development 
pursuant to which customary international law principles are later codified, as part of the 
grounds that give rise to this confusion. Yet, Kläger in turn observes: 
 
It might well be that in some circumstances in which the international 
minimum standard is sufficiently elaborate and clear, the standard of 
fair and equitable treatment might be equated with it. But in other 
cases, it might as well be the opposite, so that the fair and equitable 
treatment standard will be more precise than its customary international 
law forefathers.  
 
Kläger, supra note 788 at 81. Here, Kläger suggests that the evolutionary development of 
the standard is one from customary international law to conventional international law. In 
material contrast to Tudor, Kläger further asserts: 
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different, what is the difference? May the difference have any effect on 
damages/quantum?788 Numerous other rudimentary issues concerning the 
standards of protection accorded to foreign investor/investment plague 
BITs and, in considerable measure, result from the ad hoc interrelationship 
among the approximately 3,000 BITs that are not centralized or otherwise 
negotiated pursuant to consensus or a coordinated format-protocol. The 
invariable consequences of this want of rigor that tends to weaken Host 
States by exposing them to unforeseen causes of action lacking predictive 
value and that never were contemplated by the BIT parties. 
Ironically, as to the public purpose doctrine, this lack of structural 
soundness and conceptual and doctrinal consistency have empowered Host 
States by amplifying the space of their regulatory sovereignty. 
2. The Findings of Empirical Analysis of Public Purpose 
in BIT Clauses 
The methodology used in this writing to ascertain the status of the 
various iterations of the public purpose doctrine contained in BITs was 
limited to the selection of exactly 319 BITs (“the Sample BITs”) from 
different parts of the world so as to ensure a juridically broad-based 
representative sample.789 In total, eight discernible public purpose 
doctrinal categories were identified.790  A ninth public purpose doctrine 
                                                                                                                         
On many occasions, the issue will not even be whether the fair and 
equitable treatment standard is different or more demanding than the 
customary standard, but only whether it is more specific, less generic 
and spelled out in a contemporary fashion so that its application is more 
appropriate to the case under consideration. This does not exclude the 
possibility that the fair and equitable treatment standard imposed under 
a treaty can also eventually require a treatment additional to or beyond 
that of customary law. Such does not appear to be the case with the 
present dispute, however. The very fact that recent interpretations of 
investment treaties have purported to change the meaning or extent of 
the standard only confirms that, those instruments aside, the standard is 
or might be a broader one.  
 
Id. 
 
788 See generally Martinez-Fraga, supra note 51, at 61 (discussing the “uncertainty 
pervading in basic clauses contained in BITs because of the fractured and fragmented 
BITs framework.”). 
 
789 These treaties have been identified and listed in alphabetical order in a chart format 
forming part of Appendix II, entitled “An Empirical Review of the Preeminence of the 
Public Purpose Doctrine Throughout the Ever-Expanding Universe of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties.” 
 
790 The eight exceptions in the form of public purpose doctrine iterations were the 
following: (i) environmental and labor, (ii) limited specific public purpose exceptions, 
(iii) no relaxation of existing public purpose measures, (iv) general exceptions, (v) 
security exceptions (vi) exceptions for transfers, (vii) prudential financial measures 
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exception appeared with considerable regularity in the preamble of certain 
BITs concerning the principle of sustainable development.791  
Within the universe of the nine BIT public purpose doctrine iterations and 
clauses identified, five categories of the public purpose doctrine were most 
recurrent: (i) the principle of sustainable development alone or in 
conjunction with health, safety and environment, or labor;792 (ii) 
environment and labor;793 (iii) limited public purpose exceptions;794 (iv) 
no relaxation for health, safety, or environment;795 and (v) clarification of 
indirect expropriation.796 Analysis of the Sample BITs’ treatment of the 
public purpose doctrine demonstrates that the BIT network tends to favor 
the interests of Host States because of their respective reliance on the 
public purpose doctrine as an organizing principle regulating the exercise 
of regulatory sovereignty. While a number of the Sample BITs did not 
                                                                                                                         
exceptions, and (viii) clarification of indirect expropriation exceptions. Each exception is 
analyzed and exemplified in at least one form in Appendix II.  
 
791  The Agreement Between Canada and Jordan for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, by way of example, in the preamble States: 
 
RECOGNIZING that the promotion and the protection of investments 
of investors of one Party in the territory of the other Party will be 
conducive to the simulation of mutually beneficial business activity, to 
the development of economic cooperation between them and to the 
promotion of sustainable development. 
 
Canada-Jordan BIT, supra note 546, preamble.  
 
792 Appendix II at 2. See, e.g., Canada-China BIT, supra note 546, preamble.  
 
793 Appendix II at 3. See,, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
art. XVII ¶ 2, Can.-Arm., May 8, 1997, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_armenia.pdf [hereinafter Canada-
Armenia BIT]. 
 
794 Appendix II at 3. See, e.g., Canada-Jordan BIT, supra note 546, art. VII ¶ 2. 
 
795 Appendix II at 4. See,, e.g., Canada-Jordan BIT, supra note 546, art. XI; Agreement 
Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Republic of Colombia on 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments art. VII, Bel.-Col., Feb. 4, 2009,  
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Belgium_colombia.pdf [hereinafter 
Belgium-Colombia BIT].  
 
796 Appendix II at 8. See, e.g., Canada-China BIT, supra note 546, annex B.10 
(“Expropriation”); Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between 
the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of India art. 6 ¶ 2(iv), Colom.-Ind., Nov. 10, 
2009, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/colombia_india.pdf [hereinafter 
Colombia-India BIT].  
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contain any public purpose doctrine language or provision,797 it was hardly 
uncommon for most BITs containing public purpose based exceptions to 
contain different iterations of the doctrine.798 Analyses of each of the 
representative public purpose doctrine exceptions contained in BITs as 
well as paradigmatic BITs asserting multiple iterations of the public 
purpose doctrine, are worth reviewing because they demonstrate a trend 
towards (i) broadening regulatory sovereignty, and (ii) promoting a legacy 
public purpose doctrine containing exceptions that touch and concern “all 
things public,” while preserving the right to a self-judging standard on the 
part of the invoking State. It is significant to observe that most of the 
Sample BITs containing representative public purpose-based exceptions 
are of recent vintage.799  
B. Public Purpose in the Form of Sustainable Development 
Language in BITs and Combinations of Sustainable 
Development, and Health, Safety & Environment, or Labor. 
The Colombia-Japan BIT800 is particularly helpful in analyzing the 
scope and content of the public purpose doctrine within BITs, as well as 
the multiple iterations of the doctrine within a single treaty. The public 
purpose doctrine pervades this BIT. It is an illustrative paradigm because 
all of the eight referenced public purpose categories801 are contained in the 
treaty; additionally, language referencing the public purpose category of 
sustainable development, health, safety and environment, and labor can be 
found in the preamble. 
The prominence of the public purpose doctrine in this  BIT also is 
conceptually helpful because the treaty concerns an unqualified 
industrialized nation (i.e., Japan) and an economy in transition that no 
longer can be classified in economic terms as a “developing country.”802 
                                                 
797 The lack of reference is aside from the standard recitation of the elements of a valid 
expropriation that is present in almost every BIT which due to its standardized form and 
prevalence was not included in the empirical analysis. For an example of this standard, 
see, e.g.,  Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
Argentine Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, and Protocol art. 7, 
Aus.-Arg.,  Aug. 23, 1995, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_australia.pdf.  
 
798 Appendix II at 5-6. See, e.g., Canada-Jordan BIT, supra note 546; Colombia-Japan 
BIT, supra note 546.  
 
799 Especially those evincing the sustainable development expression in Appendix II at 2.  
 
800 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546.  
 
801 See supra note 792 & accompanying text.  
 
802 See, e.g., Robert W. McGee , Corporate Governance in Transition and Developing 
Economies: A Case Study of Colombia (August 25, 2010), 
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Signed on September 12, 2011, the treaty is rather recent and fairly can be 
deemed to be prototypical of a second-generation BIT. It is also indicative 
of contemporary trends concerning the use of the public purpose doctrine 
in recent second-generation BITs. 
1. A Rich Preamble: Sustainable Development, Health, 
Safety & Environment, and Labor  
The preamble to the Colombia-Japan BIT reflects that the parties 
intended for the treaty to form part of customary international law.803 This 
aspiration, best contextualized by the BIT’s own language, is helpful to 
the construction of legal principles that it embodies. Because the parties 
viewed this BIT as hopefully “contribut[ing] to the strengthening of 
international cooperation with respect to the development of international 
rules on foreign investment,”804 it is reasonably certain to assume that 
recent developments in customary international law as to foreign 
investment were consulted when the respective delegations were 
negotiating the BIT.805 This sensitivity to the current status of international 
rules on foreign investment as “work in progress” is helpful because it 
causes doctrine to be embodied in rules and principles and not just the 
particular negotiating issues unique to the parties. There is value to a 
                                                                                                                         
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665056 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1665056 (last visited 
April 29, 2013) (evaluating Colombia as a transition economy under relevant OECD 
standards). 
 
803 The preamble provides:  
 
Wishing that this Agreement will contribute to the strengthening of 
international cooperation with respect to the development of 
international rules on foreign investment. 
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, preamble. This language suggests that the 
signatories viewed the Agreement as having consequences in the international arena 
beyond just the parties to the BIT. 
 
804 Id. 
 
805 These types of clauses that overtly State that the parties aspire for the treaty to 
contribute to the development of international rules on foreign investment are rare but not 
entirely uncommon and Japan seems to be sensitive to them. By way of example, the 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion, Protection and 
Liberalization of Investment, signed on November 22, 2008, contains the identical clause: 
 
Wishing that this Agreement will contribute to the strengthening of 
international cooperation with respect to the development of 
international rules on foreign investment. 
 
Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion, Protection and 
Liberalisation of Investment, Per.-Jap., Nov. 22, 2008, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/japan_peru.pdf [hereinafter Japan-Peru BIT]. 
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clause that may remind the parties to the BIT and non-party readers that 
the juridical elements of the BIT serve a much broader and even nobler 
function, than just that stimulating micro-economic transfers of wealth 
between the signatories. 
The view of BITs as contributing “to the development of 
international rules on foreign investment” comports with the Colombia-
Japan BIT’s inclusion, if only by mention in its preamble, of the doctrine 
of sustainable development.806 The seemingly all-encompassing broad 
scope of the sustainable development expression of the public purpose 
doctrine in this clause is studiously accompanied by explicit reference to 
maintenance of status quo regulatory sovereignty as to “health, safety and 
environmental measures of general application.”807 Consequently, the all-
encompassing breadth of the doctrine of sustainable development, which, 
as suggested, has been construed as justifying regulatory sovereignty in all 
spheres so long as such regulation can be said to be reasonably related to 
any aspect of economic development, is here materially narrowed. The 
qualification “without relaxing health, safety and environmental measures 
of general application,” which draws upon the public purpose exceptions 
in Article XX of the GATT concerning international trade law, provides 
the principle of sustainable development with considerable analytical 
support. But for the public purpose categories of security (which arguably 
may be said to be contained in “safety and financial soundness”), the 
general gamut of exceptions fall under health, safety, and environment. 
The reference to sustainable development in the preamble, is a quite 
meaningful negotiation accomplishment for the likely host-State: 
Colombia. It is possible, and even likely, that the Japanese and Colombian 
delegations negotiating the BIT reached an accommodation pursuant to 
which the gains secured by the inclusion in the BIT of the principle of 
sustainable development were not undermined by relaxing the imported 
GATT Article XX exceptions. 
This creative preservation of the effects of the scope and content of 
the sustainable development iteration of the public purpose doctrine may 
result in having practical implications that redound in favor of both home 
and Host States, depending on the nature of the majority of the 
investments contemplated. In this particular case, the sustainable 
                                                 
806 The preamble in pertinent part provides: 
 
RECOGNIZING that these objectives and the promotion of sustainable 
development can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and 
environmental measures of general application.  
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, preamble.  
 
807 Id. 
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development exception, with the qualification of not relaxing health, 
safety and environmental measures of general application, perfectly 
comports with the FDI expectations of Japan and Colombia, which 
primarily (if not exclusively) concern resource development pertaining to 
oil and gas, mining, and forestry. According to the  Vale Columbia 
University Center on Sustainable International Investment, Colombia 
received a total of $13.2 billion in FDI in 2011.808 Approximately $7.835 
billion of that total was allocated to primary resource development (oil and 
gas, forestry and mining).809 Only $987 million were earmarked for 
construction and manufacturing, while $4.46 billion was reserved for 
financial services and $3.7 billion invested in the hospitality and 
infrastructure sectors.810 Assuming that for purposes of this BIT, Japan 
contemplates being positioned as the Home State with Colombia serving 
as the Host State it would logically follow that the stronger capital-
exporting Japanese economy would have negotiated in effect for a freeze 
on the exercise of regulatory sovereignty concerning health, safety, and 
environmental measures of general application that are most likely to 
touch and concern FDI destined for resource development. Support for the 
sustainable development doctrine in a form restricted by security and 
general financial welfare, in exchange for status quo regulatory 
sovereignty as to resource development public purpose subject matters, 
makes eminent sense. The very opposite, however, turned out to be the 
case. 
The Colombia-Japan BIT illustrates the evolution of a negotiation 
dynamic pursuant to which underdeveloped countries and economies in 
transition enjoy greater negotiating standing. Developing resource-rich 
States, while still far less influential than their industrialized counterparts, 
have benefitted from a more integrated Global economy that favors and 
requires interdependence over independence. This healthy shift is 
conducive to greater balance and less disparity between industrialized 
States and underdeveloped countries; as such, it requires appreciation 
separate and apart from the need to reform public purpose so as to curtail 
abuses and corruption perpetuated under the cloak of a greater common 
good. 
As a second-generation BIT with signatories who have expressed a 
sensitivity for the development of international rules governing the 
liberalization, promotion, and protection of foreign investment, the use of 
                                                 
808 Miguel Posada Betancourt, Inward FDI in Colombia and its Policy Context 2012, 
Vale-Columbia University Center on Sustainable Investment, available at 
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/inward-fdi-colombia-and-its-policy-context-2012-
miguel-posada-betancourt (last visited July 2, 2013).  
 
809 Id.  
 
810 Id. 
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the public purpose doctrine in different iterations ranging from 
international trade law principles garnered from the GATT’s Article XX, 
to the principle of sustainable development, or of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, comports with a trend that witnesses a vast 
expansion of the public purpose doctrine nourished by principles not only 
extracted from international investment law, but also having their origins 
in international trade law and human rights law. The international juridical 
culture of investment law now must face the challenges of a broader but 
equally ill-defined and self-judging public purpose doctrine that forms part 
of customary international law and that has pervaded international 
investment law purportedly concerning itself with the promotion and 
protection of foreign investment. Here, Japan and Colombia, in some 
sense, have attempted to meet this challenge so as to render the public 
purpose doctrine workable by skillfully providing a succinct but effective 
check on two different manifestations of the public purpose doctrine, 
presumably based upon the subject matter of the likely FDI between these 
countries. While the result may point to an imbalance between home- and 
host-State FDI protection, the tendency favoring greater interdependence 
merits acknowledgement as a sign of concrete gains in this field. 
A second-generation BIT should be illustrative of a new generation 
of Host States enjoying greater bargaining standing with respect to 
industrialized States. Many States that historically were accurately termed 
“underdeveloped countries” have outgrown this nomenclature. A number 
of “underdeveloped countries” have in effect shed that status to become 
“economies in transition” or countries approximating industrial-developed 
nations. Colombia, Perú, and Brazil serve as helpful examples of such 
development in Latin America.811 For example, between  2007 and 2011 
Japan experienced a -0.136% growth rate; in stark contrast, Colombia 
posted a 4.402% figure.812 Similarly, other resource-rich countries such as 
India, México, Perú, Turkey, and Brazil, to name just a few, are 
transitioning from developing country status to the more economically 
                                                 
811  AVERAGE GDP GROWTH RATES 
 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007  
China 9.3 10.4 9.2 9.6 14.2 10.54 
India 6.86 9.55 8.24 3.89 9.8 7.668 
Peru 6.81 8.78 0.84 9.8 8.91 7.028 
Turkey 8.5 9.16 4.83 0.66 4.67 5.564 
Colombia 5.91 4 1.65 3.55 6.9 4.402 
Brazil 2.73 7.53 0.33 5.17 6.1 4.372 
Chile 5.99 6.1 -1.04 3.66 4.6 3.862 
Japan -0.7 4.4 -5.53 -1.04 2.19 -0.136 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, available at: data.worldbank.org 
 
812 Id. 
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equipoised posture of being both capital-exporting and capital-importing 
States. This enhanced standing would, in part, explain greater bargaining 
power on the part of States such as Colombia that in turn would lead to the 
inclusion of broad public purpose exceptions into BITs. This negotiating 
posture was not contemplated in the preceding generation of BITs. 
The preamble to the Colombia-Japan BIT, in addition to raising the 
(i) sustainable development public purpose exception, and (ii) the 
international trade law GATT exceptions, also references (iii) “labor and 
management.”813 The “labor” public purpose exception is tempered by the 
conjunctive “and” that both grammatically and substantively combines 
labor with management “in promoting investment between the Contracting 
Parties.”814 Even though the preamble speaks of the BIT as “the beginning 
of a new economic partnership between the Contracting Parties,” but for 
the sustainable development iteration of the public purpose doctrine 
referenced in the fifth paragraph of the preamble, the totality of the 
preamble is framed by the unqualified and predominant objective of 
promoting and protecting foreign investment by investors of the 
contracting parties. Notwithstanding the explicit reference to the principle 
of sustainable development, the purpose of the BIT, as suggested by the 
title and preamble, is far removed from seeking to correct historical 
asymmetries between the parties. The language “[r]ecognizing the 
growing importance of the progressive liberalization of investment for 
stimulating initiative of investors and for promoting prosperity and 
mutually favorable business activity in the Contracting Parties,” is not 
susceptible to being construed as setting forth objectives for the general 
growth of underdeveloped countries, correcting historical inequities, or in 
any way fostering the promotion of social justice, as suggested by the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.815 Thus, the Colombia-
Japan BIT, a representative second-generation BIT, incorporates 
sustainable development but does so in a qualified manner and always 
within the context of the overarching objective of promoting the 
liberalization and protection of foreign investment. It does so within a 
manifest consciousness of having the BIT contribute to the “development 
of international rules on foreign investment.”816 
                                                 
813 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, preamble. 
814 Id. 
 
815 See supra notes 696-707 & accompanying text. 
 
816 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, preamble . 
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2. The GATT Article XX Exceptions in BITs 
The GATT international trade law public purpose exceptions now 
form part of standard exceptions in BITs.817 As discussed,818 the wholesale 
importation of the GATT Article XX international trade law exceptions 
into second-generation BITs materially expands the scope and application 
of the public purpose doctrine even though the policy objectives of 
international trade law materially differ from the goals of international 
investment law.819 Vesting the public purpose exceptions in BITs with 
these trade law principles contributes to the lack of transparency and 
uncertainty that pervades the legacy public purpose doctrine.820 
The Colombia-Japan BIT incorporates the GATT Article XX 
exceptions in Article 5 (“Performance Requirements”) of the BIT.821 The 
explicit reference to the international trade law public purpose exceptions, 
within the context of the Colombia-Japan BIT, is particularly problematic 
because of the preamble’s explicit reference to these exceptions as status 
                                                 
817 Appendix II at 5. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments art. XVII ¶ 3, Can.-Thai., Jan. 17, 1997, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_thailand.pdf [hereinafter 
Canada-Thailand BIT].  
 
818 See discussion supra at Chapter 1.F. 
 
819 See note 128 & accompanying text.  
 
820 The Appendix  reflects the number of representative Sample BITs that have adopted 
language substantially similar to the GATT Article XX exceptions: no less than nineteen 
BITs. See Appendix II at 9-15.  
 
821 Article 5, Paragraph 6 reads: 
 
6.  Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner and provided that such measures do not 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or 
investment activities, nothing in subparagraphs 1(b), (c) and (f) 
and 2(a) and (b) shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party 
from adopting or maintaining measures, including environmental 
measures: 
 
(a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; 
 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or  
 
(c) related to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources. 
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 5 ¶ 6.  
 
 EAST\64724221. 3295 
quo categories that are not to be relaxed or altered. The preamble 
specifically States: 
Recognizing that these objectives and the promotion of 
sustainable development can be achieved without relaxing 
health, safety and environmental measures of general 
application.822 
The term “without relaxing” if construed as meaning without altering 
standards so as to meet the exigencies of health, safety and environmental 
concerns while simultaneously providing the Home State with the security 
arising from the transparency of knowing that standards governing these 
exceptions shall remain constant, presumably as of the time frame 
culminating in the BIT’s execution. An interpretation of the term “without 
relaxing” as meaning “without compromising or diminishing,” but not 
including a limit on enhancing or increasing regulatory activity as to 
health, safety, and environmental measures, is the most reasonable and 
universal interpretation.823 Pursuant to this understanding of the text, a 
Host State would be privileged to increase, and not just maintain at status 
quo, regulatory measures pertaining to health, safety and the environment. 
This reading would comport with an expanded and proactive view of the 
public purpose doctrine as set forth in Article 5(6)(a)(b) of the BIT vesting 
the Host State with plenary regulatory sovereignty to regulate human, 
animal or plant life or health to the likely detriment of the Host State’s 
obligation to protect foreign investment/investor and other incident 
interests pertaining to the Home State. The enhancement of regulatory 
sovereignty could most efficiently be tempered to protect foreign 
investments/investors by developing a substantive public purpose doctrine 
that is not self-judging and applied pursuant to a proportionality test. The 
gamut of Article XX GATT exceptions also would have to be viewed as 
applying in the context of macroeconomic scenarios and not just to the 
microeconomic events that typically characterize foreign direct 
investments falling within the ambit of a BIT 
A second methodology that would limit the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty pertaining to human, animal or plant life or health would arise 
from an exhaustive disclosure on the part of contracting States of their 
regulatory framework. Here, transparency is paramount. Such disclosure 
or transparency, however, is hardly achievable even at a theoretical level. 
                                                 
822 Id. preamble. 
 
823 The last paragraph of the Colombia-Japan BIT contained in Article 44 provides that 
all texts in the Japanese, Spanish, and English languages are “equally authentic,” but that 
“in case of any divergency, the English text shall prevail.” Id. art. 44. The Spanish 
language exemplar refers to “without relaxing” as “disminución,” meaning diminishing 
or reducing. 
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Regime change, among many other political factors, would render the 
most pristine rendition of a regulatory rubric materially less than fully 
predictable or certain not to infringe upon foreign investments/investors. 
Attaining the highest possible level of transparency, despite the likelihood 
of securing absolute certainty arising from complete transparency, still 
should play a greater role in key BIT clauses where the public purpose 
doctrine is likely to be relied upon as a source for expanding regulatory 
sovereignty.824 
A third approach to placing reasonable constraints on regulatory 
sovereignty as to human, animal or plant life or health in connection with 
transparency in regulatory rubric disclosure would be to substitute the 
term “without relaxing,” as it appears in the fifth paragraph of the 
Colombia-Japan BIT, with the term “without altering existing status 
quo….” Placing “a ceiling” on the quality and nature of regulatory 
measures concerning specific subject matter, i.e., health, safety and 
environmental measures, by referencing a particular and known status quo 
certainly would contribute to a reasonable restraint on the use of this 
public purpose regulatory principle and its relation to obligations in favor 
of foreign investors/investments protection.  
The environment and labor exceptions are very much discernible 
in second-generation BITs.825 The two most common clauses containing 
                                                 
824 While a sensitivity for transparency with respect to regulatory sovereignty has 
appeared in BITs, the principle of transparency is yet to realize its full potential in this 
regard. The Colombia-Japan BIT, for example, references a need for transparency in the 
very preamble: 
 
Intending to further create stable, equitable, favorable and transparent 
conditions for greater investment by investors of one Contracting Party 
in the Area of the other Contracting Party.  
 
Id. preamble (emphasis supplied).This cursory reference in the preamble is still a far cry 
from a comprehensive disclosure requirement.  
 
 
825 See, e.g., Agreement Between Japan the Laos People’s Democratic Republic for the 
Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment art. 24, Jap.-Laos, Jan. 16, 2008, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Japan_Laos.pdf [hereinafter Japan-Laos 
BIT]:  
 
The Contracting Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by investors of the other Contracting Party by relaxing 
environmental measures. To this effect each Contracting Party should 
not waive or otherwise derogate from such environmental measures as 
an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition or expansion in its 
Area of investments by investors of the other Contracting Party. 
 
See also Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
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the environmental exception can be found in the Canada-Armenia BIT826 
and the Colombia-UK BIT.827 The Canada-Armenia BIT provides: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing 
any measure otherwise consistent with this Agreement that 
it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is 
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental 
concerns.828  
The Colombia-UK BIT reads: 
                                                                                                                         
Protection of Investment art. 12 ¶ 2 , USA-Rwa., Feb. 19, 2008, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Rwanda.pdf [hereinafter USA-
Rwanda BIT] (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to Prevent a party from 
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Treaty 
that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is 
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns”); Agreement Between the 
Government of the United Arab Emirates and the Government of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 16, UAE-
Aze., Nov. 20, 2006, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/UAE_azerbaijan.pdf [hereinafter UAE-
Azerbaijan] (“Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent a Contracting Party from applying 
measures according to its laws and regulations in order to protect…environment.”); 
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of 
Costa Rica for the Promotion and Protection of Investments annex I.III ¶ 1, Can. – C.R., 
Mar. 18, 1998,  http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_costarica.pdf 
[hereinafter Canada-Costa Rica BIT] (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
prevent a Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental 
concerns.”); Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
Barbados for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment art. XVII ¶ 2 , Can.-
Bar., May 29, 1996, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_barbados.pdf [hereinafter 
Canada-Barbados BIT] (same); Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
Hungary and the Government of the Russian Federation for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 2 ¶ 3, Hun.-Rus., Mar. 6, 1995, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/hungary_russia.pdf [hereinafter Russia-
Hungary BIT] (“This Agreement shall not preclude the application of either Contracting 
Party of measures, necessary for…protection of the environment.”).  
 
826 Canada-Armenia BIT, supra note 795, art. XVII ¶ 2.  
 
827 Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Colombia art. VIII, U.K.-Col., Mar. 17, 2010, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/colombia_united%20kingdom.pdf 
[hereinafter UK-Colombia BIT].  
 
828 Canada-Armenia BIT, supra note 795, art. XVII ¶ 2. 
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Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
that it considers appropriate to ensure that an investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive 
to environmental concerns, provided that such measures are 
non-discriminatory and proportionate to the objectives 
sought.829 
The Colombia-UK BIT represents the more stringent, and, therefore, 
balanced approach to the exception. It provides for two fundamental 
qualifying elements that must be met by the Host State. First, the measure 
must be non-discriminatory. Second, it must be “proportionate to the 
objectives sought.”830 Those qualifications are helpful and conducive to a 
balanced approached that takes into consideration the interests of both 
home and Host States. The non-discriminatory and proportionality 
strictures bespeak an objective methodology that wrests presumptions of 
correctness from the invoking State based upon the assumption that States 
are better placed to evaluate public purpose needs. Also, proportionality 
represents an important contribution towards mitigating the “all or 
nothing” approach that historically has categorized the unilateral 
application of public purpose exceptions on the part of Home States.  
This approach to the environmental iteration of the public purpose 
doctrine is laudable but far from representative of a mainstream approach 
despite its clearly discernible recurrence among the Sample BITs, albeit in 
the context of clarifications or annexes.831 The paradigmatic second-
generation Colombia-Japan BIT, for example, dispenses with the very 
valuable “proportionality” restriction but qualifies exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty by proscribing (i) arbitrariness, (ii) lack of foundation as to 
manner, and (iii) an indirect or “disguised” constraint on international 
trade or investment: 
Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary 
or unjustifiable manner and provided that such measures do 
not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade 
or investment activities, nothing in subparagraphs 1(b), (c) 
and (f) and 2(a) and (b) shall be construed to prevent a 
                                                 
829 UK-Colombia BIT, supra note 829, art. VIII. 
 
830 Id. 
 
831 See, e.g., Canada-Peru BIT, supra note 546, annex IV ¶ (c); Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Republic of Mozambique Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Protocol ¶ 1, USA-Moz., Dec. 
1, 1998, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_mozambique.pdf 
[hereinafter USA-Mozambique BIT].  
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Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining measures, 
including environmental measures: 
(a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and 
regulations that are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement;  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; or  
(c) related to the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources.832 
The three qualifying requirements need to be balanced against a 
considerable subject matter gamut ranging from enforcement of laws and 
regulations consistent with the BIT, to ¨the conservation of living and non-
living exhaustible natural resources.”833 The use of the GATT Article XX 
language to define the scope of contemplated regulatory measures is not 
suggestive of balanced symmetrical allocation of rights between home and 
Host States.  
Conceptually, it is not clear what general environmental measures 
may reasonably pertain to performance requirements, which is the 
centerpiece subject matter of Article V of the BIT. The Article V 
“Performance Requirements” concern international commercial trade 
issues such as: (i) level or percentage of goods or services to be 
exported;834 (ii) level or percentage of domestic content to be achieved,835 
(iii) requirements to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods 
produced in a strategic area;836 (iv) requirements pertaining to the volume 
or value of imports and exports;837 (v) restrictions on sales of goods or 
services in a particular Home State geographic market that investments of 
the investor produce or in any way relating to the volume or value of 
foreign exchange earnings;838 and (vi) the transfer of proprietary 
knowledge within the subject area save for specifically excepted 
                                                 
832 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. V ¶ 6. . 
 
833 Id. art. V ¶ 6(a)-(c). 
 
834 Id. art. V ¶ 1(a).  
 
835 Id. art. V ¶ 1(b). 
 
836 Id. art. V ¶ 1(c). 
 
837 Id. art. V ¶ 1(d). 
 
838 Id. art. V ¶ 1(e). 
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requirements.839 These categories of limits on performance requirements 
are not directly, or conceptually, at all related to issuance of environmental 
measures. The mention of the environmental exception expression of the 
public purpose doctrine in this context merely serves to broaden Home 
State regulatory sovereignty. The very generic and conventional reference 
to “environmental measures” coupled with the shortcomings of the legacy 
public purpose doctrine all serve to multiply the disproportionate effect of 
the exception. 
The Sample BITs identify a third category of “limited public 
purpose exceptions.”840 At a discernible level, this category of limited 
public purpose exceptions nicely fits into two narrow categories: (i) 
exceptions from performance requirements841 and (ii) exceptions from 
                                                 
839 Id. art. V ¶ 1(f). Performance requirements concerning the transfer of technology are 
qualified as follows: 
 
… except when the requirement: 
 
(i) is imposed or enforced by a court, administrative tribunal or 
competent authority to remedy an alleged violation of competition 
laws; or  
 
(ii) concerns the transfer or use of intellectual property rights or 
disclosure of proprietary information which is undertaken in a manner 
not inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. 
Id.  
 
840 Appendix II at 3. 
 
841 See, e.g., Canada-Jordan BIT, supra note 546, art. 7 ¶ 2;  Canada-Perú BIT, supra note 
546, art. 7 ¶ 2; Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Antigua & Barbuda 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Protocol ad art. 
3 ¶ (a), Ger.-Ant., Nov. 5, 1998, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_barbuda_gr_eng.pdf 
[hereinafter Germany-Antigua & Barbuda BIT]; Agreement Between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Concerning the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Protocol ad art. 2 ¶ (a), Ger.-Ban., 
May 8, 1981, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_bangladesh.pdf 
[hereinafter Germany-Bangladesh BIT]; Agreement Between Barbados and the Federal 
Republic of Germany Protocol ad art. 3 ¶ (a), Ger.-Bar., Dec. 2, 1994, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_barbados.pdf [hereinafter 
Germany-Barbados BIT]; Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Benin Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Capital Investment 
Protocol ad art. 2 ¶ (a), Ger.-Ben., Jun. 28, 1978, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_benin.pdf [hereinafter 
Germany-Benin BIT];  Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments art. 3 ¶ 3, Ger.-Eth., Jan. 19, 2004, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_ethiopia.pdf [hereinafter 
Germany-Ethiopia BIT]; Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Co-
operative Republic of Guyana Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments Protocol ad art. 3 ¶ (a)(3), Ger.-Guy., Dec. 6, 1989, 
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national treatment.842 The Canada-Jordan BIT843 in Article 7(2) is 
illustrative of the core language of the performance requirements 
exceptions. It reads: 
A measure that requires an investment to use a technology 
to meet generally applicable health, safety or environmental 
requirements shall not be construed to be inconsistent with 
subparagraph 1(f) [Performance Requirements].844 
The totality of the performance requirements exception articulated in 
Article 7 of the Canada-Jordan BIT is quite extensive and mirrors that of 
the Colombia-Japan BIT as to key material terms.845 The Canada-Jordan 
BIT, executed in 2009, approximately two years prior to the signing of the 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_guyana.pdf [hereinafter 
Germany-Guyana BIT]; Agreement Between the Lebanese Republic and the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
Protocol ad art. 3 ¶ (a)(3), Ger.-Leb., Mar. 18, 1997, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_lebanon.pdf [hereinafter 
Germany-Lebanon BIT]; Agreement Between the United Mexican States and the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
Protocol ad art. 3 ¶ (a), Ger.-Mex., Aug. 25, 1998, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_mexico.pdf [hereinafter 
Germany-Mexico BIT]; Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Republic of the Philippines for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
Protocol ad art. 3 ¶ (a), Ger.-Phi., Apr. 18, 1997, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_philippines.pdf [hereinafter 
Germany-Philippines BIT]; Agreement Between Japan and the People’s Republic of 
China Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Protocol 
¶ 3, Jap.-Chi., Aug. 27, 1988,  
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_japan.pdf [hereinafter Japan-
China BIT].  
 
842 See e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
Between the Kingdom of Spain and the Federal Republic of Nigeria art. 5 ¶ 4, Spa.-Nig., 
Jul. 9, 2002, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/spain_nigeria.pdf 
[hereinafter Spain-Nigeria BIT]; Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments Protocol ad art. 4 ¶ (a), Nig.-Ger., Mar. 28, 2000, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_nigeria.pdf [Hereinafter 
Nigeria-Germany BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Thailand and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments art. 3 ¶ 3, Rus.-Tha., Oct. 17, 2002, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/russia_thailand.pdf [hereinafter 
Thailand-Russia BIT].  
 
843 Canada-Jordan BIT, supra note 546, art. 7 ¶ 2.  
 
844 Id.  
 
845 See infra Appendix I for a comparison of the Performance Requirements provision in 
the Canada-Jordan BIT with the corresponding provision in the Colombia-Japan BIT.   
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Colombia-Japan BIT, also is a paradigmatic second-generation BIT. 
Accordingly, even within the presumably narrow subject matter 
constraints of the very technical performance requirements public purpose 
exception, “health, safety or environmental requirements”846 of GATT 
origin are comingled with a broad spectrum of performance requirements 
subject matter exceptions, much like the Article 5(6) performance 
requirements of the Colombia-Japan BIT.847  
-- The second limited public purpose exception is found as 
tempering the National Treatment standard. The Sample BITs do vary 
considerably as to the role of public purpose in connection with national 
treatment. While, for example, second-generation BITs such as the 
Canada-Jordan BIT and the Colombia-Japan BIT are silent in referencing 
any iteration of the public purpose doctrine as a qualifying factor as to 
National Treatment,848 the U.K.-Colombia BIT and the Germany-Antigua 
& Barbuda BIT explicitly temper the National Treatment obligation 
pursuant to the relatively broad construction of the public purpose 
doctrine. The U.K.-Colombia provides:  
The provision of this Agreement relative to the grant of 
treatment not less favourable than that accorded to 
investors of either Contracting Party or of any third State 
shall not be construed so as to preclude the adoption or 
enforcement by a Contracting Party of measures which are 
                                                 
846 Canada-Jordan BIT, supra note 546, art. 7 ¶ 2.  
 
847 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 5 ¶ 6.  
 
848 In both of these BITs (Colombia-Japan and Canada-Jordan), the substantive obligation 
of National Treatment does not contain, nor is it followed, by qualifying public purpose 
exceptions. The same holds true for the closely related substantive obligation of Most-
Favored-Nation Treatment. Article 3 (“Most-Favored-Nation Treatment”) of the 
Colombia-Japan BIT nearly qualifies Most-Favored-Nation Treatment by noting that the 
treatment applies only to substantive and not to procedural obligations, by asserting the 
following “Note”: 
 
It is understood that the treatment referred to in paragraph 1 does not 
include treatment accorded to investors of a non-Contracting Party and 
their investments by provisions concerning the settlement of investment 
disputes such as the mechanisms set out in Chapter III and Chapter IV 
that are provided for in other international agreements between a 
Contracting Party and a non-Contracting Party.  
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 3 bis.  
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necessary to protect national security, public security or 
public order.849  
Similarly, the older Germany-Antigua & Barbuda BIT, originally signed 
in 1998 and amended by protocol in 2000, notably amends Article III at 
Protocol Ad Article 3(a) by asserting: 
The following shall more particularly, though not 
exclusively, be deemed ‘activity’ within the meaning of 
Article III (2): The Management, Maintenance, Use, 
Enjoyment and Disposal of an Investment. The following 
shall, and particularly, be deemed ‘treatment thus 
favourable’ within the meaning of Article III: Unequal 
Treatment in the Case of Restrictions on the Purchase of 
Raw or Auxiliary Materials, of Energy or Fuel or of Means 
of Production or of Operation of Any Kind, unequal 
treatment in the case of impeding in the marketing of 
products inside or outside the country, as well as any other 
measures having similar effects. Measures that have to be 
taken for reasons of public security or order, public health 
or morality shall not be deemed “treatment less favorable’ 
within the meaning of Article III.850 
Both the U.K.-Colombia BIT and the Germany-Antigua & 
Barbuda BIT suggest that “treatment not less favorable than that accorded 
to investors of either Contracting Party,” is warranted, and, therefore, it 
does not constitute treatment any less favorable where the public purpose 
doctrine must be resorted to on a compulsory or mandatory basis. Neither 
BIT uses the words “compulsory” or “mandatory,” but the same 
                                                 
849 UK-Colombia BIT, supra note 829, art. IV ¶ 1. Article IV (“Exceptions”) is 
immediately preceded by the Article III recitation of the substantive Most-Favoured-
Nation provision stating: 
 
1. Each Contracting Party shall grant to the investments of investors 
of the other Contracting Party made in its territory, a treatment not less 
favourable than that accorded, in like circumstances, to investments of 
its own investors or to investments of investors of another third State, 
whichever is more favourable to the investor. 
 
2. The most favourable treatment to be granted in like circumstances 
referred to in this Agreement does not encompass mechanisms for the 
settlement of investment disputes, such as those contained in Articles 
IX and X of this Agreement, which are provided for in treaties or 
international investment agreements. 
 
Id. art. IIII.  
 
850 Germany-Antigua & Barbuda BIT, supra note 845, Protocol ad art. 3 ¶ (a). 
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construction can be placed with respect to the word “necessary” in the 
case of the U.K.-Colombia BIT and the phrase “have to be taken” as to the 
Germany-Antigua & Barbuda BIT. This “mandatory” predicate to some 
extent does remove recourse to the public purpose doctrine from the ambit 
of self-judgment. Even though a sovereign itself is best placed to assess 
national exigencies, the compulsory nature of a necessity indeed engrafts 
meaningful objective criteria into the process.  
The broad conceptual categories of public purpose qualifying 
national treatment in both BITs merit emphasis. The potential use of (i) 
public security, (ii) public health, (iii) public morality, (iv) national 
security, (v) public security, and (vi) public order, enable a rich set of 
possibilities on which to premise the exercise of regulatory sovereignty in 
ways that may invade treaty obligations to protect foreign investment.851 
Even the notable, omitted categories—such as environment, human and 
animal life and health—arguably may fall within the ambit of the public 
purpose iterations listed. Taken together, the exceptions from performance 
requirements and national treatment pervading many of the second-
generation BITs form three fundamental propositions underlying this 
writing. First, the public purpose doctrine materially dilutes treaty 
obligation protections running in favor of investors (i) because of the 
debilities endemic to the legacy public purpose doctrine and (ii) the actual 
incorporation of the doctrine as actual qualifications to protection 
standards within the very language of the substantive protection 
obligations. Second, the new paradigm of economic interdependence and 
the sustained growth enjoyed by a significant number of resource-rich 
jurisdictions that formerly were classified as “developing countries” and 
now stand as “economies in transition” likely to attain industrialized-
country economic status, has led to greater bargaining power on the part of 
prospective Host States that previously were unable to negotiate in pari 
materia with their industrialized counterparts. Third, Home State investor 
expectations have been, and are likely to continue to be, frustrated because 
of the predictive value that the public purpose doctrine in this context 
wrests from the substantive standards of investor protection. The 
consequence of these three propositions is simple enough. As concerns 
regulatory sovereignty, the symmetrical structure that bilateral investment 
treaties at least in principle contemplate,, is materially distorted in favor of 
Host States. 
Lack of relaxation of standard with respect to health, safety, or 
environment as one collective category, and for labor as a distinct subject 
matter for categorical classification, is well represented in the Sample 
                                                 
851 Compare UK-Colombia BIT, supra note 829, art. IV ¶ 1 with Germany-Antigua & 
Barbuda BIT, supra note 845, Protocol ad art. 3 ¶ (a).  
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BITs.852 In some instances both categories appear together in BITs.853 The 
Colombia-Japan BIT is representative of a treaty embracing both 
categories: 
1. Each Contracting Party recognizes that it is 
inappropriate to encourage investment activities of 
investors of the other Contracting Party and of a non-
Contracting Party by relaxing its domestic health, safety or 
environmental measures or by lowering its labor standards. 
Accordingly, each Contracting Party should not waive or 
otherwise derogate from such measures or standards as an 
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition or 
expansion of its Area of investments by investors of the 
other Contracting Party of a non-Contracting Party. 
2. Each Contracting Party may adopt, maintain or 
enforce any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure 
                                                 
852 See, e.g., Belgium-Colombia BIT, supra note 797, art. VII (“Environment”), art. VIII 
(“Labour”); Canada-Jordan BIT, supra note 546, art. 11  (“Health, Safety and 
Environmental Measures”); Canada-Perú BIT, supra note 546, art. 11 (“Health, Safety 
and Environmental Measures”); Agreement Between the Japan and the Republic of Iraq 
Guinea for the Promotion and Protection of Investment art. 22, Jap.-Iraq, Jun. 7, 2012, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/japan_iraq.pdf [hereinafter Japan-Iraq 
BIT] (“Health, Safety and Environmental Measures and Labour Standards”); Japan-
Papau New Guinea BIT, supra note 546, art. 22 (“Health, Safety and Environmental 
Measures and Labour Standards”);  Japan-Laos BIT, supra note 827, art. 24 
(“Environmental Measures”); Japan-Perú BIT, supra note 807, art. 26 (“Health, Safety 
and Environmental Measures and Labour Standards”); Agreement Between Japan and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of 
Investment art. 21 (“Environment”), Jap.-Viet., Nov. 14, 2003, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/japan_vietnam.pdf [hereinafter Japan-
Vietnam BIT]; Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the United Mexican 
States on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Protocol ad. art. 3 
(“Health, Safety and Environment”), Mex.-Swi., Jul. 10, 1995, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/mexico_switzerland.pdf [hereinafter 
Mexico-Switzerland BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania Concerning the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 4 (“Health, Safety and 
Environmental Measures”), Turk.-Tanz., Mar. 11, 2011, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Turkey_Tanzania.pdf [hereinafter 
Turkey-Tanzania BIT]; USA-Rwanda BIT, supra note 827, art. 12 (“Investment and 
Environment”), art. 13 (“Investment and Labour”); Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 12 (“Investment and Environment”) & art. 13 
(“Investment and Labour”), USA-Uru., Nov. 5, 2005, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Uruguay.pdf [hereinafter USA-
Uruguay BIT]. 
 
853 See, e.g., Japan-Iraq BIT, supra note 854, art. 22; USA-Rwanda BIT, supra note 827, 
art. 12 & art. 13.  
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that investment activities in its Area are undertaken in a 
manner not incompatible with its environmental law, 
provided that such measure is consistent with this 
Agreement.854 
The measures on health, safety, environment and labor contained in the 
first paragraph of Article 21 speak only of a State “relaxing its domestic” 
standards as to the referenced public purpose categories, but does not 
speak to enhancing or rendering more stringent any existing standards in 
these areas or otherwise introducing new ones. This interpretation is 
important, in part because it illustrates the possibly determinative role that 
regulatory transparency and attendant diligence by Home State investors 
may play in the relationship between capital-exporting and capital-
importing States such as Japan and Colombia. 
The commitment to status quo with respect to regulatory measures 
concerning the referenced public purpose categories is significantly less 
clear in the case Paragraph 2 of Article 21. This paragraph, in addition to 
using the phrase “maintain or enforce” also explicitly references measures 
that a Contracting Party “may adopt.” The two operative standards for 
issuance of measures along these lines are the measure’s (i) compatibility 
with the State’s environmental law, and (ii) consistency with the 
Agreement (i.e., the Colombia-Japan BIT). Despite a surface semblance of 
objective criteria, what may be considered as consistent with the BIT 
agreement or compatible with a State’s environmental law is hardly 
objectively demonstrable. In most cases, compatibility with a State’s 
environmental law presents considerable challenges—not the least of 
which is acquiring an understanding of the compatibility between the 
measure at issue and the policies underlying “black letter” environmental 
law as to consistency with the BIT. A comprehensive analysis may not be 
possible without securing the intent of the Agreement’s drafter, which in 
turn may not even be possible. Consistency, at least beyond the scope of 
physics and mathematics, is a relative term. 
Variations on the prescription to relaxation for health, safety or 
environment are well-illustrated in Article 11 of the Canada-Jordan 
BIT,855 and Article VII of the Belgium-Colombia BIT.856 The non-
                                                 
854 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 21 ¶¶ 1-2 (emphasis supplied).  
 
855 Article 11 of the Canada-Jordan BIT provides:  
 
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment 
by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. 
Accordingly, a Party may not waive or otherwise derogate from, or 
offer to waive or otherwise derogate from , such measures as an 
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or 
retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party 
considers that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it 
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relaxing of domestic health, safety or environmental measures provision 
contained in Article 11 of the Canada-Jordan BIT does not reference any 
language suggesting the expansion of regulatory sovereignty, much like 
Article 21(1) of the Colombia-Japan BIT. In fact, the language of the two 
provisions are materially indistinguishable, but for a reference to labor 
standards in Article 21(1).857 
                                                                                                                         
may request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall 
consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement. 
 
Canada-Jordan BIT, supra note 546, art. 11.  
 
856 Article VII of the Belgium-Colombia BIT provides:  
 
1. Recognising the right of each Contracting Party to establish its own 
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental 
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly 
its environmental legislation, each Contracting Party shall strive to 
ensure that its legislation provides for high levels of environmental 
protection and shall strive to continue improving this legislation.  
 
2. The Contracting Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment by relaxing domestic environmental legislation. 
Accordingly, each Contracting Party shall ensure that it does not waive 
or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate 
from, such legislation as an encouragement for the establishment, 
maintenance or expansion in its territory of an investment. 
 
3. The Contracting Parties recognize that co-operation between them 
provides enhanced opportunities to improve environmental protection 
standards. 
 
4. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
that it considers appropriate to ensure that an investment activity in its 
territory is undertaken in accordance with the environmental law  of the 
Party. 
 
5. The dispute settlement mechanisms under Articles XII and XIII of 
this Agreement shall not apply to any obligation undertaken in 
accordance with this Article. 
 
Belgium-Colombia BIT, supra note 797, art. VII.  
 
857 The no-relaxation provisions in BITs attaching to different iterations of the public 
purpose doctrine vest the Host State with considerable discretion to adopt labor policies, 
laws and regulations that may adversely affect investment/investor protection obligations. 
A comprehensive example is provided in Article VIII of the Belgium-Colombia BIT: 
 
1. The Contracting Parties recognize: 
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The public purpose doctrine is a centerpiece of “General 
Exceptions” contained in the Sample BITs.858 In the context of general 
exceptions the public purpose doctrine suggests itself in three discernible 
modalities: (i) a de minimus expression pursuant to which regulatory 
sovereignty is encouraged and justified based upon just basic unqualified 
reference to security interests, public health, animal and plant life,;859 (ii) a 
more Global iteration of the public purpose doctrine akin to Art. XX of the 
GATT;860 and (iii) public purpose in the form of “public order” 
                                                                                                                         
a. the right of each Contracting Party to establish its own 
domestic labour standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly 
its labour legislation;  
 
b. that each Contracting Party shall endeavour to ensure that 
the principles set forth in paragraph 6 of Article I 
[Internationally Recognized Labour Standards] be recognized 
and maintained by its national legislation; and 
 
c. that it is inappropriate to encourage the establishment, 
maintenance or expansion in its territory of an investment by 
relaxing domestic labour legislation. 
 
2. The Contracting Parties recognize that co-operation between them 
provides enhanced opportunities to improve labour standards.  
 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any 
measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that an investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in accordance with the labour law 
of the Party. 
 
4. The dispute settlement mechanisms under Articles XII and XIII of 
this Agreement shall not apply to any obligation undertaken in 
accordance with this Article. 
 
Id. art. VIII (emphasis supplied).  
 
858 See, e.g., Canada-Armenia, supra note 795, art. XVII ¶ 3; Canada-Barbados BIT, 
supra note 827, art. XVII ¶ 3; Canada-China, supra note 546, art. 33 ¶ 2; Canada-Costa 
Rica BIT, supra note 827, annex I.III ¶ 3; Colombia-India BIT, supra note 798, art. 13 ¶ 
5; Japan-Vietnam BIT, supra note 854, art. 15 ¶ 1. 
 
859 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 
11, NZ-Chi., Nov. 22, 1988, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_newzealand.pdf [hereinafter New 
Zealand-China BIT].  
 
860 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Art. XVIII ¶ 
3,Can.-Thai., Jan. 17, 1997, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_thailand.pdf [hereinafter 
Canada-Thailand BIT].  
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language.861 Even though these three exceptions typically appear under an 
article entitled “General Exceptions,”862 they are also common to 
“catchall” clauses that serve as the functional equivalent to general 
exceptions articles in treaties.863  
The New Zealand-China BIT, signed November 22, 1988 is clearly 
a first-generation BIT; therefore, it is illustrative of negotiation efforts 
concerning BITs between industrialized and non-industrialized States at a 
time where economic globalization was far from apogee and economic 
models were largely based on foundational premises of financial 
independence rather than interdependence. The New Zealand-China BIT 
presents a helpful example of this economic construction that reflected a 
negotiation dynamic that ultimately favored Home States (capital-
exporting countries). That BIT’s equivalent to a “General Exceptions” 
article is found in Article 11, entitled “Prohibitions and Restrictions,” 
which reads: 
The provisions of this Agreement shall not in any way limit 
the rights of either Contracting Party to apply prohibitions 
or restrictions of any kind or take any other action directed 
to the protection of its essential security interests, or to the 
protection of public health or the prevention of disease and 
tests in animals or plants.864 
It is not surprising that Host States generally were limited in their ability 
to negotiate successfully fundamental premises that amplified the scope of 
regulatory sovereignty. Even the title of Article 11 (“Prohibitions and 
Restrictions”) could find less customary international law interpretive 
recourse than the term “General Exceptions” would be able to garner. Put 
simply, it is not altogether disconcerting that in 1988 non-industrialized 
States would not have as much standing to negotiate general exceptions as 
they would at the height of economic globalization, and the adoption of 
financial models that stressed economic interdependence as a material 
governing principle.865 Despite the arguably expansive language contained 
                                                 
861See, e.g., Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 15 ¶ 1; Hungary-Russia BIT, supra 
note 827, art. 2 ¶ 3.   
 
862See, e.g., Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 15 ¶ 1; Canada-Thailand BIT, 
supra note 862, art. XVIII.  
 
863 See, e.g., New Zealand-China BIT, supra note 861, art. 11 (“Prohibitions and 
Restrictions”); Hungary-Russia BIT, supra note 827, art. 2 (“Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments”).  
 
864 New Zealand-China BIT, supra note 861, art. 11 
 
865 As noted by the United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, “[i]n 2011, FDI 
inflows increased in all major economic groups—developed, developing and transition 
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in Article 11, only three public purpose categories are identified. Of the 
three, one addressing animal and plant life, is fairly circumscribed. Even 
the remaining two (protection of essential security interests and protection 
of public health) by themselves do not stand out as unbridled licenses to 
regulate to the detriment of substantive investment/investor protection 
obligations. 
The use of the public purpose doctrine as a pivotal premise of 
treaty-based general exceptions is well-chronicled in Article XVII of the 
Canada-Thailand BIT. The broad scope and clear influence of the GATT 
expressed in Article XVII commands analysis.866 The general exceptions 
                                                                                                                         
economies.” WIR 2012, supra note 423, at 38. However, despite the fact that “[g]lobal 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows exceeded the pre-crisis average in 2011, reaching 
$1.5 trillion despite turmoil in the global economy,” such levels were still about 23% 
lower than the FDI flows at the peak of economic globalization in 2007. Id. at xi.  
 
866 Article XVII (“Application and General Exceptions”) States: 
 
(1) This Agreement shall apply to any investment made by an 
investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party before or after the entry into force of this Agreement. 
 
(2) Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate 
to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertake in a 
manner sensitive to environmental concerns.  
 
(3) Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner or do not constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining 
measures, including environmental measures:  
 
(a) necessary to ensure compliance with laws and regulations 
that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; 
 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
or 
 
(c) relating to the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on the domestic 
production or consumption; 
 
(d) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, 
historic or archeological value; 
 
(e)  essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in 
general or local short supply provided that any such measures 
shall be consistent with the principle that all investors are 
entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such 
products, in that any such measures which are inconsistent with 
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contained in Article XVII of the Canada-Thailand BIT are quite expansive 
and arguably all-encompassing. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article XVII do 
purport to set some kind of limitation on regulatory sovereignty. 
Consonant with Paragraph 2, Contracting Parties are proscribed from 
adopting or enforcing measures inconsistent with the BIT. Similarly, 
Paragraph 3 proscribes the adoption of the enforcement of measures that 
are either arbitrary or unjustifiable, as well as measures disguised to 
restrict international trade or investment. But for these two sets of 
constraints, the public purpose doctrine is asserted in the form of a 
verbatim recitation adoption of five fundamental general exceptions from 
the GATT’s Art. XX.867  
The incorporation of the GATT Article XX General Exceptions represents 
an expansive spectrum of public purpose categories that in turn may 
justify regulatory sovereignty to the detriment of substantive treaty-based 
protection standards. Moreover, the qualifying standard in the double 
negative, “not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement,”868 does 
not meaningfully temper the otherwise boundless public purpose subject 
matter exceptions listed in Subsections (3)(b)-(e). In contrast with the base 
public purpose exception contained in Article 11 of the China-New 
Zealand BIT, public purpose in the form of the GATT’s Article XX 
General Exceptions, vests both States (capital-importing countries) with 
considerable advantages over foreign investors/investments. This 
normative foundation for the exercise of regulatory sovereignty 
undermines any legitimate aspiration to “bilateralism” that contracting 
parties to a BIT may hope to enjoy. Public purpose, as expressed through 
the GATT’s General Exceptions cannot be tempered by even absolute 
regulatory transparency (if such a thing in fact existed), and similarly is 
incapable of being checked by mere treaty drafting techniques. It does 
remain unassailable that the role of public purpose in the form of GATT 
Article XX General Exceptions incorporated into a BIT represents a 
practically infinite capacity to disappoint investor/investment 
expectations, and dangerously favors host-State regulatory sovereignty to 
the detriment of substantive foreign investment/investor protection that 
theoretically represents the broader goal of a BIT in the first instance. 
                                                                                                                         
the other provisions of this Agreement shall be discontinued as 
soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist. 
 
Canada-Thailand BIT, supra note 862, art. XVII (emphasis supplied).  
 
867 The wholesale incorporation of the GATT’s General Exceptions into the Article XVII 
(Application and General Exceptions) of the Canada-Thailand BIT is nothing short of 
remarkable. Compare Canada-Thailand BIT, supra note 862, art. XVIII ¶ 3(a)-(e) with 
GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(b), (d), (f), (g) & (j).  
 
868 Canada-Thailand BIT, supra note 862, art. XVII(a).  
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The third variation of the public purpose doctrine appearing in the 
form of general exceptions take the form of “public order” language. The 
maintenance of public order and the need to protect public morals are 
perhaps the potentially most dangerous public purpose expressions 
because of their inherently subjective content. At what point does public 
order mutate into the repression of the public? What exactly is public 
order remains as a classical query that perhaps is incapable of being 
satisfactorily at all addressed. Likewise, what is morality? Equally 
fundamental, can morality be contracted or legislated in the name of 
public purpose? Much like Xeno’s paradoxes, inquiries concerning the 
nature of public order or public morality can be posed ad infinitum without 
bringing the examiner any closer to a satisfactory resolution.  
Public order language appears in the Sample BITs as having two 
contextual variants. In the first, exemplified in Article 15(1) of the 
Colombia-Japan BIT, public morals and public order are listed as only two 
public purpose general exceptions in a long list of public purpose 
categories.869 The second variation of the public order exception forming 
                                                 
869 Article 15(1) of the Colombia-Japan BIT reads:  
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied by a 
Contracting Party in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against another Contracting 
Party, or a disguised restriction on investments of investors of that 
other Contracting Party in the Area of the former Contracting Party, 
nothing in this Agreement other than Article 12 [Treatment in Case of 
Strife] shall be construed to prevent that former Contracting Party from 
adopting or enforcing measures, including those to protect the 
environment: 
 
(a) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;  
(b)  necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public 
order; 
 
Note: The public order exception may be invoked only where a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the 
fundamental interests of society.  
 
(c)  necessary to secure compliance with the laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement 
including those relating to:  
 
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to 
deal with the effects of a default on contracts; 
(ii) the protection of privacy of the individual in relation to 
the processing and dissemination of personal data and the 
protection of confidentiality of personal records and accounts; 
or  
(iii) safety; or 
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part of general exceptions found in BITs is evidenced by Article 2(3) of 
the Russia-Hungary BIT. That provision States that the treaty:  
[S]hall not preclude the application of either Contracting 
Party of measures, necessary for the maintenance of 
defence, national security and public order, protection of 
the environment, morality, and public health.870  
Public order, as part of general exceptions, finds resonance in the Sample 
BITs and, to some extent, can be viewed as species of a “catchall” clause 
that vests States, most likely Host States, with a quite meaningful license 
to exercise regulatory sovereignty to the detriment of substantive investor 
protection obligations. The broad theoretical expanse of public order is 
evinced by the somewhat recurring practice of qualifying this exception by 
noting that its application is limited to instances of extreme emergencies 
affecting the State or even its national security. The Colombia-Japan BIT, 
by way of example, qualifies its single-sentence reference to public order 
(i.e., “necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order”), by 
a most distinctive observation:  
Note: The public order exception may be invoked only 
where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to 
one of the fundamental interests of society.871 
                                                                                                                         
(d) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, 
historic, archeological or cultural value.  
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 15 ¶ 1 (emphasis supplied).  
 
870 Hungary-Russia BIT, supra note 827, art. 2 ¶ 3. This exception is contained in Article 
2 (“Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments”), which provides, in full:  
 
1. Each  Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable 
conditions for investors of the other Contracting Party to make 
investments in its territory and shall admit such investments in 
accordance with its laws and regulations. 
 
2. Investments of investors of one Contracting Party shall at all times 
be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection 
and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
 
3. This Agreement shall not preclude the application of either 
Contracting Party of measures, necessary for the maintenance of 
defence, national security and public order, protection of the 
environment, morality and public health. 
 
Id. art. 2 (emphasis supplied).  
 
871 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 15 ¶ 1 bis.  
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This qualification is testament to the virtually unbridled foundation for 
exercise of regulatory sovereignty that a mere reference to “public order,” 
as is the case in most BITs, may cause and thus unsettle expectations and 
any aspiration to symmetry and bilateralism to the Contracting Parties. In 
this connection, the Colombia-Japan BIT is helpful in illustrating how 
treaty drafting techniques may help mitigate the ills of the legacy public 
purpose doctrine.872 
The three variants of the public purpose doctrine contained in the 
“General Exceptions” category illustrate the pivotal role that the public 
purpose doctrine plays across expansive subject matter even within one 
category. Yet, as with the reference to the doctrine in (i) preambles, (ii) 
environment and labor, and (iii) no relaxation clauses, nowhere in the 
general exception clauses canvassed among Sample BIT exemplars was 
public purpose, in any of its iterations, defined. Similarly, no standard was 
referenced as to its application, and very limited linkage to proportionality 
was observed. 
The fifth public purpose exception notably contained in the Sample 
BITs is the security category.873 The security exceptions expression of the 
public purpose doctrine comprises five variants: (i) restriction on the 
dispute settlement section of the BIT only;874 (ii) a plain Statement 
                                                 
872 The role of treaty-drafting techniques as a partial solution to the disparities the legacy 
public purpose doctrine creates is discussed in the context of the principle of sustainable 
development. Supra Chapter 2, Subsection E. There it was suggested that treaty-drafting 
techniques are, at best, a partial solution to the technical and policy challenges that the 
legacy public purpose doctrine poses. Here, in the “public order” context, already a 
particular expression of the public purpose doctrine, the contributions of treaty-drafting 
techniques can be appreciated, but so too are their limitations revealed. While terms such 
as “genuine,” “sufficiently,” “serious,” and “fundamental interests of society,” certainly 
engraft a quasi-objective standard against which to determine juridical legitimacy, they 
are far from conclusive. The virtues, however, of first steps in the direction of objectivity 
cannot be sufficiently praised. 
 
873 See, e.g., Canada-China BIT, supra note 546, art. 33 ¶ 5; Canada-Jordan BIT, supra 
note 546, art. 10 ¶ 4; Canada-Peru, supra note 546, art. 10 ¶ 4; New Zealand-China BIT, 
supra note 861, art. 11; Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments art.11, Chi.-Sing., Nov. 21, 1985, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_singapor.pdf [hereinafter China-
Singapore BIT]; Belgium-Colombia BIT, supra note 797, art. II ¶ 3; Colombia-India 
BIT, supra note 798, art. 13 ¶ 5(d); Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 15 ¶ 2; 
Croatia-Azerbaijan BIT, supra note 546, art. 10; Agreement Between the Government of 
the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Kenya for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 14 ¶ 1, Slo.-Ken., Dec. 14, 2011, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Slovakia_Kenya.pdf [hereinafter 
Slovakia-Kenya BIT].  
 
874 For example, the Germany-Mexico BIT provides:  
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exception;875 (iii) security exceptions premised on the GATT Article 
XXI;876 (iv) security exceptions that include public order language;877 and 
                                                                                                                         
The dispute settlement provisions of this Section shall not apply to the 
resolutions adopted by a Contracting State, which for National Security 
reasons, prohibit or restrict the acquisition of an investment in its 
territory, owned or controlled by its nationals, by nationals or 
companies of the other Contracting State, according to the legislation of 
the relevant Contracting State. 
 
Germany-Mexico BIT, supra note 845, art. 20.  
 
875 The New Zealand-China BIT provides:  
 
The provisions of this Agreement shall not in any way limit the right of 
either Contracting Party to apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind 
or take any other action direct to the protection of its essential security 
interests, or to the protection of public health, or to the prevention of 
disease and pests in animals or plants. 
 
New Zealand-China BIT, supra note 861, art. 11. A second form of this variant is 
exemplified by the Austria-India BIT:   
 
Nothing in this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from 
taking necessary action in abnormal circumstances for the protection of 
its essential security interests or in circumstances of extreme 
emergency in accordance with its laws applied on a non-discriminatory 
basis. 
 
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Austria and the Government of 
the Republic of India for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 12 ¶ 2, Ind.-
Aust., Dec. 18, 2000, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/austria_india.pdf 
[hereinafter Austria-India BIT].  
 
876 The Canada-China BIT, for example, provides:  
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
 
(a)  to require a Contracting Party to furnish or allow access to 
information if the Contracting Party determines that the disclosure of 
that information is contrary to its essential security interests; 
 
(b) to prevent a Contracting Party from taking any actions that it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests: 
 
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements 
of war and to such traffic and transactions in other goods, 
materials, services, and technology undertaken directly or 
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or other security 
establishment; 
 
(ii)  in time of war or other emergency, in international relations; 
or, 
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(v) a qualification that national security interests are self-judging.878 The 
security exceptions expression of the public purpose doctrine theoretically 
harbors the same fundamental concerns identified as pervading an 
orthodox understanding of the doctrine. In practice, however, with few 
notable exceptions such as the use of public order as a premise for 
adversely compromising a standard of investment protection and 
commercial transactions alleged to be indirectly for the purpose of 
supplying a military or other security establishment, non-economic 
security exceptions are readily discernible and historically have proven to 
be statistically inconsequential in treaty-based international arbitrations.879 
                                                                                                                         
(iii)  relating to the implementation of national policies or other 
nuclear explosive devices; or 
 
(c) to prevent a Contracting Party from taking action in pursuance of 
its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
 
Canada-China BIT, supra note 546, art. 33 ¶ 5. Notably, with the exception of Article 
35(5)(b)(iii), the remaining five subsections comprising the totality of Art. 33(5) is based, 
in most instances verbatim, on the Article XXI (“Security Exceptions”) of the GATT.  
 
877 The Belgium-Colombia BIT provides, in relevant part:  
 
Nothing contained in this Agreement shall bind either Contracting 
Party to protect investments made with capital or assets derived from 
illegal activities, and it shall not be construed so as to prevent a Party 
from adopting or maintaining measures intended to preserve public 
order, the fulfillment of its duties for the keeping or restoration of 
international peace and security; or the protection of its own essential 
security interests.  
 
Belgium-Colombia BIT, supra note 797, art. II ¶ 3 (emphasis supplied). Similarly, the 
Hungary-Russia BIT States:  
 
This Agreement shall not preclude the application of either Contracting 
Party of measures, necessary for the maintenance of defence, national 
security and public order, protection of the environment, morality and 
public health, 
 
Hungary-Russia BIT, supra note 827, art. II ¶ 3 (emphasis supplied).  
 
878 See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Nicaragua Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment Protocol ¶ 1, USA-Nic., Jul. 1, 1995, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_nicaragua.pdf [hereinafter USA-
Nicaragua BIT] (“With respect to Art. XIV, paragraph 1, the parties confirm their mutual 
understanding that whether a measure is undertaken by a party to protect its national 
security interests is self-judging.”).  
 
879 However,, such issues have still drawn substantial attention from both domestic and 
multinational legislative bodies. See generally James K. Jackson, Foreign Investment and 
National Security: Economic Considerations, Congressional Research Service Report for 
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Public purpose in the context of security exceptions have no pretense but 
to be self-judging, i.e., far-removed from objective criteria.880 
The Colombia-Japan BIT is premised on the GATT Article XXI 
model. As previously noted, this BIT organizationally treats security 
exceptions together with general exceptions in Article 15. Article 15 is 
substantially similar to Article XX881 and Article XXI882 of the GATT but 
for a notice provision that, significantly, is triggered after the undertaking 
of a measure inconsistent with Paragraph 1 of Article 15: 
3. In cases where a Contracting Party takes any 
measure, pursuant to paragraph 1, that does 
not conform with the obligations under this 
Agreement other than Article 12, that 
Contracting Party shall endeavor to, as soon 
as possible, notify the measure to the other 
Contracting Party.883 
The Article 15(3) notification provision significantly only applies to the 
regulatory sovereignty premised on the GATT’s Article XX exceptions 
and not to the security exceptions expression of the public purpose 
doctrine. Both the general exceptions and security exceptions, however, 
appear to be self-judging. The fundamental inference to be drawn from the 
plain language of Article 15 forecloses consideration of pre-measure 
notice or consultation.  
While the unique character of non-economic security interests 
conceptually and practically lends considerable support to an expansive 
content that is self-judging and wanting in proportionality of application, it 
remains critical to note that the fundamental principle underlying 
normative claims to unilateral and non-proportional regulatory sovereignty  
is based on a public purpose, albeit one that theoretically may entail the 
preservation of actual sovereignty.  
                                                                                                                         
Congress, Apr. 4, 2013, available at  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natset/RL34561.pdf (last 
visited July 8, 2013).  
 
880 See, e.g., USA-Rwanda BIT, supra note 827, art. 18 ¶ 1 (“Nothing in this Treaty shall 
be construed…to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary 
for…protection of its own essential security interests.”) (emphasis supplied) 
 
881 Compare Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 15 ¶ 1 with GATT, supra note 19, 
art. XX.  
 
882 Compare Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 15 ¶ 2 with GATT, supra note 19, 
art. XXI. 
 
883 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 15 ¶ 3.  
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Exceptions for transfers comprise the sixth category of public 
purpose exceptions contained in the Sample BITs.884 The exceptions for 
transfers consist of two categories: (i) restrictions on transfers permitted 
for specific application of national laws885 and (ii) exceptions for balance-
of-payment difficulties.886 These two categories of exceptions for transfers 
in turn have their own quite discernible variations.  
Restrictions on transfers based upon specific application of 
national laws is subject-matter based and subject to (i) equitable, (ii) non-
discriminatory, and (iii) good faith application of law.887. Restrictions on 
                                                 
884 See, e.g., Canada-Armenia BIT, supra note 795, art. IX ¶¶ 3, 5; Canada-Barbados 
BIT, supra note 827, art. IX ¶¶ 3, 5; Agreement Between the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Government of the State of Kuwait for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments art. 6 ¶ 4, Chi.-Kuw., Nov. 23, 1985, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_kuwait.pdf [hereinafter China-
Kuwait BIT]; Colombia-India BIT, supra note 798, art. 5 ¶¶ 3-4;  Agreement Between 
the Government of the Republic of France and the Government of the United Mexican 
States on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 7, Fra.-Mex., Nov. 
12, 1998, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/mexico_france.pdf 
[hereinafter France-Mexico BIT]; Agreement Between Japan and the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investment 
art. 8 ¶ 2, Jap.-Sri., Mar. 1, 1982, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/srilanka_japan.pdf [hereinafter Japan-
Sri Lanka BIT].  
 
885 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
Ukraine for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. IX (“Transfer of Funds”), 
Can.-Ukr., Oct. 24, 1994, Error! Hyperlink reference not 
valid.http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_ukraine.pdf [hereinafter 
Canada-Ukraine BIT].  
 
886 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of Venezuela 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. VII ¶ 4, Spa.-Ven., Nov. 2, 1995, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/spain_venezuela_sp.pdf [hereinafter 
Spain-Venezuela BIT],  
 
887 The Canada-Armenia BIT, for example, provides:  
 
Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, a Contracting Party may prevent a 
transfer through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith 
application of its laws relating to: 
 
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection of rights of 
predators; 
(b) issuing, trading or dealing in securities; 
(c) criminal or penal offenses; 
(d) reports of transfers of currency or other monetary 
instruments; 
(e) ensuring the satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory 
proceedings.  
 
Canada-Armenia BIT, supra note 795, art. IX ¶¶ 3(emphasis supplied). A broader scope 
for restrictions on transfers based on the safety, soundness, integrity or financial 
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transfers permitted for specific application of national laws do not reflect 
any mandatory principle qualifying such restrictions for a specific time 
frame; in fact, the exercise of regulatory sovereignty pursuant to issuance 
of a measure restricting transfers that comports with national law is not 
required to lift or modify the transfers restrictions at the earliest possible 
time. Likewise, such restrictions do not require “serious” or “exceptional” 
need. 
Restrictions on transfers may issue in the form of regulatory 
sovereignty where a contracting party experiences “serious balance of 
payment difficulties, or the threat thereof.”888 In addition to the 
“seriousness” requirement imposed by the Canada-Slovakia BIT variant, 
such measures must comport with seven material qualifications. The 
measure(s): (i) must be equitable; (ii) cannot be arbitrary; (iii) cannot be 
“unjustifiably discriminatory”; (iv) must meet a “good faith” requirement; 
(v) must be of limited duration; and (vi) must be a specially tailored 
remedy for the particular balance of payments problem at issue.889 
The exception for balance of payment difficulties clause contained 
in the Colombia-India BIT at Article 5(4) is indicative of a more 
streamlined approach premised on the hierarchy of placing 
macroeconomic management concerns over and above the microeconomic 
issues endemic to particular cases of foreign investment protection. This 
clause provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
this Article, the Contracting Parties may temporarily 
restrict the transfers in the event of a serious balance-of-
                                                                                                                         
responsibility of financial institutions—yet, also subject to equitable, non-discriminatory 
and good faith application of measures—is further identified in Article. XI(2) of the 
Canada-Armenia BIT, notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX(3). Art. XI (2) of the 
Canada-Armenia BIT reads: 
 
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) of Article IX, and without 
limiting the applicability of paragraph (3) of Article IX, a Contracting 
Party may prevent or limit transfers by a financial institution to, or for 
the benefit of, an affiliate of or person related to such institution or 
provider, through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith 
application of measures relating to maintenance of the safety, 
soundness, integrity or financial responsibility of financial institutions. 
 
Id. art. XI ¶ 2 (emphasis supplied).  
 
888 See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Slovak Republic for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investment art. IX ¶ 3(a), Can.-Slo., Jul. 20, 2010, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Canada_slovakia_new.pdf  [hereinafter 
Canada-Slovakia BIT].  
 
889 Id. art. IX  ¶ 3(b).  
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payments or threat thereof; or in cases where, in 
exceptional circumstances, movements of capital cause or 
threaten to cause serious difficulties for macroeconomic 
management, in particular, monetary and exchange rate 
policies, provided such restrictions are compatible or are 
issued in conformity with the agreements of the IMF or are 
applied upon request of the latter and are equitable, non-
discriminatory and in good faith.890 
This iteration of the clause, in addition to introducing macroeconomic 
necessity as a justifiable public purpose, also preserves the requirements 
that measures be equitable, non-discriminatory, in good faith and in 
response to serious balance-of-payments difficulties contained in the 
Canada-Slovakia BIT891 
The temporal qualifications such as “limited duration” and “a time 
schedule for [the] removal” of the measures restricting funding identified 
in the Canada-Slovakia BIT are altogether omitted from the Colombia-
India BIT, including the stricture commanding that the measure be 
narrowly tailored to the problem that it seeks to address.892 
The least qualified and, therefore, broadest expression of the 
exceptions for transfers iteration of the public purpose doctrine is 
exemplified by the Japan-Pakistan BIT. In that instrument, the single 
limiting qualification to the doctrine is the adjective “exceptional” 
modifying “financial or economic circumstances.”893 
                                                 
890 Colombia-India BIT, supra note 798, art. 5 ¶ 4. 
 
891 It is important to note that while the Canada-Slovakia BIT does not reference 
“conformity with the agreements of the IMF” as does the Colombia-India BIT, it does 
explicitly allude to “accordance” with “the WTO Agreement and the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.” Compare Colombia-India BIT, supra 
note 798, art. 5 ¶ 4, with Canada-Slovakia BIT, supra note 890, art. IX¶ 3(b) (emphasis 
supplied).  
 
892 Canada-Slovakia BIT, supra note 890, art. IX ¶ 3(b). 
 
893 The Japan-Pakistan BIT provides, in relevant part:  
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article, 
either Contracting Party may, in exceptional financial or economic 
circumstances, impose such exchange restrictions in accordance with 
its laws and regulations and in conformity with the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund so long as each 
Contracting Party is a party to the said Articles of Agreement. 
 
Agreement Between Japan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Concerning the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment art. 8 ¶ 2, Jap.-Pak., Mar. 10, 1998, 
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The Colombia-Japan BIT covers exceptions for transfers under the 
banner of “temporary safeguard measures.” It addresses exceptions for 
transfers akin to the clause used in the Japan-Pakistan BIT, but unlike that 
treaty, the Colombia-Japan BIT does not mention the International 
Monetary Fund; instead, it limits its qualification to “serious difficulties 
for macroeconomic management.”894 
Notwithstanding carefully crafted variations of exceptions for 
transfers evinced in the Sample BITs under (i) restrictions on transfers 
permitted for specific application of national laws and (ii) exceptions for 
balance-of-payment difficulties, this public purpose based exception 
intermingles macroeconomic standards pertaining to the WTO Agreement 
and the Articles of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with protection 
standards that are best framed in a microeconomic context. The exceptions 
also are self-judging and rife with elements that ostensibly appear to be 
particular, but in fact are less than uniform nor actually defined within the 
ambit of public international law, such as “good faith.” 
An orthodox approach would suggest that macroeconomic 
standards are universal and, therefore, less susceptible to arbitrariness or 
manipulation. In this same vein, macroeconomic exigencies may be said to 
embrace objective criteria such that “exceptional financial or economic 
circumstances” that affect an entire nation itself points to a problem the 
solution of which inherently entails an expansive expression of public 
purpose that can be gauged. Absent from the exceptions is any reference 
to proportionality or causation beyond “movements of capital [that may] 
cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties for macroeconomic 
management,”895 such as “actual cause” or “direct and proximate cause.” 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/pakistan_japan.pdf [hereinafter Japan-
Pakistan BIT].  
 
894 The Colombia-Japan BIT provides:  
 
1. A Contracting Party may adopt or maintain measures not 
conforming with its obligations under paragraph 1 of Article 2 relating 
to cross-border capital transactions and Article 14: 
 
(a) in the event of serious balance-of payments and external 
financial difficulties or threat thereof; or 
 
(b) in cases where, in exceptional circumstances, movements of 
capital cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties for 
macroeconomic management, in particular, monetary and 
exchange rate policies. 
 
Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 16 ¶ 1(a)-(b).  
 
895 Colombia-India BIT, supra note 798, art. 5 ¶ 4.  
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Instead, vague terms such as “serious difficulties” that point to subjective-
self-judging criteria pervade the exceptions for transfers. 
Prudential financial measures constitute the seventh expression of the 
public purpose doctrine contained as an exception in the Sample BITs.896 
Two variations of the prudential financial measures exceptions clause are 
discernible from the Sample BITs. The broadest exemplar is represented 
by a brief single sentence clause that vests Host States with virtually 
unbridled regulatory sovereignty as to this subject matter. Accordingly, 
the scope of the clause is inversely proportionate to its length. The 
Belgium-Colombia BIT contains such a clause, which provides:  
Nothing contained in this Agreement shall apply to 
measures adopted by any Contracting Party, in accordance 
with its law, with respect to the financial sector for 
prudential reasons, including those measures aimed at 
protecting investors, depositors, insurance takers or 
trustees, or to safeguard the integrity and stability of the 
financial system.897  
Notably, the only limitation placed on a Host State exercising regulatory 
sovereignty pursuant to this provision is the qualifying language “in 
accordance with its law, with respect to the financial sector for prudential 
reasons.”898 In fact, even the objectives of the measures taken are not 
limited to protecting specific classes of individuals as to the financial 
system and the financial system itself, as evinced by the word “including.” 
The clause’s ample scope, lacking reference to any “objective” standard, 
bespeaks an anatomy favoring a self-judging rubric that enhances host-
State regulatory sovereignty.  
The Canada-Armenia BIT exemplifies the second variation of 
prudential financial measures exceptions contained in BIT clauses. This 
type of clause reads: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining reasonable 
measures for prudential reasons, such as: 
                                                 
896 See, e.g., Belgium-Colombia BIT, supra note 797, art. 2 ¶ 5; Canada-Costa Rica BIT, 
supra note 827, annex I.III ¶ 3; Japan-Vietnam BIT, supra note 854, art. 17.  
 
897 Belgium-Colombia BIT, supra note 797, art. 2 ¶ 5.  
 
898 Id. 
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the protection of investors, depositors, financial market participants, 
policy-holders, policy-claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is 
owed by financial institutions; 
the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial 
responsibility of financial institutions; and  
ensuring the integrity and stability of a Contracting Party’s financial 
system.899 
The reference to “reasonable measures”900 represents a compelling call for 
objective analysis. Moreover, the term “such as,” in contrast with 
“including those measures” (this latter qualification contained in the 
Belgium-Colombia BIT) seeks to identify qualifying paradigms rather 
than general subject matter inclusion. 
The Colombia-Japan BIT, paradigmatic of new generation BITs, 
contains a hybrid of the two most notable variations of the prudential 
measures public purpose exceptions, but limits the exception’s application 
by subordinating it to the BIT’s “obligations”: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement, a Contracting 
Party shall not be prevented from taking measures relating to financial 
services sector for prudential reasons, including measures for the 
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a 
fiduciary duty is owed by an enterprise supplying financial services, or 
measures to ensure the integrity and stability of its financial system. 
In cases where a Contracting Party takes any measure, pursuant to 
paragraph 1, that does not conform with the obligations under this 
Agreement, that Contracting Party shall not use such measure as a means 
of avoiding its obligations under this Agreement.901 
The first paragraph of this clause limits measures for the protection of 
third parties by referencing “persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed”902 
The second paragraph of the clause speaks of not conforming with the 
obligations under this Agreement.”903 Subordinating this ambit of 
regulatory sovereignty to the BIT’s imperatives certainly illustrates the 
                                                 
899 Canada-Armenia BIT, supra note 795, art. XI ¶ 1,(emphasis supplied). 
 
900 Id. 
 
901 Colombia-Japan BIT, supra note 546, art. 17 (emphasis supplied). 
 
902 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 
903 Id.  
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virtues of using treaty-drafting techniques to rein in what otherwise would 
be an unbridled license for the exercise of regulatory sovereignty with 
respect to a particular exception. Further, the use of the word “conform” 
materially weakens application of the exception because of the term’s 
expansive and general character. Alternative limiting language—standard 
qualification clauses such as “not in compliance with the laws of the 
Contracting Party enforcing the measure” or “in conflict with the 
obligations under this Agreement”—provides Host States seeking to 
circumvent investor protection obligations with greater flexibility in 
construing limits to the exception.  
Unlike other iterations of the public purpose doctrine, prudential 
measures and their appropriate application are inextricably related to the 
State necessity doctrine in ways that can be analyzed based upon 
“objective” economic analysis. By way of example, the need to undertake 
specific macroeconomic measures to stabilize currency in a 
macroeconomic crisis, or to render investors or depositors whole in the 
wake of an institutional financial collapse, present tangible scenarios that 
command exercise of prudential measures that may adversely affect 
orthodox host-State obligations in favor of foreign investors. The 
“jurisprudence” arising from investor-state arbitrations concerning 
application of this defense and/or prudential measures, provides the 
universe of investors in capital-exporting countries with considerable 
expectation guidelines in this field.904  
Empirical analysis is affirmatively conclusive as to the presence, 
scope, and content of the public purpose doctrine in BITs. The fragmented 
configuration of BITs generally, together with particulars that are unique 
to private and generally non-transparent negotiations between States, 
considerably cloud content and, therefore, any aspiration for substantive 
uniformity with respect to content. While analysis of the 319 BITs 
comprising the “Sample BITs” certainly establishes that multiple iterations 
of the public purpose doctrine comprise customary international law, there 
is little evidence on how the public purpose exception is to be applied, let 
alone of any objective or uniform standard governing application of the 
doctrine’s multiple iterations.  
                                                 
904 See generally EDF International S.A v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/23, Award (June 11, 2012) available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1069.pdf; Sempra Energy 
International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the 
Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award (Jun. 29, 2010), available 
at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0776.pdf;   Continental 
Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 
2008), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf.  
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Based upon analysis of the Sample BITs, the doctrine remains self-
judging in application by host-States. Additionally, with few exceptions, 
the public purpose doctrine as embodied in the Sample BITs generally 
remains expansive and, therefore, favoring Host States over Home States. 
This asymmetry contributes to uncertainty and is eroding investor 
expectations as to process legitimacy. Put simply, the fragmented structure 
of the approximately 3,000 BITs constituting this decentralized network of 
treaties fosters asymmetrical treatment and not bilateralism in the 
relationship between investor and host-State. This problem is further 
exacerbated with respect to expressions of the public purpose doctrine 
such as “sustainable development,” which themselves are the byproduct of 
multiple interpretations depending on the historically contingent 
development of the doctrine in different regions of the globe.905 The 
discernible appearance of the public purpose doctrine in a rather limited 
set of subject matter categories and an equally restricted number of 
variations of clauses, does render an aspiration or uniformity as to scope, 
content, and application realistic. Also, the patent lack of symmetry made 
worse by the wholesale importation of macroeconomic principles from 
Article XX of the GATT, contribute to expanding disproportionately the 
fear of Host State regulatory sovereignty. Second-generation BITs, such as 
the emblematic Colombia-Japan BIT, demonstrate a meaningful paradigm 
shift that favors underdeveloped and economies in transition. These newer 
BITs suggest that in an environment of economic globalization, 
traditionally weaker capital-importing States now have greater negotiating 
leverage in crafting BITs. The byproduct of this development, however, 
has contributed to causing the proverbial pendulum to swing in an extreme 
direction, fueling regulatory sovereignty.906 
                                                 
905 In the case of sustainable development in particular, we have seen how the treatment 
of the doctrine differs because of the manner in which decolonization occurred in 
different regions of the world. No single definition of the principle is anywhere 
articulated or adopted. In the context of BITs, sustainable development is mentioned but 
never defined. See discussion supra Chapter 2, Subsection E.  
 
906 The new generation BITs do not altogether disavow the interests of Home States. A 
number of the BITs that Canada has executed, for example, contain clarification of 
indirect expropriation clauses that further Home State interests. The Canada-China BIT is 
illustrative: 
 
The Contracting Parties confirm their shared understanding that: 
 
1. Indirect expropriation results from a measure or series of 
measures of a Contracting Party that has an effect equivalent 
to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or 
outright seizure. 
 
2. The determination of whether a measure or series of measures 
of a Contracting Party constitutes an indirect expropriation 
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requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, 
among other factors: 
 
a) the economic impact of the measure or series of 
measures, although the sole fact that a measure or 
series of measures of a Contracting Party has an 
adverse effect on the economic value of an 
investment does not establish that an indirect 
expropriation has occurred; 
b) the extent to which the measure or series of measures 
interferes with distinct, reasonable, investment-
backed expectations; and 
c) the character of the measure or series of measures. 
 
3. Except in rare circumstances, such as if a measure or series of 
measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it cannot be 
reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in 
good faith, a non-discriminatory measure or series of measures 
of a Contracting Party that is designed and applied to protect 
the legitimate public objectives for the well-being of citizens, 
such as health, safety and the environment, does not constitute 
indirect expropriation.  
 
Canada-China BIT, supra note 546, annex. B.10 (“Expropriation”). Many such clauses 
also contain the inclusion of government intent as a factor to be considered. See, .e.g, 
Canada-Slovakia BIT, supra note 890, annex A ¶ (b)(iii)  (“…the character of the 
measure or series of measures, including their purpose and rationale…”);  Colombia-
India BIT, supra note 798, art. 6 ¶ 2(iv) (“…the character and intent of the measures or 
series of measures, whether they are for bona fide public interest purposes or not and 
whether there is a reasonable nexus between them and the intention to expropriate.”).  
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Perhaps the most emblematic expression of the public purpose 
doctrine that manifests a commitment to bolstering regulatory sovereignty 
is found in the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 
Much like fundamental principles of Sustainable Development and Self-
Determination, the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources (“PSNR”) has its genesis in the process of decolonization.907 
The historical phenomenon of decolonization witnessed a stark shift in 
domestic and international economic policy that prioritized the 
development and “repatriation” of natural and economic resources 
pertaining to former colonies.908 Along the same vein as the sustainable 
development expression of the public purpose doctrine, the principle of 
PSNR is premised on the proposition that colonization gave rise to 
policies that disadvantaged colonial States in favor of the colonizing 
sovereignties.909 PSNR, much like the principle of sustainable 
development,910 varies both doctrinally and conceptually depending on its 
regional historic origins.  
By way of example, Schrijver observes this phenomenon, but 
expresses it in terms of the doctrinal ambiguity present when identifying a 
homogeneous treaty-based objective:  
Treaties which implicitly or explicitly formulate the right of 
permanent sovereignty hardly ever spell out its objectives. 
The Human Rights Covenants of 1966 provide that: 
‘Peoples may for their own ends dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources and that they should enjoy and utilize 
                                                 
907 Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in IntraState Natural Resource 
Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45 
VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 785, 789 (2010) (“In the last century alone, international 
law has played a significant role in global debates regarding ownership, use, control, and 
development of land and natural resources. More specifically, in the period of colonial 
dissolution, the international doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
was developed and applied to interState disputes between colonizing States and newly 
independent colonies.”) 
 
908 See id. at 789-90.   
 
909 Id. at 790 (noting that the “doctrine emerged with the aim of protecting newly 
independent States from economic recolonization resulting from the appropriation of 
their natural resource base by foreign actors.”). 
 
910 As noted, while there exists a general understanding of sustainable development with 
essential elements that are shared by the community of nations, the doctrine’s expression 
in considerable measure is related to its historicity. Thus, for example, the doctrine’s 
expression in the European Convention on Human Rights is materially different from the 
scope and subject matter of the doctrine as expressed in the Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights. Moreover, the iteration of the doctrine in both of these conventions is 
materially distinct from the doctrine as found in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. See discussion supra Chapter 3.   
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these fully and freely.’ The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ of 1981 is slightly less general: ‘This right 
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people.’ It 
is further provided that States shall exercise this right ‘with 
a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity.’911 
A review of international instruments distinctly identifies PSNR as 
a principle of customary and conventional international law.912 Its content 
and scope, however, remain less clear. Both appear to be grounded on two 
propositions: (i) a construction of history that finds it necessary to redress 
resource and economic inequities arising from the colonizer/colony 
relationship; and (ii) a narrow and “self-evident” approach to public 
purpose that provides a normative foundation for the self-determination of 
natural resources by States with little qualification regarding broader 
obligations attendant to the right of PSNR that a State may have with 
respect to the community of nations.913 Both of these premises command 
review of the foundation of international instruments giving rise to PSNR. 
                                                 
911 NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS 
AND DUTIES 21 (Cambridge University Press 2008).   
 
912 See, e.g., Integrated Economic Development and Commercial Agreements, G.A. Res. 
523, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952) [hereinafter 
G.A. Res. 523]; Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources, G.A. Res. 626, 
U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952) [hereinafter G.A. 
Res. 626]; Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. 
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 
1803]; Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 2158, UN GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/6518 (1966) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2158]; 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources of Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 
3016, UN GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/8963 (1972) [hereinafter 
G.A. Res. 3016]; Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. 
GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 
3171].  
 
913 Schrijver compellingly argues that  
 
The challenge of the next two or three decades will be how to balance 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources with other basic 
principles and emerging norms of international law─including the duty 
to observe international agreements, grant fair treatment to foreign 
investors, pursue sustainable development at national and international 
levels and to respect human and peoples’ rights─and in this way to 
serve best the interests of present and future generations.  
 
SCHRIJVER, supra note 913, at 380.  
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A. PSNR: The Structural Foundations of a Doctrine 
1. General Assembly Res. 523 and 626  
The pre-economic globalization United Nations resolutions giving rise to 
the principle of PSNR contain the seeds for what eventually would 
become conflicting paradigms of sovereignty. This fundamental 
dissonance—between traditional Westphalian conceptions of 
sovereignty914 and a contemporary understanding viewed through the lens 
of transnational interdependence and shared Global responsibilities915—
can be gleaned by the not-too-delicate balance that the foundational 
resolutions sought to accomplish in harmonizing the interests between 
developed (Home States) and developing nations (Host States). The 
remedial nature of these resolutions emphasize a policy favoring 
underdeveloped States that would vest Host States with virtually 
unchecked regulatory sovereignty in the interest of an overtly nationalistic 
public purpose. 
General Assembly Resolution 523, entitled “Integrated Economic 
Development and Commercial Agreements,” for the first time asserts that 
as a matter of “right”—in  conjunction with principles of self-
determination—”under-developed countries” are empowered to use their 
“natural resources” in the interests of economic national development.916 
This foundational resolution on the principle of PSNR does not define any 
of its essential terms, but in fact affirmatively advances a stark contrast 
between developed and underdeveloped States, and in so doing articulates 
the resolution’s remedial nature.  
The resolution not too indirectly suggests that the use and 
stockpiling of raw materials on the part of developed States has caused or 
increased “the economic difficulties in many of the under-developed 
                                                 
914 See supra note 51 & accompanying text.  
 
915 See discussion supra Chapter 4, Section B . 
 
916 General Assembly Resolution 523, provides in pertinent part: 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Considering that the under-developed countries have the right to 
determine freely the use of their natural resources in that they must 
utilize such resources in order to be in a better position to further the 
realization of their plans of economic development in accordance with 
their national interests, and to further the expansion of the world 
economy[.] 
 
G.A. Res. 523, supra note 914 . 
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countries.”917 Even though the resolution does not address a remedial 
purpose incident to historical advantages that industrialized countries 
secured from underdeveloped States, it does express a causal relationship 
in the present originating in industrialized countries, and having an effect 
on underdeveloped States. By so doing, the resolution expressed its 
conceptual commitment primarily to (i) orthodox Westphalian notions of 
sovereignty and (ii) the development of underdeveloped countries. 
The principles of (i) self-determination, (ii) sustainable 
development, and (iii) permanent sovereignty over natural resources (the 
last two understandably in very embryonic form) are explicitly referred to 
in the resolution interdependently, each providing analytical support for 
the other. The resolution in relevant part reads: 
Bearing in mind that one way of obtaining the means 
necessary for carrying out economic development plans in 
underdeveloped countries is the creation of conditions 
under which these countries could more readily acquire 
machinery, equipment and industrial raw materials for the 
goods and services exported by them,  
1. Recommends that members of the United Nations 
within the framework of their general economic policy, 
should: 
(a). Continue to make every possible effort 
to carry out the recommendations contained 
in paragraphs, 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Economic 
and Social Council Resolution 341 (XII), 
Section A of 20 March, 1951; 
                                                 
917 General Assembly Resolution 523 does not explicitly identify developed or 
industrialized States as culprits in relation to the economic challenges that 
underdeveloped States face. The text of this section of the resolution, however, leaves 
little doubt that only by imputing these economic challenges to developed countries can 
the provision be reasonably construed. The pertinent language reads: 
 
Considering, that the existing sharp increase in the demand for raw 
materials, including the demand for stock-piling has resulted in an 
increase in the prices of a number of raw materials and in fluctuations 
in the price of others; has in many cases been accompanied by 
increased prices and reduced availability of important items of 
machinery, equipment, consumer goods and industrial raw materials 
necessary for the development of under-developed countries;  has 
created inflationary pressures and brought about the regulation of 
prices at different relative levels for different products and has thereby 
caused or increased the economic difficulties in many of the under-
developed countries[.] 
 
Id.  
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(b). Consider the possibility of facilitating 
through commercial agreements: 
… 
(ii) The development of natural 
resources which can be utilized for 
the domestic needs of the 
underdeveloped countries and also 
for the needs of international trade,  
provided that such commercial agreements 
shall not contain economic or political 
conditions violating the sovereign rights of 
the under-developed countries, including the 
right to determine their own plans for 
economic development.918  
The emphasis placed on national economic development pursuant to an 
ostensibly unbridled right on the part of underdeveloped countries919 is 
inimical to post-economic globalization paradigms based on 
interdependence and broad exceptions to the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty largely based upon the more Global concerns of the 
community of nations.  
Resolution 523 is not altogether silent on the right of 
underdeveloped countries “to determine freely the use of their natural 
resources.”920 In three notable passages, Resolution 523 indeed references 
underlying policies that concern the community of nations and not just 
what would be in the national interests of particular States. The very first 
paragraph alludes to the connection between the right to determine freely 
the use of their natural resources by underdeveloped countries and the 
equally important task of seeking “to further the expansion of the world 
economy.”921 Second, the resolution recognizes the necessity of 
                                                 
918 Id. (emphasis supplied).  
 
919 The Resolution is silent as to all countries or industrialized countries having this 
unfettered “right to determine freely the use of their natural resources.” Id. Analytically, 
within the framework of the resolution, the right logically would extend to all States 
because it is premised on the universal principle of self-determination. Because the 
resolution only mentions underdeveloped countries, the exclusion of industrialized and 
even of underdeveloped States is best construed as a point of emphasis and purpose only.  
 
920 Id. at ¶ 1.  
 
921 Id. It is noteworthy that the objective of expanding the world economy is treated in 
pari materia with the economic development of the national interests of underdeveloped 
States. 
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“[c]ontinu[ing] to make every possible effort to carry out the 
recommendations contained in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Economic and 
Social Council resolution 341 (XII), Section A, of 20 March 1951.”922 But 
for a single reference to the purchasing power of the “poorer sections of 
the population,”923 the resolution mostly aims to address macroeconomic 
measures at an international level that purport to benefit all members of 
the international community. Accordingly, the measures do not seek to 
redress past wrongs or to correct specific problems only confronting 
developed States as a result of economic and political measures that may 
be ascribed to developed or industrialized countries. Finally, Resolution 
523 speaks to “the needs of international trade.” Properly contextualized 
this provision of the resolution concerns the use of commercial agreements 
to assist underdeveloped nations in developing their natural resources in 
order to meet their domestic needs. This proposition is then extended with 
a conjunctive to include “the needs of international trade.”924  
                                                 
922 As noted in Resolution 523, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Economic and Social Council 
resolution 341 (XII), Section A, set forth: 
 
1. Recommends that all Members of the United Nations during the 
period of general shortage of goods, take special measures to bring 
about adequate production and equitable international distribution 
of capital goods, essential consumers’ goods and raw materials 
especially needed for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the preservation of standards of living and the furthering 
of economic development; 
2. Recommends that all members of the United Nations during the 
period of general inflationary pressure, take measures, direct or 
indirect, to regulate at equitable levels and relationships, the prices 
of essential goods moving in international trade, including capital 
goods, essential consumers’ goods and raw materials; 
3. Recommends that the equitable regulation of distribution prices 
referred to in recommendations 1 and 2 above be maintained as 
long as strong inflationary pressures persist, in order to minimize 
changes in the purchasing power, in terms of imports, of current 
earnings from exports as well as of monetary assets; 
4. Recommends further that all Members of the United Nations take 
all steps in their power to prevent the development of inflationary 
pressures, thereby preventing speculative profits and maintaining 
the purchasing power of the poorer sections of the population. 
 
Id. at n.1.  
 
923 See id.  
 
924 Subsection 1(b)(ii) provides:  
 
The development of natural resources which can be utilized for the 
domestic needs of the underdeveloped countries and also for the needs 
of international trade.  
 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
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 Notwithstanding these three surface references to issues that touch 
and concern all members of the international community, Resolution 523 
is fundamentally a resolution premised on specific needs for particular 
nations; such needs in turn are unique to each nation and the set of 
underdeveloped countries. Those very particular needs, i.e., the economic 
wants of specific countries that are underdeveloped, are territorially based. 
Moreover, the resolution’s emphasis on the freedom accorded to each 
country to utilize their natural resources freely suggests a subjective (self-
judging) standard based upon each country’s understanding of the manner 
and the resource to be developed, as well as the domestic economic wants 
to be addressed. This subjective self-judging criteria comports with the 
precept of self-determination that pervades the resolution and the principle 
of PSNR. It also embodies an analytical methodology that constitutes the 
orthodox application, scope, and substantive content of the public purpose 
doctrine. The reliance on a subjective standard, together with the use of 
critical terms such as “natural resources,” “rights,” “underdeveloped 
countries,” and “national interests,” bereft of any proportionality, cannot 
help but bring to mind the self-judging, content-free, non-proportional, 
and territorially based public purpose doctrine. The resolution’s reliance 
on conventional sovereignty and its pre-dating of economic globalization 
by half a century, without more, helps explain the normative foundations 
of the orthodox public purpose doctrine more generally, and also identifies 
the very seeds of change that were embedded in the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources since its very inception in this 
embryonic pronouncement. 
 
 Issued on December 21, 1952, scarcely twelve months after 
Resolution 523, General Assembly Resolution 626 entitled “Right to 
exploit freely natural wealth and resources” further bolstered the 
legitimacy of PSNR. Consonant with Resolution 523,  Resolution 626 
emphasizes the existence of a right of States to use and exploit freely their 
natural resources.925 Unlike its predecessor, however, Resolution 626 
stresses that in addition to aiding underdeveloped nations with their 
“progress” and “economic development,” the right to exploit freely natural 
wealth and resources is conducive to “universal peace.”926 Secondly, 
                                                                                                                         
 
925 As noted in the third paragraph of Resolution 626: 
 
Remembering that the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their 
natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty and is in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
 
G.A. Res. 626, supra note 914, at ¶ 3.  
 
926 Two provisions in Resolution 626 bridge the right to exploit freely natural resources to 
peace. The first is found in the second paragraph of the resolution:  
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Resolution 626 also distinguishes itself from Resolution 523 by 
proscribing “direct or indirect” acts aimed at interfering with “the 
sovereignty of any State over its natural resources.”927 Read together, 
General Assembly Resolutions 523  and 626 assert four continuing goals 
ostensibly under the banner of furthering the interests of the international 
community: (i) fueling the expansion of the world economy;928, (ii) 
regulating international production and equitable distribution of capital 
goods needed for the maintenance of peace and security;929 (iii) curtailing 
international inflation;930 and (iv) meeting the needs of international 
trade.931 
 
 Within the rubric of Resolutions 523 and 626 these four Global 
objectives are best pursued by ensuring that States freely utilize their 
natural resources in order to meet particular economic needs. The 
regulations’ argument for a State’s right to develop its own natural 
resources freely are premised on the right of self-determination and 
perceived national interests. Therefore, both resolutions establish a direct 
relationship between enhanced regulatory sovereignty premised on a 
territorial conception of sovereignty, and the desire to increase 
international trade, expand the Global economy, and maintain world 
                                                                                                                         
Bearing in mind the need for encouraging the underdeveloped countries 
in the proper use and exploitation of their natural wealth and resources,  
 
Considering that the economic development of the under-developed 
countries is one of the fundamental requisites for the strengthening of 
universal peace. 
 
Id. (underlined emphasis supplied).Less explicitly, paragraph 1 of the resolution also 
draws attention to the relationship between the right to exploit freely natural resources 
and peace in the form of “security, mutual confidence and economic cooperation among 
nations.” That paragraph reads: 
 
Recommends all Member States, and the exercise of their right freely to 
use and exploit their natural wealth and resources wherever deemed 
desirable by them for their own progress and economic development, to 
have due regard, consistently with their sovereignty, to the need for 
maintaining the flow of capital in conditions of security, mutual 
confidence and economic cooperation among nations.  
 
Id. (underlined emphasis supplied). 
 
927 Id. at ¶ 2.  
 
928 G.A. Res. 523, supra note 814, at ¶ 1.    
 
929 Id. at ¶ 1(a).     
 
930 Id. 
 
931 Id. at ¶ 1(b)(ii).  
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peace. The term “national interests” within the context of these two 
foundational PSNR General Assembly resolutions represents the public 
purpose normative foundation of the PSNR principle. Pursuant to this 
conceptual construction of public purpose, regulatory sovereignty in 
furtherance of the ostensible public purpose of freely utilizing natural 
resources would trump suspending the “free exercise of this right” based 
upon overriding transnational concerns. To the contrary, the workings of 
the resolutions dictate that the unassailable and uncompromising 
principles of self-determination and national interests underlying “the right 
to determine freely the use of natural resources” by individual States are 
not at all juxtaposed to the Global concerns of international trade, 
expansion of the Global economy, or peace. According to the doctrinal 
configuration of the resolutions, absolute regulatory sovereignty in 
furtherance of the “free” use of natural resources serves as a requisite 
predicate to shared international economic concerns and development. 
 
 The conceptual and doctrinal origins of the PSNR expression of 
the public purpose doctrine rest on a paradigm on independence and an 
orthodox understanding of sovereignty that pre-dates economic 
globalization. This pre-economic globalization Westphalian construct of 
sovereignty holds that public purpose based upon precepts of self-
determination and natural interests is both absolute and best understood 
pursuant to a State’s own self-judging criteria. It disallows any conceptual 
space that would invite an exception to regulatory sovereignty arising 
from transnational needs, such as investment protection obligations 
running from a host to home932 
 
B. The Development of the Nomenclature Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources and the Creation of a Commission  
 Neither Resolution 523 nor Resolution 626 actually mentions the 
term “permanent sovereignty over natural resources.” While both of these 
provisions do express a right to the development of natural resources that 
is based on the twin principles of self-determination and public purpose,933 
                                                 
It is important to place these resolutions in their appropriate historical context. In 1951, 
the year in which GA Resolutions 341 (XII) and 523 (VI) issued, international human 
rights law, by way of example, commanding that orthodox territorial sovereignty must be 
subordinated to transnational norms that seek the protection of persons irrespective of 
citizen status, also was in an embryonic development phase. Thus, exceptions to 
regulatory sovereignty based upon non-domestic or non-national issues, found little 
precedent. In fact, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, widely considered the 
first step in the international human rights movement, was not adopted until December 
10, 1945. See UDHR, supra note 648.  
 
933 Resolution 523 expresses public purpose in terms of “national interests.”  G.A. Res. 
523, supra note 914. Resolution 626 expresses the public purpose doctrine as 
“consistently with their sovereignty,” in referring to the basis for the use and exploitation 
of natural resources. G.A. Res. 626, supra note 914. 
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the concept of a permanent sovereignty over natural wealth is far from 
being fully developed, let alone reduced to its now familiar nomenclature 
of “permanent sovereignty over natural resources.” The public purpose 
component of both resolutions, however, cannot at all be conceptually 
severed from pre-economic globalization notions of territorial sovereignty 
and regulatory paradigms based upon economic models of independence. 
It would not be too much of a conceptual leap to conclude that the process 
of decolonization that spawned a need to issue United Nations 
resolutions—resolutions that identified a virtually unqualified right of 
States to develop their natural resources and wealth in furtherance of 
national interests and pursuant to the principle of self-determination—also 
materially influenced the development of a public purpose doctrine in 
public international law that is self-judging by the invoking State, does not 
provide for proportionality, and is treated as intuitively self-evident, much 
like the precept of self-determination. 
 
 The right to determine freely a State’s use of its natural resources 
as set forth in Resolutions 523 and 626 first received its current 
nomenclature of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the two 
draft covenants on human rights that the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights published during its tenth session (February 23-April 16, 
1954).934 It is in Part 1, Article 1 of the Draft International Covenants on 
Human Rights that the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural 
wealth and resources is first found. The historical context in which it 
surfaces, at the apogee of the Cold War when nationalistic fervor and 
decolonization also were at a pinnacle, is important. Also central to 
understanding the normative anatomy of this expression of public purpose 
and more generally of the development of the orthodox conception of the 
public purpose doctrine as defined in this writing, is the textual context in 
which PSNR is mentioned. 
 
 PSNR as to nomenclature and substantively as a right appears early 
in the draft covenants. In Part 1, Article 1, Paragraph 3, the two-paragraph 
step preceding, however, are helpful to the understanding of PSNR’s 
scope and content as originally conceived: 
 
All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-
determination, mainly, the right freely to determine their 
political economic, social and cultural status. 
 
All States, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories 
                                                 
934, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Eighteenth Session, 
Supplement No. 7 (E/2573), Annexes I - III (Feb. 23-April 16, 1954) [hereinafter Draft 
International Covenant on Human Rights].  
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and those controlling in whatsoever manner the exercise of 
that right by another people, shall promote the realization 
of that right in all their territories and shall respect the 
maintenance of that right in other States, in conformity with 
provisions of the United Nations Charter.935 
 
The principle of self-determination also is underscored as endemic to 
regulatory sovereignty in the context of economic development. Thus, the 
first historical mention of the principle of PSNR in an international 
instrument is preceded by two paragraphs that highlight the importance of 
the principle of self-determination and its connection to economic status or 
development. This context is suggestive of the proposition that the 
exercise of regulatory sovereignty in furtherance of political, economic, 
social, and cultural status is but an expression of self-determination that 
need only consider national interest or public purpose within an orthodox 
territorial framework. It is within this conceptual structure that PSNR is 
explicitly referenced as to nomenclature and hierarchy as an inalienable or 
absolute precept of public international law: 
 
3. The right of peoples to self-determination shall also 
include permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources. In no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence on the 
grounds of any rights that may be claimed by other 
States.936 
 
This first and historically significant reference to PSNR has two very 
distinct consequences that directly have influenced the character and 
application of the public purpose doctrine in international law. First, 
because PSNR is conceptualized and presented as drawing its normative 
foundation from the precept of “self-determination,” the PSNR expression 
of the public purpose doctrine is accorded self-evident or intuitive status. 
Indeed, the very language of the draft international covenants on human 
rights States that PSNR actually forms part of and is subsumed by the 
precept of self-determination.937 
 
 Therefore, the customary treatment of public purpose as a self-
evident principle concerning all things public as understood through the 
prism of the State was significantly bolstered by treating the PSNR 
expression of the doctrine as included in the principle of self-
                                                 
935 Id. at Part. 1, Art. 1 ¶¶ 1-2.  
 
936  Id. at ¶ 3 (emphasis supplied). 
 
937 Id. (stating that “[t]he right of peoples to self-determination shall also include 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.”) (emphasis supplied).  
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determination. The latter is held out to be a paradigmatic example of an 
intuitive and self-evident principle that defies the need for conceptual 
understanding beyond intuition or doctrinal justification for its application 
as part of the exercise of regulatory sovereignty.  
 
 Second, the orthodox conceptualization and understanding of the 
public purpose doctrine is suggestive of a hierarchical status pursuant to 
which actions undertaken in furtherance of a purported public purpose 
preempt other legally binding obligations on the part of States. This 
normative standing certainly may be explained in part by the weight and 
standing historically accorded to “first principles” generally in 
philosophical discourses,938 and in public international law in particular.939 
                                                 
938 See generally ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS (Robin Smith, ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 
1989); THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province, ed., Christian Classics 1981).  
 
939 In the realm of public international law, those norms accorded hierarchical status are 
referred to as jus cogens. One scholar has attempted to summarize the application and 
relevance of jus cogens as follows:  
 
[R]ules of jus cogens can be defined in general terms as being non-
derogable rules of international ‘public policy.’ Given their overriding 
importance and indeed because often they involve matters of 
international public order it can be Stated that each and every State has 
a legal interest therein. As a result, one can State that peremptory 
obligations are owed all States (and other subjects of international law) 
to the international community of States as a whole. One can recall the 
well-known dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case:  
 
‘[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between 
the obligations of a State towards the international 
community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another State…. By their nature the former are the 
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the 
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes…. Such obligations derive, for example, in 
contemporary international law, from the outlawing 
of acts of aggression, and of genocide [] as also from 
the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of 
the human person, including protection from slavery 
and racial discrimination.’ 
 
These erga omnes obligations have been defined as obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole, in the 
vindication of which all States have legal interest. They are rules which 
accord a right to all States to make claims. Such rules are ‘[o]pposable 
to, valid against, ‘all the world’ i.e., all other legal persons, irrespective 
of consent on the part of those thus affected.’ It should be noted, 
however that although all norms of jus cogens are enforceable erga 
omnes not all erga omnes obligations are jus cogens.’ 
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More than this historical legacy, however, accounts for the primacy 
bestowed upon public purpose and the public purpose expression of 
PSNR. The draft international covenants on human rights at minimum 
contributed to the “absolute” or “pre-eminent” treatment of PSNR. Here, 
too, the plain language of the text is eloquent because it provides that “[i]n 
no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence on the 
grounds of any rights that may be claimed by other States.”940 The 
proposition is clear and arresting. The unequivocal nature of the phrase 
“[i]n no case” supports the proposition that even pursuant to its lawful 
negotiations and treaties with other States or foreign, non-national, private 
entities (i.e., foreign investors), a State may not foreclose its citizens from 
control or access to the wealth and resources of a nation, as may be argued 
to be the case in every instance where States contract with foreign private 
entities for the exploration, exploitation, and refinement of its natural 
resources.941 Read together, public purpose is understood as a fundamental 
element of both the principle of self-determination and PSNR. In the latter 
case, the public purpose doctrine represents a State’s “means of 
subsistence” and in this sense preempts the exercise of rights by other 
States or foreign private individuals. The public purpose doctrine is 
depicted as one that cannot be subordinated to the greater good of the 
                                                                                                                         
Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) and International 
Humanitarian Law, in MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO 
CASSESE 595 et seq., at 14 (The Hague 2003) (internal citations omitted). There is no 
rigid definition of jus cogens or exhaustive, definitive, and immutable list detailing every 
category of jus cogens. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law, entitled 
“Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (‘jus cogens’),” 
recognizes the existence and peremptory nature of jus cogens: 
 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the 
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is 
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character. 
 
VCLT, supra note 105, art. 53.   
 
940 Draft International Covenant on Human Rights, supra note 936 (emphasis supplied). 
 
941 Pursuant to the PSNR doctrine, exploitation and development agreements between 
States and private foreign entities that vest in foreign entities the control, disposition, or 
economic benefit of a State’s natural resources, may be susceptible to challenge and 
characterization as an illicit privatization. Similarly, even where such rights are vested in 
foreign private entities by legislative enactments, such legislation may still be vulnerable 
to constitutional challenges. The legality and legitimacy is further susceptible to attack 
where even narrow and restricted rights are accorded in perpetuity or for periods of time 
that compromise the potential benefits of such rights that one or more generations of a 
State’s citizens may claim. 
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community of nations (arguably a higher public purpose) because of 
legacy constructions of sovereignty, territoriality, and the political 
independence of States based upon 19th century economic globalization 
models.942 
 
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 corroborates 
PSNR’s status as a fundamental principle because of its relationship to the 
right of self-determination and as a universally-held, inalienable right.943 
Similarly, Resolution 1803 alludes to regulatory sovereignty and self-
judging public purpose by identifying “national interests” as the talisman 
pursuant to which States are to utilize their natural wealth and 
resources.944 
 
Entitled “Permanent sovereignty over natural resources,” 
Resolution 1803 is the first United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
to coin the nomenclature. In addition to the standing that this historical 
fact accords to the resolution, Resolution 1803 is also significant because 
of its role in aiding its predecessors: Resolution 523 (adopted January 12, 
1952); Resolution 626 (adopted December 21, 1952); and Resolution 1314 
(adopted December 12, 1958).945 While these three predecessor 
resolutions integrated economic development and commercial agreements 
along with the right to exploit freely natural wealth and resources, as well 
as the right to self-determination,946 they do not explicitly and concisely 
adopt the nomenclature “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” 
nor do they distinguish PSNR from sustainable development, or the 
promotion of economic development, and economic independence with 
respect to non-industrialized States. By explicitly referencing its 
predecessor resolutions, Resolution 1803 imparts conceptual coherence 
and uniformity to PSNR by appropriately chronicling its development.  
 
                                                 
942 See supra notes 909-912 & accompanying text.  
 
943 Resolution 1803 specifically identifies PSNR “as a basic constituent of the right to 
self-determination.” G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 914. Moreover, as to the “inalienable” 
status of PSNR, the resolution States: 
 
Any measure in this respect must be based on the recognition of the 
inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources in accordance with their national interests, and on other 
respect for the economic independence of States. 
Id.  
 
944 Id. 
 
945 Id. 
 
946 See supra note 939 & accompanying text.  
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 Without abandoning the goals of economic development of 
developing countries,947 reliance on the principle and the right of nations 
to self-determination,948 and provision of assistance to developing 
countries free of conditionality,949 Resolution 1803 underscores PSNR as a 
freestanding principle. The resolution demonstrates that PNSR, while 
tangentially related to the general right of States to pursue and promote 
their economic development, is a distinct principle in and of itself, 
providing:   
 
Noting that the creation and strengthening of the inalienable 
sovereignty of States over their natural wealth and 
resources reinforces their economic independence,  
 
Desiring, that there should be further consideration by the 
United Nations of the subject of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources in the spirit of international co-
operation in the field of economic development, 
particularly that of the developing countries, …950 
 
Here, PSNR’s normative standing as an absolute principle of international 
law from which there can be no derogation, and in this sense conceivably 
a nascent jus cogens, is notable.951 The resolution’s ostensible but 
unspoken aspiration to accord jus cogens status to PSNR may be gleaned 
                                                 
947 In this regard, Resolution 1803 provides:  
 
That it is desirable to promote international cooperation for the 
economic development of developing countries, and that economic and 
financial agreements between the developed and the developing 
countries must be based on principles of equality and the right of 
peoples and nations to self-determination,… 
 
G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 899.  
 
948 Id. 
 
949 The resolution provides, in relevant part:   
 
That the provision of economic and technical assistance, loans and 
increased foreign investment must not be subject to conditions which 
conflict with the interests of the recipient State,… 
 
Id.  
 
950 Id. 
 
951 See supra note 939 & accompanying text.  
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from the effort to “internationalize” the principle within the framework of 
economic development.952 
 
 Resolution 1803’s commitment to the development of PSNR, as a 
public purpose-based principle of international law that, although forming 
part of the right to self-determination, is also independent and 
freestanding, and exemplified by the resolution’s own declaration. Seven 
of the eight paragraphs comprising this declaration explicitly reference 
and define PSNR.953 Paragraph four of the resolution’s declaration does 
                                                 
952 See id. Most commentators are of a single voice in recognizing that jus cogens as a 
category of international law contains the following essential elements: (1) It is a norm 
that is accepted and recognized by the international community of States; (2) It cannot be 
derogated or otherwise altered by agreement or contract; (3) A norm of jus cogens status 
may only be modified by a binding norm of equal hierarchies; (4) The norm pertains to 
international law generally and, therefore, applies to all States comprising the 
international community; and (5) The violation of a norm by one State affects or is of 
consequence to all other States and deemed an international crime. Additionally, 
enactments contrary to jus cogens are null, void, or voidable. See Fabián Novak Talavera 
& Luis García-Corrochano Moyano, Derecho Internacional Público, Introducción y 
Fuentes, (tomo I) Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Instituto de Estudios 
Internacionales, FONDO EDITORIAL 2003, at pp. 426-430, for a concise discussion of 
these elements. 
 
953 Set forth below are the paragraphs in the resolution’s declaration referencing and 
defining the content, scope, and application of PSNR. Paragraph number four of the 
declaration concerning the nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning, has been 
omitted:  
 
Declares that: 
 
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their 
natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their 
national development and of the well-being of the State concerned. 
 
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as 
well as the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, 
should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the 
peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with 
regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities. 
 
3. In cases where authorization is granted, the capital imported and the 
earnings on that capital shall be governed by the terms thereof, by the 
national legislation in force, and by international law. The profits 
derived must be shared in the proportions freely agreed upon, in each 
case, between the investors and the recipient State, due care being 
taken to ensure that there is no impairment, for any reason, of that 
State’s sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources.  
 
5. The free and beneficial exercise of sovereignty furthered by the 
mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality. 
 
6. International co-operation for the economic development of 
developing countries, whether in the form of public or private capital 
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not literally reference PSNR. However, the reasonable and arguably 
necessary construction of this paragraph leaves little room for a conclusion 
other than the understanding that a Host State’s taking of both foreign and 
domestic property based on PSNR preempts any such ownership interest. 
Within the meaning of paragraph four, PSNR constitutes a public purpose 
(a “reason of public utility, security or the national interest”) sufficient to 
override any foreign or domestic private interest in furtherance of a taking 
pursuant to the exercise of regulatory sovereignty.954 
 
 Read together, paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 of the resolution’s 
declaration emphasizes the primacy of PSNR over Host State obligations 
in favor of Home State investors/investments.955 Paragraph 2, 3, 6, 7, and 
                                                                                                                         
investments, exchange of goods and services, technical assistance, or 
exchange of scientific information, shall be such, as to further their 
independent national development and shall be based upon respect for 
their sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.  
 
7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders the 
development of international co-operation and maintenance of peace.  
 
8. Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between 
sovereign States shall be observed in good faith; States and 
international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously respect the 
sovereignty of peoples and nations their natural wealth and resources 
in accordance with the Charter and principles set forth in the present 
resolution. 
 
G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 914 (emphasis supplied). 
 
954 Paragraph number four of Resolution 1803’s declaration reads: 
 
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on 
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest 
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private 
interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases, the owner shall be 
paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in 
the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and 
accordance with international law. In any case where the question of 
compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction of 
the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon 
agreement by Sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement 
of disputes should be made through arbitration or international 
adjudication.  
 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 
955 See supra note 954. These paragraphs predate the 1965 Washington Convention  (also 
known as the ICSID Convention) by 13 years. Accordingly, it does not contain “Home 
State,” “Host State,” or other “investor protection obligation” nomenclature. In this same 
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8 attempt to preempt tensions arising from the expectations of investment 
protection held by investors from capital-exporting States and the 
diminution in value or taking of such investments pursuant to the exercise 
of regulatory sovereignty on the part of capital-importing States. By way 
of example, paragraph two of the resolution’s declaration speaks to 
harmonizing the interests of foreign capital invested in furtherance of the 
exploration, exploitation, and development of host-State natural resources 
with host-State exercise of regulatory sovereignty in the context of PSNR: 
 
The exploration, development and disposition of such 
resources [the natural wealth and resources of States], as 
well as the import of the foreign capital required for these 
purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and 
conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to 
be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, 
restriction or prohibition of such activities.956 
 
In addition to asserting that Host States and foreign investors are to honor 
agreements controlling the proportional distribution of income that foreign 
investments generate, paragraph three adds that there is also a need for 
“due care being taken to ensure that there is no impairment, for any 
reason, of that State’s sovereignty over its natural wealth and 
resources.”957 Similarly, paragraph 8 attempts to reconcile a bilateral good 
faith requirement between Host States and foreign investors and the 
seemingly unbridled preemptive scope of the PSNR expression of the 
public purpose doctrine: 
 
Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or 
between sovereign States shall be observed in good faith; 
States and international organizations shall strictly and 
conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and 
nations over their natural wealth and resources in 
accordance with the Charter and the principles set forth in 
the present resolution.958 
 
The parameters of the principle of PSNR as set forth in Resolution 1803 
are self-judging, based upon a State’s understanding of its own national 
interests and scope of the exercise of its sovereignty. Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                         
vein, treaty-based standards and their scope and content are equally absent from the 
declaration’s eight-paragraph text. 
 
956 G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 914.  
 
957 Id. 
 
958 Id.  
 
 EAST\64724221. 3346 
resolution enshrines PSNR as a principle of international law that because 
of its grounding in an orthodox conception of the public purpose doctrine 
and traditional notions of sovereignty, overrides legitimately vested 
investor protection obligations on the part of Host States in favor of 
foreign investors.  
 
 Thus, the resolution demonstrates a historical understanding of 
public purpose pursuant to which interests grounded in the doctrine 
preempt “private” microeconomic interests, both foreign and domestic. 
This draconian approach to public purpose in the form of PSNR was of 
considerable utility during the historical juncture where decolonization 
required a strong and compelling sense of nationalism and the repatriation 
of national assets, most notably control over natural resources that would 
become ever more precious with the demands of the Cold War. This 
historical relevance and economic utility are no longer relevant and have 
become a notable impediment to foreign direct investment, and to the 
relationship between developed countries and economies in transition. 
globalization has called for qualifications on all expressions of public 
purpose in international law. 
 
 The legacy public purpose doctrine and, therefore, the PSNR 
expression of the doctrine, reflects an asymmetrical content and 
application that favors Host State interests over those of Home State 
capital-exporting countries.959 This understanding of public purpose 
arguably threatens the very bilateralism endemic to BITs and in so doing 
gives rise to frustrated expectations between foreign investors and Host 
States. The international instruments demonstrating the early development 
of PSNR embody this lack of symmetry or penchant favoring economies 
in transition or underdeveloped countries. 
 
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2158 is 
instructive.960 Issued only four years after its PSNR predecessor, 
Resolution 1803, this resolution treats PSNR as an established principle of 
public international law. Indeed, Resolution 2158 goes beyond 
establishing a nomenclature and content for PSNR and speaks to 
safeguarding the principle and ensuring that the developing States benefit 
from its efficient and strategic application.961 This effort to safeguard the 
                                                 
959 See supra Chapter 4, Section B, where this phenomenon is discussed in the context of 
bilateral investment treaties . 
 
960 Resolution 2158, entitled “Permanent sovereignty over natural resources,” was passed 
at the 1478th plenary meeting on November 25, 1966. G.A. Res. 2158, supra note 914.  
 
961 Resolution 2158, in pertinent part, provides: 
 
Considering that in order to safeguard the exercise of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, it is essential that their exploitation 
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use and application of PSNR, particularly with respect to “foreign capital,” 
is fundamentally predicated on supervision of foreign investment on the 
part of host-State governments and the interests of underdeveloped 
countries. While explicit reference is made to the need to provide 
“government supervision over the activity of foreign capital to ensure that 
it is used in the interests of national development,” no reference is made to 
host-State obligations to protect and “to safeguard” foreign investments.962 
To the contrary, paragraph four of the resolution “[c]onfirms that the 
exploitation of natural resources in each country shall always be 
conducted in accordance with its national laws and regulations.”963 The 
application of PSNR as a paradigmatic public purpose tenet is absolutist 
and asymmetrical in favor of Host States, i.e., underdeveloped countries. 
The international instruments giving rise to PSNR as a principle of public 
international law do not impose obligations on Host States beyond fleeting 
reference to bilateral good faith in adhering to contractual obligations.964  
 
 Instead of seeking bilateralism in the relationship between 
underdeveloped countries and industrialized States, Resolution 2158 
actually extracts commitments from and imposes obligations on both 
Home States (developed countries) and the United Nations in favor of 
Host States (underdeveloped States).965 The resolution actually calls for 
                                                                                                                         
and marketing should be aimed at securing the highest possible rate of 
growth of the developing countries, 
 
Considering further that this aim can better be achieved if the 
developing countries are in a position to undertake themselves  the 
exploitation and marketing of their natural resources so that they may 
exercise their freedom of choice in the various fields related to the 
utilisation of natural resources under the most favourable conditions,  
 
Taking into account the fact that foreign capital whether public or 
private, forthcoming at the request of the developing countries, can 
play an important role inasmuch as it supplements the efforts 
undertaken by them in the expectation and development of their natural 
resources, provided that there is government supervision over the 
activity of foreign capital to ensure that it is used in the interests of 
national development, … 
 
Id. (emphasis supplied) 
 
962 Id. 
 
963 Id. at ¶ 4.  
 
964 See e.g., G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 914 (“Foreign investment agreements freely 
entered into by or between sovereign States shall be observed in good faith.”). 
 
965 In this regard, Resolution 2158 provides:  
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the Secretary-General to expedite the inclusion of programs addressing the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources in order to accelerate 
economic development, and to provide for appropriate progress reports.966 
Subsequent resolutions concerning PSNR, most notably Resolutions 2626 
and 3171 emphasize the need for affirmative contributions from 
                                                                                                                         
3. States that such an effort should help in achieving the maximum 
possible development of the natural resources of the developing 
countries and in strengthening their ability to undertake this 
development themselves, so that they might  effectively exercise their 
choice in deciding the manner in which the exploitation and marketing 
of their natural resources should be carried out; 
 
6. Considers that, when natural resources of the developing countries 
are exploited by foreign investors, the latter should undertake proper 
and accelerated training of national personnel at all levels and in all 
fields connected with such exploitation; 
 
7. Calls upon the developed countries to make available to the 
developing countries, at their request, assistance, including capital 
goods and know-how, for the exploitation and marketing of their 
natural resources in order to accelerate their economic development, 
and to refrain from placing on the world market non-commercial 
reserves of primary commodities which may have an adverse effect on 
the foreign exchange earnings of the developing countries.  
 
G.A. Res. 2158, supra note 914, at ¶¶ 3, 6-7 (underlined emphasis supplied). 
 
966 The resolution calls upon considerable international resources in furtherance of 
economic growth pursuant to PSNR: 
 
Requests the Secretary-General: 
 
(a) To co-ordinate the activities of the Secretariat in the field of 
natural resources with those of other United Nations organs and 
programmes, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, the United Nations Development Programme, the 
regional economic commissions, the United Nations Economic and 
Social Office in Beirut, the specialized agencies and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, and in particular with those of the United 
Nations industrial development organization; 
 
(b) To take the necessary steps to facilitate, through the work of the 
Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations 
Development Organization and the Advisory Committee on the 
Application of Signs and Technology to Development, the inclusion of 
the exploitation of the natural resources of the developing countries in 
programmes for their accelerated economic growth; 
 
(c) To submit to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session a 
progress report on the implementation of the present resolution.  
 
Id.  
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industrialized States based upon historical economic dominance or 
colonization on the part of developed countries.967 Both of these 
resolutions to be sure stress the need for developing countries to exercise 
their best efforts in furtherance of economic development.968 
Notwithstanding resolution language emphasizing that developing 
countries have the primary responsibility of contributing to their own 
economic development, the resolution is far from prescribing that PSNR 
imposes duties on developing countries with respect to foreign investors or 
Home States (industrialized countries). In fact, these foundational 
resolutions continue to reference the primacy and absolute character of 
PSNR. Resolution 3171, by way of example, provides:  
 
[A]n intrinsic condition of the exercise of the sovereignty 
of every State is that it be exercised fully and effectively 
over all the natural resources of the State, whether found on 
land or in sea,…969 
 
As such, Resolution 3171 specifically refers to regulatory sovereignty 
pertaining to economic development in the context of PSNR as an 
“inviolable principle,” and adds that the full exercise by each State or 
sovereignty over its natural resources is an essential condition for 
achieving the objectives and targets of the Second United Nations 
Developmental Decade.970 The resolution further provides that such 
“exercise requires that action by States aimed at achieving a better 
                                                 
967 International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development 
Decade, G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR 25th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8124 
(1970) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2626]; G.A. Res. 3171, supra note 914.   
 
968 In this regard, Resolution 2626 provides:  
 
(11) The primary responsibility for the development of developing 
countries rests upon themselves, as stressed in the Charter of Algiers, 
but however great their own efforts, these will not be sufficient to 
enable them to achieve the desired development goals as expeditiously 
as they must unless they are assisted through increased financial 
resources and more favorable economic and commercial policies on the 
part of developed countries.  
 
(73) Developing countries will take specific steps to augment 
production and improve productivity in order to provide goods and 
services necessary for raising levels of living and improving economic 
viability. While this will be primarily their own responsibility,…  
 
G.A. Res. 2626, supra note 969 (internal citations omitted).  
 
969 G.A. Res. 3171, supra note 914.  
 
970 Id.  
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utilization and use of those resources must cover all stages, from 
exploration to marketing.”971 
 
 Further, in stark contrast with the identification of obligations that 
PSNR engrafts on developing States, Resolution 2626  speaks to the 
obligations of industrialized States in support of the efforts of developing 
countries in maximizing PSNR.972 
 
 The progressive interdependence among States delineated by both 
Resolution 2626 and Resolution 3171 is framed within the immediate 
post-colonization historical context. For this reason, the regulations stress 
both: (i) reorganization on the part of underdeveloped States of their 
natural resources; and (ii) an ever increasing gap between industrialized 
and underdeveloped nations resulting from the ills of colonization and the 
systemic violation of sovereignty on the part of the industrialized States 
that implemented such conduct with respect to underdeveloped countries 
as a matter of national policy.973  
                                                 
971 Id. Additionally, paragraph 1 of Resolution 3171 provides:  
 
Strongly reaffirms all the inalienable rights of States to permanent 
sovereignty over all their natural resources, on land within their 
international boundaries as well as those in the C-bed and the subsoil 
thereof within their national jurisdiction and in superjacent waters. 
 
Id.  
 
972 Resolution 2626, subparagraph 73, provides:  
 
While this [PSNR and the development of natural wealth and 
resources] will be primarily their [underdeveloped countries] own 
responsibility, production policies will be carried out in a global 
context designed to achieve optimum utilization of world resources, 
benefitting both developed and underdeveloping countries. Further 
research will be undertaken, by the international organizations 
concerned, in the field of optimal international division of labor to 
assist individual countries or groups of countries in their choice of 
production and trading structures. Depending on the social and 
economic structure and particular characteristics of individual 
countries, consideration will be given to the role which the public 
sector and co-operatives  might play in augmenting production.  
 
G.A. Res. 2626, supra note 969, at ¶ 73. Additionally, paragraph 76 in part provides that, 
“[d]eveloped countries and international organizations will assist in the industrialization 
of developing countries through appropriate means.” Id. at ¶ 76. Along this same vein, 
paragraph 77 asserts that “[i]nternational financial and technical assistance will be 
extended in support of their [that of developing countries] endeavor.” .Id. at ¶ 77. 
 
973 Resolution 3171 speaks to the resolute support of  “the efforts of the developing 
countries and of the peoples of the territories under colonial and racial domination in 
foreign occupation and their usage to regain effective control over their natural 
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 While Global poverty and the development of natural resources in 
ways that maximize the needs of all nations remains a paramount 
challenge, the terms of this transnational dialogue must be re-
contextualized and defined anew, certainly as concerns PSNR. Economic 
globalization has caused “interdependence” to give rise to public purpose 
paradigms that transcend territorially based sovereignty models. The post-
economic globalization world must rely on expressions of the public 
purpose doctrine, such as PSNR, premised on expectations of bilateralism 
beyond absolutist precepts suggesting that without exception States’ 
treaty-based obligations, as well as duties arising under customary 
international law, a priori and without exception, under all circumstances 
must be subordinated to regulatory sovereignty in furtherance of PSNR. 
 
 Without challenging the proposition that the consequences of 
colonialism have left economic scars that have not fully healed and, 
therefore, command redress by affluent nations, the advent of Global and 
regional markets, together with the horizontal and virtually ubiquitous 
proliferation of Global centers of processing and manufacturing within the 
rubric of a Global economy that is not territorially based, requires a more 
comprehensive understanding of public purpose. Proportionality, 
bilateralism, and an understanding of interdependence beyond one rooted 
on the reparation of historical inequities must replace a legacy approach 
that fosters insecurity and want of predictive value as to the very economic 
relationships on which all nations depend in order to maximize the 
efficient use and allocation of Global resources. PSNR needs to be 
doctrinally revisited and perhaps modified as a rebuttable presumption that 
also creates obligations and duties in Host States in favor of foreign 
investors. In the era of economic globalization, FDI cannot be viewed as 
merely a “private” matter that must be subordinated to regulatory 
sovereignty under all circumstances. 
 
C. Seminal Decisional Law on PSNR 
 
                                                                                                                         
resources.” G.A. Res. 3171, supra note 914.  Resolution 2626 in turn points to disparities 
in allocation of wealth among States as the primary cause of international tensions: 
 
(3) However, the level of living of countless millions of people in the 
developing part of the world is still pitifully low. These people are 
often still undernourished, uneducated, unemployed and wanting in 
many other basic amenities of life. While a part of the world lives in 
great comfort  and even affluence, much of the larger part suffers from 
abject poverty, and in fact the disparity is continuing to widen. This 
lamentable situation has contributed to the aggravation of world 
tensions.  
 
G.A. Res. 2626, supra note 969, at ¶ 3.   
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 The “decisional law”974 on PSNR is scant and not instructive. 
Despite PSNR’s practical and theoretical reach and implications, this 
expression of the public purpose doctrine has not surfaced as a contentious 
precept forming part of the arbitral culture arising from investor-state 
disputes. This paucity of “authority” in the form of awards is particularly 
quizzical because of the precept’s amenability to construction as a host-
State defense and also in light of the prevalence of resource-based 
investor-state arbitration.975 Additionally, PSNR’s preeminence in 
international instruments would suggest greater prominence in the field. 
Indeed, Sornarajah has maintained that PSNR is a principle of jus 
cogens.976  
 
 PSNR’s normative standing is based on three fundamental 
propositions that have in turn contributed to the orthodox understanding of 
public purpose in public international law. First, by treating PSNR as an 
element of the principle of self-determination, the tenet is enshrined as a 
                                                 
974 The term “decisional law” refers to arbitral awards arising from treaty-based 
arbitration.  
 
975 As of June 30, 2013, 25% of all ICSID administered cases have pertained to “oil, gas, 
and mining,” while another 12% have dealt with “electric power and other energy.”  
ICSID CASELOAD-STATISTICS, Issue 2013-2, http://www.icsid.worlbank.org (last visited 
August 13, 2013).  
 
976 Specifically, Sornarajah reports in one writing that “some authorities regard as an ius 
cogens principle [permanent sovereignty over natural resources].” M. SORNARAJAH, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT  193(Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed. 
2010). The tribunal in El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic 
identified Professor Sornarajah as himself, adopting the position that PSNR is a principle 
of jus cogens, citing to the expert report that he filed in that case. The award in relevant 
part reads: 
 
168. Professor Sornarajah finally turns to the permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, which he considers to be a principle of jus 
cogens. This means that, with the fluctuations of what can be 
considered as being the public interest, an element of paramount 
importance in this matter, the rights granted to operators and investors 
may fluctuate as well; entrants to the field cannot but be aware of that 
possibility. Pursuant to the jus cogens argument, what may have been 
possible at a given time under the angle of the jus cogens principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources will no longer be at 
another point in time. In technical terms, this means that a supervening 
impossibility of performance may occur under Article 61 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In such situations, the 
Respondent’s expert concludes, “a recovery of sovereignty is 
permissible.” According to the Respondent’s expert, all BITs are 
subject to that limitation.  
 
El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award ¶ 168 (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0270.pdf [hereinafter El Paso Energy]. 
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jus cogens. Elevated to the status of a first principle, by definition this 
expression of public purpose can no longer admit discursive reasoning as a 
means for justifying its doctrinal pre-eminence. Conceptually the validity 
and legitimacy of first principles must be assumed and explanation or 
discourse may only serve to obfuscate or derail.977 Underlying PSNR is 
the principle that it serves a public purpose that is absolute, and not subject 
to limitation by qualification or other conditionality. Because of its public 
purpose foundation forming part of the principle of self-determination, 
PSNR is not susceptible to discursive reasoning. It is in the pantheon of 
the “self-evident” and “intuitive” truths.  
 
 Second, the practical workings of PSNR are inextricably 
intertwined with the doctrine of sustainable development.978 Also 
enshrined as a precept of universal regard and application, the doctrine of 
sustainable development is deemed an unassailable and absolute principle 
that also does not allow for discursive justification or consideration. The at 
times inseparable references to economic development (the principle of 
sustainable development) and PSNR often confusingly appear as two 
aspects of a single doctrine.979 Irrespective of this proximate and at times 
deceptive relationship between the doctrines, it remains uncontroverted 
that they are separate and distinct, although sharing a common historical 
origin founded on the process of decolonization. Further, PSNR is widely 
regarded as a predicate to economic development. In turn, economic 
development is viewed as a universal self-evident right shared by all 
peoples that is not subject to compromise or subordination pursuant to 
legal fiat. PSNR’s close relationship with the precept of sustainable 
development and their common historicity contribute to the treatment of 
PSNR as an absolute, intuitive and self-evident legal norm that cannot be 
compromised. This absolutist configuration and elite normative status 
itself is premised on public purpose, further nurturing a symbiotic 
relationship between public purpose and its multiple expressions that 
removes the doctrine from the realm of rational justification. 
                                                 
977 Jus cogens present prime examples of the intuitive and non-discursive foundation of a 
first principle’s normative status. The right not to be enslaved and the proscription of 
genocide are illustrative. Discourse aspiring to justify either of these tenets would not be 
necessary and actually is likely to detract from the immediacy of the normative 
foundation that underlies them. Bona fide first principles that are self-justifying, without 
more, pre-empt other tenets that may weaken their application, and are not susceptible to 
less than absolute treatment. Thus, it would be irrational, or even inconceivable, to posit a 
qualification or partial application to the right to be free from slavery or the norm 
proscribing genocide. 
 
978 See supra Chapter 4, Section B, for a discussion of the role of Sustainable 
Development within the public purpose doctrine.  
 
979 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 914; G.A. Res. 2158, supra note 914; G.A. Res. 
2626, supra note 954.  
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 Third, PSNR, as a right has been described in international 
instruments as “inalienable.”980 The a priori configuration of a norm that 
is inalienable does not admit challenge even at a theoretical level. As with 
self-determination, and sustainable development, the precept’s 
inalienability stems from a public purpose that is framed by the historical 
conditions of decolonization. This historical grounding is important but 
cannot be construed as determinative. Inalienability further entrenches a 
legacy interpretation, understanding, and application of the public purpose 
doctrine in all of its expressions. 
 
 Fourth and finally, because PSNR is defined through the prism of 
first principles, its application is absolute and does not permit 
compromise. Therefore, it is conducive to “all or nothing” determinations. 
A Global paradigm of integration, however, bespeaks proportionality and 
not resolutions that are absolute and detached from the community of 
nations.  
 
 Ascribing a jus cogens status to PSNR because of its alleged 
conceptual relationship with (i) the principle of self-determination, (ii) the 
principle of economic development, and its characterization as (iii) 
inalienable and (iv) absolute or non-proportional, contributes a 
construction of public purpose as justifying exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty without regard to any countervailing or even mitigating 
proposition. For example, such elevated status could be used in connection 
with a public purpose that is not linked to regulatory sovereignty but rather 
to an overarching concern for furthering a public purpose rooted in the 
common good of the community of nations. 
 
 PSNR exemplifies the manner in which public purpose has been 
infused with a subjective content framed within a historically based policy 
that is presented as beyond discursive reasoning (akin to a first principle or 
jus cogens), the application of which disavows proportionality. The 
practical consequence of this legacy construction is to arm regulatory 
sovereignty with a doctrinal and normative foundation that does not permit 
scrutiny, transparency and that in the name of a higher principle empowers 
States to undermine the very rule of law under which they purport to be 
organized. 
 
 While the first decades of decolonization in a pre-economic 
globalization international community masked and actually rewarded 
these debilities, the exigent demands of a Global economy has 
underscored them without embracing a pendular shift that turns its back on 
the collective responsibility to assist developing nations and economies in 
transition.  
                                                 
980 See supra note 973 & accompanying text.  
 EAST\64724221. 3355 
 
	EAST\64
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAP
 
The R
Statu
 
 
724221.3 
 TER 6
ole of Publ
tes; Can FI
ic Purpose 
PS Rehabili
in Foreign I
tate the Do
356
nvestment
ctrine?  
 Protection 
	EAST\64724221.3 357 
 Most States have enacted domestic legislation that is characterized 
as intended to promote foreign investment pursuant to investor 
protection.981 Much like their treaty counterparts – the network of over 
3,000 BITs – the foreign investor protection statutes (“FIPS”) are not at all 
the product of a centralized legislative system.982 Consequently, the FIPS 
are lacking in uniformity as to (i) structure, (ii) terms, (iii) common 
nomenclature, (v) substance, and even (vi) comprehensive shared 
aspirations or underlying policies. This want of uniformity bespeaks a 
structural debility that certainly commands concern. Fundamental 
principles of comity and reciprocity may legitimately be called into 
question, whereas here, disparate, and at times even contradictory policies, 
are memorialized pursuant to statutory frameworks that ostensibly purport 
to advance a shared objective, i.e., Host State investor/investment 
protection. This absence of a coordinated effort by States at an 
international level with respect to legislating FIPS also has given rise to 
conflicting constructions and applications of the public purpose doctrine.  
 
 Generally, most FIPS apply public purpose normative standing in 
furtherance of Host State investment protection obligations in favor of 
foreign investors. Put simply, an analytical sampling of FIPS conducted 
abstractly, and without reference to BITs, would suggest that Host States 
primarily are concerned with exercising their regulatory sovereignty and 
legislative fiat in furtherance of maximizing foreign investor protection 
even to the detriment of adherence to post-investment enacted 
legislation.983 The role of the public purpose doctrine in FIPS provides 
                                                 
981 See generally DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT VOL. I & II (Lulu.com, pubs., 2008). 
 
982 See discussion on the structural framework of BITs supra at Chapter 4. 
 
983 The Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s Law on Investment No. 59-2005-QH11, enacted 
by the National Assembly on November 29, 2005, is particularly instructive and 
revealing as to this point. By way of example, under Chapter 2,(“Investment 
Guarantees”), Article 11 (“Investment Guarantees in the Event of change in law or 
policies”), the law provides: 
 
1. If a newly promulgated law or policy contains higher benefits and 
incentives than those to which the investor was previously entitled, then 
the investor shall be entitled to the benefits and incentives in 
accordance with the new law as from the date the new law or policy 
takes effect.  
 
2. If a newly promulgated law or policy adversely affects the lawful 
benefits enjoyed by an investor prior to the date of effectiveness of such 
law or policy, the investor shall be guaranteed to enjoy incentives the 
same as the investment certificate or their shall be resolution by one, a 
number or all of the following methods: 
 
(a) Continuation of enjoyment of benefits and incentives; 
(b) There shall be deduction of the loss from taxable income; 
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public international law with an existing analytical framework and 
construct in which the very public purpose principles that are used to 
engraft unbridled regulatory authority on a State, grants foreign investors 
investment protection premised on an application of the public purpose 
doctrine that preempts the public purpose justification for the exercise of 
regulatory sovereignty. This use of the public purpose doctrine is unique 
to FIPS. It starkly contrasts with host-State friendly constructions of the 
doctrine more generally in customary and conventional international law. 
 
 Because of the proliferation of FIPS, this study traces the contours 
of the public purpose doctrine in the these instruments by drawing from a 
set of 17 FIPS gathered from (i) Eastern Europe,984 (ii) Southeast Asia,985 
(iii) Middle East,986 (iv) Africa,987 (v) Latin America,988 (vi) 
                                                                                                                         
(c) There shall be a change of the operational objective of the 
project; 
(d) Consideration shall be given to pain, compensation in 
necessary circumstances. 
 
3. Based on the provisions of the laws and commitments in international 
treaties of which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a member, the 
Government shall make specific provisions on guarantee for interests 
investors in the case where a change in laws or policies affects 
adversely the interests of the investors.  
 
Law on Investment (Nov. 29, 2005), 
http://www.vietnamlaws.com/freelaws/Lw59na29Nov05CIL%5B10Apr06%5D.
pdf (translation by Phillips Fox) (emphasis supplied) 
 
984 Law No. 7764 (“For Foreign Investments”), (February 11, 1999), 
http://www.slas.info/legislazione_albanese/law%20_7764_1993_foreign_investments.ph
p (Albania) [hereinafter Albania Law No. 7764]; Law of Georgia on the Investment 
Activity Promotion & Guarantees (November 12, 1999), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=10912 [hereinafter Georgia Law on 
Investment]; Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan On Investments (January 8, 2003), 
http://invest.gov.kz/upload/docs/en/bc1349944fb05dec7fec0578fd9b50da.pdf 
[Kazakhstan Law on Investments]; Federal Law on Foreign Investment in the Russian 
Federation (July 9, 1999), 39 ILM 894 (2000) [Russian Law on Foreign Investment].  
 
985 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign-capital Enterprises (October 31, 
2000), http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/investment/36754.htm [China Foreign-
capital Enterprise Law]; Law on Investment Promotion (July 8, 2009), 
http://thailand.nlambassade.org/binaries/content/assets/postenweb/t/thailand/nederlandse-
ambassade-
inbangkok/import/producten_en_diensten/handel_en_investeren/zakendoen_in_laos/laoti
aanse-investeringswet-2009 (Lao PDR) [hereinafter Lao PDR Law on Investment 
Promotion]; Law on Investment (Nov. 29, 2005), 
http://www.vietnamlaws.com/freelaws/Lw59na29Nov05CIL%5B10Apr06%5D.pdf 
(translation by Phillips Fox) (Vietnam) [hereinafter Vietnam Law on Investment]. 
 
986 Law No. 8/2001 Regulating Direct Foreign Capital Investment in the State of Kuwait 
(April 17, 2001), http://www.kuwaitemb-australia.com/files/direct_investment.pdf 
[hereinafter Kuwait Direct Foreign Capital Investment Law]; The Foreign Capital 
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understandings between European Union & the United States,989 and (vii) 
North America.990 It shall be suggested that the FIPS represent an existing 
framework through which the public purpose doctrine may be further 
developed and institutionalized so as to temper the ill effects of a legacy 
doctrine. Although far from constituting a doctrinal solution to the 
consequences of a public purpose doctrine that is self-judging and absolute 
in application, FIPS may help to further the quest for application of the 
doctrine in ways that comport with the exigencies of a Global era. 
 
 Viewed collectively, FIPS can be described as providing a 
confluence of premises in the name of foreign investor/investment 
protection. Indeed, often foreign investment protection is sought to be 
furthered by FIPS that merely provide for foreign investor/investment 
incentives and that offer little, if any, foreign investor protection beyond 
what may already be provided for by way of BITs.991 Other FIPS provide 
                                                                                                                         
Investment Law for the Organization and Encouragement of Industry (October 16, 1994), 
http://om.mofcom.gov.cn/table/wgtz.pdf (Oman) [hereinafter Oman Foreign Capital 
Investment Law]; Law of Investment Guarantees and Incentives & its Executive 
Regulations: Investment Law No. 8 (1997), www.egypt-law.com/Investments_law.pdf 
(Egypt) [hereinafter Egypt Investment Law No. 8]. 
 
987 Proclamation No. 280/2002 Re-Enactment of the Investment Proclamation (July 2, 
2002), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et013en.pdf (Ethiopia) [Ethiopia 
Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002]; Act 478: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 
Act (August 29, 1994), http://www.intax-
info.com/pdf/law_by_country/Ghana/Ghana%20Investment%20Promotion%20Centre%2
0Act%201994.pdf [hereinafter Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act]. 
 
988  Foreign Investment Law (March 3, 1998), 
http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/arch/gua/investment_law.pdf (Guatemala) 
[hereinafter Guatemala Foreign Investment Law]; Legislative Decree No. 662 – 
Approving the Juridical Stability System for Foreign Investment (September 2, 1991), 
http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/arch/per/D.L.%2520662tradrev.pdf (Peru) 
[hereinafter Peru Legislative Decree No. 662]; Overview of Law for the Promotion of 
Foreign Investment (Law No. 344) (May 24, 2000), http://www.PROnicaragua.org 
(Nicaragua) [hereinafter Overview of Nicaragua’s Law for the Promotion of Foreign 
Investment].  
 
989 1997 European Union-United States Summit, 11 April 1997 Understanding Between 
the European Union and the United States on US extraterritorial legislation (April 11, 
1997); 1998 European Union-United States Summit, Understanding with Respect to 
Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection (London, May 18, 1998) 
[hereinafter 1998 E.U.-U.S. Understanding] . 
 
990 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE: BUREAU OF ECONOMIC & BUSINESS AFFAIRS, 2012 Investment 
Climate Statements, available at http://www.State.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/index.htm 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2013).  
 
991 See, e.g., Lao PDR Law on Investment Promotion, supra note 987. This legislation 
provides for no less than eight (8) different zones for purposes of facilitating foreign 
investment, i.e.: (i) industrial zones, (ii) export processing zones, (iii) duty-free zones, 
(iv) information and technology development zones, (v) ordered trade zones, and (vi) 
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investor protection – guarantees – as the cornerstone investment 
incentive.992 A third set of FIPS emphasize neither economic-based 
                                                                                                                         
urbanized trade zones. Moreover, Article 1 of the Law on Investment Promotion duly 
emphasizes foreign investor incentives from a national systemic perspective: 
 
“The Law on Investment Promotion stipulates principles, regulations 
and measures regarding the promotion and management of domestic 
and foreign investments aiming at ensuring investment with 
convenience; speediness; accuracy; being protected by the 
Government; and ensuring the rights and benefits of investors, of the 
State and of the people. The law aims to enhance the roles and benefits 
of investments contributed to the national socio-economic growth in a 
continuous and sustainable manner; and significantly to the national 
protection and development.” (Art. 1) 
 
Id. art. 1. But for fleeting reference to “being protected by the Government,” investment 
protection is only superficially mentioned in Article 61 “Forms of Investment 
Protection,” and Article 62 “Protection of Intellectual Property.” Neither provision, 
however, sets forth a compelling protection regime that would realistically incentivize 
foreign investment. Article 61 speaks to protection of investors against “seizure, 
confiscation or nationalization by administration processes,” but omits such key elements 
as due process, and non-discriminatory practice as investor safeguards. Id. art. 61. The 
reference to “actual value” in the article is encouraging, but of little practical 
consequence when contextualized within the framework of a dispute resolution clause 
(Article 78) that circumscribes the administration of justice to national institutions that 
hardly can be characterized as independent of the State’s exercise of its own sovereignty.  
 
Article 62 is but a single sentence declaration providing that intellectual property will be 
protected consonant with “the Lao PDR or [disjunctive in original] international treaties 
to which Lao PDR is a contracting party.” Id. art. 62. In contrast, the clear majority of the 
99 articles comprising the Law on Investment Promotion concern economic or subject 
matter investor incentives. 
 
992 For example, the Albanian FIPS comprises a total of 12 articles with reference only to 
investment protection and no mention of economic incentives. See Albania Law No. 
7764, supra note 986. Similarly, the Georgian FIPS States that “[t]he purpose of the law 
is to establish the investment-promotional regime,” and comprises sixteen articles that 
emphasize investment protection or guarantee. See Georgia Law on Investment, supra 
note 986.  Indeed, Article 16 providing for dispute resolution—in contrast, for example, 
with Article 9 of the Republic of Kazakhstan’s FIPS omitting specific arbitral 
agreements—explicitly references any international arbitration body that has been set up 
by UNCITRAL (Commission of the United Nations for International Trade Law) and 
ICSID. 
 
Ethiopia’s Proclamation No. 280/2002 Re-enactment of the investment proclamation, for 
example, in Part Two (“Investment Objectives, Areas and Incentives”) consists of nine 
numbered paragraphs and eleven subparagraphs. Despite this elaborate narrative detailing 
investment objectives and incentives, special legislation and regulations concerning the 
protection of foreign investors/investments are nowhere mentioned. The investment 
objectives do underscore “the realization of sustainable economic and social 
development” as paramount to the legislation: 
 
PART TWO: Investment Objectives, Areas and Incentives 
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4. Investment Objectives of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia  
 
The Objectives of the investment policy of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia are designed to improve the living standards of 
the peoples of Ethiopia through the realization of sustainable economic 
and social development, the particulars of which are the following: 
 
1) to accelerate the country’s economic development; 
2) to exploit and develop the immense natural resources 
of the country; 
3) to develop the domestic market through the growth of 
production, productivity, and services; 
4) to increase foreign exchange earnings by encouraging 
expansion in volume and variety of the county’s 
export products and services and the improvement of 
their quality as well as to save foreign exchange 
through production of import substituting products; 
5) to encourage balanced development and integrate 
economic activity among the Regions and to 
strengthen the inter-sectoral linkages of the economy; 
6) to enhance the role of the private sector in the 
acceleration of the development of the country’s 
economy; 
7) to render foreign investment play its proper role in 
the country’s economic development; 
8) to create wide employment opportunities for 
Ethiopians and to foster the transfer of technical 
know-how, of managerial skills, and of technology 
required for the progress of the country. 
 
5. Areas of Investment Reserved for the Government or Joint 
Investment with the Government 
 
1) The following investment areas are exclusively reserved for 
the Government: 
(a) Transmission and supply of electrical energy through 
the Integrated National Grid System and 
(b) Postal services with the exception of courier services. 
 
2) Investors shall be allowed to invest in the following areas 
only in joint venture with the Government: 
 
(a) Manufacturing of weapons and ammunition and 
(b) Telecommunication services. 
 
6. Areas of Investment Reserved for Domestic Investors  
 
Areas of investment exclusively reserved for Ethiopian nationals and 
other domestic investors shall be specified by regulations to be issued 
by the Council of Ministers. 
 
7. Regarding investments to be undertaken in Joint Venture with the 
Government  
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incentives nor incentives premised on special legislative enactments 
protecting or guaranteeing foreign investment. This third category of 
FIPS, which is well-exemplified by the People’s Republic of China’s 
FIPS, highlights the importance of host-State development and investor 
obligation to adhere to domestic law.993 
                                                                                                                         
The Supervising Authority of Public Enterprises shall receive 
investment proposals submitted by any private investor intending to 
invest in joint venture with the government; it shall submit same to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry for decision and, upon approval, 
designate a public enterprise to invest as partner in the joint investment. 
 
8. Areas of Investment Open for Foreign Investors  
 
All areas of investment, other than those exclusively reserved, under 
this Proclamation, for the Government or joint venture with the 
Government or for Ethiopian nationals or other domestic investors, 
which shall be specified by regulations to be issued by the Council of 
Ministers, shall be open for foreign investors. 
 
9. Investment Incentives 
 
1) Areas of investment specified by regulations to be issued by 
the Council of Ministers pursuant to the investment objectives 
Stated under Article 4 of this Proclamation shall be eligible for 
investment incentives. 
 
2) The regulations to be issued pursuant to Sub Article (1) of this 
Article shall determine the type and extent of entitlement to 
incentives. 
 
Ethiopia Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002, supra note 989, Part Two.  
 
993 The very first article (Art. 1) of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Foreign-Capital Enterprises (Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China 
No. 41) is instructive as to this point. Quite notably, the article fundamentally speaks to 
Host State development and the national economy: 
 
With a view to expanding economic cooperation and technological 
exchange with foreign countries and promoting the development of 
China’s national economy, the People’s Republic of China permits 
foreign enterprises, other foreign economic organizations and 
individuals (hereinafter collectively referred to as “foreign investors”) 
to set up enterprises with foreign capital in China and protects the 
lawful rights and interests of such enterprises. 
 
China Foreign-capital Enterprise Law, supra note 987, art. 1. Most of the 24 articles 
comprising the People’s Republic of China’s FIPS are bereft of economic or protection 
incentives regarding foreign investments. The China FIPS mostly sets forth the foreign 
investment application format, and the obligation of investors to abide by the laws and 
regulations of the People’s Republic of China.  
 
For completeness’s sake it should be observed that the sum total of foreign investment 
protection strictures within the China FIPS is contained in a single sentence in Article 4 
providing that: “[t]he investments of a foreign investor in China, the profits it earns and 
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 Viewed holistically, the FIPS represent a confluence of economic 
incentives, investment protection or guarantees, incentives, investor 
obligations, privileges, and rights, and dispute resolution recourse. The 
public purpose doctrine pervades the FIPS framework. Often, as discussed 
below, in ways that are contradictory even within the anatomy of a single 
FIPS.  
 
A. The Public Purpose of FIPS Investor Protection  
 FIPS that are committed to investor protection as a fundamental 
tenet applied to incentivize FDI attempt to legislate against the exercise of 
regulatory sovereignty. Where such regulatory activity infringes on 
investor protection obligations implicitly, if not altogether explicitly, such 
FIPS point to a different and higher form of public purpose, one that 
accounts for the aligned interests of both home and Host States. The 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s FIPS, by way of example, provides that 
“lawful assets and invested capital of investors shall not be nationalized or 
confiscated by administrative measures.”994 This succinct and unqualified 
Statement is presented as a self-standing proposition. It is tempered only 
by a subsequent paragraph that itself merits analysis because of its own 
limitations in restricting the blanket protection against nationalization or 
confiscation pursuant to legacy regulatory sovereignty. Absolute foreign 
investor protection against nationalization or confiscation is only 
subordinated to national defense and security: 
 
2. In case of real necessity for purpose of national defence 
and security and in the national interest, if the State 
requires compulsory or requisitions an asset of an investor, 
such investor shall be compensated or paid damages at the 
market price at the time of announcement of such 
compulsory acquisition or requisition.995  
 
In addition to limiting any exception to absolute protection accorded to 
investors from regulatory sovereignty to concerns pertaining to “national 
defen[s]e and security,” the need identified must be a “real necessity.” 
Moreover, the use of the conjunctive “and” stresses that a genuine national 
defense or security need must be present, thus materially narrowing 
application of the exception. Use of the “market price” compensation 
standard, as opposed to the common “adequate” or “fair” metric, comports 
                                                                                                                         
its other lawful rights and interests are protect by Chinese law.”  Id. art 4. This general 
and scant recitation cannot be construed as aspiring to incentivize foreign investors, 
without more. 
 
994 Vietnam Law on Investment, supra note 987, art. 6 ¶ 1. 
 
995 Id. art. 6 ¶ 2 (emphasis supplied). 
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with a protection regime that purports to grant to foreign investors 
virtually absolute protection. Linking market prices to “the time of 
announcement of such compulsory acquisition or requisition” conduct 
provides still an additional layer of investor protection at the compensation 
phase because most non-FIPS, i.e., BITs, or regional trade agreements 
favor Host States by measuring damages as of the date of the actual taking 
and not the earlier time frame fixed by public notice of a prospective 
confiscation.996 
 
 Egypt’s FIPS is similarly categorical in its commitment to foreign 
investor protection.997 The provisions under part two of the Egyptian FIPS 
entitled “Investment Guarantees” specifically addresses four areas where 
the exercise of regulatory sovereignty premised on public purpose 
historically has raised risks for FDI: (i) nationalization or confiscation, (ii) 
encumbrance of assets, (iii) administrative intervention in pricing and 
profits, (iv) regulatory authority governing licensing and land use. The 
first of these safeguards on its face provides an absolute commitment to 
protect foreign investment from nationalization or confiscation. In a crisp 
and concise sentence, the FIPS provides that “[c]ompanies and 
establishments may not be nationalized or confiscated.”998 Unlike the 
Vietnam FIPS, nowhere does the Egyptian FIPS qualify this Statement, 
even with respect to national defense and security, or national interest. The 
investor protection obligation is without exception and in this sense 
absolute. The absence of an indirect nationalization or expropriation, or 
actions tantamount to nationalizations or expropriations in the context of 
this FIPS is not at all disconcerting because the omission is mitigated by 
subsequent articles in Part Two. 
 
                                                 
996 For example, Art. 1110 of the NAFTA (“Expropriation & Compensation”) provides, 
in relevant part:  
 
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took 
place (“date of expropriation”), and shall not reflect any change in 
value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known 
earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value 
including declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as 
appropriate, to determine fair market value.  
 
3. Compensation shall be paid without delay and be fully realizable.  
 
North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1110 ¶¶ 2-3, US-Can-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 
32 I.L.M.639 (1993). 
 
997 See Egypt Investment Law No. 8, supra note 988 . 
 
998 Id. at art. 8. 
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 Investor protection risk attendant to asset encumbrance also is 
forcefully presented. The single sentence article States that “[c]ompanies 
and establishments may neither be sequestered nor may their assets be 
subject to administrative attachment, seized, restrained, frozen, or 
expropriated.”999 Article 9 contains the first reference to the term 
“administrative” in any form. While its presence opens the door to the 
possibility of lawful judicial attachment, seizure, restraining orders, 
freezes on assets, or expropriations, it is the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty through administrative agencies that historically has 
challenged foreign investment protection. Also, the absence of any 
qualifying language in this context is investor and Home State friendly. 
Even though the term “assets” is not defined in the FIPS, the use of this 
generic term would suggest that tangible and intangible property is 
covered.1000 
 
 The limitations on administrative authority with respect to 
intervening in prices and profits also is unqualified. The investment 
guarantees on this issue State that “[n]o administrative authority may 
intervene in pricing the products of companies and establishments 
knowingly determining their profits”1001 The provision of subsidies to 
domestic companies in competition with foreign investors in a particular 
                                                 
999 Id. at art. 9. 
 
1000 Most FIPS contain a section defining terms deemed material. In this regard the 
Egyptian FIPS is an exception. For example, Article 3 of the Law of Georgia on the 
Investment Activity Promotion & Guarantees defines “assets” as: 
 
a) any contribution to the capital of an object established with the 
foreign investments; 
b) any profit and dividend as well as the assets remaining after the 
whole or partial sale of the foreign investment; 
c) levies associated with contractual (including debt) liabilities; 
d) the right to use property tax to be preliminarily fixed as the income 
interest gained by using other person’s property, including natural 
resources, copyright, patents (royalty) as well as payment of 
administrative and other charges. 
 
Georgia Law on Investment, supra note 986, art. 3. See also Russian Law on Foreign 
Investment, supra note 986, art. 2 (“Basic Terminology Used in This Federal Law”); 
Albania Law No. 7764, supra note 986, art .1 (“General Provisions”); Lao PDR Law on 
Investment Promotion, supra note 987, art. 3; Vietnam Law on Investment, supra note 
987, art. 3; Ethiopia Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002, supra note 989, art. 2 
(“Definitions”); Guatemala Foreign Investment Law, supra note 990, art. 1; 1998 E.U.-
U.S. Understanding, supra note 991, ¶ d (“Definitions”).  
 
1001 Egypt Investment Law No. 8, supra note 988, art. 10. 
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sector has spawned considerable treaty-based arbitral disputes.1002 Indirect 
takings, actions tantamount to the taking, or administrative equivalent to 
the taking often present themselves in the form of competitive advantages 
that a Host State provides to key domestic players who in turn underprice 
foreign competitors. Frequently such administrative gyrations are 
implemented post-entry and after foreign investor know-how has been 
acquired by key host-State technocrats. Accordingly, a provision of this ilk 
may in fact serve as a material incentive to foreign investors.  
 
 The fourth pillar of the Egyptian investment guarantees goes far in 
allaying investor fears of an indirect taking or of exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty tantamount or equivalent to a taking pertaining to licensing 
and environmental concerns. This provision reserves termination or 
cancellation of a license to the Prime Minister and only upon referral by a 
competent administrative authority: 
 
No Administrative Authority may cancel or suspend, in 
whole or in part a license for usufruct of real eState, which 
the company or establishment is licensed to utilize, except 
in case of breach of the conditions of the license. 
 
A decree terminating or canceling a license shall be issued 
by the Prime Minister upon a proposal of the 
Administrative Authority. The involved party may 
challenge such decree before the Administrative Courts 
within thirty (30) days from the date of notification or 
acknowledgment thereof.1003 
 
Relegating licensing and environmental matters that touch or concern 
foreign investors to the Prime Minister with recourse to challenge such a 
decree to administrative courts underscores the severity of host-State 
commitment to legal obligations favoring foreign investors. This unique 
and somewhat extraordinary provision may well serve as a paradigm for 
tempering regulatory sovereignty in favor of Host States on an unqualified 
basis founded on application of the legacy public purpose doctrine.  
 
 Unlike the Vietnamese and the Egyptian FIPS, the FIPS enacted by 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic is representative of a weaker but 
more conventional protection standard that bears a closer resemblance to 
                                                 
1002 See, e.g. United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, 
UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits, 24 May 2007, 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0885.pdf. 
 
1003 Egypt Investment Law No. 8, supra note 988, art. 11. 
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the takings regimes contained in most BITs.1004 The Lao’s provisions on 
investment protection read: 
 
The Government fully acknowledges and protects the 
investment of investors against seizure, confiscation or 
nationalization by administration processes.  
 
In the case that the Government has the need for public 
interests; the investors shall be compensated with an actual 
value based on market price at the time of transferring 
money and the payment method is agreed by both parties. 
 
The Government acknowledges and protects the intellectual 
property of registered investors in accordance with the Law 
on Intellectual Property in the Lao PDR or international 
treaties to which Lao PDR is a contracting party.1005 
 
The Lao foreign investment protection strictures contained in its FIPS is 
not indicative of a protection standard greater than that which is contained 
in most FIPS, and, arguably, perhaps even less so.1006 Despite mention of 
                                                 
1004 Compare Lao PDR Law on Investment Promotion, supra note 987, art. 61 (“Forms of 
Investment Protection”) with Agreement Between Japan and the Laos People’s 
Democratic Republic for the Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment art. 
11 (“Expropriation and Compensation”), Jap.-Laos, Jan. 16, 2008, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/Japan_Laos.pdf. The Japan-Lao PDR 
BIT tracks the traditional customary international law requirements for an expropriation:  
 
1. Neither Contracting Party shall expropriate or nationalise 
investments in its Area of investors of the other Contracting Party or 
take any measure equivalent to expropriation or nationalisation 
(hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) except: (a) for a public 
purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) upon payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation pursuant to paragraphs 
2, 3 and 4; and (d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 
5. 
 
Id. art. 11 (emphasis supplied); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).  
 
1005 Lao PDR Law on Investment Promotion, supra note 987, art. 61 & art. 62. (emphasis 
supplied). 
 
1006 The great majority of BITs proscribe expropriations or nationalizations direct or 
indirect, or acts tantamount to a direct or indirect nationalization or expropriation, but for 
instances where the confiscation takes place (i) in accordance with due process (ii) in a 
non-discriminatory manner, (iii) in furtherance of a public purpose, and (iv) where 
compensation issued. Three of these four predicates for a legal taking are missing from 
the Lao PDR Article 61 investment protection rubric. 
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“an actual value based on market price”1007 that at first review appears to 
favor foreign investment protection, the vesting period for calculating 
compensatory damages is placed as of “the time of transferring money.” 
The late damage calculation trigger point militates in favor of host-State 
interests. Here too, recourse to a legacy public purpose normative 
foundation for exercise and legal justification of the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty to the detriment of purportedly binding investor protection 
obligations introduces the panoply of concerns endemic to application of a 
subjective non-proportionality based doctrine devoid of substantive 
content and commensurable standard.  
 
The Kuwait FIPS is structured so as to proscribe in a succinct and 
compelling Statement confiscation or nationalization of licenses provided 
to foreign investors.1008 The stricture plainly provides that: “[f]oreign 
enterprises licensed under the provision of this law may not be confiscated 
or nationalized.”1009 
 
Despite the seemingly unqualified nature of the pronouncement, the 
ostensibly absolute protection tenet is actually subject to a legacy public 
purpose limitation. The second paragraph wrests away what the first 
paragraph granted: 
 
Expropriation may only be made for public interest in 
accordance with the laws applicable and against a 
compensation equivalent to the enterprise’s real economic 
value at the time of the expropriation. Such value shall be 
assessed according to the economic situation prior to any 
threat of expropriation. Further the due compensation shall 
be paid without delay.1010 
 
Notwithstanding the vulnerabilities presented by an orthodox public 
purpose analysis in supplying a normative foundation for an expropriation, 
prospective victimized investors are provided with the most liberal and 
rewarding compensation calculus because the timeframe for computing 
compensatory damages commences “prior to any threat of 
expropriation”1011 As with the Vietnamese FIPS, this trigger date for 
                                                 
1007 Id. 
 
1008 See Kuwait Direct Foreign Capital Investment Law, supra note 988, art. 8 (“Secured 
Guarantees for Foreign Investments”).  
 
1009 Id. 
 
1010 Id. 
 
1011 Id. 
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computing compensation is more favorable to investors than the rubric 
contained in most BITs.1012 
 
 The Vietnam and Egypt FIPS are representative of a public 
purpose that overrides the normative command of the doctrine in its 
legacy form when underlying regulatory sovereignty. It, therefore, is 
indicative of a broader public purpose capable of subordinating orthodox 
regulatory sovereignty in pursuit of a common but national goal to a 
higher and more encompassing obligation that is specific in nature, narrow 
as to subject matter, objective in application, and more consonant with an 
environment of globalization. In addition, overriding exercise of 
regulatory sovereignty in furtherance of incentivizing FDI has the 
additional benefit of redounding in advancing the best interests of the very 
principles that regulatory sovereignty aspires to promote through the 
obligation of the legacy public purpose doctrine. The existence of a legal 
structure in place in Host States to protect and support foreign investors is 
most helpful to the extent to which the international community may 
extract and extrapolate general principles of international law from FIPS, 
particularly those principles that may contribute to enriching the public 
purpose doctrine.  
 
 Mere enactment of FIPS even where properly drafted and as part 
of coordinated uniform effort on the part of the international community, 
however, would only represent a very embryonic and partial solution. The 
United States Department of State has identified three shortcomings that 
would vitiate the effects of even model legislation. At the outset, FIPS, 
may be enacted but are not always enforced in practice.1013 Corruption 
also plays a material negative role in the application of investor protection 
                                                 
1012 The Japan-Peru BIT is representative of the traditional standard for measuring the 
date at which compensation for an expropriation attaches:  
 
The compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investments at the time when the expropriation was 
publicly announced or when the expropriation occurred, whichever is 
earlier. The fair market value shall not reflect any change in value 
occurring because the expropriation had become publicly known 
earlier.  
 
Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion, Protection and 
Liberalisation of Investment art. 13 ¶ 2, Per.-Jap., Nov. 22, 2008, available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/japan_peru.pdf.  
 
1013 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE: BUREAU OF ECONOMIC & BUSINESS AFFAIRS, 2012 
Investment Climate Statement: Russia, available at 
http://www.State.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191223.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (“A 
legal structure is in place to support foreign investors, although the laws are not always 
enforced in practice.”) [hereinafter Russia Investment Climate Statement]. 
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obligations.1014 Moreover, in the case of former Soviet bloc countries, 
confiscations effectuated during the communist regime have created 
insurmountable title problems that may redound to the detriment of 
foreign investor protection.1015 A fourth limitation on the efficacy of FIPS 
(as shall be discussed in greater detail in the next subsection) are carve-out 
provisions that limit foreign investor ownership in specifically designated 
properties and industry sectors. Fifth, in addition to these considerations, 
as of the date of this writing the treaty-based arbitration decisional law 
does not suggest that FIPS have played any meaningful role in the 
doctrinal or conceptual adjudication of disputes. In this same vein, on the 
question of investor protection or of the role of public purpose in 
harmonizing principles of investor protection with the exercise of 
regulatory sovereignty, FIPS have generated scant if any authority.1016 
Corruption, carve-outs, non-enforcement, and less than even a perfunctory 
presence in the decisional law of treaty-based international arbitration may 
indeed explain the limited role that FIPS have played in the doctrinal 
development of customary international law as to the relationship between 
investor protection and regulatory sovereignty, let alone in the 
development of the public purpose doctrine. Indeed, with respect to non-
enforcement, corruption and carve-outs, the U.S. Department of State’s 
observations on Russia’s FIPS are helpful: 
 
The 1991 Investment Code guarantees that foreign 
investors will enjoy rights equal to those of Russian 
investors, although some industries have limits on foreign 
ownership…. The 1999 Law on Foreign Investment 
[citation omitted] (emphasis in original) also affirms this 
principle of equal treatment. Unfortunately, corruption 
plays a sizable role in the Judicial System…. Moreover, 
Russia has sought to enhance consultation mechanisms 
with international businesses, including through the 
Foreign Investment Advisory Council, regarding the impact 
of the country’s legislation, regulations, and dispute 
mechanisms on the business and investment climate. Still, 
                                                 
1014 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE: BUREAU OF ECONOMIC & BUSINESS AFFAIRS, 2012 Investment 
Climate Statement: Albania, available at 
http://www.State.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191094.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2013) 
(“Despite progress in these reforms, major challenges remain with investors citing 
widespread corruption, weak law enforcement, insufficiently defined property rights, 
government bureaucracy, lack of developed infrastructure, and frequent changes in the 
legal framework.”) [hereinafter Albania Investment Climate Statement]. 
 
1015 See Russia Investment Climate Statement, supra note 1015 & Albania Investment 
Climate Statement, supra note 1016.  
 
1016 In fact, as of the date of this writing, it appears that no decisional law regarding FIPS 
has been generated in the investor-State dispute context.  
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the country’s investment dispute mechanisms remain a 
work in progress and at present can result in a non-
transparent, unpredictable process.  
 
The 1991 Investment Code prohibits the nationalization of 
foreign investments, except following legislative action and 
where deemed to be in the national interest. Such 
nationalizations may be appealed to the courts of the 
Russian Federation, and the investor must be adequately 
compensated. At the sub-federal level, expropriation has 
occasionally been a problem, as has local government 
interference and a lack of enforcement of court rulings 
protecting investors.1017 
 
In connection with title encumbrances, the State Department’s recent 
analysis with respect to Albania’s FIPS is equally availing:  
 
The Albanian Constitution guarantees the right of private 
property. According to Article 41 of the Albanian 
Constitution, expropriation or limitation in the exercise of a 
property right can be done only in the public interest. And 
with fair compensation. In the post-communist period, 
expropriation has been limited to land needed for projects 
in the public interest, mainly infrastructure projects, 
including, but not limited to roads, energy infrastructure, 
waterworks, airports, etc. However, compensation has 
generally been below market value and some owners have 
complained publicly about the compensation process being 
slow and unfair. 
 
There are many ongoing disputes per properties confiscated 
during the communist regime. The restitution compensation 
process started in 1993 had been slow and marred by 
corruption. The process still ongoing and many U.S. 
citizens of Albanian origin have long-running disputes with 
the government regarding restitution of property.1018 
 
B. FIPS Carve-outs and Public Purpose  
 
 The anatomy of FIPS is rife with “carve-out” provisions where 
public purpose generally serves as an organizing principle or qualifying 
                                                 
1017 Russia Investment Climate Statement, supra note 1015 (emphasis supplied). 
 
1018 Albania Investment Climate Statement, supra note 1016 (emphasis supplied).  
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doctrine.1019 These provisions suffer from the ills that orthodox public 
purpose workings generally engraft on rights and limitations, but are 
generally helpful because they introduce transparency to the FIPS 
framework and thus shape and allay Home State/investor expectations. 
These carve-outs typically concern (i) investor rights and guarantees,1020 
(ii) investor obligations,1021 (iii) industry sectors where foreign investment 
is proscribed,1022 and (iv) formulas for the compensation of takings of 
foreign investments.1023  
                                                 
1019 See, e.g., Albania Law No. 7764, supra note 986, art.4, art. 10; Kazakhstan Law on 
Investments, supra note 986, art. 4 ¶ 3(2); Russian Law on Foreign Investment, supra 
note 986, art. 4 ¶ 2; China Foreign-capital Enterprise Law, supra note 987, art. 4, art. 5; 
Lao PDR Law on Investment Promotion, supra note 987, art. 4; Kuwait Direct Foreign 
Capital Investment Law, supra note 988, art. 8 ; Oman Foreign Capital Investment Law, 
supra note 988, art. 12; Ethiopia Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002, supra note 989, 
art. 21.  
 
1020 See, e.g., Kazakhstan Law on Investments, supra note 986, art. 4 ¶ 3(2) (“These 
guarantees shall not cover…amendments introduced to legislative acts of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan to ensure national and ecological security, public health and morality.”); Lao 
PDR Law on Investment Promotion, supra note 987, art. 4 (“The Government promotes 
the investment in all sectors and business and all areas throughout the country, except 
areas and business operations which are related to national security; seriously harmful to 
environment either in short run or long term; negative effects to public health; and the 
national culture.”) 
 
1021 See, e.g., China Foreign-capital Enterprise Law, supra note 987, art. 4 (“Enterprises 
with foreign capital shall abide by Chinese laws and regulations and may not engage in 
any activities detrimental to China’s public interests.”) (emphasis supplied). 
 
1022 For example, Article 14 of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act provides that 
“[t]he enterprises specified in the Schedule are reserved for citizens and shall not be 
undertaken by a person who is not a citizen.” Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 
supra note 989, art. 14. The Schedule to the Act specifies the following:  
 
Enterprises Wholly Reserved for Citizens 
 
1. The sale of anything whatsoever in a market, petty trading, 
hawking or selling from a kiosk. 
2. Operation of taxi service and car hire service. (A non-
Ghanaian may undertake this service where there is a 
minimum fleet of ten new vehicles.) 
3. All aspects of pool betting business and lotteries, except 
football pools. 
4. Operation of beauty salons and barber shops.  
 
Id. Schedule [Section 18].  
 
1023 See, e.g., Albania Law No. 7764, supra note 986, art.4 (“Foreign investments will not 
be expropriated or nationalized directly or indirectly, they will not be the subject of any 
measure equal to these measures, except in special cases, in the interest of the public use, 
defined by law, without any discrimination, with immediate, appropriate and effective 
compensation, in accordance with legal procedures.”) (emphasis supplied).  
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 In some instances, the cumulative effect of the carve-outs provide 
prospective investors with some insight into the regulatory sphere of the 
target Host State.1024 The Georgia FIPS is rich in carve-out provisions, 
specifically addressing rights of investors, duties of investors, 
qualifications attendant to investment activity, and investment 
inviolability. Among the more practical investor rights is the guarantee to 
engage in business and in the conduct of the investment while having the 
rights and guarantees enjoyed by Georgian citizens. Investors also are 
granted the right to full bank accounts, secure loans, and purchase stocks. 
Upon satisfying domestic fiscal obligations, such as taxes, as a matter of 
right investors are vested with “unlimited” transfer rights. Along these 
same lines, investors enjoy the right to export property.1025  
                                                 
1024 As may be expected, the connection between the quantity of carve-outs, the quality of 
the carve-outs, and the extent to which both of these first two factors yield transparency is 
particular to each FIPS. 
 
1025 For example, the Law of Georgia on the Investment Activity Promotion and 
Guarantees, Article 3 (“Rights of Investors”), provides:  
 
1. In conducting the investment and entrepreneurial activity a foreign investor’s 
right s and guarantees shall not be less than when the rights and guarantees 
enjoyed by Georgian natural and legal person.  
2. An investor shall be entitled to open current and other accounts in any currency 
with banking institutions located on the territory of Georgia.  
3. An investor shall be entitled to take loans in banking and financial institutions 
located in Georgia or from natural or legal persons. 
4. An investor shall be entitled to acquire stocks, bonds, and other securities and 
property both in Georgia and abroad.  
5. A foreign investor shall, upon payment of taxes and necessary levies, have the 
right to convert the profit (income) gained from investments at the market rate 
of exchange of Georgian banking institutions and in the right of unlimited 
repatriation abroad.  
 
Such assets may be: 
a) any contribution to the capital of an object established with the foreign 
investments; 
b) any profit and dividend as well as the assets remaining after the whole or 
partial sale of the foreign investment; 
c) levies associated with contractual (including debt) liabilities; 
d) the right to use property tax to be preliminarily fixed as the income interest 
gained by using other person’s property, including natural resources, 
copyrights, patents (royalty) as well as payment of administrative and other 
charges. 
 
6. A foreign investor shall be entitled to export the property being in his 
possession. 
7. The right as per paragraph five of this Article may be subject to restriction under 
law by court’s decision in connection with bankruptcy, committing an offense, 
or non-performance of a civil obligation. 
 
Georgia Law on Investment, supra note 986, art. 3. 
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 The Article prescribing investor rights does not at all place such 
rights in jeopardy based upon potential application of an overriding State 
interest in the form of the public purpose doctrine. Structurally, the 
Georgian FIPS artfully expresses the scope and depth of regulatory 
sovereignty premised on public purpose in a carefully crafted sentence that 
certainly hides much more than it may ever wish to reveal. Immediately 
following the narrative of investor rights, investor duties are collapsed into 
a formally simple twenty-five word sentence that reads: 
 
An investor shall be liable to conduct activities in 
accordance with the effective Georgian legislation as well 
as legislation concerning the environment and health 
protection.1026 
 
Close analysis of this seemingly simple provision would suggest that 
regulation allegedly premised on environmental and health concerns may 
preempt host-State foreign investment protection obligations.1027 
 
 In a formal and perhaps even substantive effort to enhance 
transparency and legitimacy, proscribed investments in specific industry 
sectors are made subject to approval where presented by the President of 
Georgia to the Parliament.1028 Moreover, special industry sectors regulated 
by permit or license issued by regulatory agencies are identified with 
specificity. These industry sectors, ranging from the manufacture and sale 
of weapons and explosives to issuance of securities for public circulation, 
manifestly touch or concern strategic industries that in turn may affect the 
general population.1029 In addition to rational corollaries arising from these 
                                                                                                                         
 
1026 Id. art.4. (emphasis supplied). 
 
1027 Notably, however, the Georgian FIPS does not specifically address the soundness of 
financial institutions as a public purpose consideration that may override investor 
protection obligations. The term “health protection” contained in Article 4, however, is 
sufficiently vague as to encompass perceived risks to the health and soundness of 
Georgian financial institutions. 
 
1028 Id. art 9. 
 
1029 Article 9 (“Prohibition and Restriction in the Sphere of Investment Activity”) reads: 
 
1. A list of branches where the investment realization is prohibited shall 
be subject to approval of Parliament of Georgia on presentation by 
President of Georgia. 
 
2. An investor shall not be entitled without a permit or license issued by 
an appropriate agency to engage in the following activity: 
 
a) manufacture and sale of weapons and explosives; 
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strictures, the expectation of legacy public purpose regulatory sovereignty 
to be sure looms large while Art. 9 in itself certainly represents a 
meaningful carve-out that serves notice and transparency policies as to 
foreign direct investment, the provision itself is devoid of reference to 
legislative enactments or other authority earmarked to protect foreign 
investment, or otherwise fashioned so as to incentivize foreign investors 
on the ground of investment guarantee and security.  
 
 These shortcomings notwithstanding, it is worth emphasizing that 
the Georgian FIPS is emblematic of legislation that mitigates the hardships 
of regulatory sovereignty premised on public purpose to the detriment of 
host-State investor protection obligations. Two salient strictures 
illustrating the underlying policy favoring investor protection in ways that 
mitigate technical application of regulatory sovereignty with respect to 
issues so material as to constitute conditions precedent to triggering the 
rubric of home-State investor protection obligations such as (i) juridical 
structure or form of ownership and (ii) citizenship status, command 
particular attention. Pursuant to Chapter 1, Art. 2., Investment Activity 
Subject (Investor) and Object, “[a] foreign investor shall be deemed to 
be… [a] Georgian citizen permanently residing abroad.” This seemingly 
innocuous provision is illustrative, at minimum, of a political willingness 
to shed technical jurisdictional defenses that Host States generally raise 
when challenging treaty-based claims asserted by a foreign citizen 
alleging to be a “foreign investor.” Casting an expansive net so as to 
include a Georgian citizen permanently residing beyond the national 
territory of Georgia as a “foreign investor” under any analysis represents a 
broad and liberal manifestation of a policy favoring foreign 
investors/investments. Even more meaningful, is the adoption of a 
methodology for statutory construction of the actual FIPS that place 
substance over form. This overarching principle is a commendable 
contribution to the drafting of FIPS.  
 
 Along the very same lines of the broad definition of “foreign 
investor,” the Georgian FIPS protects foreign investors against exercise of 
                                                                                                                         
b) preparation and sale of medicines and substances that are 
subject to special control; 
c) use of forest resources and entrails; 
d) setting up of casinos and other gambling houses which 
provide for arranging games and lotteries; 
e) banking activity; 
f) insurance activity; 
g) issue of securities for public circulation; 
h) wireless communication service and TV and radio 
channels’ creation; 
i) other activities defined by the effective Georgian legislation. 
 
Id.  
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regulatory sovereignty based on a nearly formal definition of ownership in 
an investment within the territory of Georgia by adopting an all-inclusive 
understanding of the term limited only by Art. 9 and 12 of the FIPS.1030 
The Georgian FIPS also emphasizes substance over form on the gateway 
issue of ownership:  
 
Investments on the territory of Georgia may be realized in 
an object with any form of ownership which investment is 
not prohibited as per paragraph one of Article 9 of this law. 
Investments in the objects listed in Articles 9 and 12 of this 
law may be realized only on the basis of an appropriate 
special permit or license.1031 
 
The identification of agency-regulated licensing and permitting in the 
context of foreign investment coupled with identified restrictions provide 
both home and Host States with a base premise from which both may 
draw in formulating specific investor protection obligations and 
expectations. While the “duties of investors’ set forth in Art. 4 of the 
Georgian FIPS is somewhat disappointing, they still represent a 
meaningful step in the right direction when appropriately contextualized. 
 
 Structurally similar to the Georgian FIPS, the Lao FIPS dedicates 
the entirety of Part V (Rights and Obligations of Investors) of its FIPS, 
comprising eight articles, to setting forth affirmative investor rights.1032 
                                                 
1030 As to Article 9, see supra notes 1031-32 & accompanying text. Article 12 
(“Acquisition of Property Right to Land and Other Natural Resources”) States: 
 
Acquisition of the Property Right to Land and Other Natural Resources 
as well as the right to develop natural resources shall be regulated 
under laws of Georgia ‘On Property of Agricultural Land,’ ‘On Lease 
of Agricultural Land,’ ‘On the Procedure for Granting Concessions to 
Foreign Countries and Companies,’ ‘On Entrails ‘ and other legislative 
acts. 
 
Id. art. 12.  
 
1031 Id. art. 2.  
 
1032 Part V of the Lao PDR Law on Investment Promotion vests foreign investors with the 
fundamental rights necessary to conduct business, providing: 
 
Article 63: (Rights of Investors) 
 
Investors have the following basic rights: 
1. Right to invest; 
2. Rights to govern and manage business operations;  
3. Rights to hire labor forces;  
4. Rights to reside in the Lao PDR in case of foreign investors; 
5. Rights to transfer capitals, assets, and incomes from Lao PDR 
to abroad in case of foreign investors. 
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Two qualifications, however, are necessary for purposes of 
contextualizing the narrative of purported rights. First, Part V does not 
appear or purport to provide investors with rights greater than or different 
from those accorded to domestic investors. Nowhere in Part V does the 
carve-out enumerating investor rights contain premises specially tailored 
to meet concerns particular to foreign investors. While the Lao FIPS does 
assert that foreign investors shall be treated no differently from domestic 
                                                                                                                         
 
Article 64 (Right to Invest) 
 
Rights to invest are defined as follows: 
1. To invest in all business sectors and zones which are not 
prohibited to invest under the laws of the Lao PDR; 
2. To invest according to the types and forms of enterprises in 
accordance with laws and regulations; 
3. To apply for project concession from the Government or local 
authorities on the case-by-case basis to develop a project; 
4. To apply for a concession to establish a Special Economic 
Zone and Specific Economic Zone from the Government; 
5. To establish a representative office or a branch in Lao PDR; 
6. To apply for the changing of the investment objectives or 
activities in the case that the business operations are not 
effective due to the changes of the Government’s policies, 
regulations and laws; 
7. To own assets; 
8. To receive protection from the Government in relation to 
rights and legitimate benefits from the investment; 
9. To receive any facilitations provided by the Government to the 
investment; 
10. To receive benefits from the lease or concession such as the 
right to use and to use this right as a collateral with another 
person or financial institutions or to allow the joint-venture, to 
sublease, to sell and to transfer the Land use rights in 
accordance with the terms of the lease or concession in the 
contract and other condition according to the laws; 
11. A right holder of the land use or concession has the right to 
use land in accordance to the terms leasing contract or 
concession agreement; and owns property such as buildings or 
any constructions on that piece of land and to transfer the 
rights to local people or foreigners; 
12. To open a Kip account or foreign currency account with banks 
located in Lao PDR; 
13. To lodge complaints with the relevant authorities in the case 
of impairment of the investment; 
14. To receive other rights and benefits  as provided in the laws 
and regulations. 
 
Lao PDR Law on Investment Promotion, supra note 986, art. 63 & art. 64. See also art. 
65 (“Rights to administrate and manage business”); art. 66 (“Rights to hire labor forces”);  
art. 67 (“Rights to reside in case foreign investors”); art. 68 (“Rights to transfer capitals, 
assets and income from the Lao PDR in case of foreign investors”); and art. 70 
(“Obligations to protect the environment”). 
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investors,1033 in bestowing rights to foreign investors no right or privilege 
is extended beyond the qualified guarantee contained in Art. 60 
(Protection of Investment). Second, none of the enumerated investor rights 
are exempted from exercise of regulatory sovereignty premised on public 
purpose. Indeed, much like Art. 4. (Duties of Investors) of the Georgian 
FIPS,1034 Art. 70 of the Lao FIPS (Obligations to protect the environment) 
raises ominous concerns: 
 
The investors are obliged to protect environment; investors 
must ensure that their business activities do not cause 
severely impacts to the public, national security, public 
order or health of employees. In the event of causing any 
environmental problems, the investors have to undertake 
necessary measures to address these problems in a timely 
manner and in accordance with laws.1035  
 
Even though the “obligations” are worded in the affirmative and fashioned 
so as to require an affirmative violation on the part of the foreign investor 
to trigger the causal connections that would give rise to a violation, one 
cannot help but notice that the provision is replete with references to 
classical expressions of the legacy public purpose doctrine: 
 
(i) “the public [generally],”  
(ii) “national security,” 
(iii)“public order,” and 
(iv) “health of employees.”1036 
 
In addition to the plain language requiring a causal connection to the 
investment/investor as a predicate to any liability—likely in the form of 
regulatory enactments—concerns based on the belief that the provision 
will be used ostensibly and affirmatively to justify an exercise of 
regulatory sovereignty to the detriment of investor protection, perhaps is 
somewhat further allayed because in light of any of the enumerated 
“problems,” the initial burden first appears to be placed on the investor in 
order to mitigate or cure any damage.1037 Relegating these remedial tasks 
                                                 
1033 See id. 
 
1034 See Georgia Law on Investment, supra note 986, art. 4 (“An investor shall be liable to 
conduct activities in accordance with the effective Georgian legislation as well as 
legislation concerning the environment and health protection.”).  
 
1035 Lao PDR Law on Investment Promotion, supra note 986, art. 70 
 
1036 Id. 
 
1037 The plain meaning of the final subordinate clause of the provision is helpful in this 
sense: “the investors have to undertake necessary measures to address these problems in a 
timely manner and in accordance with laws.” Id. 
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to foreign investors in the very plain language of the provision, so the 
argument says, does more than merely reiterate a preexisting obligation to 
mitigate. This carve-out language is helpful, in large measure, because it 
constitutes a paradigm for the future drafting of FIPS and BITs so as to 
harmonize the perceived exigencies of the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty with host-State obligations to protect foreign investments as a 
matter of both domestic positive law and public international law.  
 
 From a public purpose analysis perspective, Part VI (Prohibited 
Actions) of the Lao FIPS prescribes three sets of prohibitions: (i) general, 
(ii) prohibited actions for government officials, (iii) prohibited actions for 
investors.1038 Quite notably, the carve-outs for proscribed activity and 
actions studiously omits government reference. Indeed, two of the three 
provisions (Articles 71 and 73), are directed to investors, even though Art. 
71 does so by omitting reference to “government officials” or to the 
government. Instead, the prefacing sentence explicitly targets 
                                                                                                                         
 
1038 Part VI (“Prohibited Actions”) of the Lao PDR Law on Investment Promotion 
provides, in relevant part:  
 
Article 71: General prohibition 
 
Individuals and organizations are prohibited to perform the following actions: 
1. Authorize to conduct the prohibited or illegal business operations; 
2. Take any forms of impediments to the investment promotion in Lao PDR; 
3. Perform other prohibited acts as described in the laws and regulations. 
 
Article 72:  Prohibited actions for the government officials 
Government officials are prohibited to perform the following actions: 
1. Abuse the power, duties and position for the purpose of acquiring personal 
benefits; 
2. Receive bribes from investors or persons who will receive the prospective 
benefits from investment; 
3. Disclose confidential documents of the nation, Government and investors; 
4. Create an unreasonable delay for the consideration of documents or retain 
investors’ documents; 
5. Perform other prohibited actions as described in the laws and regulations. 
 
Article 73: Prohibited actions for investors 
 
Investors are prohibited to perform the following actions: 
1. Give bribes to officers and government officials who have responsibilities 
for concerned tasks; 
2. Fail to fulfill obligations, conceal income and profit including duty and tax 
figures; 
3. Slander or discredit organizations and government officials; 
4. Perform other prohibited actions as described in the laws and regulations. 
 
Lao PDR Law on Investment Promotion, supra note 986, arts. 71-73.  
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“[i]ndividuals” and “organizations.” Art. 72 is directed at “government 
officials,” but it omits any reference to the actual government, State, 
geopolitical subdivisions, State agencies, or State instrumentalities. The 
Part VI “Prohibited Actions” simply do not qualify the Host State’s 
regulatory fiat, while it indeed underscores potential investor liability 
where investor actions are deemed to fall within the ambit of “prohibited 
acts as described in the laws and regulations.”1039 Certainly it may be 
argued that these carve-outs that do not bestow any exemptions from 
regulatory decrees to investors and that do not qualify at all the exercise of 
regulatory sovereignty serve as a clear warning to prospective investors 
and to this extent foster transparency. The prohibited actions, more 
realistic, serve to buttress application of public purpose as set forth within 
Art. 70 of the FIPS. Also, the prohibited action carve-outs would support a 
construction of Art. 60 (Protection of investment) as not granting foreign 
investors any additional protection beyond that already contained in 
international treaties to which Lao PDR is a signatory. This issue, 
however, remains wholly inconclusive.  
 
C. Dispute Resolution Clauses in FIPS and Public Purpose 
 
 The lack of centralization and coordinated administration in the 
enactment of FIPS globally has led to a material lack of uniformity in the 
dispute resolution clauses that form part of  FIPS. Lack of uniformity is 
present both inter- and intra-nationally. Even among signatories to the 
ICSID convention, we find that the dispute resolution clauses contained in 
the FIPS of signatory countries vary considerably.1040 Additionally, 
material omissions or discrepancies also abound when analyzing the 
connection between specific country BITs and FIPS. Specifically, while a 
specific State may have signed a BIT that is expansive and rich in (i) 
investor protection obligations and (ii) containing an elaborate dispute 
resolution clause providing for domestic judicial and international arbitral 
recourse pursuant to specific predicate jurisdictional requirements, that 
same State’s corresponding FIPS may be devoid of a dispute resolution 
provision at all mirroring the analogous provision in a BIT to which it is a 
signatory.1041 These contradictions contribute to process legitimacy 
concerns in the areas of regulatory sovereignty and investor protection. 
                                                 
1039 Id. art. 71 ¶ 3. 
 
1040 Compare Albania Law No. 7764, supra note 986, art.8 with Russian Law on Foreign 
Investment, supra note 986, art. 10. These clauses, as well as the dispute resolution 
clauses of the other FIPS analyzed, are reproduced in Appendix III, which provides a 
means for comparing FIPS and BITs both intra- and internationally.  
 
1041 While this phenomenon is exposed more fully infra at Appendix III, an extreme 
example of this disparity may be presented by the State of Kuwait. In the Kuwaiti FIPS, 
the dispute resolution clause provides:  
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Article 16. The Kuwaiti Courts alone shall be competent to consider 
whatever disputes arising between foreign investment enterprises and 
third parties. However, the parties may agree to refer such dispute to 
arbitration. 
 
Kuwait Direct Foreign Capital Investment Law, supra note 988, art. 16. In stark contrast, 
the Lithuania-Kuwait BIT provides, in relevant part:  
 
Article 9. Settlement of Disputes Between a Contracting State and an 
Investor 
 
(1) Disputes between a Contracting State and an investor of the other 
Contracting State relating to an investment of the latter in the territory 
of the former shall, if possible, be settled amicably. 
(2) If such disputes cannot be settled according to the provisions of 
paragraph (1) within a period of three months from the date at which 
either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement, the dispute 
shall, subject to paragraph (3) below, at the written request of the 
investor concerned be submitted to international arbitration in 
accordance with paragraph (4). 
(3) An investor may choose to submit the dispute for resolution: 
(a) the courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting 
State that is a party to the dispute; or 
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed 
dispute-settlement procedures; or 
(c) in accordance with paragraph (4), provided that the 
investor has consented in writing to the settlement by 
arbitration in accordance with the appropriate rules, 
thereunder. 
(4) Unless within the periods of 3 months provided in paragraph (2) 
above, the parties to the dispute have agreed an alternative dispute 
settlement procedure, the dispute may, at the election in writing of the 
investor concerned, be submitted for settlement by arbitration to: 
(a) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“the Centre”), established pursuant to the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other States, opened for signature at 
Washington 18 March 1965 (“the Washington Convention”), 
provided that the Washington Convention is applicable to the 
dispute; or 
(b) an arbitral tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), as those Rules may be modified by the parties 
to the dispute (the Appointing Authority referred to in Article 
7 of the Rules shall be Secretary General of the Centre); or 
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to the arbitration 
rules of any arbitral institution mutually agreed between the 
parties to the dispute. 
(5) Each Contracting State hereby gives its unconditional consent to the 
submission of an investment dispute for settlement by binding 
arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
(6) (a) The consent given in paragraph (5), together with the consent 
given under paragraph (3), shall satisfy the requirement for written 
agreement of the parties to a dispute for purposes of each of Chapter II 
of the Washington Convention, Article II of the United Nations 
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 These ad hoc “corelationships” notwithstanding, a meaningful 
discernible pattern between the public purpose based investor protection 
obligation contained in FIPS and the efficacy of the corresponding dispute 
resolution clause set forth in a particular FIPS emerges. The extent of 
investor protection obligation enunciated is directly proportional to the 
efficacy of the dispute resolution clause contained in that same FIPS 
where efficacy is defined as the ability of an investor to prosecute a claim 
against the Host State (State enacting the FIPS) in the form of an 
international arbitration based upon a bilateral or multilateral investment 
treaty.1042  
 
 States that enshrine investor-protection obligations based upon an 
understanding of public purpose that preempts the legacy doctrine extend 
this construction of the doctrine to the FIPS dispute resolution clause. 
Thus they provide investors with a final layer of protection in the form of 
a non-parochial and neutral international fora where public international 
law applies in conjunction with FIPS protection obligations. The Georgian 
FIPS stands out as particularly exemplary. As earlier noted,1043 Art. 7 of 
the Georgian FIPS views the public purpose of foreign investment 
protection as generally preempting the exercise of regulatory sovereignty 
based upon the public purpose doctrine in furtherance of national 
objectives but for quite few and specially qualified circumstances 
requiring a showing of “urgent necessity established by organic law” and 
“only” when accompanied by “appropriate compensation.”1044 
 
 In this connection, it is critical to underscore that, “appropriate 
compensation” within the meaning of the Georgian FIPS represents 
“actual value” and not prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, fair 
                                                                                                                         
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958 (“New York Convention”), 
and Article I of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
 
Agreement Between the Republic of Lithuania and the State of Kuwait for the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 9, Jan. 15, 2003, Lit.-Kuw., 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/lithuania_kuwait.pdf. 
 
. 
1042 Efficacy here is not understood as efficiency, but rather as the ability to air disputes in 
a neutral international fora pursuant to a non-judicial dispute resolution arbitral 
proceeding through which the claimant’s causes of actions may be based upon violations 
of treaty-based investor protection obligations, as well as additional claims contained in 
the relevant FIPS. 
 
1043 See supra notes 1027-28 & accompanying text. 
 
1044 Georgia Law on Investment, supra note 986, art. 7. 
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compensation or “just compensation.”1045 Consonant with this 
commitment to foreign investor protection at the “expense” of regulatory 
sovereignty, the Georgian dispute resolution clause is compellingly fair 
and, therefore, in keeping with an investor protection rubric in which 
public purpose is not a priori ubordinated to the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty to the detriment of foreign investments/investors. The dispute 
resolution clause eviscerates parochial adjudication methodologies and 
renders viable treaty-based arbitral proceedings. It merits reading and re-
reading. 
 
1. A dispute between a foreign investor and an enterprise 
registered in Georgia shall be subject to resolution 
under the agreement of the parties or in courts of 
Georgia. 
2. A dispute between a foreign investor and a State agency 
shall unless the procedure for its resolution is not 
defined by way of their agreement, be subject to 
resolution in courts of Georgia or in the International 
Center for the Resolution Investment Disputes. Unless 
the dispute is considered in the International Center for 
the Resolution of Investment Disputes, a foreign 
investor shall be entitled to apply to any international 
arbitration body which has been set up by the 
Commission of the United Nations for International 
Trade Law — UNCITRAL to resolve the dispute in 
accordance with the rules established under the 
arbitration and international agreement. 
3. Any award of the international arbitration bodies as 
indicated in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be final 
and not subject to appeal. Its observance shall be 
secured by the State.1046 (emphasis supplied). 
 
The courts of Georgia are referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 16 in the 
disjunctive and only after emphasizing resolution by agreement of the 
parties. Moreover, the clause mentions both ICSID and UNCITRAL 
investor-state arbitration as a mandatory (“shall”) dispute resolution 
methodology subject only to an agreement by the parties concerning 
contentions arising from investments. Finally, the commitment to 
recognize the finality of an international arbitral award arising from 
paragraph 2 of the clause and to reduce to writing the State’s commitment 
                                                 
1045 See supra note 513 & accompanying text for discussion on the distinction between 
actual value and prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, or “just compensation.” 
 
1046 See Georgia Law on Investment, supra note 986, art. 16 (“Procedure for Dispute 
Resolution”).  
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to observing such an award, represents an intent to adhere to ICSID or 
UNCITRAL arbitral awards that is rarely found even in dispute resolution 
clauses contained in BITs, or anywhere else. 
 
 A similar directly proportional relationship between the investor 
protection obligations contained in a FIPS and the terms embodied in its 
dispute resolution clause is present in the Vietnamese FIPS. As is the case 
with the Georgian FIPS, the Vietnamese FIPS does not subordinate the 
public purpose of investor protection to the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty in pursuit of domestic objectives.1047 Although less rich and 
not as aptly drafted as its Georgian counterpart, the Vietnamese FIPS 
dispute resolution provision protects investors against the asymmetries of 
host-State adjudication of investment-driven contentions, even though the 
provision also is replete with references to Vietnamese tribunals (both 
courts and arbitration bodies), it still provides prospective claimants with 
access to the benefits of an international treaty-based arbitration premised 
on application of public international law and of the FIPS’s investor 
protection standards: 
 
Article 12  Dispute resolution 
 
1. Any dispute relating to investment activities in Vietnam 
shall be resolved through negotiation and conciliation, 
or shall be referred to arbitration or to a court in 
accordance with law. 
2. Any dispute as between domestic investors or as 
between a domestic investor and a State administrative 
body of Vietnam relating to investment activities in the 
territory of Vietnam shall be resolved at a Vietnamese 
court or arbitration body. 
3. Any dispute to which one disputing party is a foreign 
investor or an enterprise with foreign owned capital, or 
any dispute as between foreign investors shall be 
resolved by one of the following tribunals and 
organizations: 
 
(a) A Vietnamese court; 
(b) A Vietnamese arbitration body; 
(c) A foreign arbitration body; 
(d) An international arbitration body; 
(dd) An arbitration tribunal established in 
accordance with the agreement of the disputing 
parties. 
4. Any dispute between a foreign investor and State 
administrative body of Vietnam relating to investment 
                                                 
1047 See supra notes 996-97 & accompanying text. 
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activities in the territory of Vietnam shall be resolved 
by a Vietnamese court or arbitration body, unless 
otherwise provided in a contract signed between a 
representative of a competent State body of Vietnam 
with the foreign investor or in an international treaty of 
which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a 
member.1048 
 
 In keeping with the very meaningful and investor-oriented 
protection strictures of the FIPS, the dispute resolution provision of the 
FIPS itself constitutes a recognizable investor-protection-based incentive. 
Access to the delocalized international arbitral fora, whether contract or 
treaty-based, is accorded to claimants in any dispute where a party is a 
foreign investor. 
 
 Perhaps the direct proportionality between investor protection 
obligations in FIPS and the efficacy of the dispute resolution provision 
contained in that very FIPS is best exemplified by the Investment Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises.1049 
 
 Quite remarkably, that legislation provides virtually no foreign 
investment protection and heavily relies on a legacy public purpose 
framework. It merely asserts that “[t]he State does not nationalize or 
requisition any enterprise with foreign capital.”1050 It immediately adds 
“[h]owever, [that] under special circumstances when public interests 
require, enterprises with foreign capital may be requisitioned through legal 
procedures and appropriate compensation shall be made.” (emphasis 
supplied).1051 Accordingly, application of the nomenclature “FIPS” to this 
legislation is arguably a misnomer. The China FIPS provides for less 
investor protection than any of the recent BITs to which China is a 
signatory.1052  
                                                 
1048 Vietnam Law on Investment, supra note 987, art. 12 (“Dispute Resolution”). 
(emphasis supplied). 
 
1049 China Foreign-capital Enterprise Law, supra note 987. 
 
1050 Id. art. 5. 
 
1051 Id. 
 
1052 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Can.-China, Sept. 9, 2012, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_china.pdf 
(referencing the Full Protection & Security, Fair & Equitable Treatment, National 
Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation, and International Minimum Standards, and providing 
protection against Expropriation and Nationalization); Bilateral Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the Government of the Republic of 
Colombia and the Government of the Republic of China, Colom.-Chi, Nov. 22, 2008, 
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 The term “dispute resolution” does not at all appear in the China 
FIPS. Likewise, the legislation is bereft of any reference to the term 
“arbitration,” let alone “international arbitration.” The paucity of any 
mention of foreign investment protection standards or strictures is met 
only by the outright omission of a dispute resolution provision. The 
substantive connection between investor protection obligations and 
standards, and dispute resolution provisions in FIPS can be readily 
established empirically. 
 
D. The Teachings of FIPS Public Purpose Analysis And The Use 
of FIPS as Remedial Doctrinal Instruments 
 
 As a general principle, FIPS have not materially contributed to 
efforts aimed at defining with greater precision principles of customary 
international law. The history of contemporary customary international 
law—the international law of the last fifty years—does not abound in 
examples of instances where domestic statutes addressing issues of public 
purpose international law have had the effect (de jure or de facto) having a 
causal effect on the development of an existing principle of customary 
international law so as to render such principle substantively meaningful 
in light of historical developments. FIPS are uniquely positioned to make 
such a contribution possible with respect to the legacy public purpose 
doctrine. From a practical perspective the use of FIPS, without more, is 
insufficient to rehabilitate so critical a doctrine that has been prolifically 
applied in multiple areas of customary and conventional international law 
ranging from human rights and investor protection, to the exploitation of 
strategic natural resources, and questions pertaining to national and 
regional sustainable economic development. The FIPS analysis of the 
public purpose doctrine, however, suggests that in the realm of investor 
protection, there are eight separate and distinct related areas in which FIPS 
may play a very significant role in helping to vest the doctrine with 
substantive attributes that may best help its application in an environment 
of economic globalization.  
 
                                                                                                                         
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/colombia_china.pdf (same); Agreement 
Between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, NZ-Chi., Nov. 22, 1988, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_newzealand.pdf (referencing the 
Fair & Equitable Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation Standards, and providing 
protection against Expropriation and Nationalization) Agreement Between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of 
Singapore on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Chi.-Sing., Nov. 21, 1985, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_singapor.pdf (same). 
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 First, the most material contribution that FIPS may generate is 
fashioning investor protection standards based upon a public purpose 
analysis that preempts the exercise of regulatory sovereignty in 
furtherance of national interests upon a legacy understanding of the 
doctrine. As discussed,1053 already a number of FIPS have applied the 
public purpose doctrine in favor of investor protection so as to preempt 
exercise of regulatory sovereignty based on the doctrine to the detriment 
of foreign investors. This contribution is extraordinary, but it must be 
recognized as such and appropriately contextualized. These FIPS 
demonstrate the existence of a conceptual and doctrinal foundation for 
applying the public purpose doctrine in ways that preempt the exercise of 
regulatory sovereignty to the harm of foreign investors, as well as a 
political will to understand the public purpose doctrine as a normative 
rubric that may be exercised beyond the legacy framework in support of 
regulatory sovereignty and national interests. This existing “first step” is 
paramount in transcending the legacy public purpose doctrinal construct 
and at arriving at a substantive, objective, proportionality-driven, and 
bilateral conception of this principle. Much work remains.  
 
 A second contribution of FIPS that highlight the preeminence of a 
public purpose doctrine embodied in a domestic legislative enactment but 
used in furtherance of foreign investor protection so as to further the 
broader interests of an international community concerns the issue of 
intent. The issue of signatory intent as to the meaning of public purpose in 
BITs, for example, in some sense is addressed or can be addressed through 
FIPS. Host States whose very legislative rubric creates a public purpose 
hierarchy in support of investor protection should be estopped and 
altogether proscribed from asserting in the context of investor-state 
arbitrations a public purpose-based right to invade the realm of investor 
protection in the name of regulatory sovereignty. As previously noted,1054 
to date the use of FIPS as foundational evidentiary proof of intent has been 
omitted from the analysis contained in arbitral awards. There is no 
justification for having such compelling evidence of this ilk lay fallow. 
Moreover, as a matter fundamental fairness, Host States should not be able 
to engage in a systematic “bait and switch” policies with respect to 
investor protection. The practice is ethically and doctrinally unsound. It 
makes little sense for States to speak to entice foreign investors to invest 
in their economy by holding out a statutory framework that provides for 
material investor protection obligations, and only then to have the same 
Host State assert that an expropriation or nationalization is justified based 
upon public purpose, without at all being bound by the very plain 
language of its own FIPS. Structural integrity in holding States to one 
                                                 
1053 See supra Chapter 6.B “FIPS Carve-Outs & Public Purpose.” 
 
1054 See supra  note 1018 & accompanying text.  
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consistent position as to investor protection in turn shall contribute to the 
systemic legitimacy of investor-state arbitration and to the promotion of 
FDI. 
 
 A third potential contribution that FIPS may offer to the role of the 
public purpose doctrine is to serve as an instrument that harmonizes the 
scope and content of BITs and domestic sustainable development. As 
demonstrated in Appendix III,1055 regrettably in most instances the FIPS 
pertaining to signatory countries of BITs contain investor-protection 
obligations that materially differ from those contained in BITs. Certainly 
some part of this dissonance may be attributable to the differences 
between negotiations between representatives of two different countries 
(typically with home and Host State interests), and the negotiation 
dynamic attendant to the enactment of domestic legislation that 
fundamentally seeks to incentivize foreign investors. Disparities between 
these two negotiating processes notwithstanding, an important reason 
explaining this lack of coherence, and often internal contradictions,1056 
arise because little or no weight is accorded to FIPS. Prospective Host 
States should be made accountable for ensuring that where FIPS proscribe 
exercise of regulatory sovereignty to the detriment of foreign investment 
protection, BITs to which such countries are signatories also should reflect 
this level of commitment to foreign investment protection obligations. 
States also should be encouraged to use FIPS as a paradigm for the 
crafting of public purpose BIT language that does not provide for the use 
of the public purpose doctrine to support investor protection policies and 
objectives in situations where regulatory sovereignty challenges such 
aspirations.  
 
 Fourth, FIPS constitute evidence of State practice consonant with 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.1057 Thus, 
there already exists a conceptual foundation for the development of a 
customary international law pursuant to which the public purpose doctrine 
would not be relegated to serving exclusively the interests of domestic 
regulatory sovereignty to the detriment of foreign investor protection. To 
the contrary, FIPS may serve as a foundation for the development of a 
customary international law that renders public purpose as a doctrine 
relevant to the exigencies of an economic Globalized environment, and to 
a world now configured by post-Westphalian sovereignty. This crevice 
may lead to a greater aperture for the fashioning of a public purpose 
doctrine that meets the demands of an international community that is 
                                                 
1055 See infra Appendix III. 
 
1056 The comparisons within Appendix III amply demonstrate this contradiction.  
 
1057 See supra note 355 & accompanying text for discussion on Art. 38 of the ICJ and 
what constitutes evidence of State practice.  
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increasingly interdependent and where the substantive distinction between 
Host State and Home States progressively are becoming less clear.  
 
 A fifth contribution of FIPS to the development of a meaningful 
doctrine is the potential of using FIPS as a legislative framework capable 
of establishing as a matter of law that the principle of public purpose (i) 
must be objective and susceptible to application in support of the exercise 
of national regulatory sovereignty only where clear and convincing 
industry-based standards are met suggesting that a bona fide public 
purpose is present; (ii) shall be content-rich, meaning that public purpose 
must be defined with greater specificity than simply an understanding that 
the doctrine applies “to all things public;” (iii) shall be removed from 
furthering the interests of political ideologies of whatsoever ilk.  
 
 A sixth and the final contribution here mentioned on the part of 
FIPS towards a viable public purpose doctrine is the use of the FIPS 
structure to set forth a test based upon futility. Application of a futility 
standard as to the fundamental question of whether a particular measure 
alleged to be based on public purpose in fact comports with the doctrine’s 
requirement helps foster objectivity. The self-judging rationale adduced by 
a State that merely characterizes a regulatory enactment as implemented 
“for a public purpose,” without any other factual foundation for this legal 
finding, should be deemed insufficient.  
 
 In instances where it is demonstrated that a particular regulatory 
measure does not contribute in an objective manner, for example, in the 
case of a financial institution with respect to the rehabilitation of that 
entity, or in instances of revoked licenses and the manner in which the 
revocation materially redounds to the best interests of a specific 
community, the measure will be deemed futile. Similarly, regulatory acts 
that are implemented in furtherance of political ideology but ostensibly 
premised on fiscal public purpose considerations, shall be deemed futile if 
in fact economic benefit is either incommensurable or not material. The 
“futility element” of a public purpose analysis helped test the evidentiary 
foundations of a regulatory measure averred to have been grounded on the 
public purpose doctrine. Measures that prove to be futile when viewed 
through the lenses of pragmatism and utilitarianism will likely prove to be 
unworthy of public purpose justification.  
 
 The coordinated and concerted use of FIPS is a possibility but not 
a likely probability. Fundamental questions concerning this approach 
remain unresolved. How are FIPS to be drafted by individual countries for 
purposes of offering sui generis investor incentives in the form of 
protection guarantees to be harmonized internationally in order to present 
a uniform standard for public purpose requirements? Are there NGOs 
appropriately positioned to facilitate such an undertaking? Can the 
 EAST\64724221. 3390 
international community set aside parochial interests and pursue the goal 
of adopting, implementing, and enforcing public purpose strictures along 
the lines of the six propositions here referenced? Even assuming that a 
collective political will can be summoned in furtherance of this aspiration, 
what measures can be secured to ensure implementation? Even with the 
decentralized and ad hoc network that characterizes the current standing of 
FIPS, the United States Department of State has identified corruption as a 
principal cause of the non-enforcement of FIPS. If FIPS that were enacted 
as part of a domestic legislative process and in keeping with a domestic 
agenda are not enforced because of corruption, the challenges incident to 
FIPS that must comply with international standards that are further 
removed, at least in part, from a national political agenda, are likely to 
face even greater challenges arising from legal irregularities. National 
legislation in the form of FIPS, however, do provide for an existing 
theoretical and practical construct through which the public purpose 
doctrine may be dislodged from the realm of self-serving national 
manipulation. Whether by happenstance or by design, more than an initial 
first step in this direction already has been taken by the very enactment of 
FIPS.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
I.  Introduction 
  The public purpose doctrine connotes the art of ruling wisely in 
benefit of the welfare.   
 
 The phrase refers also to issues related to the legislature or to the 
courts that are considered of fundamental concern to a specific jurisdiction 
and to the whole society.  However, the doctrine answers also the 
idiosincracy of a certain jurisdiction.  In other words, is a variable notion, 
depending on changing manners, morals and economic conditions.  With 
regards to States, the concept of public policy designates the body of 
principles and rules recognized by a State, which, by their nature, may bar 
the recognition or enforcement of a judgment or an arbitral award 
rendered in the international context (i.e. a judgment issued by a foreign 
court that seeks to be enforced; or the enforcement of an international 
arbitration award).  This bar on either the recognition or enforcement that 
any State has, given its ius imperium, includes: (i) fundamental principles, 
pertaining to justice or morality, that the State wishes to protect even when 
it is not directly concerned; (ii) rules designed to serve the essential 
political, social or economic interests of the State; and (iii) the duty of the 
State to respect its obligations towards other States or international 
organizations. 
 
 Economic globalization and non-territorially based understandings 
of sovereignty have underscored a need to revisit, or perhaps just simply 
visit, the role of the public purpose doctrine in customary and 
conventional international law. The tension between a State’s legitimate 
right to regulate, and its equally genuine and binding obligations 
concerning foreign investment protection often rest on the scope and 
application of this doctrine. Unlike the orthodox territorially grounded 
principle of sovereignty, the public purpose doctrine has commanded little 
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attention from jurists and scholars. Therefore, it has not developed to meet 
the multiple demands of capital-exporting and capital-importing countries 
in a Global environment. The legacy public purpose doctrine reflects a 
substantively bankrupt doctrine that is nearly eviscerating itself. Economic 
globalization has called for a qualification of public purpose in 
international law.  
 
II.  Public purpose as a concept that should be binding on States 
 The public purpose doctrine is the conceptual arbiter between 
competing and equally legitimate legal obligations, each of which is 
binding on States. Whether a State’s obligation to regulate in furtherance 
of its perceived or even actual national interests preempts its legal and 
binding obligations to protect foreign investment often depends on the 
nature of the public purpose upon which the exercise of regulatory 
sovereignty is said to be premised. The self-judging configuration of the 
legacy public purpose doctrine provides States with unbridled discretion 
tantamount to a license to exercise this regulatory authority systematically 
to the detriment of its obligations to protect foreign investment. Moreover, 
the subjective standard of the doctrine, in addition to fostering abuse, also 
places into question process legitimacy, and militates against much-
needed transparency. The scant academic and juridical pronouncements on 
public purpose, however, have led some voices to conclude that public 
purpose is to be ignored because of the doctrine’s vulnerabilities to self-
serving application on the part of States. Therefore, these despondent cries 
argue, in instances of expropriation, nationalization, or the taking of 
property on the part of States, only the presence of compensation, due 
process, and non-discriminatory treatment actually matter because public 
purpose is bereft of content and little more than a pretext for State 
encroachment on what should be sacrosanct investor protection 
obligations.  
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 Pretending that an established principle of international law does 
not exist because historical conditions and juridical strictures have 
rendered its orthodox content of little relevance and susceptible to abuse is 
hardly a productive and inspiring pragmatic posture. Even from just a 
plain utilitarian standpoint, the international community cannot afford to 
turn a blind eye to public purpose. If for no other reason, the doctrine’s 
challenges must be confronted precisely because it exists, it is ubiquitous 
within the framework of both customary and conventional international 
law, and more importantly is the ground that the doctrine is being used as 
an aider and abetter to States that seek to renege on commitments to 
foreign investors after having extracted strategic value from the FDI. 
 
 Even though the public purpose doctrine is an integral part of 
conventional international law, there has been no systematic, nor perhaps 
even an ad hoc, effort to define it, notwithstanding the laudable efforts of 
the NAFTA’s drafters and a few others who have expressed concern for its 
workings. To the contrary, the doctrine is used indiscriminately with 
virtually no care being placed on its normative application based upon 
content or subject matter, i.e., police powers, human health, animal life 
and environment, national security, resource licensing, or economic 
policy. Similarly, conventional international law does not discriminate 
with respect to application of the public purpose doctrine irrespective of 
whether the public purpose exception at issue has its origins in 
international trade law, or international investment law. Within the context 
of human rights conventions, the public purpose doctrine serves an 
important role, but it is one that is yet to find a powerful voice. The three 
human rights conventions here analyzed (the European Convention, the 
Inter-American Convention, and the African Charter) all avail themselves 
of the doctrine in order to craft qualifications applicable to many, but not 
all, human rights enunciated within each convention, respectively. Thus 
implicitly, and all too quietly, suggesting that the doctrine is absolutely 
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pivotal in helping to construct a hierarchy among human rights. Clearly 
those rights that cannot be mitigated or conditioned on public purpose, 
such as the right to have a name, or the rights of children, are not 
susceptible to State intervention without immediately prompting the 
outcry of the entire community of nations committed to protecting 
fundamental human rights. Other rights, such as the right to property, are 
open to public purpose doctrine qualification and State interdiction on that 
basis. Therefore, the public purpose doctrine also serves as a standard 
against which the inalienability of a human right can be measured. This 
important conceptual role is nowhere articulated within the framework of 
any of the referenced human rights conventions. Yet, it should be. Indeed, 
it here has been argued, that it must be mentioned and developed. 
Consciousness of the fundamental role of public purpose, be it in the 
context of human rights conventions, regional trade agreements, BITs, or 
commercial law conventions, is necessary if the doctrine is to be relied on 
as a talisman for exceptions to State intervention providing them with the 
right to disavow the rights of others. 
 
 The public purpose doctrine also finds a voice in customary 
international law. International law instruments and resolutions issued by 
credible, legitimate NGOs amply establish the existence of the public 
purpose doctrine as forming part of customary international law. Here too, 
however, the doctrine is not vested with subject matter content, objective 
criteria for application, a place in the hierarchy of customary international 
law principles, nor otherwise defined. These insufficiencies are arresting 
because, as with conventional international law, customary international 
law is rife with reliance on the public purpose doctrine, and the doctrine is 
pivotal to the very State practices that evince its existence in this realm of 
international juridical precepts.  
 
III. Towards a new public policy doctrine 
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 The way in which the legacy public purpose doctrine must be 
modified certainly presents practical challenges, but it has the virtue of 
being clear. Eleven propositions that certainly have no pretense of 
exhausting the subject, appear to be central to the meaningful 
rehabilitation of the doctrine. First, public purpose cannot be construed as 
a self-evident proposition. The doctrine must be understood necessarily 
subject to discursive reasoning.  
 
 Second, all things public need not fall within the ambit of the 
public purpose doctrine. Put simply, a public act is not a priori legitimate 
as an exception to an obligation merely because of its public nature, and, 
therefore, said to fall within the doctrine’s purview. It is in the “purpose” 
component of the doctrine that content can best reside. 
 
 Third, as with all propositions susceptible to discursive reasoning, 
the subjective perception, origins, or justification of an act does not render 
it legal or normatively viable on the basis of the public purpose doctrine. 
The act itself must be subject to commensurable criteria based upon its 
adduced objectives.  
 
 Fourth, economic globalization and its attendant paradigm of 
interdependence command that States compromise and jointly address 
transnational concerns within the framework of a paradigm that does not 
tolerate “zero-sum game” results where alternative scenarios are 
reasonably viable. In the context of investment protection as concerns the 
relationship between capital-exporting and capital-importing States, for 
example, “all or nothing” consequences from the doctrine’s application 
need to be materially modified or altogether eliminated. The “effects test,” 
for example, found in the NAFTA “decisional law” must yield to a test to 
be applied in the context of a tempered public purpose doctrine that may 
 EAST\64724221. 3396 
lead to a reasonable and proportionality driven result. Principles of 
international proportionality and bilateralism can go far in curing this ill.  
 
 Fifth, there must be a concerted effort on the part of the 
international community of nations to fashion new criteria for public 
purpose when used as a normative foundation for the disavowance of 
binding obligations on States purportedly based upon the doctrine. The 
transformation of a doctrine so deeply vested in public international law 
cannot be the product of unilateral initiatives. The structure of the 
doctrine’s reform must be the product of collaborative efforts on the part 
of both capital-exporting and capital-importing States. Interdependence is 
an essential element of this reform. By definition it requires compromise. 
 
 Sixth, a hierarchy of public purposes, all falling within the ambit of 
a single public purpose doctrine, needs to be identified. The stratification 
of principles is not foreign to customary or conventional international law. 
Matters affecting the application of principles of jus cogens, or touching 
upon strategic areas that concern human life, must be accorded 
preeminence over domestic policy-making that may readily fall under the 
auspices of medium to long-term, by way of example, economic planning. 
In this connection, principles such as PSNR and Sustainable Development 
cannot be treated as general articles of faith justifying any and all 
measures rationally related to the elements of either stricture.  
 
 Seventh, public purpose cannot be confused with State action in 
furtherance of regime perpetuation or the “historical obligation” of 
ideological dissemination. Here the “futility test” referenced in this writing 
can serve as an important standard that would help address this abuse of 
process. The current status of the doctrine, however, is so great as to 
imbue this issue with uncertainty turning its consequences into little more 
than mere speculation. Comment e to §712 of the ALI ReStatement 
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(Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987) is certainly helpful in 
demonstrating this State of affairs: 
 
e. Taking for public purpose. The requirement that a taking 
be for a public purpose is reiterated in most formulations of 
the rules of international law on expropriation of foreign 
property. That limitation, however, has not figured 
prominently in international claims practice, perhaps 
because the concept of public purpose is broad and not 
subject to effective reexamination by other States. 
Presumably, a seizure by a dictator or oligarchy for private 
use could be challenged under this rule. 
 
(emphasis in original, underlining supplied). 
 
 
 Eighth, harmonizing public purpose in FIPS and BITs so that the 
quantum and quality of investor protection obligations binding on States 
can lead to the fulfillment and not the frustration of expectations between 
home and Host States is central to the doctrine’s rehabilitation. Conflicting 
or disparate obligation standards in these instruments merely lend 
themselves to arbitrariness, lack of transparency, and serve as the 
facilitators for irregularities and corruption.  
 
 Ninth, one practical partial solution that may be immediately 
implemented is by having signatories to international agreements agree on 
a definition of public purpose within the meaning of a particular 
instrument. Quite remarkably, there is little evidence in draft regional 
trade agreements that this approach has been explored, let alone 
exhausted. 
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 Tenth, States applying public purpose in furtherance of the 
exercise of regulatory sovereignty should bear the burden by a standard 
akin to “clear and convincing” of demonstrating the objective foundations 
and commensurable underpinnings of the doctrine’s application. In this 
connection, Home State investors should enjoy a rebuttable presumption 
that public purpose is not sufficient to justify encroachment on an 
international obligation to protect foreign investment. Agreement on the 
allocation of burden, presumptions and rebuttability, shall meaningfully 
contribute to the legacy doctrine’s reform at a very practical level. 
 
 Eleventh, and lastly, there must be a recognition that NGOs and 
national policy-making instruments such as FIPS, represent pragmatic 
vehicles for tempering, forming, transforming, and defining a new public 
purpose doctrine that may serve the interests of the entire community of 
nations consonant with the demands of economic globalization,  an 
understanding of sovereignty that embraces principles of bilateralism and 
proportionality, and the exigency of harmonizing conflicting economic 
interests among States in different junctures of economic, social and 
political development. 
 
 The development and implementation of these eleven propositions 
is daunting. The task is even more intimidating upon reflection suggesting 
that the eleven elements are but just a small representative sample of 
necessary reform. Equally disconcerting are the pragmatic challenges 
endemic to any effort to bring into being a doctrine that touches so many 
different aspects of international law. Some comfort, nonetheless, perhaps 
can be found in realizing that consciousness of the problem in and of itself 
may serve as a mitigating factor. States can be called to task when 
applying the doctrine. Academics can be challenged to contribute to the 
development of public purpose within a rubric that meets some or all of 
the concerns that this contribution has identified. Similarly, legislators can 
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be moved and legislation developed to address these issues pursuant to 
legislative drafting techniques. National treaty-negotiating teams also may 
facilitate bringing about short to medium term mitigation of the problems 
inherited from the legacy public purpose doctrine. 
 
 The practical, doctrinal, and conceptual road that must be traveled 
before a comprehensive doctrine is actually developed and accepted by the 
community of nations remains a difficult one, even where short and 
medium term pragmatic mitigation techniques are successfully applied. 
Indeed, it remains less than clear the extent to which these temporary 
measures may actually cause material improvement. It is with reference to 
Ovid’s challenging maxim in the Metamorphoses, “est nulla via invia 
virtuti,” (“for virtue no path is impossible”) that perseverance in the face 
of the virtually insurmountable must be pursued.1058 Resolve for pursuing 
the seemingly impossible in and of itself is part of the objective sought. 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
1058 See OVID IV: METAMORPHOSES, BOOKS IX-XV, Book 14, Line 113 (Frank Justus 
Miller, Trans.,  G.P. Goold, ed., Loeb Classical Library 1916). Here Aeneas asks a sibyl 
for a clear path through Avernus’s realm so that he may visit his deceased father living in 
the realm of the shades: 
 
Great things do you ask, you man of mighty deeds, whose hand, by 
sword, whose piety, by fire, has been well tried. But have no fear, 
Trojan; you shall have your wish, with my guidance you shall see the 
dwellings of Elysium  and the latest Kingdom of the universe; and you 
shall see your dear father’s shade. There is no way denied to virtue.  
 
(emphasis supplied). 
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Appendix I.  
 
A Comparison Between the Performance 
Requirements Articles of the Canada-Jordan BIT and 
the Colombia-Japan BIT. 
Article 7 (Performance 
Requirements ) 
Canada-Jordan BIT: 
Article 5 (Performance 
Requirements) Colombia-Japan BIT: 
 
1. Neither Party may impose or 
enforce any of the following 
requirements, or enforce any 
commitment or undertaking, in 
connection with the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct or operation 
of an investment of an investor of 
a Party in its territory: 
(a) to export a given level or 
percentage of goods; 
(b) to achieve a given level or 
percentage of domestic 
content; 
(c) to purchase, use or accord a 
preference to goods produced 
or services provided in its 
territory, or to purchase goods 
or services from persons in its 
territory;  
(d) to relate in any way the volume 
or value of imports to the 
volume or value of exports or 
to the amount 
(e) to restrict sales of goods or 
services in its territory that 
such investment produces or 
provides by relating such sales 
in any way to the volume or 
value of tis exports or foreign 
exchange earnings; 
(f) to transfer technology, a 
 
1. Neither Contracting Party shall 
impose or enforce, in connection 
with investment activities in its 
Area of an investor of the other 
Contracting Party or of a non-
Contracting Party, any of the 
following requirements: 
 
(a) to export a given level or 
percentage of goods or 
services; 
 
(b) to achieve a given level or 
percentage of domestic content; 
 
(c) to purchase, use or accord a 
preference to goods produced 
in its Area, or to purchase 
goods from natural or legal 
persons or any other entity in 
its Area; 
 
(d) to relate in any way the volume 
or value of imports to the 
volume or value of exports or 
to the amount of foreign 
exchange inflows associated 
with investments of that 
investor; 
 
(e) to restrict sales of goods or 
services in its Area that 
investments of that investor 
produce or provide by relating 
such sales in any way to the 
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production process or other 
proprietary knowledge to a 
person in its territory, except 
when the requirement is 
imposed or the commitment or 
undertaking is enforced by a 
court, administrative tribunal 
or competition authorities to 
remedy an alleged violation of 
competing laws or to act in a 
manner not inconsistent with 
other provisions of this 
Agreement; or 
(g) to supply exclusively from the 
territory of the Party the goods 
it produces or the services it 
provides to a specific regional 
market or to the world market. 
2. A measure  that requires an 
investment to use a technology to 
meet generally applicable health, 
safety or environmental 
requirements shall not be 
inconsistent with subparagraph 
1(f). 
3. Neither Party may condition the 
receipt or continued receipt of an 
advantage, in connection with an 
investment in its territory of an 
investor of a Party, on compliance 
with any of the following 
requirements: 
(a) to achieve a given level or 
percentage of domestic 
content;  
(b) to purchase, use or accord a 
preference to goods produced 
in its territory, or to purchase 
goods from producers in its 
territory; 
(c) to relate in any way the volume 
or value of imports to the 
volume or value of its exports 
or foreign exchange earnings; 
 
(f) to transfer technology, a 
production process or other 
proprietary knowledge to a 
natural or legal person or any 
other entity in its Area, except 
when the requirement: 
 
(i) is imposed or enforced by a 
court, administrative tribunal 
or competent authority to 
remedy an alleged violation 
of competition laws; or 
 
(ii) concerns the transfer or use 
of intellectual property 
rights or disclosure of 
proprietary information 
which is undertaken in a 
manner not inconsistent with 
the TRIPS Agreement;  
 
(g) to locate the headquarters of 
that investor for a specific 
region or the world market in 
its Area; or 
(h) to supply one or more of the 
goods that the investor 
produces or the services that 
the investor provides to a 
specific region or the world 
market, exclusively from its 
Area. 
 
2. Neither Contracting Party may 
condition the receipt or continued 
receipt of an advantage, in 
connection with the investment 
activities in its Area of an investor 
of the other Contracting Party or of 
a non-Contracting Party, on the 
compliance with any of the 
following requirements: 
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volume or value of exports or 
to the amount of foreign 
exchange inflows associated 
with such investment; or 
(d) to restrict sales of goods or 
services in its territory that 
such investment produces or 
provides by relating such sales 
in any way to the volume or 
value of its exports or foreign 
exchange earnings. 
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from 
conditioning the receipt or 
continued receipt of an advantage, 
in connection with an investment 
in its territory of an investor of a 
Party, on compliance with a 
requirement to locate production, 
provide a service, train or employ 
workers, construct or expand 
particular facilities, or carry out 
research and development, in its 
territory. 
5. Paragraphs 1 and 3 shall not apply 
to any requirement other than the 
requirements set out in those 
paragraphs. 
6.  The provisions of: 
(a) subparagraphs 1(a), (b) and (c), 
and 3(a) and (b) shall not apply 
to qualification requirements 
for goods or services with 
respect to export promotion 
and foreign aid programs; 
(b) subparagraphs 1(b), (c), (f) and 
(g) and 3(a) and (b) shall not 
apply to procurement by a 
Party or a State enterprise; and 
(c) subparagraphs 3(a) and (b) 
shall not apply to requirements 
imposed by an importing Party 
 
(a) to achieve a given level or 
percentage of domestic content; 
 
(b) to purchase, use or accord a 
preference to goods produced 
in its Area, or to purchase 
goods from natural or legal 
persons or any other entity in 
its Area; 
 
(c) to relate in any way the volume 
or value of imports to the 
volume or value of exports or 
to the amount of foreign 
exchange inflows associated 
with investments of that 
investor; or (d) to restrict sales 
of goods or services in its Area 
that investments of that 
investor produce or provide by 
relating such sales in any way 
to the volume or value of its 
exports or foreign exchange 
earnings. 
 
3. Nothing in paragraph 2 shall be 
construed to prevent a Contracting 
Party from conditioning the receipt 
or continued receipt of an 
advantage, in connection with 
investment activities in its Area of 
an investor of the other Contracting 
Party or of a non-Contracting 
Party, on compliance with a 
requirement to locate production, 
supply a service, train or employ 
workers, construct or expand 
particular facilities or carry out 
research and development, in its 
Area. 
 
4. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply 
to any requirement other than those 
requirements set out in those 
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relating to the content of goods 
necessary to qualify for 
preferential tariffs or 
preferential quotas. 
 
paragraphs. 
 
5.  The provisions of: 
 
(a) subparagraphs 1(a), (b) and (c) 
and 2(a) and (b) shall not apply 
to qualification requirements 
for goods or services with 
respect to export promotion 
programs and foreign aid 
programs; and 
 
(b) subparagraphs 2(a) and (b) 
shall not apply to the 
requirements imposed by an 
importing Contracting Party 
relating to the content of goods 
necessary to qualify for 
preferential tariffs or 
preferential quotas. 
 
6.  Provided that such measures are not 
applied in an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable manner and provided 
that such measures do not 
constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade or investment 
activities, nothing in subparagraphs 
1(b), (c) and (f) and 2(a) and (b) 
shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting or 
maintaining measures, including 
environmental measures: 
 
(a) necessary to secure compliance 
with laws and regulations that 
are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement; 
 
(b) necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health; or
 
(c) related to the conservation of 
living or non-living exhaustible 
natural resources. 
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Appendix II.  
 
An Empirical Review of the Preeminence of the Public 
Purpose Doctrine Throughout the Ever-Expanding 
Universe of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
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Part I: The Key 
Preamble 
KEY VARIATIONS 
S 
Sustainable 
Development 
Reference 
Canada-China 
RECOGNIZING the need to promote investment based on the principles of 
sustainable development;  
 
Canada-Jordan 
RECOGNIZING that the promotion and the protection of investments of 
investors of one Party in the territory of the other Party will be conducive to the 
stimulation of mutually beneficial business activity, to the development of 
economic cooperation between them and to the promotion of sustainable 
development;  
 
P 
Health, 
Safety & 
Environment 
Reference 
 
 
China-Guyana 
AGREEING that these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety 
and environmental measures of general application;  
L 
Labor 
Reference 
Kenya-Slovakia 
RECOGNIZING that the development of economic and business ties can promote 
respect for internationally recognized labour rights;  
 
USA-Poland 
RECOGNIZING that the development of business and economic ties can 
contribute to the well-being of workers in both countries and promote respect for 
fundamental worker rights;  
PS, PL, 
PLS, LS 
Some 
Combination 
of the Above 
Colombia-Japan 
RECOGNIZING that these objectives and the promotion of sustainable 
development can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental 
measures of general application;  
RECOGNIZING the importance of the cooperative relationship between labor 
and management in promoting investment between the Contracting Parties;  
 
Croatia-Azerbaijan 
DESIRING to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the protection 
of health, safety, and the environment and the promotion of sustainable 
development,  
 
Japan-Papua New Guinea 
RECOGNISING that economic development, social development and 
environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of 
sustainable development and that cooperative efforts of the Contracting Parties to 
promote investment can play an important role in enhancing sustainable 
development;  
RECONGISING also that these objectives can be achieved without relaxing 
health, safety and environmental measures of general application;  
ACKNOWLEDGING the importance of the cooperative relationship between 
labour and management in promoting investment between the Contracting 
Parties;  
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Turkey-Gabon 
CONVINCED that these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, 
safety and environmental measures of general application as well as 
internationally recognized labor rights;  
 
Environment & Labor 
KEY VARIATIONS 
E 
Environmental 
Exception 
Canada-Armenia, Art. XVII(2)  
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party 
from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with 
this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is 
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.  
 
Colombia-U.K., Art. VIII 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining, or enforcing any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
an investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns, provided that such measures are non-discriminatory and 
proportionate to the objectives sought.  
L 
Labor 
Exception 
 
Colombia-Belgium, Art. VIII(3) 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as to prevent a Contracting Party 
from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that an investment activity in its territory is undertaken in 
accordance with the labour law of the Party.  
 
 
Limited Public Purpose Exceptions 
KEY VARIATIONS 
P 
Exception 
from 
Performance 
Requirements 
 
Canada-Jordan, Art. 7(2) 
A measure that requires an investment to use a technology to meet generally 
applicable health, safety or environmental requirements shall not be construed to 
be inconsistent with subparagraph 1(f) [Performance Requirements].  
 
N 
Exception 
from National 
Treatment 
Colombia-U.K., Art. IV(1) 
The provisions of this Agreement relative to the grant of treatment not less 
favourable than that accorded to investors of either Contracting Party shall not be 
construed so as to preclude the adoption or enforcement by a Contracting Party 
of measures which are necessary to protect national security, public security, or 
public order.  
 
Germany-Antigua & Barbuda, Protocol Ad Art. 3  
Measures that have to be taken for reasons of public security and order, public 
health or morality shall not be deemed “treatment less favourable” within the 
meaning of Article 3.  
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No Relaxation 
KEY VARIATIONS 
P 
No 
Relaxation 
for Health, 
Safety, or 
Environment 
 
Canada-Jordan, Art. 11 
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing 
domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should 
not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate 
from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party 
considers that the other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request 
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to 
avoiding any such encouragement. 
 
Colombia-Belgium, Art. VII 
1. Recognizing the right of each Contracting Party to establish its own levels of 
domestic environmental protection and environmental development policies 
and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental 
legislation, each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure that its legislation 
provides for high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to 
continue improving this legislation.  
2. The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic environmental legislation. Accordingly, 
each Contracting Party shall ensure that it does not waive or otherwise 
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such legislation 
as an encouragement for the establishment, maintenance or expansion in its 
territory of an investment.  
3. The Contracting Parties recognize that co-operation between them provides 
enhanced opportunities to improve environmental protection standards.  
4. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as to prevent a Contracting 
Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that an investment activity in its territory is undertaken 
in accordance with the environmental law of the Party.  
5. The dispute settlement mechanisms under Articles XII and XIII of this 
Agreement shall not apply to any obligation undertaken in accordance with 
this Article.  
 
L 
No 
Relaxation 
for Labor 
Colombia-Belgium, Art. VIII 
1. The Contracting Parties recognize:  
a. the right of each Contracting Party to establish its own domestic 
labour standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly its labour 
legislation;  
b. that each Contracting party shall endeavor to ensure that the 
principles set forth in paragraph 6 of Article I [internationally 
recognized labor standards] be recognized and maintained by its 
national legislation; and  
c. that it is inappropriate to encourage the establishment, maintenance 
or expansion in its territory of an investment by relaxing domestic 
labour legislation.  
2. The Contracting Parties recognize that co-operation between them provides 
enhanced opportunities to improve labour standards.  
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as to prevent a Contracting 
Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that an investment activity in its territory is undertaken 
in accordance with the labour law of the Party.  
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4. The dispute settlement mechanisms under Articles XII and XIII of this 
Agreement shall not apply to any obligation undertaken in accordance with 
this Article.  
PL 
Provision for 
Both – Either 
Separate or 
Together 
 
Colombia-Japan, Art. 21(1) 
Each Contracting Party recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment activities of investors of the other Contracting Party and of a non-
Contracting Party by relaxing its domestic health, safety or environmental 
measures or by lowering its labor standards. Accordingly, each Contracting Party 
should not waive or otherwise derogate from such measures or standards as an 
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, or expansion in its Area of 
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party and of a non-Contracting 
Party.  
 
General Exceptions 
KEY VARIATIONS 
B 
Stripped-
Down 
Exception 
 
China-New Zealand, Art. 11 
The provisions of this Agreement shall not in any way limit the right of either 
Contracting Party to apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind or take any other 
action direct to the protection of its essential security interests, or to the protection 
of public health, or the prevention of disease and pests in animals or plants. 
 
X 
Similar to 
GATT Art. 
XX 
Canada-Thailand, Art. XVII(3) 
Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable 
manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or 
investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting 
Party from adopting or maintaining measures, including environmental measures: 
(a) necessary to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement;  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; or 
(c) relating to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption.  
(d) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic, or 
archaeological value;  
(e) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short 
supply, provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle 
that all investors are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply 
of such products, and that any such measures, which are inconsistent with the 
other provisions of this Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the 
conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist.  
 
O 
Includes 
Public 
Order 
Language 
Colombia-Japan, Art. 15(1) 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied by a Contracting 
Party in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination against the other Contracting Party, or a disguised restriction on 
investments of investors of that other Contracting Party in the Area of the former 
Contracting Party, nothing in this Agreement other than Article 12 [Treatment in 
Case of Strife] shall be construed to prevent that former Contracting Party from 
adopting or enforcing measures, including those to protect the environment:  
(a) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;  
(b) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order;  
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Note: The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of 
society.  
(c) necessary to secure compliance with the laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to:  
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the 
effects of a default on contract;  
(ii) the protection of privacy of the individual in relation to the processing 
and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of 
personal records and accounts; or 
(iii) safety; or 
(d) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic, 
archaeological or cultural value.  
 
Russia-Hungary, Art. 2(3) 
This Agreement shall not preclude the application of either Contracting Party of 
measures, necessary for the maintenance of defence, national security and public 
order, protection of the environment, morality and public health.  
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Security Exceptions 
KEY VARIATIONS 
D 
Dispute 
Settlement 
Only 
 
Germany-Mexico, Art. 20 
The dispute settlement provisions of this Section shall not apply to the resolutions 
adopted by a Contracting State, which for national security reasons, prohibit or 
restrict the acquisition of an investment in its territory, owned or controlled by its 
nationals, by nationals or companies of the other Contracting State, according to 
the legislation of the relevant Contracting State.  
 
B 
Stripped-
Down 
Exception 
China-New Zealand, Art. 11 
The provisions of this Agreement shall not in any way limit the right of either 
Contracting Party to apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind or take any 
other action direct to the protection of its essential security interests, or to the 
protection of public health, or the prevention of disease and pests in animals or 
plants.   
 
India-Austria, Art. 12(2) 
Nothing in this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from taking 
necessary action in abnormal circumstances for the protection of its essential 
security interests or in circumstances of extreme emergency in accordance with its 
laws applied on a non-discriminatory basis.  
 
X 
Similar to 
GATT 
Art. XXI 
Canada-China, Art. 33(5) 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:  
(a) to require a Contracting Party to furnish or allow access to information if the 
Contracting Party determines that the disclosure of that information is 
contrary to its essential security interests;  
(b) to prevent a Contracting Party from taking any actions that it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests:  
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to 
such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services, and 
technology undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying 
a military or other security establishment;  
(ii) in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or 
(iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or other nuclear 
explosive devices; or 
(c) to prevent a Contracting Party from taking action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.  
 
O 
Includes 
Public Order 
Language 
Colombia-Belgium, Art. II(3) 
Nothing contained in this Agreement shall bind either Contracting Party to protect 
investments made with capital or assets derived from illegal activities, and it shall 
not be construed so as to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining measures 
intended to preserve public order, the fulfillment of its duties for the keeping or 
restoration of international peace and security; or the protection of its own 
essential security interests.  
 
Russia-Hungary, Art. 2(3) 
This Agreement shall not preclude the application of either Contracting Party of 
measures, necessary for the maintenance of defence, national security and public 
order, protection of the environment, morality and public health.  
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S 
Self-Judging 
USA-Nicaragua, Protocol 1 
With respect to Article XIV, paragraph 1, the parties confirm their mutual 
understanding that whether a measure is undertaken by a party to protect its 
national security interests is self judging. 
 
 
Exceptions for Transfers 
KEY VARIATIONS 
N 
Restrictions 
on 
Transfers 
Permitted 
for Specific 
Application 
of National 
Laws 
Canada-Armenia, Art. IX(3) 
Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 & 2, a Contracting Party may prevent a transfer 
through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of its laws 
relating to:  
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection of rights of creditors; 
(b) issuing, trading or dealing in securities;  
(c) criminal or penal offenses; 
(d) reports of transfers of currency or other monetary instruments; or 
(e) ensuring the satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory proceedings.  
 
Canada-Armenia, Art. XI(2) 
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of Article IX, and without limiting the 
applicability of paragraph (3) of Article IX, a Contracting Party may prevent or 
limit transfers by a financial institution to, or for the benefit of, an affiliate of or 
person related to such institution or provider, through the equitable, non-
discriminatory and good faith application of measures relating to maintenance of 
the safety, soundness, integrity or financial responsibility of financial institutions. 
 
B 
Exception 
for Balance 
of Payment 
Difficulties 
Canada-Slovakia, Art. IX(3) 
(a) Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party 
from adopting or maintaining measures that restrict transfers where the 
Contracting Party experiences serious balance of payments difficulties, or the 
threat thereof, and such restrictions are consistent with paragraph (b).  
(b) Measures referred to in subparagraph (a) shall be equitable, neither arbitrary 
nor unjustifiably discriminatory, in good faith, of limited duration and may not 
go beyond what is necessary to remedy the balance of payments situation. A 
Contracting Party that imposes measures under this Article shall inform the 
other Contracting Party forthwith and present as soon as possible a time 
schedule for their removal. Such measures shall be taken in accordance with 
other international obligations of the Contracting Party concerned, including 
those under the WTO Agreement and the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund.  
 
Colombia-India, Art. 5(4) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the 
Contracting Parties may temporarily restrict the transfers in the event of serious 
balance-of-payments or threat thereof; or in cases where, in exceptional 
circumstances, movements of capital cause or threaten to cause serious difficulties 
for macroeconomic management, in particular, monetary and exchange rate 
policies, provided such restrictions are compatible or are issued in conformity with 
the agreements of the IMF or are applied upon request of the latter and are 
equitable, non-discriminatory and in good faith.  
 
 
Japan-Pakistan, Art. 8(2) 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article, either 
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Contracting Party may, in exceptional financial or economic circumstances, impose 
such exchange restrictions in accordance with its laws and regulations and in 
conformity with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund so 
long as each Contracting Party is a party to the said Articles of Agreement.  
 
Prudential Financial Measures Exceptions 
KEY VARIATIONS 
P 
Exception 
for 
Prudential 
Financial 
Measures 
Canada-Armenia, Art. XI(1) 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from 
adopting or maintaining reasonable measures for prudential reasons, such as:  
(a) the protection of investors, depositors, financial market participants, 
policy-holders, policy-claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is 
owed by a financial institution;  
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial 
responsibility of financial institutions; and 
(c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a Contracting Party’s financial 
system. 
 
Colombia-Belgium, Art. II(5) 
Nothing contained in this Agreement shall apply to measures adopted by any 
Contracting Party, in accordance with its law, with respect to the financial sector 
for prudential reasons, including those measures aimed at protecting investors, 
depositors, insurance takers or trustees, or to safeguard the integrity and stability 
of the financial system.  
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Clarification of Indirect Expropriation 
KEY VARIATIONS 
C 
Clarification 
of What 
Constitutes 
Indirect 
Expropriation 
Canada-China, Annex B.10 (“Expropriation”) 
The Contracting Parties confirm their shared understanding that: 
1. Indirect expropriation results from a measure or series of measures of a 
Contracting Party that has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation 
without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.  
2. The determination of whether a measure or series of measures of a 
Contracting Party constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-
case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
(a) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the 
sole fact that a measure or series of measures of a Contracting Party has 
an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment does not 
establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(b) the extent to which the measure or series of measures interferes with 
distinct, reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and 
(c) the character of the measure or series of measures. 
3. Except in rare circumstances, such as if a measure or series of measures is so 
severe in light of its purpose that it cannot be reasonably viewed as having 
been adopted and applied in good faith, a non-discriminatory measure or 
series of measures of a Contracting Party that is designed and applied to 
protect the legitimate public objectives for the well-being of citizens, such as 
health, safety and the environment, does not constitute indirect 
expropriation.   
I 
Inclusion of 
Government 
Intent as a 
Factor 
 
Canada-Romania, Annex B. 
....the character of the measure or series of measures, including their purpose and 
rationale. 
 
Colombia-India, Art. 6(2)(iv) 
...the character and intent of the measures or series of measures, whether they are 
for bona fide public interest purposes or not and whether there is a reasonable 
nexus between them and the intention to expropriate.  
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Part II: The Results 
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Argentina-Bolivia - - - - - - - - - 
Argentina-Chile - - - - - - - - - 
Argentina-China - - - - - - - - - 
Argentina-Finland - - - - - - - - - 
Argentina-
Guatemala - - - - - - - - - 
Argentina-Greece - - - - - - - - - 
Argentina-Jamaica - - - - - - - - - 
Argentina-
Netherlands - - - - - - - - - 
Argentina-Peru - - - - - - - - - 
Argentina-Sweden - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-
Argentina - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-Czech 
Republic - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-Egypt - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-
Indonesia - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-Lithuania - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-Pakistan - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-Papua 
New Guinea - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-Romania - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-Uruguay - - - - - - - - - 
Australia-Vietnam - - - - - - - - - 
Brazil-Chile - - - - - - - - - 
Brazil-Finland - - - - - - - - - 
Brazil-Netherlands - - - - - - - - - 
Brazil-Venezuela - - - - - - - - - 
Canada-Armenia - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-Barbados - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-China S E - - X DX NB P C 
Canada-Costa Rica - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-Croatia - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-Ecuador - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-Egypt - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-Jordan S - P P X X N P C 
Canada-Lebanon - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-Panama - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-Peru S - P P X DX N P C 
Canada-Poland - - - - - - B - - 
Canada-Romania - E - P X X NB P I 
Canada-South 
Africa - E - - X - N P - 
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Canada-Slovakia - - - P X X NB P I 
Canada-Thailand - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-Ukraine - E - - X - N P - 
Canada-Venezuela - E - - X - NB P - 
China-Albania - - - - - - - - - 
China-Australia - - - - - - - - - 
China-Bahrain - - - - - - - - - 
China-Belgium - - - - - - - - - 
China-Bolivia - - - - - - - - - 
China-Bosnia 
Herzegovina - - - - - - - - - 
China-Botswana - - - - - - - - - 
China-Bulgaria - - - - - - - - - 
China-Cote 
D’Ivorie - - - - - - - - - 
China-Estonia - - - - - - - - - 
China-Guyana P - - - - - - - - 
China-Kuwait - - - - - - B - - 
China-Netherlands - - - - - - - - - 
China-New 
Zealand - - - - B B - - - 
China-Pakistan - - - - - - - - - 
China-Singapore - - - - B B - - - 
China-Sweden - - - - - - - - - 
China-Uganda - - - - - - B - - 
Colombia-Belgium - EL - PL - O NB P C 
Colombia-China - - - - - O N P C 
Colombia-India - E - - O B NB P I 
Colombia-Japan PLS E P PL O X NB P C 
Colombia-U.K. - E N - -   NB P C 
Croatia-Azerbaijan PS - - - - B N - - 
Egypt-Albania  - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-Argentina  - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-Austria - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-Belarus  - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-China - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-Finland  - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-Jordan  - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-Latvia  - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-Netherlands  - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-Portugal  - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-Thailand  - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt-U.K.  - - - - - - - - - 
France-Malta  - - - - - - - - - 
France-Mexico - - - - - - B - - 
France-Peru  - - - - - - - - - 
France-Uganda - - - - - - B - - 
France-Uruguay  - - - - - - - - - 
Germany-Antigua 
& Barbuda  - - P - - - B - - 
Germany-
Argentina - - P - - - - - - 
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Germany-
Bangladesh  - - P - - - - - - 
Germany-Barbados  - - P - - - - - - 
Germany-Benin  - - P - - - B - - 
Germany-Ethiopia - - P - - - - - - 
Germany-Guyana  - - P - - - - - - 
Germany-India - - P - - B - - - 
Germany-Kuwait  - - - - - - - - - 
Germany-Lebanon - - P - - - - - - 
Germany-Mexico - - P - - D NB - - 
Germany-
Philippines - - P - - - - - - 
Germany-Poland - - P - - - B - - 
Germany-Republic 
of Korea - - P - - - B - - 
Germany-Syria - - P - - - - - - 
Hungary-Australia - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-Canada - - - - - - B - - 
Hungary-Chile - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-China - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-Croatia - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-Cuba - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-Greece - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-Israel - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-Lebanon - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-
Netherlands - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-
Singapore - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-Sweden - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-Thailand - - - - - - - - - 
India-Australia - - - - - B - - - 
India-Austria - - - - - B - - - 
India-Croatia - - - - - B - - - 
India-Czech 
Republic - - - - - B - - - 
India-Denmark - - - - - 
Pests 
Only - - - 
India-Egypt - - - - - B - - - 
India-Ghana - - - - - B - - - 
India-Indonesia - - - - - B - - - 
India-Morocco - - - - - O - - - 
India-Netherlands - - - - - B - - - 
India-Oman - - - - - B - - - 
India-Republic of 
Korea - - - - - - - - - 
India-Sri Lanka - - - - - B - - - 
India-Sweden - - - - - B - - - 
India-Switzerland - - - - - B - - - 
India-Turkey - - - - - B - - - 
India-U.K. - - - - - B - - - 
Italy-Bangladesh - - - - - - - - - 
Italy-Bosnia 
Herzegovina - - - - - - - - - 
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Italy-Egypt - - - - - - - - - 
Italy-Jordan - - - - - - - - - 
Italy-Lebanon - - - - - - N - - 
Italy-Malta - - - - - - - - - 
Italy-Mexico - - - - - D NB - - 
Italy-Mongolia - - - - - - - - - 
Italy-Pakistan - - - - - - - - - 
Italy-Philippines - - - - - - - - - 
Italy-Republic of 
Korea - - - - - - - - - 
Italy-Tanzania - - - - - - - - - 
Japan-Bangladesh - - - - - - - - - 
Japan-China - - P - - - - - - 
Japan-Egypt - - - - - - - - - 
Japan-Iraq PL - - PL - - NB P - 
Japan-Laos PL E - P O X NB P - 
Japan-Mongolia - - - - - - B - - 
Japan-Pakistan - - - - - - B - - 
Japan-Papua New 
Guinea PLS - - PL - - NB P - 
Japan-Peru PL - - PL O X NB P C 
Japan-Sri Lanka - - - - - - B - - 
Japan-Vietnam P - - P O X NB P - 
Kenya-Slovakia PL - - - - O NB - - 
Mexico-Australia - - - - - - NB - - 
Mexico-Austria - - - - - D NB - - 
Mexico-China - - - - - - NB - - 
Mexico-Cuba - - P - - D NB - - 
Mexico-Czech 
Republic - - - - - - NB - - 
Mexico-Denmark - - - - - - NB - - 
Mexico-Greece - - - - - - NB - - 
Mexico-Iceland - - - - - D NB - - 
Mexico-India - - - - - B NB - - 
Mexico-
Netherlands  - - - - - D NB - - 
Mexico-Portugal - - - - - - B - - 
Mexico-Republic 
of Korea - - - - - - NB - - 
Mexico-Sweden - - - - - D NB - - 
Mexico-
Switzerland - - - P - D - - - 
Mexico-U.K. - - - - - - NB - - 
Nigeria-Finland PL - - - - O - - - 
Nigeria-Germany - - N - - - - - - 
Nigeria-
Netherlands - - - - - - - - - 
Nigeria-Republic 
of Korea - - - - - - - - - 
Nigeria-Spain - - N - - - - - - 
Nigeria-Turkey - - - - - - - - - 
Nigeria-U.K. - - - - - - - - - 
Peru-Belgium - - P PL - - N - - 
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Peru-Republic of 
Korea - - - - - - - - - 
Peru-Singapore - - - - - B N - - 
Republic of Korea-
Algeria - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Austria - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Bangladesh - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Bolivia  - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Chile - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
El Salvador - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Finland - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Laos - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Lithuania - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Netherlands - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Portugal - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Qatar - - - - - - - - - 
Republic of Korea-
Ukraine - - - - - - - - - 
Russia-Canada - - - - - - B - - 
Russia-Cyprus - - - - - - - - - 
Russia-Egypt - - - - - - - - - 
Russia-Ethiopia - - - - - - - - - 
Russia-Greece - - - - - - - - - 
Russia-Hungary - E - - O O - - - 
Russia-Japan - - - - - B B - - 
Russia-Lithuania - - - - - - - - - 
Russia-Netherlands - - - - - - - - - 
Russia-Norway - - - - - - - - - 
Russia-Thailand - - N - - - - - - 
Russia-Ukraine - - - - - - - - - 
Russia-U.K. - - - - - - - - - 
Saudi Arabia-
Austria - - - - - - - - - 
Saudi Arabia-
BeloLux - - - - - - - - - 
Saudi Arabia-
Czech Republic - - - - - O N - - 
Saudi Arabia-
Malaysia - - - - - - - - - 
Saudi Arabia-
Republic of Korea - - - - - - - - - 
South Africa-Chile - - - - - - - - - 
South Africa-
Czech Republic - - - - - - - - - 
South Africa-
Finland - - - - - - - - - 
  
EAST\64724221.3 438 
South Africa-Iran - - - - - - - - - 
South Africa-
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - 
South Africa-
Turkey - - - - - - - - - 
South Africa-
Zimbabwe - - - - - - - - - 
Spain-Croatia - - - - - - - - - 
Spain-Cuba - - - - - - - - - 
Spain-Czech 
Republic - - - - - - - - - 
Spain-Hungary - - - - - - - - - 
Spain-Lebanon - - - - - - - - - 
Spain-Morocco - - - - - - - - - 
Spain-Republic of 
Korea - - - - - - - - - 
Turkey-Gabon PL - - - X X B - C 
Turkey-Italy - - - - - - - - - 
Turkey-Japan - - - - - - B - - 
Turkey-Tanzania - - - P X X B - C 
Turkey-UAE - - - - - - - - - 
UAE-Austria - - - - - - B - - 
UAE-Azerbaijan - E - - O O - - - 
UAE-China - - - - - - - - - 
UAE-Czech 
Republic - - - - - - - - - 
UAE-Finland - - - - - - - - - 
UAE-Malaysia - - - - - - - - - 
UAE-Republic of 
Korea - - - - - - - - - 
UAE-
Turkmenistan - - - - - - - - - 
UAE-Vietnam - - - - - - - - - 
U.K.-Albania - - - - - - - - - 
U.K.-Bulgaria - - - - - - - - - 
U.K.-Burundi - - - - - - - - - 
U.K.-Chile - - - - - - - - - 
U.K.-China - - - - - - B - - 
U.K.-Jamaica - - - - - - B - - 
U.K.-Mongolia - - - - - - - - - 
U.K.-Nicaragua - - - - - - - - - 
U.K.-Oman - - - - - - - - - 
U.K.-Singapore - - - - - - B - - 
U.K.-Swaziland - - - - - - - - - 
U.K.-Vanuatu - - - - - - - - - 
USA-Albania PL - - - - B N - - 
USA-Argentina L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Armenia L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Azerbaijan PL - - - - B N - - 
USA-Bolivia PL - - - - B N - - 
USA-Bulgaria L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Cameroon - - - - - O N - - 
USA-Croatia PL - - - - B N - - 
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USA-Czech 
Republic L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Ecuador L - - - - O N - - 
USA-El Salvador PL - - - - B N - - 
USA-Georgia PL - - - - B N - - 
USA-Haiti - - - - - O N - - 
USA-Jordan PL - - - - B N - - 
USA-Kyrgyzstan L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Latvia L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Lithuania L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Mongolia L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Morocco - - - - - O N - - 
USA-Mozambique PL - - - - B N - - 
USA-Nicaragua PL - - - - BS N - - 
USA-Poland L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Romania L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Russia L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Rwanda PL E P PL - X N P C 
USA-Senegal - - - - - O N - - 
USA-Sri Lanka L - - - - O NB - - 
USA-Trinidad & 
Tobago PL - - - - B N - - 
USA-Tunisia - - - - - O NB - - 
USA-Turkey - - - - - O NB - - 
USA-Ukraine L - - - - O N - - 
USA-Uruguay PL EL - PL P X N P C 
USA-Uzbekistan PL - - - - B N - - 
Venezuela-
Argentina - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-
Barbados - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-Bolivia - - - - - - B - - 
Venezuela-Brazil - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-Chile - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-Costa 
Rica - - - - - - NB - - 
Venezuela-Czech 
Republic  - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-
Denmark - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-
Ecuador - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-
Germany - - N - - - - - - 
Venezuela-
Lithuania - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-
Netherlands - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-
Paraguay - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-Peru - - - - - O - - - 
Venezuela-Spain - - - - - - B - - 
Venezuela-Sweden - - - - - - - - - 
Venezuela-U.K.  - - - - - - - - - 
 
  
EAST\64724221.3 440 
Appendix III.  
 
A Spatial Comparison of Provisions Relating to 
Investment Protection, Incentives and Dispute 
Resolution in Foreign Investment Promotion Statutes 
and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
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Protection and Incentives 
Provided Under FIP 
Dispute Resolution Procedure 
Under FIP 
Protection Provided Under 
BIT Dispute Resolution Procedure Under BIT 
R
u
s
s
i
a
 
 
1999 Law on Foreign 
Investment  (July 9, 1999).
 
Article 4(1) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Articles 5, 6, & 7 - Guarantees 
of Legal Protection for and 
Availability of Foreign 
Investors/Investments in the 
Russian Federation .
 
Article 8 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.   
 
Article 9 - Guarantees to 
Foreign Investors Against 
Unfavorable Changes in the 
Legislation of the Russian 
Federation. 
 
Articles 12 - 17 - Specific 
Investment Related Incentives 
and Rights Provided for Foreign 
Investors, Such as the Right to 
Export.  
 
Article 23 - Governmental 
Policy in the Sphere of Foreign 
Investment.  
1 
999 Law on Foreign Investment  
(July 9, 1999). 
 
Article 10. Guarantee of Proper 
Settlement of Disputes Related to 
Investment and Business Activities of 
Foreign Investors in the Russian 
Federation 
Any dispute involving a foreign 
investor and related to the investment 
and business activities of such investor 
in the Russian Federation shall be 
settled in compliance with the 
international treaties of the Russian 
Federation and federal laws in a court, 
an arbitration court or international 
arbitration (arbitration tribunal). 
 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the 
Republic of Hungary and 
the Government of the 
Russian Federation for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments
 
Article 2(1) - Promotion of 
Investments.  
 
Article 2(2) -  Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard and Full Protection 
& Security.
 
Article 3 - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 3 - Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment Standard
 
Article 5 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
Hungary and the Government of the Russian Federation for 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
 
Article 8. Disputes between an Investor of one Contracting Party 
and the other Contracting Party 
l. Any dispute which may arise between an investor of one 
Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party in connection 
with an investment in its territory shall, as far as possible, be 
settled through negotiations. 
2. If the dispute between an investor of one Contracting Party and 
the other Contracting Party can not be thus settled within a period 
of six months from the date it arose, the investor shall be entitled 
to submit the case either to: 
a) a competent court or arbitration tribunal of the Contracting 
Party in the territory of which the investment has been made; 
b) the Arbitration Institution of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce; 
c) an ad hoc arbitration tribunal set up in accordance with the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
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Law No. 7764 (February 11, 
1999).  
 
Article 2(1) - Promotion of 
Investments. 
 
Article 2(2) -  Fair & Equitable 
Treatment Standard and Full 
Protection & Security.
 
Article 2(3) - International 
Minimum Standard of 
Treatment.  
 
Article 3 - Right to Employ 
Foreign Citizens. 
 
Articles 4 & 5 - Protection 
Against Expropriation & 
Nationalization.   
 
Article 11 - Transparency.  
 
Law No. 7764 (February 11, 1999). 
 
Article 8. Dispute Settlement. 
1. If a dispute arises between a foreign 
investor and an Albanian private party 
or an Albanian State enterprise or 
company, which has not been settled 
through an agreement, the foreign 
investor may choose to settle
the dispute according to any kind of 
previously agreed upon and applied 
procedures. If there is no procedure 
foreseen for the settlement of disputes, 
then the foreign investor has the right 
to submit the dispute for resolution to 
a competent court or arbitrator of the 
Republic of Albania, according to its 
laws. 
 
2. If a dispute arises between a foreign 
investor and the Albanian public 
administration, which has not been 
settled through an agreement, the 
foreign investor may submit the 
dispute for resolution to a competent 
court or arbitrator of the Republic of 
Albania, according to its laws. If the 
dispute relates to expropriation, 
compensation for expropriation or 
discrimination, as well as to transfers 
as provided in article 7 of this law,
the foreign investor may submit the 
dispute for resolution to the 
International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“Center”), 
established by the Convention for the 
settlement of investment disputes 
between the States and citizens of 
other States, approved in Washington, 
on 18 March 1965.
 
3. Every decision of international 
arbitration according to this article is 
final and irrevocable for the parties in 
dispute. The Republic of Albania 
undertakes to apply without delay the 
provisions of these decisions and 
 
Agreement on 
Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the 
Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the 
Republic of Albania
 
Article 2 - Promotion of 
Investments .
 
Article 3(1) -  Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard and Full Protection 
& Security.
 
Article 3(2) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 3(3) - Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article 6 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Albania 
 
Article 9.  
1) Any dispute between either Contracting Party and a national of 
the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of that 
nation al in the territory of the former Party shall as far as possible 
be settled by the par- ties to the dispute in amicable way. 
2) If such a dispute can not be settled within a period of three 
months from the date at which either party to the dispute 
requested amicable settlement, the dispute shall at the request of 
the national concerned be submitted to an international arbitral 
tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nation Commission on International Trade Law. 
3) In case both Contracting Parties have become members of the 
Convention of 18 March 1965 on the Settlement of Investments 
Disputes between State and National of other States, disputes 
between either Contracting Party and nationals of the other 
Contracting Party under the first paragraph of the present Article 
shall be submitted for settlement by conciliation or arbitration to 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. 
4) A legal person which bas the nationality of one Contracting 
Party and which before such a dispute arises is controlled by 
nationals of an other Contracting Party shall for the purpose of 
article 25 (2)(b) of the Convention referred to in paragraph 3 
above be treated as a national of that other Contracting Party. 
5) Each Contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional consent 
to the submission of disputes to international arbitration in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
6) The awards of arbitration shall be final and binding and shall be 
enforced in accordance with domestic law. 
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assure their implementation within its 
territory. 
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Law of Georgia On the 
Investment Activity 
Promotion & Guarantees 
(November 12, 1999).
 
Article 3(1) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 3(2)- (5) - Financial & 
Monetary Related Rights 
Accorded to Foreign Investors.
 
Article 3(6) - Right to Export. 
 
Article 5 - Promotion of 
Investment.  
 
Articles 7 & 8 - Guarantee of 
Investment Inviolability, i.e., 
Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization. 
 
Article 10 - Right to Employ 
Foreigners; Right of Foreign 
Employees to Export Income;  
Exception from Taxation of 
Foreign Employees Not 
Residing Permanently in 
Georgia.  
 
Article 15 - Guarantees During 
Amendment of Legislation.  
 
Law of Georgia On the Investment 
Activity Promotion & Guarantees 
(November 12, 1999).
 
Article 16. Procedure for Dispute 
Resolution 
1. A dispute between a foreign 
investor and an enterprise registered in 
Georgia shall be subject to resolution 
under the agreement of the parties or 
in courts of Georgia.
 
2. A dispute between a foreign 
investor and a State agency shall 
unless the procedure for its resolution 
is not defined by way of their 
agreement, be subject to resolution in 
courts of Georgia or in the 
International Center for the Resolution 
Investment Disputes. Unless the 
dispute is considered in the 
International Center for the Resolution 
of Investment Disputes, a foreign 
investor shall be entitled to apply to 
any international arbitration body 
which has been set up by the 
Commission of the United Nations for 
International Trade Law - UNCITRAL 
to resolve the dispute in accordance 
with the rules established under the 
arbitration and international 
agreement. 
 
3. Any award of the international 
arbitration bodies as indicated in 
paragraph 2 of this Article shall be 
final and not subject to appeal. Its 
observance shall be secured by the 
State. 
 
Agreement Between the 
Republic of Austria and 
Georgia for the Promotion 
and Protection of 
Investments 
 
Article 2 - Promotion of 
Investments. 
 
Article 3(1) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard and Full Protection 
& Security.
 
Article 3(2) - Assurance of 
Non-Interference with 
Foreign Investment. 
 
Article 3(3) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 3(3) - Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Standard. 
 
Article 4 - Transparency.  
 
Article 5 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
Agreement Between the Republic of Austria and Georgia for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
 
Article 12. Means of Settlement, Time Periods.  
(1) A dispute between a Contracting Party and an investor of the 
other Contracting Party shall, if possible, be settled by negotiation 
or consultation. If it is not so settled, the investor may choose to 
submit it for resolution: 
(a) to the competent courts or administrative tribunals of the 
Contracting Party, party to the dispute; 
(b) in accordance with any applicable previously agreed dispute 
settlement procedure; or 
(c) in accordance with this Article to: 
(i) the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“the Centre”), established pursuant to the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States (“the ICSID Convention”), if the Contracting 
Party of the investor and the Contracting Party, party to the 
dispute, are both parties to the ICSID Convention; 
(ii) the Centre under the rules governing the Additional Facility 
for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the 
Centre, if the Contracting Party of the investor or the Contracting 
Party, party to the dispute, but not both, is a party to the ICSID 
Convention; 
(iii) a sole arbitrator or an ad hoc arbitration tribunal established 
under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”); 
(iv) the International Chamber of Commerce, by a sole arbitrator 
or an ad hoc tribunal under its rules of arbitration. 
(2) A dispute may be submitted for resolution pursuant to 
paragraph 1 (c) of this Article after 50 days from the date notice of 
intent to do so was provided to the Contracting Party, party to the 
dispute, but not later than five years from the date the investor 
first acquired or should have acquired knowledge of the events 
which gave rise to the dispute. 
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Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan On Investments 
(January 8, 2003). 
 
Article 4 - Guarantees of Legal 
Assistance for Investors, 
including Right to 
Compensation for Illegal 
Activies of Republic of 
Kazakhstan.   
 
Article 5 - Guarantees of Right 
to Use Revenues at Investor’s 
Discretion.  
 
Article 6 - Transparency.  
 
Article 8 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
Articles 11-22 - Public Support 
to Investments, which includes a 
vast array of Investment 
Incentives and Procedures for 
Obtaining Investment 
Preferences.  
 
Article 23 - Stability of 
Contracts.  
Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
On Investments (January 8, 2003). 
 
Article 9. Settlement of Disputes
1. Investment disputes can be settled 
either by negotiations, including 
involving experts, or in compliance 
with the procedure for disputes 
settlement agreed in advance.
 
2. If investment disputes can not be 
settled in compliance with provisions 
of paragraph 1 of this Article disputes 
shall be settled in compliance with 
international agreements and 
legislative acts of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan in courts of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan as well as in 
international arbitrations identified 
upon agreement of parties.
 
3. Disputes which are not related to 
investments shall be settled in 
compliance with the legislation of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. 
Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the 
Republic of Kazakhstan 
Concerning the 
Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment.  
 
 
Article II(1) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article II(1) - Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article II(2)(a) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard and Full Protection 
& Security.
 
Article II(2)(a) - 
International Minimum 
Standard of Treatment.
 
Article II(2)(b) -  Assurance 
of Non-Interference with 
Foreign Investment. 
 
Article II(7) - Transparency. 
 
Article III - Protection 
Against Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment.  
 
Article VI. 
2. In the event of an investment dispute, the parties to the dispute 
should initially seek a resolution through consultation and 
negotiation. If the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the national 
or company concerned may choose to submit the dispute for 
resolution: 
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Party that in a 
Party to the dispute; or 
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute-
settlement procedures; or 
(c) in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3. 
3. (a) Provided that the national or company concerned has not . 
submitted the dispute for resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b) 
and that six months have elapsed from the date on which the 
dispute arose, the national or company concerned may choose to 
consent in writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement 
by binding arbitration: 
(i) to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“Centre”) established by the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965 (“ICSID 
Convention”), provided that the Party is a Party to such 
Convention; or 
(ii) to the Additional Facility of the Centre, if the Centre is not 
available; or 
(iii) in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); 
or 
(iv) to any other arbitration institution, or in accordance with any 
other arbitration rules, as may be mutually agreed between the 
parties to the dispute. 
(b) Once the national or company concerned has so consented, 
either Party to the dispute may initiate arbitration in accordance 
with the choice so specified in the consent. 
4. Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment 
dispute for settlement by binding arbitration in accordance with 
the choice specified in the written consent of the national or 
company under paragraph 3. Such consent, together with the 
written consent of the national or company when given under 
paragraph 3 shall satisfy the requirement for: 
(a) written consent of the parties to the dispute for purposes of 
Chapter II of the ICSID Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) 
and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules; and 
(b) an “agreement in writing,” for purposes of Article II of the 
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United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958 
(“New York Convention”). 
5. Any arbitration under paragraph 3(a)(ii), (iii) or (iv) of this 
Article shall be held in a State that is a Party to the New York 
Convention. 
6. Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be 
final and binding on the parties to the dispute. Each Party 
undertakes to carry out without delay the provisions of any such 
award and to provide in its territory for its enforcement. 
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Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Foreign-capital 
Enterprises (October 31, 
2000). 
 
Article 1 - Permission and 
Protection for Foreign 
Investments. 
 
Article 3 - Special Promotion 
for Export-Oriented or 
Technologically-Advanced 
Foreign-Capital Enterprises. 
 
Article 4 - General Protection 
for Investments. 
 
Article 5 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
  
Article 12 - Right of Foreign 
Employees to Form Unions. 
 
Article 15 - Right to Import 
Materials from the World 
Market.  
 
Article 19 - Right to Remit 
Profits Abroad.  
 Agreement Between the 
People’s Republic of China 
and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the 
Promotion and Protection 
of Investments.
 
Article 2(1) - Promotion of 
Investments.  
 
Article 2(1) - Transparency. 
 
Article 2(2) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard and Full Protection 
& Security.
 
Article 2(2) -  Assurance of 
Non-Interference with 
Foreign Investment. 
 
Article 3(1) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 3(1) - Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article 4 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments. 
 
Article 8. Settlement of Disputes between an Investor and a 
Contracting Party 
1. Any dispute between a Contracting Party and an investor of the 
other Contracting Party, related to an investment, shall be as far as 
possible settled amicably through negotiations. 
2. If the dispute cannot be settled amicably through negotiations 
within six months from the date it has been raised by either party 
to the dispute, it shall be submitted: 
- to the competent court of the Contracting Party that is a party to 
the dispute; or 
- to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(the Centre) under the Convention on the Settlement of Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, done at Washington 
on March 18, 1965 provided that the Contracting Party involved 
in the disputes may require the investor concerned to go through 
the domestic administrative review procedures specified by the 
laws and regulations of that Contracting Party before the 
submission to the Centre. 
Once the investor has submitted the dispute to the jurisdiction of 
the concerned Contracting Party or to the Centre, the choice of 
one of the two procedures shall be final. 
3. The arbitration award shall be based on: 
- the provisions of this Agreement; 
- the laws of the Contracting Party in whose territory the 
investment has been made including the rules relative to conflict 
of laws; and 
- the rules and universally accepted principles of international law. 
4. The arbitration award shall be final and binding on both parties 
to the dispute and shall be executed by the Contracting Party 
concerned. 
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Law on Investment Promotion 
(July 8, 2009). 
 
Articles 2, 4 & 5 - Promotion of 
Investments; Governmental 
Policy on Investment 
Promotion; Principles of 
Investment Promotion. 
 
Article 7 - Promotion of 
International Cooperation and 
Integration in Investment 
Promotion.  
 
Articles 44-46 - One-Stop-
Service for Investment: 
Principles & Procedures. 
 
Articles 49 & 50 - Promoted 
Sectors and Promoted Zones for 
Foreign Investment. 
 
Articles 51-54 - Incentives 
Related to Taxes, Financing & 
Customs Duties; Specific 
Promotion Incentives for Public 
Investments, i.e., Hospitals, 
Schools, etc.
 
Articles 56 - 59 - Promotion of 
Investment Via Transparency 
and Land Use Rights. 
 
Articles 60 - 62 - Protection of 
Investment, including Protection 
Against Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
Articles 63 - 68 - General Rights 
of Investors, including Right to 
Invest, Right to Govern & 
Manage Business Operations, 
Right to Hire Labor Forces, 
Right to Reside, Right to 
Transfer.  
 
Article 72 - Prohibited Actions 
for Government Officials. 
Law on Investment Promotion (July 
8, 2009). 
 
Article 78: Forms of dispute 
resolution 
The dispute resolution related to 
investment can be performed in the 
following forms: 1. Mediation; 2. 
Administrative dispute resolution; 3. 
Dispute resolution by the Committee 
for Economic Dispute Resolution;
4. Filing of litigation.
 
Article 79: Mediation
In the case of conflict related to 
investment, the parties should make all 
efforts to solve the conflict by 
consultation and mediation to reach 
mutual benefits.
 
Article 80: Administrative dispute 
resolution 
In the case of conflict that cannot be 
amicably settled or mediated the 
parties have the right to require the 
Planning and Investment authority or 
the Industry and Commerce authority 
or other relevant sectors to address the 
conflict as an administrative dispute 
resolution in accordance with their 
roles and duties.
 
Article 81: Dispute resolution by the 
Committee for Economic Dispute 
Resolution 
In case that the conflict cannot be 
amicably settled or remedied in the 
administrative dispute resolution 
process, the parties have the right to 
request the Committee for Economic 
Dispute Resolution for resolution in 
accordance with the laws and consent 
of both parties.
 
Article 82: Filing of litigation
In case that a party finds that the 
conflict resolution from concerned 
authorities is not fair or the investment 
Agreement Between Japan 
and the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic for 
the Liberalisation, 
Promotion and Protection 
of Investment.
 
Article 2- National Treatment 
Standard. 
 
Article 3 - Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 4 - Promotion of 
Investment.  
 
Article 5 - International 
Minimum Standard of 
Treatment. 
 
Article 5 - Fair & Equitable 
Treatment Standard and Full 
Protection & Security.
 
Article 6 - Access to Courts 
of Justice. 
 
Article 9 - Transparency. 
 
Article 12 - Protection 
Against Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
 
 
 
Agreement Between Japan and the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic for the Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of 
Investment. 
 
Article 17. Settlement of Investment Disputes between a 
Contracting Party and an Investor of the Other Contracting 
Party 
1. For the purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a 
dispute between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other 
Contracting Party that has incurred loss or damage by reason of, 
or arising out of, an alleged breach of any right conferred by this 
Agreement with respect to investments of investors of that other 
Contracting Party. 
2. Nothing in this Article shall be construed so as to prevent an 
investor who is a party to an investment dispute (hereinafter 
referred to in this Article as “disputing investor”) from seeking 
administrative or judicial settlement within the Area of the 
Contracting Party that is a party to the investment dispute 
(hereinafter referred to in this Article as “disputing Party”). 
3. An investment dispute shall, as far as possible, be settled 
amicably through consultation or negotiation between the 
disputing investor and the disputing Party (hereinafter referred to 
in this Article as “the disputing parties”). 
4. If the investment dispute cannot be settled through such 
consultation or negotiation within three months from the date on 
which the disputing investor requested the consultation or 
negotiation in writing and if the disputing investor has not 
submitted the investment dispute for resolution under courts of 
justice or administrative tribunals or agencies, the disputing 
investor may submit the investment dispute to one of  the 
following international conciliations or arbitrations: 
(a) conciliation or arbitration in accordance with the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965, 
as may be amended (hereinafter referred to in this Article as 
“ICSID Convention”), so long as the ICSID Convention is in 
force between the Contracting Parties; 
(b) conciliation or arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules 
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
as may be amended, so long as the ICSID Convention is not in 
force between the Contracting Parties; 
(c) arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, as may be amended; and 
(d) if agreed with the disputing Party, any arbitration in 
accordance with other arbitration rules. 
5. The applicable arbitration rules shall govern the arbitration set 
forth in paragraph 4 except to the extent modified in this Article. 
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Article 96 - Incentives for  
Outstanding Performance.  
is damaged, the party has the right to 
file a complaint to the People’s Court 
for settle the conflict according to the 
laws and regulations. With regard to 
conflicts related to the investment 
contracting with the Government, the 
settlement of such conflicts shall 
follow the procedures stipulated in the 
contract. 
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Law on Investment 
(December 25, 2001). 
 
Article 4 - Policies on 
Investment, including Equal 
Treatment, Recognition of 
Ownership, and Policy of 
Incentives.  
 
Articles 6 - 11 - Investment 
Guarantees to Foreign Investors, 
including Guarantees Related to 
Capital & Assets, Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 
Open Markets, Right to Remit 
Capital and Assets Abroad, 
Guarantee of Uniform 
Prices/Fees/Charges, and 
Guarantees in Event of Changes 
in Law. 
 
Articles 12 - 19 - Rights of 
Investors, including Right to 
Autonomy in Investment, Right 
to Access and Use Investment 
Resources, Right to Import & 
Export, Right to Purchase 
Foreign Currencies, Right to 
Assign, and Right to Mortgage. 
 
Articles 32 - 39 - Investment 
Incentives, including Taxes and 
Land Use Rights. 
 
Articles 40 - 44 - Various 
Promises of Support for Foreign 
Investments.  
Law on Investment (December 25, 
2001).  
 
Article 12. Dispute resolution.
1. Any dispute relating to investment 
activities in Vietnam shall be resolved 
through negotiation and conciliation, 
or shall be referred to arbitration or to 
a court in accordance with law.
 
2. Any dispute as between domestic 
investors or as between a domestic 
investor and a State administrative 
body of Vietnam relating to 
investment activities in the territory of 
Vietnam shall be resolved at a 
Vietnamese court or arbitration body.
 
3. Any dispute to which one disputing 
party is a foreign investor or an 
enterprise with foreign owned capital, 
or any dispute as between foreign 
investors shall be resolved by one of 
the following tribunals and 
organizations: (a) A Vietnamese court; 
(b) A Vietnamese arbitration body; (c) 
A foreign arbitration body; (d) An 
international arbitration body; (dd) An 
arbitration tribunal established in 
accordance with the agreement of the 
disputing parties.
 
4. Any dispute between a foreign 
investor and State administrative body 
of Vietnam relating to investment 
activities in the territory of Vietnam 
shall be resolved by a Vietnamese 
court or arbitration body, unless 
otherwise provided in a contract 
signed between a representative of a 
competent State body of Vietnam with 
the foreign investor or in an 
international treaty of which the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a 
member. 
Agreement between 
Australia and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments.
 
Article 3(1) - Promotion of 
Investments. 
 
Article 3(2) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment. 
 
Article 3(3) - Assurance of 
Non-Interference with 
Foreign Investment. 
 
Article 4 - Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 6 - Transparency.
 
Article 7 - Protection Against 
Expropriation . 
Agreement between Australia and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments. 
 
Article 12. Settlement of disputes between a Contracting Party 
and a national of the other Contracting Party 
(1) In the event of a dispute between a Contracting Party and a 
national of the other Contracting Party relating to an investment, 
the parties to the dispute shall initially seek to resolve the dispute 
by consultations and negotiations. 
(2) If the dispute in question cannot be resolved through 
consultations and negotiations, either party to the dispute may: 
(a) in accordance with the law of the Contracting Party which has 
admitted the investment, initiate proceedings before that 
Contracting Party’s competent judicial or administrative bodies; 
(b) if both Contracting Parties are at that time party to the 1965 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States (“the Convention”),[1] refer 
the dispute to the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“the Centre”) for conciliation or arbitration 
pursuant to Articles 28 or 36 of the Convention; 
(c) if both Contracting Parties are not at that time party to the 
Convention, or one party to the dispute has not consented to 
referring the dispute to the Centre, refer the dispute to an Arbitral 
Tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex B of this 
Agreement, or by agreement, to any other arbitral authority. 
(3) Once an action referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article has 
been taken, neither Contracting Party shall pursue the dispute 
through diplomatic channels unless: 
(a) the relevant judicial or administrative body, the Secretary-
General of the Centre, the arbitral authority or tribunal or the 
conciliation commission, as the case may be, has decided that it 
has no jurisdiction in relation to the dispute in question; or 
(b) the other Contracting Party has failed to abide by or comply 
with any judgment, award, order or other determination made by 
the body in question. 
(4) In any proceeding involving a dispute relating to an 
investment, a Contracting Party shall not assert, as a defence, 
counter-claim, right of set-off or otherwise, that the national 
concerned has received or will receive, pursuant to an insurance or 
guarantee contract, indemnification or other compensation for all 
or part of any alleged loss. 
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The Foreign Capital 
Investment Law (October 16, 
1994). 
 
Article 8.1 - Exemption from 
Income Tax for Companies 
Conducting Activities in 
Specific Sectors. 
 
Article 9.1 - Exemption from 
Custom Duties on Plant & 
Machinery.   
 
Article 11 - Right to Transfer 
Profits Abroad. 
 
Article 12 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
The Foreign Capital Investment 
Law (October 16, 1994).
 
Article 14
It may be agreed to refer any dispute 
between the foreign investment 
projects and third parties to a local or 
international arbitration tribunal. 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the 
Sultanate of Oman and the 
Government of the 
Republic of India for the 
Promotion and Protection 
of Investments.
 
Article 3(1) - Promotion of 
Investments.  
 
Article 3(2) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article 4 - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 4 - Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 5 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
Agreement Between the Government of the Sultanate of 
Oman and the Government of the Republic of India for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments. 
 
Article 9. Settlement of Disputes Between an Investor and a 
Contracting Party.  
(1) any dispute between an investor of one contracting Party and 
the other Contracting Party in relation to an investment of the 
former under this Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled 
amicably through negotiations between the parties to the dispute. 
(2) Any such dispute which has not been amicably settled within a 
period of six months may, if both Parties agree, be submitted 
(a) to resolution, in accordance with the law of the Contracting 
Party which has admitted the investment to that Contracting 
Party’s competent judicial or administrative bodies; or 
(b) to international conciliation under the Conciliation Rules of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
(3) Should the Parties fail to agree on a dispute settlement 
procedure provided under in paragraph 2 of this Article or where a 
dispute is referred to conciliation but conciliation proceedings are 
terminated other than by signing of a settlement agreement, the 
dispute may be referred to arbitration. The arbitration procedure 
shall be as follows: 
(a) If the Contracting Party of the investors and the other 
Contracting Party are both parties to the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of other States, 1965 and the investor consents in writing to 
submit the dispute to the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes such a dispute shall be referred to the Centre; 
or 
(b) If both parties to the dispute so agree, under the Additional 
Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and 
Fact-Finding Proceedings; or 
(c) To an ad hoc arbitral tribunal by either party to the dispute in 
accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, 1976, subject to the 
following modifications: 
(i) The appointing authority under Article 7 of the Rules shall be 
the President, the Vice-President or the next senior Judge of the 
International Court or Justice, who is not a national of either 
Contracting Party. The third arbitrator shall not be a national of 
either Contracting Party 
(ii) The parties shall appoint their respective arbitrators within two 
months. 
(iii) The arbitral award shall be made in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
(iv) The arbitral tribunal shall State the basis of its decision and 
give reasons upon the request of either party. 
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Law No. 8/2001 Regulating 
Direct Foreign Capital 
Investment (April 17, 2001). 
 
Article 8 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
Article 10 - Protection Against 
Unfavorable Changes in 
Legislation.  
 
Article 11 - Right to Assign. 
 
Article 12 - Right to Transfer 
Profits Abroad. 
 
Article 13 - Exemptions & 
Privileges for Foreign Investors, 
including Income Tax, Custom 
Duties, and Recruitment of 
Foreign Labor.  
Law No. 8/2001 Regulating Direct 
Foreign Capital Investment (April 
17, 2001). 
 
Article 16
The Kuwaiti Courts alone shall be 
competent to consider whatever 
disputes arising between foreign 
investment enterprises and third 
parties. However, the parties may 
agree to refer such dispute to 
arbitration. 
Agreement Between the 
Republic of Lithuania and 
the State of Kuwait for the 
Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments. 
 
Article 2 - Promotion of 
Investments.  
 
Article 3(1) - International 
Minimum Standard of 
Treatment.  
 
Article 3(1) - Assurance of 
Non-Interference with 
Foreign Investment. 
 
Article 3(2) - Transparency. 
 
Article 3(4) - Access to 
Courts of Justice. 
 
Article 4(1) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article 4(2) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 4(2) - Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article 6 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement Between the Republic of Lithuania and the State 
of Kuwait for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments. 
 
Article 9. Settlement of Disputes Between a Contracting State 
and an Investor 
(1) Disputes between a Contracting State and an investor of the 
other Contracting State relating to an investment of the latter in 
the territory of the former shall, if possible, be settled amicably. 
(2) If such disputes cannot be settled according to the provisions 
of paragraph (1) within a period of three months from the date at 
which either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement, 
the dispute shall, subject to paragraph (3) below, at the written 
request of the investor concerned be submitted to international 
arbitration in accordance with paragraph (4). 
(3) An investor may choose to submit the dispute for resolution: 
(a) the courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting State 
that is a party to the dispute; or 
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute-
settlement procedures; or 
(c) in accordance with paragraph (4), provided that the investor 
has consented in writing to the settlement by arbitration in 
accordance with the appropriate rules, thereunder. 
(4) Unless within the periods of 3 months provided in paragraph 
(2) above, the 
parties to the dispute have agreed an alternative dispute settlement 
procedure, the dispute may, at the election in writing of the 
investor concerned, be submitted for settlement by arbitration to: 
(a) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“the Centre”), established pursuant to the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of other States, opened for signature at Washington 18 March 
1965 (“the Washington Convention”), provided that the 
Washington Convention is applicable to the dispute; or 
(b) an arbitral tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), as those Rules may be modified by the parties to 
the dispute (the Appointing Authority referred to in Article 7 of 
the Rules shall be Secretary General of the Centre); or 
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to the arbitration rules 
of any arbitral institution mutually agreed between the parties to 
the dispute. 
(5) Each Contracting State hereby gives its unconditional consent 
to the submission of an investment dispute for settlement by 
binding arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article. 
(6) (a) The consent given in paragraph (5), together with the 
consent given under paragraph (3), shall satisfy the requirement 
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for written agreement of the parties to a dispute for purposes of 
each of Chapter II of the Washington Convention, Article II of the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958 
(“New York Convention”), and Article I of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. 
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Investment Law No. 8 (1997).
 
Overview Provided by Egyptian 
Investment Authority 
 
Companies may not be 
confiscated, nationalized., 
sequestered, seized or 
expropriated by administrative 
order. 
 
No administrative body can 
interfere in setting prices or 
profit margins.
 
Projects are allowed to 
repatriate their capital and 
profits. Projects may be entirely 
owned by foreigners. 
Furthermore, their boards of 
directors may be wholly 
composed of foreigners.
 
Companies have the right to 
own building lands and develop 
real eState as needed for 
implementing and expanding 
their activities, regardless of the 
nationality or place of residence 
of partners and shareholders or 
the percentage of their 
participation.  (Except for Sinai, 
as Foreign ownership is only 
allowed in the case of 
partnership with an Egyptian 
partner who has to own 51 per 
cent of the land)
 
Projects are exempted from 
certain labor requirements of the 
Egyptian Companies’ Law and 
the Labor Law. 
 
Foreign experts’ salaries are 
exempted from income tax if 
their stay in Egypt is shorter 
than one year.  
 
Investment Law No. 8 (1997).
 
Overview Provided by Egyptian 
Investment Authority 
 
Law No. 8 stipulates that settling 
investment disputes in connection with 
the implementation of its provisions 
may be carried out in accordance with 
the convention or agreement of the 
investor’s choice. Settlement of such 
disputes may be reached using the 
provisions of any one of the following:
 
Conventions in force between the Arab 
Republic of Egypt and the country of 
the investor 
 
Agreement on Settlement of Disputes 
which Arise in Respect of Investments 
Between the Countries and the 
Nationals of Other Countries (a.k.a. 
the Washington Convention of March 
18, 1965), which Egypt adopted in 
1971;    
 
Law No. 27 of 1994 on Arbitration in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, as 
amended.   
 
Disputes may also be settled by means 
of arbitration before the Cairo 
Regional Center for International 
Commercial Arbitration. 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan and the 
Government of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt on the 
Mutual Promotion and 
Protection of Investments.
 
Article 2(1) - Promotion of 
Investments.  
 
Article 2(2) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard and Full Protection 
& Security. 
 
Article 3(1) - Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment. 
 
Article 4 - Protection Against 
Expropriation.  
Agreement Between the Government of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the Arab Republic 
of Egypt on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of 
Investments. 
 
Article 6. Settlement of Dispute between the Investor and the 
Host State. 
1. Each Contracting Party accepts to present each dispute of legal 
character arise between him and any of the other Contracting 
party nationals concerning investments exists in his territory to the 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, in 
order to settle it through conciliation and arbitration according to 
procedure. Provided for in the convention on the settlement of 
investment disputes between States and nationals of other States, 
opened for signature at Washington on 18 March 1965. 
2. The nationals of any Contracting Party may present to the local 
judicial authorities of the other Contracting Party; the host of the 
investment, any dispute with legal character arise between 
themselves and the other Contracting Party concerning the 
investment that exists on the territory of that Contracting Party. 
3. If a national of any of the two Contracting Parties chose to file a 
case with any of the two bodies mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of this article it will be impossible for him to file the same with 
another body. 
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Projects are free to maintain 
foreign currency bank accounts.  
Projects are subject to a flat rate 
of 5 per cent in customs duties 
on imported equipment and 
machinery.  
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Proclamation No. 280/2002 
Re-Enactment of the 
Investment Proclamation 
(July 2, 2002). 
 
Article 4 - Investment 
Objectives.  
 
Article 9 - Investment 
Incentives.  
 
Article 20 - Remittance of 
Funds for Investors and Foreign 
Employees.  
 
Article 21 - Investment 
Guarantees and Protections, 
including Protection Against 
Expropriation & Nationalization 
and Right to Remit 
Compensation in Convertible 
Foreign Currency. 
 
Article 24 - One-Stop Shop 
Service. 
 
Article 25 - Transmission of 
Information on Investment.
 
Article 36 - Employment of 
Expatriates.   
Proclamation No. 280/2002 Re-
Enactment of the Investment 
Proclamation (July 2, 2002). 
 
Article 17. Right to Appeal. 
An investor who has a grievance 
against a decision of an appropriate 
investment organ may, within 30 days 
from receipt of the decision, appeal to 
the Federal Investment Board or to the 
concerned organ of a Regional 
Government, as may be appropriate. 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia and the 
Government of the 
Republic of the Sudan on 
the Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of 
Investment. 
 
Article 2 - Promotion of 
Investments.  
 
Article 3(1) - Assurance of 
Non-Interference with 
Foreign Investment. 
 
Article 3(2) - Fair and 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article 3(2) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 3(2) - Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article 4 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
Agreement Between the Government of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the 
Republic of the Sudan on the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investment. 
 
Article 9. Settlement of Disputes between a Contracting Party 
and an Investor of the Other Contracting Party 
1. Disputes which might arise between one of the Contracting 
Parties and an Investor of the other Contracting Party concerning 
an investment of that Investor in the territory of the former 
Contracting Party shall, whenever possible, be settled amicably 
between the parties concerned. 
2. If the dispute has not been settled within a period of six months 
from the date either party to the dispute requested amicable 
settlement, the dispute shall at the request of the Investor 
concerned be submitted for settlement to: 
a) the competent court of the Contracting Party in the territory of 
which the investment has been made; or 
b) the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) established pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of the other 
States, opened for signature, at Washington, on March 18, 1965, if 
both Contracting Parties are members of this Convention; or 
c) the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
under the Rules Governing Additional Facility for the 
Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the Center 
(Additional Facility Rules) if one of the Contracting Parties is not 
a Contracting State of the Convention as mentioned in Paragraph 
2(b) of this Article; or 
d) an international ad hoc arbitral which, unless and otherwise 
agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, shall be established 
under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
3. The arbitral awards shall be final and binding on both parties to 
the dispute and shall be executed according to the international 
laws of the Contracting Party. 
4. Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit investment 
disputes for resolution to the alternative dispute settlement 
mechanisms and shall be executed in accordance with the 
preceding paragraphs. 
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Act 478: Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre Act 
(August 29, 1994). 
 
Article 2 - Object of Act is to 
Promote Investments. 
 
Article 3 - Functions of the 
Centre.  
 
Articles 23 - 26 - Entitlement to 
Incentives and Priority Areas. 
 
Article 27 - Investment 
Guarantee of Transferability. 
 
Article 28 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
Article 31 - Assistance to 
Investment Enterprises, 
including provision for the 
Centre to act as liaison to 
Government for Enterprise. 
 
Article 32 - Personal 
Remittances.  
Act 478: Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre Act (August 29, 
1994).  
 
Article 29. Dispute settlement 
procedures 
(1) Where a dispute arises between an 
investor and the Government in 
respect of an enterprise, efforts shall 
be made through mutual discussion to 
reach an amicable settlement.
(2) A dispute between an investor and 
the Government in respect of an 
enterprise to which this Act applies 
which is not amicably settled through 
mutual discussions may be submitted 
at the option of the aggrieved party to 
arbitration 
(a) in accordance with the rules of 
procedure for arbitration of the United 
Nations Commission of International 
Trade Law, or
(b) in the case of a foreign investor, 
within the framework of a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement on investment 
protection to which the Government 
and the country of which the investor 
is a national are parties, or
(c) in accordance with any other 
national or international machinery for 
the settlement of investment dispute 
agreed to by the parties.
(3) Where in respect of a dispute, there 
is disagreement between the investor 
and the Government as to the method 
of dispute settlement to be adopted, the 
choice of the investor shall prevail. 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the 
Republic of India and the 
Government of the 
Republic of Ghana for the 
Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments.
 
Article 3(1) - Promotion of 
Investments.  
 
Article 3(2) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article 4(1) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 4(1) - Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Standard.  
 
Article 5 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India 
and the Government of the Republic of Ghana for the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments. 
 
Article 9. Settlement of Disputes Between an Investor and a 
Contracting Party 
(1) Any dispute between an investor of one Contracting Party and 
the other Contracting Party in relation to an investment of the 
former under this Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled 
amicably through negotiations between the parties to the dispute. 
(2) Any such dispute which has not been amicably settled within a 
period of six months may, if both Parties agree, be submitted: 
(a) for resolution, in accordance with the law of the Contracting 
Party which has admitted the investment to that Contracting 
Party’s competent judicial, arbitral or administrative bodies; or 
(b) to the International conciliation under the Conciliation Rules 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
(3) Should the Parties fail to agree on a dispute settlement 
procedure provided under paragraph (2) of this Article or where a 
dispute is referred to conciliation but conciliation proceedings are 
terminated other than by signing of a settlement agreement, the 
dispute may be referred to Arbitration. The Arbitration procedure 
shall be as follows: 
(a) If the Contracting Party of the Investor and the other 
Contracting Party are both parties to the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and nationals of 
other States, 1965 and the investor consents in writing to submit 
the dispute to the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, such a dispute shall be referred to the 
Centre; or 
(b) If both parties to the dispute so agree, under the Additional 
Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and 
Fact-Finding proceedings; or 
(c) to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal by either party to the dispute in 
accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, 1976, subject to the 
following modifications: 
(i) The appointing authority under Article 7 of the Rules shall be 
the President, the Vice-President or the next senior Judge of the 
International Court of Justice, who is not a national of either 
Contracting Party. The third arbitrator shall not be a national of 
either Contracting Party. 
(ii) The parties shall appoint their respective arbitrators within two 
months. 
(iii) The arbitral award shall be made in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement and shall be binding for the parties 
in dispute. 
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Foreign Investment Law 
(March 3, 1998). 
 
Article 2 - Promotion of 
Investments.  
 
Article 3 - National Treatment 
Standard; Protection Against 
Discrimination.  
 
Articles 4 & 5 - Permission for 
Ownership by Foreign 
Investors.  
 
Article 6 - Protection Against 
Expropriation & 
Nationalization.  
 
Article 7 - Guarantee of Free 
Trade.  
 
Article 8 - Access to Foreign 
Exchange and Transfers. 
 
Article 10 - Prohibition Against 
Double Taxation.  
Foreign Investment Law (March 3, 
1998).  
 
Article 11. Settlement of Disputes
If permitted under an international 
treaty or agreement duly signed, 
approved, and ratified by the 
Guatemalan State, any investment-
related disputes that may arise between 
a foreign investor and the Guatemalan 
State, its agencies, or other State 
entities may be submitted to 
international arbitration or other 
alternate dispute-settlement 
mechanisms, as applicable, in 
accordance with the provisions of said 
treaty or convention and with 
applicable domestic laws. 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the 
Republic of Korea and the 
Government of the 
Republic of Guatemala for 
the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments.
 
Article 2(1) - Promotion of 
Investment.  
 
Article 2(2) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard and Full Protection 
& Security.
 
Article 2(3) - Assurance of 
Non-Interference with 
Foreign Investment. 
 
Article 3 - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 3 - Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment Standard.  
 
Article 5 - Protection Against 
Expropriation.  
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea 
and the Government of the Republic of Guatemala for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments. 
 
Article 8. Settlement of Investment Disputes between a 
Contracting Party and an Investor of the other Contracting 
Party 
(1) Any dispute between either Contracting Party and the investor 
of the other Contracting Party including expropriation or 
nationalization of an investment shall, as far as possible, be settled 
by the disputing parties in an amicable way.  
(2) The local remedies under the laws and regulations of one 
Contracting Party in the territory of which the investment has 
been made shall be available for the investors of the other 
Contracting Party on the basis of treatment no less favorable than 
that accorded to investments of its own investors or investors of 
any third State, whichever is more favorable to the investor.  
(3) If the dispute cannot be settled within six(6) months from the 
date on which the claim has been raised by either party, it shall be 
submitted upon request of the investor of the Contracting Party to 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) established by the Convention of the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States opened for signature in Washington on 
18 March 1965, or ICSID additional facility.  
(4) The award made by ICSID shall be final and binding on the 
parties to the dispute. Each Contracting Party shall ensure the 
recognition and enforcement of the award in accordance with its 
relevant laws and regulations. 
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Legislative Decree No. 662 – 
Approving the Juridical 
Stability System for Foreign 
Investment (September 2, 
1991). 
 
Article 1 - General Investment 
Promotion and Guarantees. 
 
Article 2 - National Treatment 
Standard and Non-
Discrimination Provision. 
 
Article 3 - Automatic 
Authorization of Foreign 
Investment.  
 
Article 5 - Intellectual & 
Industrial Property Rights for 
Foreign Investors. 
 
Article 6 - Right to Import & 
Export.  
 
Article 7 - Right to Transfer. 
 
Article 8 - Right to Acquire 
Shares and Other Property 
Interests.  
 
Article 9 - Right to Utilize 
Foreign Exchange. 
 
Articles 10 - 18 - Provisions 
Related to Providing Stability 
for Foreign Investments. 
 
Article 31 - Abolishment of 
Laws Previously Restricting 
Foreign Investment.  
 Agreement Between Japan 
and the Republic of Peru 
for the Promotion, 
Protection and 
Liberalisation of 
Investment.  
 
Article 3 - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 4 - Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment Standard.  
 
Article 5(1) - International 
Minimum Standard of 
Treatment.  
 
Article 5(2) - Fair & 
Equitable Treatment 
Standard and Full Protection 
& Security. 
 
Article 9 - Transparency. 
 
Article 13 - Protection 
Against Expropriation.  
Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the 
Promotion, Protection and Liberalisation of Investment.  
 
Article 18. Settlement of Investment Disputes between a 
Contracting Party and an Investor of the Other Contracting 
Party 
1. For the purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a 
dispute between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other 
Contracting Party that has incurred loss or damage by reason of, 
or arising out of, an alleged breach of any obligation under this 
Agreement with respect to the investor of that other Contracting 
Party or its investments in the Area of the former Contracting 
Party. 
2. Nothing in this Article shall be construed so as to prevent an 
investor who is a party to an investment dispute (hereinafter 
referred to in this Article as “disputing investor”) from seeking 
administrative or judicial settlement within the Area of the 
Contracting Party that is a party to the investment dispute 
(hereinafter referred to in this Article as “disputing Party”). 
However, in the event that the disputing investor has submitted 
the investment dispute for resolution under one of the 
international conciliations or arbitrations referred to in paragraph 
4, the same investment dispute shall not be submitted for 
resolution under courts of justice, administrative tribunals or 
agencies or any other binding dispute settlement mechanism 
established under the national law. 
3. An investment dispute shall, as far as possible, be settled 
amicably through consultation or negotiation between the 
disputing investor and the disputing Party (hereinafter referred to 
in this Article as “the disputing parties”). 
4. If the investment dispute cannot be settled through such 
consultation or negotiation within six months from the date on 
which the disputing investor requested for the consultation or 
negotiation in writing and if the disputing investor has not 
submitted the investment dispute for resolution under courts of 
justice, administrative tribunals or agencies or any other binding 
dispute settlement mechanism established under the national law, 
if any, the disputing investor may submit the investment dispute to 
one of the following international conciliations or arbitrations: 
(a) conciliation or arbitration in accordance with the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965 
(hereinafter referred to in this Article as “ICSID Convention”), so 
long as the ICSID Convention is in force between the Contracting 
Parties; 
(b) conciliation or arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules 
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
so long as the ICSID Convention is not in force between the 
  
EAST\64724221.3 460 
Contracting Parties; 
(c) arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law; and 
(d) if agreed with the disputing Party, any arbitration in 
accordance with other arbitration rules. 
5. The applicable arbitration rules shall govern the arbitration set 
forth in paragraph 4 except to the extent modified in this Article. 
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Law for the Promotion of 
Foreign Investment (Law No. 
344) (May 24, 2000). 
 
Overview from 
ProNicaragua.org 
Law No. 344 provides: a) equal 
treatment of foreign and 
domestic investment; b) 
eliminates restrictions on the 
way in which foreign capital 
can enter the country, and c) 
recognizes the foreign 
investor’s right to own and use 
property without limitation, and 
in the case of a declaration of 
eminent domain, to receive 
proper indemnification. The 
law makes no distinction 
between acquisition, merger, 
takeover, or green-field 
investment. There are no 
restrictions in Nicaragua on 
converting or transferring funds 
associated with investments. 
Remittances of investment 
capital, earnings, loan 
repayments and lease 
repayments are freely allowed 
through the private foreign 
exchange market operated by 
local financial institutions. 
 
There is no pre-established 
minimum or maximum 
investing amount and 100% 
international ownership 
permitted. There is no 
discrimination against foreign
investors, whether it be on total 
ownership of the company or as 
shareholders. 
 
National loans are accessible 
through local banks, according 
to their terms of approval. The 
law provides property 
protection and security as well 
Mediation and Arbitration Law (Law 
no. 540) 
 
 
Overview from ProNicaragua.org 
 
The Law governs two methods alternate 
to the judicial process (Mediation and 
Arbitration) to expeditiously solve any 
dispute resulting from contractual 
relations. 
 
Can be used by both national and 
foreign investors, and by the State of 
Nicaragua to 
resolve differences on property and 
non-property assets. 
 
Applies both nationally and 
internationally, without detriment to the 
treaties, Conventions, covenant or any 
other instrument of International Law 
subscribed by Nicaragua. 
Agreement between the 
Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the 
Republic of Nicaragua for 
the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments.
 
Article 2(1) - Promotion of 
Investment.  
 
Article 3(1) - National 
Treatment Standard. 
 
Article 3(1) - Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Standard.   
 
Article 5 - Protection 
Against Expropriation.  
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
the Republic of Nicaragua for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments. 
 
Article 8. Reference to International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes 
(1) Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit to the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Centre”) for settlement by 
conciliation or arbitration under the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States opened for signature at Washington on 18 March 19651 
any legal dispute arising between that Contracting Party and a 
national or company of the other Contracting Party concerning an 
investment of the latter in the territory of the former. 
(2) A company which is incorporated or constituted under the law 
in force in the territory of one Contracting Party and in which 
before such a dispute arises the majority of shares are owned by 
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party shall in 
accordance with Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention be treated for 
the purposes of that Convention as a company of the other 
Contracting Party. 
(3) If any such dispute should arise and agreement cannot be 
reached within three months between the parties to this dispute 
through pursuit of local remedies or otherwise, then, if the 
national or company affected also consents in writing to submit 
the dispute to the Centre for settlement by conciliation or 
arbitration under the Convention, either party may institute 
proceedings by addressing a request  to that effect to the 
Secretary-General of the Centre as provided in Articles 28 and 36 
of the Convention. In the event of disagreement as to whether 
conciliation or arbitration is the more appropriate procedure the 
national or company affected shall have the right to choose. The 
Contracting Party which is a party to the dispute shall not raise as 
an objection at any stage of the proceedings or enforcement of an 
award the fact that the national or company which is the other 
party to the dispute has received in pursuance of an insurance 
contract an indemnity in respect of some or all of his or its losses. 
(4) Neither Contracting Party shall pursue through the diplomatic 
channel any dispute referred to the Centre unless: 
(a) the Secretary-General of the Centre, or a conciliation 
commission or an arbitral tribunal constituted by it, decides that 
the 
dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre; or 
(b) the other Contracting Party should fail to abide by or to 
comply with an award rendered by an arbitral tribunal. 
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as equal treatment for foreign 
and local investors. 
 
